The tradition of absolute power runs deep in Russia's history, tracing back to Muscovite rulers like Ivan the Terrible and even earlier. In this system, a czar holds complete authority over all subjects, treating them as possessions regardless of their social status – whether nobles with recognized rights or serfs with limited freedoms. The ruler retains the authority to bestow official positions or property as he pleases, without temporal restrictions. The ruler's “jurisdiction” extends to the appropriation of his subjects' possessions, freedoms, and even lives, at his sole discretion and timing. Concepts like the Magna Carta and Habeas Corpus remain foreign to Russia, up to the present day.
The FSB, a successor to the KGB, intricately blurred the lines between the state and the criminal underworld. Yevgeniy Prigozhin, a convicted criminal, has been a recurring figure in Vladimir Putin's realm since the tumultuous 1990s. Back then, Putin, serving as an aide to the mayor of St. Petersburg, was involved in a web of corrupt dealings and more serious transgressions. After consolidating his power and dismantling the oligarchic circle around "retired" President Boris Yeltsin, Putin assumed dominion over virtually all facets of Russia—its assets, entities, and populace.
Dissenters found themselves met with a choice between assassination, incarceration, or banishment from the Russian landscape. From that juncture, the so-called oligarchs were granted the liberty to misappropriate and squander resources, exercising unrestrained control. However, they had to satisfy the actual proprietor through bribes—whether channeling funds towards his caprices at the Gelendzhik palace or endowing various opulent superyachts. Moreover, they were mandated to fund a spectrum of intelligence operations and exert influence campaigns abroad on behalf of the Kremlin. It's important to highlight that they never held control over Putin's decisions, which excludes them from being classified as genuine oligarchs..
The so-called Wagner Private Military Company (bearing in mind that formal mercenary endeavors are proscribed within Russia) has functioned as a valuable instrument for the Kremlin, offering a shroud of plausible deniability. Prigozhin evolved into a well-established operator in Africa with some 5,000 mercenary forces deployed across the continent. A sophisticated network of companies established and run by Yevgeniy Prigozhin generated profit from the mercenary business serving various regimes. This endeavor not only yielded financial gains but also facilitated access to coveted resources encompassing precious minerals such as gold and diamonds, as well as fossil fuels like oil and gas.
Parallel to the inflow of untraceable financial resources, the operations conducted by the Wagner PMC bolstered the Kremlin's capacity to wield influence beyond its apparent heft, in the competitive arena of African influence vis-à-vis more resource-abundant entities from the free world and China. Before the extensive involvement in Ukraine, the Wagner PMC had already gained infamy due to its involvement in war crimes in Africa and Syria.
While the Wagner PMC momentarily captured headlines with its audacious march towards Moscow during in June, the Kremlin's propaganda machine skillfully revealed that the company's autonomy was less substantial than it seemed. Notably, the company received significant military contracts totaling $2 billion between May 2022 and 2023. Concurrently, a sophisticated propaganda network associated with Wagner, including entities like the Internet Research Agency (previously implicated in U.S. electoral interference), secured an astonishing $20 billion in government contracts.
The Kremlin discarded its facade of plausible deniability by orchestrating the destruction of a civilian aircraft carrying the chieftain and his key subordinates. In doing so, the Kremlin effectively eliminated former collaborators and operatives who had displayed disloyalty. It's worth noting that Yevgeniy Prigozhin was destined for doom even without the staged mutiny, a fate shared by numerous other figures who fought in Ukraine since 2014, often portrayed in propaganda as local "miners and tractor drivers" in the so-called civil war narrative.
Speculation has arisen regarding Yevgeniy Prigozhin's rumored possession of a collection of Kompromat, potentially containing compromising information about Vladimir Putin and other senior regime figures. This alleged leverage was reportedly intended for release in case of Prigozhin's untimely demise. Some of his mercenary forces, motivated by loyalty, issued threats to retaliate against those deemed responsible (Vladimir Putin and/or military leadership) for the assassination of their revered chieftain.
The Russian Volunteer Corps, a military unit operating within the Ukrainian Armed Forces, extended an invitation to Wagner PMC members who had refrained from participating in war crimes during their time in Ukraine—although such instances appeared quite rare. The offer was for them to join their ranks and confront Putin and the Russian military.
Those Russians, often holding fascist and imperialistic views, who are now setting up improvised memorials for Yevgeniy Prigozhin in various Russian cities or engaged in the war have learned that the next mutiny or coup d'état must result in Vladimir Putin's demise. He, they argue, bears responsibility for the catastrophic war in Ukraine, having breached agreements with Prigozhin. However, the feasibility of these threats remains questionable, as the Wagnerites were disarmed (heavy armaments and artillery), bereft of significant resources, and severed from their influential leader's connections within both the ruling hierarchy and criminal circles.
While their capabilities remain restricted, it's conceivable that dissatisfied individuals could become involved in future insurrections, especially if a coup d'état orchestrated by elements within the regime occurs, or if Russian forces experience a collapse in Ukraine leading to internal turmoil. However, these individuals might also become targets of mid and low-tier purges following actions by higher echelons of power. Russia's non-democratic framework impedes crisis resolution through elections, and Putin's inability for criminal-like dealings within the elite was starkly demonstrated as unviable. Putin doesn't obey either formal agreements or his words, which is also a lesson for the Western partners willing to find a diplomatic solution to the "Ukrainian war."
The Russian military has lost a formidable and highly effective (within Russian context) fighting force, bolstered by considerable resources. The legacy of the Wagner enterprise is now being taken up by both established and emerging loyalists. It wouldn't be surprise if figures like Viktor Bout, dubbed the "Merchant of Death," are positioned to secure substantial African assets—his conspicuous presence at the recent Russia-Africa summit lends credence to this prospect. Nevertheless, it's unlikely that Putin will repeat the mistake of allowing an individual or faction to amass resources that could potentially threaten his personal authority.
Wagner's striking ability to achieve outcomes that the conventional Armed Forces struggled with highlights the clear inefficiencies of the existing governance model. Putin, invested billions into his war apparatus and attempted reforms on multiple occasions, obsessively cultivating an image of Russia as a potent state fortified by a formidable military. Yet, the mutiny's occurrence and its resolution exposed the limitations of Putin's authority, eroding his portrayal as an invincible strongman—an element pivotal within Russian political culture.
The public's support for the Wagnerites and the popularity of figures like Yevgeniy Prigozhin reveal the deep-rooted discontent prevailing within society. Escalating internal contradictions coupled with the progressively evident catastrophe triggered by the ongoing war foreshadow a monumental upheaval, unparalleled in recent Russian history. This convulsion might be catalyzed by domestic triggers or, more likely, by the inevitable successes of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Though more robust and swift support from the West to Ukraine has been dragged back by the fear of Russia’s collapse, it’s highly likely to came about. It’s better for Ukraine and its partners to turn to contingency planning.
