Relatório completo sobre a guerra na Ucrânia – o nome correto é guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a Ucrânia – feito pelo CDS, da Ucrânia, confiável e não governamental.
Centre for Defence Strategies (CDS) is a Ukrainian security think tank.
On the Northern Slobozhansky Direction, Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka, Kindrativka, Andriivka, Yunakivka, and Yablunivka.
On the Southern Slobozhansky direction, Russian forces attacked near Vovchansk, Starytsia, Lyman, Dekhtyarnе, Ambarne, Dovhenke, Dvorichanske, toward Izbytske and Obukhivka.
On the Kupyansk direction, the enemy “Zapad (West)” Operational Grouping is making efforts to restore its position in Kupyansk. Additional units of the 47th Tank Division of the 1st Tank Army are redeploying to the extreme right flank of the operational zone of the Operational Grouping (near Kupyansk) to reinforce the 27th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade of the army, which is already advancing toward Kupyansk. The 121st and 122nd Motorized Rifle Regiments of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division of the 6th Combined Arms Army are unable to unblock the remnants of their assault groups encircled in Kupyansk due to significant losses in forward assault units.
On the Lyman direction, Russian forces attacked near Drobysheve, Novoselivka, Korovyi Yar, Oleksandrivka, Zarichne, and Yampil, toward Sosnove and Stavky.
On the Sloviansk Direction, Russian forces attacked near Dronivka, Platonivka, and Serebrianka, toward Riznykivka.
On the Kostyantynivka direction, the enemy “Bakhmut” Tactical Grouping (forces of the 3rd Army Corps, the 77th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 7th Military Base of the 49th Combined Arms Army) attempts to secure positions on the southeastern outskirts of Kostyantynivka. The 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 3rd Army Corps is breaking through toward Kostyantynivka from the direction of Bila Hora, while the 6th Motorized Rifle Division of the corps is advancing from the direction of Predtechyne along the Kostyantynivka–Bakhmut road with the objective of reaching the eastern outskirts of Kostyantynivka along a broad front.
On the Pokrovsk direction, Russian forces attacked near Nove Shakhove, near and within Pokrovsk, near Hryshyne, Rodynske, Sukhetske, Chervonyi Lyman, near and within Myrnohrad and Rivne, near Kotlyne and Molodetske.
On the Oleksandrivka direction, Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka, Filiya, Yalta, Andriivka-Klevtsove, Oleksandrohrad, Sichneve, and Vyshneve.
On the Huliaypole direction, Russian forces attacked toward Ternuvate, Zalizne, Staroukrainka, near Huliaypole, Danylivka, Dobropillya, Solodke, Rybne, Pryvillya, Zlahoda, and Dorozhanka.
On the Orikhiv direction, the situation for Ukrainian Defense Forces is deteriorating. The enemy bypassed Stepnohirsk from the west along the road toward Hryhorivka and to the east of it along the road toward Lukyanivske. Ukrainian Defense Forces will be forced in the near term to fully withdraw from the Stepnohirsk area. Despite significant losses in assault units, the 19th Motorized Rifle Division of the 58th Combined Arms Army and the 108th and 247th Air Assault Regiments of the 7th Air Assault Division continue assault actions toward Prymorske–Richne and on both flanks of Stepnohirsk. In the Prymorske area, the enemy reached the defensive line of the 128th Separate Mountain Assault Brigade of the 17th Army Corps of Ukrainian Defense Forces along the Konka River, but most likely intends to significantly expand it from the delta of this river to Komyshuvakha within the offensive zone of the 58th Combined Arms Army.
General conclusion:
On the Kostyantynivka direction, the enemy has only managed to break through with individual assault groups into the southeastern part of Kostyantynivka, in the area between Ostrovskyi Street and the City-Drive-2019 service station. At the same time, the enemy is forced to continue fighting to secure positions in Predtechyne and Oleksandro-Shultyne.
In the near term, the command of the enemy “Bakhmut” Tactical Grouping intends, following the Pokrovsk model, to commit a significant number of infantry groups for their subsequent infiltration into areas of dense urban development in Kostyantynivka with massed UAV support. Prior to the start of large-scale infiltration, the enemy will attempt to significantly complicate the logistics support of Ukrainian units defending within the city itself. The enemy command intends to organize effective air cover (reconnaissance, fire engagement, logistics support) in the tactical zone of action of its small infantry groups during their operations within the city by building up forces and means whose personnel have significant experience in the employment of UAVs.
The command of the Defense Forces of Southern Ukraine is countering the flanking envelopment of the entire Orikhiv defensive area of the 17th Army Corps of Ukrainian Defense Forces from the west, from the Stepnohirsk direction, on the right flank of the enemy “Dnepr” Operational Grouping, and from the east, from the Huliaypole direction, in the operational zone of the “Vostok (East)” Operational Grouping. The enemy command slowly but consistently implements this concept.
Supporting operation:
The Unmanned Systems Forces struck the Novokuibyshevsk Oil Refinery of PJSC NK Rosneft in Samara Oblast and the Almetyevskaya oil preparation facility in the Russian Republic of Tatarstan.
Change in the line of contact (LoC), directions of attacks and counterattacks:
There were 98 combat engagements on various fronts.
On the Southern Slobozhansky and Kursk directions, the enemy attacked the positions of Ukrainian Defense Forces three times in the areas of Vovchansk and Starytsia.
On the Lyman direction, the enemy attacked 15 times, attempting to wedge into the Ukrainian defense in the areas of Novovodyane, Myrne, Kolodyazi, Zarichne, Novoyehorivka, Novoselivka, and Yampil.
On the Sloviansk direction, Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled 2 Russian offensive actions in the areas of Siversk and Sakko i Vantsetti.
On the Kostyantynivka direction, the enemy carried out 15 attacks in the areas of Oleksandro-Shultyne, Pleshchiivka, Rusyn Yar, Yablunivka, Shcherbynivka, and toward Torske.
On the Pokrovsk direction, 23 assault actions by the aggressor were stopped in the areas of Nove Shakhove, Rodynske, Chervonyi Lyman, Pokrovsk, Kotlyne, Udachne, Molodetske, and toward Novopavlivka.
On the Oleksandrivka direction, the enemy carried out 12 attacks in the areas of Zelenyi Hai, Oleksandrohrad, Vorone, Verbove, Vyshneve, and Rybne.
On the Huliaypole Direction, 14 enemy attempts to advance were stopped in the areas of Solodke, Huliaypole, and toward Zelenе.
On the Orikhiv direction, the invader attacked twice toward Prymorske.
On the Prydniprovske direction, Ukrainian units repelled 2 Russian attacks toward the Antonivskyi Bridge.
Changes in the enemy disposition:
Prior to the New Year, the arrival of at least two groups of UAV operators from the 16th Separate SOF Brigade (6–7 servicemen each) was recorded in the area southeast and east of Kostyantynivka, into the offensive zone of the 3rd Army Corps.
Possible operation situation developments:
On the Southern Slobozhanske Direction, the enemy will attempt to capture Vovchansk, attempt to break through in the area of Tsehelne toward the Vovchansk–Staryi Saltiv road and the highway to Rubizhne with the forces of a tactical grouping (elements of the 6th Combined Arms Army, the 11th and the 44th Army Corps). These actions will slow the enemy’s advance along the eastern bank of the Siverskyi Donets to Bilyi Kolodyaz, Verkhnya Pysarivka and Buhayivka.
On the Kupyansk Direction, the enemy will hold its bridgehead in the Dvorichna and simultaneously will develop an offensive by the 47th Tank Division of the 1st Tank Army east of the city. The troops of the 6th Combined Arms Army will envelop the defense area of the 16th Army Corps of Ukrainian Defense Forces near Kolodyazne, will attack in the Milove – Ambarne and Krasne Pershe – Novovasylivka Directions, and will break through in the Dvorichna – Ridkodub Direction.
The defeat of the enemy “Zapad (West)” Operational Grouping in Kupyansk complicates and delays the seizure of the Sloviansk–Kramatorsk agglomeration. The successes of Ukrainian Defense Forces on the Kupyansk Direction will not allow Russian forces to exploit the advance of the troops of the 25th Combined Arms Army near Lyman and the 3rd Combined Arms Army near Siversk, thereby slowing the movement toward Sloviansk. Enemy forces will need to force the Siverskyi Donets River in the Lyman Direction to reach Sloviansk and secure their flanks against a possible counterstrike by Ukrainian Defense Forces from the Izium area. Russian forces are unable to develop an offensive toward Sloviansk from the Siversk Direction, as they do not have a sufficient number of troops there to conduct a frontal assault on the city.
On the Lyman Direction, the enemy’s 20th Combined Arms Army will attempt to seize the Yarova – Novoselivka – Drobysheve – Pryshyb area and block the Lyman – Izium logistics route along the northern bank of the Siverskyi Donets River. The 25th Combined Arms Army will continue its offensive east and southeast of Lyman in order to reach the Dibrova – Ozerne line and create a favorable initial position for an assault on Lyman from the south and southeast and will attempt to seize Zakitne and consolidate on the dominant heights. In addition, through actions on this Direction, the enemy seeks to support the 3rd Combined Arms Army, which is advancing toward Sloviansk along the southern bank of the Siverskyi Donets River. The troops of the 20th and 25th Combined Arms Armies will advance north and east of Lyman with the aim of isolating the defense area of the 3rd Army Corps of the Ukrainian Defense Forces around the city from the north and northwest, in order to reach the Siverskyi Donets River south of the city on the Raihorodok – Zakitne section.
By maintaining control of a bridgehead on the Siverskyi Donets river, 3rd Army Corps of the Ukrainian Defense Forces will make it much more challenging for the enemy to launch an offensive towards Sloviansk from this direction.
On the Sloviansk Direction, the 3rd Combined Arms Army will attempt to break through from the Dronivka – Siversk line to the Zakitne – Riznykivka – Kalenyky – Kryva Luka area, facilitating the offensive on Lyman by the troops of the 25th Combined Arms Army. The advance of the 3rd Combined Arms Army along the southern bank of the Siverskyi Donets River in a westward direction will allow the command of the enemy “Zapad (West)” Operational Grouping not only to concentrate the main forces of the 20th and 25th Combined Arms Armies for the assault on Lyman without diverting them to block Defense Forces positions along the river, but also to ensure maneuver by troops within the zones of the 3rd, 20th, and 25th Combined Arms Armies across the Siverskyi Donets River outside the fire influence of Ukrainian Defense Forces.
Ukrainian Defense Forces will seek opportunities to slow the enemy advance along the southern bank of the Siverskyi Donets River toward Raihorodok and Sloviansk.
On the Kostyantynivka Direction, the enemy command will attempt to conduct a deep envelopment of Kostyantynivka from the north, east, and southeast and to break through from the southwest to the near approaches to Druzhkivka, that is, to enter the deep rear of the 19th Army Corps of Ukrainian Defense Forces defending in Kostyantynivka and to its south and southwest. Enemy troops will advance in the general direction of Volodymyrivka – Rayske to reach the near approaches to Druzhkivka and will attempt to break through from the east and northeast to the Bilokuzmynivka – Virolyubivka – Izhevka – Kurtivka area. Simultaneously, the enemy will conduct a frontal offensive within the defense zone of the 12th Azov Special Purpose Brigade of the National Guard of Ukraine. The troops of the enemy’s 3rd Army Corps will advance to the Novodmytrivka – Chervone line, collapsing the defense of the 24th Separate Mechanized Brigade of the 11th Army Corps of Ukrainian Defense Forces in Chasiv Yar by an offensive from the south. The aggressor will attack along both banks of the Kazennyi Torets River in the Sofiivka area, attempt to seize the village, and advance toward Novopavlivka and Torske. In the offensive zone of the 8th Combined Arms Army, the enemy will advance in the general direction of Volodymyrivka – Sofiivka.
The Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad defense area of the 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces of Ukrainian Defense Forces will be seized by the enemy by the end of January 2026. By capturing Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, the enemy gains the chance to launch an offensive toward Dobropillya and potentially break through rapidly, with the 2nd Combined Arms Army advancing from Pokrovsk and the 51st Combined Arms Army moving from the bridgehead on the Kazennyi Torets River. The command of the enemy “Tsentr (Center)” Operational Grouping will not be able to bypass/encircle the defense area of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from the flanks, as the Defense Forces firmly hold the Vilne – Novyi Donbas line, leaving only a frontal offensive on Dobropillya, which will entail enormous losses.
On the Oleksandrivka and Huliaypole Directions, the enemy’s “Vostok (East)” Operational Grouping will attempt to envelop the Huliaypole defensive area of Ukrainian Defense Forces from the north, block its main lines of communication, reach the Huliaypole–Pokrovske road on the Dobropillya–Varvarivka section, reach the Khaychur River, force it in the Danylivka–Dobropillya area, and encircle Huliaypole from the northwest. Forces of the 36th Combined Arms Army and elements of the right flank of the 5th Combined Arms Army will attempt to break through toward Pokrovske from the southeast.
On the Orikhiv Direction, the enemy will try to break through toward Novomykolayivka to bypass the Orikhiv defensive area of Ukrainian Defense Forces from the north. The enemy “Vostok (East)” Operational Grouping will attempt to collapse the defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine southeast of Zaporizhzhia and break through to its near approaches, advancing along the Donetsk–Zaporizhzhia highway. Simultaneously, acting from the south, the enemy’s “Dnepr” Operational Grouping will attempt to break through from the Plavni–Kamianske line along the left bank of the Dnipro River toward Stepnohirsk, and from the Stepove–Mali Shcherbaky line in the northern direction with the aim of reaching the near approaches to the city of Zaporizhzhia.
On the Prydniprovske direction, the command of the enemy’s “Dnepr” Operational Grouping will continue trying to take control of most of the island zone in the Dnipro delta in the direction of Kherson, will try to create a tactical bridgehead on the right bank, and to eliminate the tactical bridgeheads of the 30th Marine Corps of Ukrainian Defense Forces in the area of the automobile and railway bridges near Antonivka.
Russian operational losses from 24.02.22 to 02.01.26
Personnel - almost 1,209 880 (+910);
Tanks – 11,494 (+6);
Armored combat vehicles ‒ 23,851 (+2);
Artillery systems – 35,720 (+42);
Multiple rocket launchers (MLRS) – 1,589 (+2);
Anti-aircraft warfare systems – 1,267 (+1);
Vehicles and fuel tanks – 72,587 (+169);
Aircraft - 434 (0);
Helicopters – 347 (0);
UAV operational and tactical level – 99,043 (+590);
Intercepted cruise and other missiles – 4,137 (+1);
Boats/ships – 30 (0).
Humanitarian + general:
During the night of 2 January, Russian forces attacked Ukraine with 116 strike UAVs of the Shahed, Gerbera types, and other UAVs. According to the Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as of 08:30 air defense forces managed to shoot down or suppress 86 enemy UAVs, about 70 of which were Shaheds. At the same time, impacts by 27 strike UAVs were recorded at 23 locations, and debris falls were recorded at two locations; as of the morning, the enemy attack was still ongoing.
On the night of 2 January 2026, Russian invaders struck energy infrastructure in Zaporizhzhia Oblast and Mykolaiv Oblast. As of the morning, power outages were recorded for consumers in the city of Zaporizhzhia and in frontline areas. According to the Ministry of Energy, restoration work is currently ongoing in Odesa Oblast and Kyiv Oblast at facilities damaged during previous attacks; in particular, in Odesa Oblast more than 11,000 households remain without electricity.
During the night and morning, Russian occupiers attacked Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, injuring two people in the Synelnykove area. According to Acting Head of the Oblast Military Administration Vladyslav Haivanenko, enemy UAVs struck the Slovianska, Bohynivska, and Vasylkivska communities, causing fires in a garage and a summer kitchen and damaging a private house, a lyceum, and a sports hall. In addition, due to a UAV attack in Kryvyi Rih, damage to vehicles was recorded, while the enemy attacked Nikopol using FPV drones.
At around 21:30 on 1 January, the Russian army attacked two people with a drone in the Dniprovskyi District of Kherson. As a result of the dropping of explosives, a 40-year-old woman and a 52-year-old man sustained blast injuries and shrapnel wounds to their legs and were taken to hospital.
At around 22:00 on 1 January, Russian occupiers attacked an emergency medical team with a drone as it arrived on a call to the wounded in the Dniprovskyi District of Kherson. As a result of an explosive drop from a UAV, an ambulance was damaged and a 70-year-old driver was injured, sustaining a mine-blast injury, a closed traumatic brain injury, and concussion. The man was hospitalized in moderate condition.
On the night of 2 January, Russian occupiers carried out one of the largest strike-drone attacks on Zaporizhzhia, hitting residential buildings, premises of a shopping center, and civilian infrastructure facilities. As reported by Prime Minister Yuliia Svyrydenko, significant damage was recorded as a result of the strikes; however, fortunately, there were no fatalities or injuries. Among other targets, a JYSK store was hit by drones and guided aerial bombs, with the building damaged and goods destroyed.
During the day on 2 January, Russian forces launched a strike with two missiles against residential development in the central part of Kharkiv, hitting a multi-story building in the Kyivskyi District. As a result of the attack, one of the buildings sustained significant destruction, and a rescue operation was deployed at the impact site. As of 15:30, it was known that 19 people had sought medical assistance; the number of injured may be уточнено during debris removal. In the Kyivskyi and Shevchenkivskyi districts of Kharkiv, as of 19:00 on Friday, 2 January, damage to at least 27 buildings was recorded.
In the evening of 1 January, Russians repeatedly attacked Semenivka in Chernihiv Oblast with UAVs; after the strikes, a hospital was on fire.
Throughout the day on 2 January, Russian forces shelled with artillery and attacked with UAVs and FPV drones the Synelnykove and Nikopol districts of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; two people were injured, and civilian facilities were damaged.
During the first two days of 2026, Russian forces shelled the Kherson Combined Heat and Power Plant more than ten times, using artillery and drones. The plant cannot operate in its normal mode; damage assessment and repairs are carried out when the security situation allows. As reported by the Chairman of the Board of Naftogaz of Ukraine Serhii Koretskyi, only on the morning of 2 January four impacts were recorded on the facility’s territory during another attack.
The results of a KIIS study for May–December 2025 indicate that Ukrainians’ attitudes toward compromises depend on the specific wording of “territorial concessions”: 58% of respondents oppose official recognition of certain territories as part of the Russian Federation, while 25% expressed readiness for such a step. Even greater resistance is caused by the idea of transferring to Russian control territories currently controlled by Ukraine, with 66% of respondents rejecting this option. As for freezing the front line without official recognition of occupation, the number of supporters of such an approach increased to 39%, although half of respondents (50%) still categorically reject this scenario. Sociologists note that in all categories there is an increase in the share of those who were unable to decide on an opinion.
According to a KIIS survey conducted from 26 November to 29 December 2025, 74% of Ukrainians consider the Russian plan for ending the war to be absolutely unacceptable, while only 17% of respondents agree with its version of “peace.” By contrast, 69% of respondents are ready to approve the plan of Europe and Ukraine, with the share of those who “readily agree” with this option increasing from 18% to 30%. In regional terms, an overwhelming majority of residents of all oblasts (71–78%) reject Russian conditions that include restrictions on the Defense Forces and troop withdrawals, while 67–69% support Ukrainian-European proposals.
The Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine warns of the continuation of a Kremlin special operation aimed at disrupting peace negotiations mediated by the United States. For this purpose, a provocation with human casualties may occur on 6–7 January. According to the Foreign Intelligence Service, to falsify evidence of Ukraine’s involvement it is planned to use fragments of Western-made strike UAVs, which will be delivered to the site of the provocation from the line of combat contact.
Centre for Defence Strategies (CDS) is a Ukrainian security think tank. We operate since 2020. We publish this brief daily. If you would like to subscribe, please send us an email at cds.dailybrief@gmail.com
Please note, that we subscribe only verified persons and can decline or cancel the subscription at our own discretion
We are an independent, non-government, non-partisan, and non-profit organisation. More at www.defence.org.ua
Our Twitter (in English) - https://twitter.com/defence_centre Our Facebook (in Ukrainian) - https://www.facebook.com/cds.UA
Our brief is for information only and we verify our information to the best possible extent
This daily brief was created and maintained with the financial support of the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Centre for Defence Strategies and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.
