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Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida;

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quarta-feira, 23 de junho de 2021

Roger Moorhouse. Poland 1939: The Outbreak of World War II - Book review by Jesse Kauffman

Nenhuma referência ao acordo Ribentrop-Molotov, que permitiu a invasão da Polônia pela Alemanha nazista nesta resenha, mas o livro certamente trata da questão. A vergonha maior fica com a G-B e a França, que tinham promessas não cumpridas de ajudar a Polônia em caso de ataque.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

H-Diplo Review Essay 353- "Poland 1939"

by George Fujii

H-Diplo Review Essay 353

23 June 2021




Roger Moorhouse:  

Poland 1939: The Outbreak of World War II.  

New York:  Basic Books, 2020.  ISBN:  9780465095384 

(hardcover, $32.00).

https://hdiplo.org/to/E353


Editors: Thomas Maddux and Diane Labrosse | Production Editor: George Fujii

Review by Jesse Kauffman, Eastern Michigan University

Roger Moorhouse’s Poland 1939: The Outbreak of World War II is a vividly evocative and fluidly written account of the invasion that marked the beginning of the Second World War in Europe.  Like Moorhouse’s other works (such as Killing Hitler, about the assassination attempts on Hitler’s life),[1] Poland 1939 is aimed at educated general readers, and it seems to have found a wide and receptive audience among them, to judge by the hundreds of favorable readers’ reviews on websites like Amazon.com and Goodreads.  The book’s success has no doubt been helped by favorable reviews in publication such as the New York Times and The Telegraph, and its shortlisting for the Royal United Services Institute’s Duke of Wellington Medal for Military History.  ThatPoland 1939 will raise awareness outside of Poland of the brutality and viciousness of Nazi Germany’s invasion, as well as the fierce resistance mounted by the Polish armed forces, is to be welcomed.  But Poland 1939, while succeeding in dispelling some myths, unfortunately reinforces others at the same time.  

Poland 1939 is driven forward by two intertwined, but nonetheless distinct narratives—one charting the flurry of diplomatic activity that accompanied the outbreak of the war, the other chronicling the course of the invasion itself.  A key theme of the first narrative is the failure of France and Great Britain to live up to their commitments to aid Poland in the event of an attack.  Of the two, Moorhouse seems to find the behavior of the British more reprehensible.  He shows that when Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and the British government offered a guarantee of security to Poland in 1939, they do not seem to have seriously thought they would have to act on it.  Instead, it was an exercise in what might be called coercive diplomacy—hoping the threat of force would be enough to deter German aggression and settle things down.  Unfortunately, the Germans called their bluff.  Of course, no help was forthcoming for Poland, because Britain was not prepared to go to war, which the British government had well known.  That can perhaps be forgiven as part of a risky but reasonable gamble, but Moorhouse quite damningly shows that the British establishment was not particularly concerned about its inability to help its ally and had more or less written Poland off as lost from the time the first German troops crossed the frontier.

Moorhouse is not quite as hard on the French government, which does not seem fair.  To be sure, he does not let it off the hook, demonstrating that France, for many reasons, lacked the will to go to war with Germany.  But the French failure was much worse than Britain’s.  France had a long-standing formal alliance with Poland, dating back to 1921; had held military conferences between top-level commanders; had the largest army in Europe after the Soviet Union; and, most obviously, was better placed than Britain to respond immediately to German aggression.  Yet, aside from a half-hearted incursion into the Saarland, France did not act when Germany went to war.  Moorhouse’s account of the September 12 meeting of the Supreme War council, where Chamberlain, French Prime Minister Edouard Daladier and senior military commanders collectively shrugged off with little sense of the scale of the betrayal they were committing.  Quoting historian Anita Prazmowska, he notes that the conference was “a veritable orgy of mutual congratulation at not having succumbed to the temptation of attacking Germany” (153).  Franco-British shirking of their commitments to Poland had devastating consequences, and not only for that country.  Not only was Poland’s military strategy built entirely around the idea that the allies would immediately come to its aid; the Nazi regime could almost certainly not have survived a full-scale incursion by the French while it was still engaged in operations in Poland. 

Those operations themselves are the subject of the second narrative thread.  Moorhouse is a fine writer of military history, and he grippingly chronicles the maneuvers and battles (against both the Germans and the Soviets) that raged from the ‘Polish Corridor’ to Lwow.  These sections of the book are particularly focused on dispelling myths.  Most importantly, Moorhouse wants to crush the lingering perception that the Germans simply steamrollered over a bungling, backward, manifestly inferior enemy.  In this he succeeds.  The Poles, he shows, fought hard and well (the initial German attack on Westerplatte, for example, was actually a failure, and ended up dragging on for days and costing the Germans quite a few casualties. The first ground assault on the Polish positions, for example, which immediately followed a heavy bombardment by the battleship Schleswig-Holstein, completely failed and cost the German invaders 13 dead and 58 wounded; a second ground assault mounted shortly thereafter also failed and resulted in the death of the ground forces’ commanding officer.  In comparison, only two Polish soldiers were killed in that first day of fighting (13-16).  Ultimately, however, he argues that Poland was doomed by the fact that it simply did not have the economic means needed to build an army that was mechanized to the degree that Germany’s was.  Moorhouse also addresses the lingering myth, created largely by German propaganda, that Polish cavalrymen charged German tanks with their horses.  Moorhouse notes that all armies still had a cavalry arm in 1939, though Poland’s was larger than most and had retained more of its traditional prestige.  According to the reigning doctrine in 1939, Polish cavalry were meant to fight as mobile infantry, rapidly maneuvering before getting of their horses to engage enemy soldiers.  This was not entirely unreasonable, given that most German soldiers in 1939, as most soldiers everywhere at that time, still got where they were going as Napoleon’s and Caesar’s did: by walking.  And in fact, there were instances when cavalry attacks against infantry were successful.  However, the Polish cavalry, like the Polish infantry, proved unable to withstand not only Germany’s tanks, but also the coordinated artillery and air support that would eventually become the heart of ‘Blitzkrieg.’

Moorhouse makes excellent use of sources, both published (such as the memoirs of soldiers and commanders) and archival (such eyewitness accounts of civilians preserved in Polish and British archives).  He is very good at blending, in nearly every paragraph, a ‘macro’ view with perceptions of those caught up in the events unfolding at the highest diplomatic and military levels.  Describing, for example, the German drive on Warsaw, he provides firsthand testimony from a Polish general, describing what it was like to be driven back by the Germans while trying to shelter in the Kampinos forest.  “I have never been through anything like that,” he noted.  “It’s a nightmare.  Hundreds killed and wounded, incessant fire, panic-stricken troops running in all directions without a purpose, always under enemy bombs.  I don’t know how I got out of that hell.” (184)  In another, exceptionally well-chosen juxtaposition, Moorhouse notes that not long after Chamberlain bluntly told the U.S. ambassador that nothing could be done for Poland, a ten-year-old Polish girl was writing in her diary that

I shall have to learn English because I know only one word ‘Goodbye,’ and that’s hardly enough to carry on a conversation with English soldiers.  Papa said that in three or four weeks they’ll be here. When they come, I should like to thank them for helping us to beat Hitler but if I haven’t learnt sufficient English to say so, I’ll just have to hug them and they’ll know what I mean” (101).

Occasionally, however, the quoted material is not as effective.  When Moorhouse describes the Germans closing in on Warsaw, he quotes a diarist who noted that “The Germans are attempting to surround Warsaw.” After all of the exceptionally powerful quotations, ones such as this land with a thud (182). 

Moorhouse’s book places strong emphasis on the nature of the brutalities inflicted on Poland in 1939, particularly by the Nazis.  He provides harrowing descriptions of, for example, the vicious treatment meted out by guards upon new arrivals to the concentration camp at Stutthof set up at the very beginning of the invasion; of a Varsovian woman  who could only listen on in despair and horror as the city’s German conquerers dragged her husband out of their apartment and shot him; of Polish civilians and military prisoners being executed by firing squad; of the creation of special SS units to roam around and exterminate those the Nazis saw as a threat to its new order, including Polish intellectuals. Driving much or all of this Moorhouse argues (correctly, in my view) was the Nazi view of the Poles as an inferior race, not worthy of the restraints that might be placed on conduct towards those deemed high up the racial hierarchy. 

While Moorhouse ably documents what might be called the ‘ugly underbelly’ of the conventional conflict, certain topics are sanitized.  Poland 1939 is written in the heroic mode, and the book is full of stories of Polish bravery and gallantry.[2] This is fair enough as far as it goes, but this idealized vision leads to some distortions or omissions.  An important one is the nature of the atrocities that occurred in the so-called Polish corridor.  What is not in dispute is that in 1939, Polish civilians and the Polish army killed German civilians, and the German army killed Polish civilians.  Nonetheless, many of the specifics of these atrocities—how and when they were sparked, for example—is a matter of much debate and uncertainty.  In the book’s depiction of these events, when the Polish army entered the homes and apartments of German civilians and then dragged them off to be shot, they were justly punishing scheming, traitorous German civilians who had launched a partisan war behind the lines.  No doubt some Polish-German civilians were guilty of this; but not all of them, and Moorhouse’s presentation of these events borders on propaganda. 

Another important omission concerns Poland’s Jews.  Moorhouse notes that when the Soviets invaded Poland from the east on September 17, they were, in some places, welcomed by the Jews.  This is an explosive topic: accusations of ‘Judeo-Bolshevism’ were used to justify atrocities against innocent Jews by Poles just as by Nazis.  In addition, aside from one very brief mention, Moorhouse does not explain that interwar Poland was a hotbed of virulent anti-semitism, as Paul Brykczynski has illustrated in his prizewinning book Primed for Violence.[3] Indeed, the distinguished historian of Central Europe William Hagen has gone as far as to provocatively argue that the Poles in the 1930s were well on the way to committing their own Holocaust.  A better sense of this context might provide some explanation for why some Jews were not unhappy to see the Red army arrive.

These are rather serious reservations.  Nonetheless, if more readers outside of Poland learn about what happened there in 1939, this book will have served a useful purpose.  I will almost certainly assign it to my undergraduate students, although with a lengthy list of caveats. 

 

Jesse Kauffman Ph.D., is Professor of History at Eastern Michigan University. His first book was Elusive Alliance: The German Occupation of Poland in World War 1 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015).  He is currently writing a survey of the First World War’s Eastern Front, to be published by Harvard University Press in 2023.


Notes

[1] Roger Moorhouse, Killing Hitler: The Plots, the Assassins, and the Dictator Who Cheated Death (New York: Bantam, 2007).

[2] In this it is reminiscent of the work of Norman Davies, the British historian noted for his intense emotional attachment to Poland and its history.  Among his many publications is the two volume God’s Playground: A History of Poland (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), which, for many years, was the indispensable English-language survey of Polish history.  This family resemblance is not surprising, since Moorhouse collaborated on and co-authored a book with him Microcosm: Portrait of a Central European City (London: Jonathan Cape, 2002).

[3] Paul Brykczynski, Primed for Violence: Murder, Antisemitism, and Democratic Politics in Interwar Poland (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2016).

sábado, 19 de junho de 2021

Grand Strategy in 10 Words: A Guide to Great Power Politics in the 21st Century, book by Sven Biscop

 

quinta-feira, 8 de abril de 2021

A decade after the Global Recession: lessons and challenges for Emerging and Developing Econômies - World Bank book (2021)

View PDF 


April 2021. 432 pages.
English Version. Paperback.
ISBN: 978-1-4648-1527-0.
Price: $55.00 

Most emerging market and developing economies weathered the 2009 global recession relatively well, in part by using the sizable fiscal and monetary policy ammunition accumulated during prior years of strong growth. However, their growth prospects have weakened since then, and many now have less policy space.

This study provides the first comprehensive stocktaking of the past decade from the perspective of emerging market and developing economies. Many of these economies have now become more vulnerable to economic shocks.The study discusses lessons from the global recession and policy options for these economies to strengthen growth and prepare for the possibility of another global downturn.

View PDF




quinta-feira, 24 de setembro de 2020

Roma não era romana, e sim mestiça, misturada, imigrantes - Robert Hughes, book excerpt

As vantagens da mestiçagem: reunir o máximo de talentos sem fazer esforço, aceitar imigrantes, todos os que desejarem se instalar para construir uma vida melhor para si e para os seus.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

 Today's selection from Delancey Place -- from Rome by Robert Hughes. 

In the founding myth of Rome, the twins Romulus and Remus established the city on the banks of the Tiber River in roughly 750 BCE and invited the outcasts of society to be its first citizens:

"[The site for Rome on the banks of the river Tiber, which was established in myth by Romulus and Remus, at first had] no inhabitants. Romulus supposedly solved this problem by creating an asylum or a place of refuge on what became the Capitol, and inviting in the trash of primitive Latium: runaway slaves, exiles, murderers, criminals of all sorts. Legend makes it out to have been (to employ a more recent simile) a kind of Dodge City.

Romulus marking the limits of Rome

"This can hardly be gospel-true, but it does contain a kernel of symbolic truth. Rome and its culture were not 'pure.' They were never produced by a single ethnically homogeneous people. Over the years and then the centuries, much of Rome's population came from outside Italy -- this even included some of the later emperors, such as Hadrian, who was Spanish, and writers like Columella, Seneca, and Martial, also Spanish-born. Celts, Arabs, Jews, and Greeks, among others, were included under the wide umbrella of Romanitas. This was the inevitable result of an imperial system that constantly expanded and frequently accepted the peoples of conquered countries as Roman citizens. Not until the end of the first century B.C.E., with the reign of Augustus, do we begin to see signs of a distinctively 'Roman' art, an identifiably 'Roman' cultural ideal.

"But how Roman is Roman? Is a statue dug up not far from the Capitol, carved by a Greek artist who was a prisoner-of-war in Rome, depicting Hercules in the style of Phidias and done for a wealthy Roman patron who thought Greek art the ultimate in chic, a 'Roman' sculpture? Or is it Greek art in exile? Or what? Mestizaje es grandeza, 'mixture is greatness,' is a Spanish saying, but it could well have been Roman. It was never possible for the Romans, who expanded to exercise their sway over all Italy, to pretend to the lunacies of racial purity that came to infect the way Germans thought about themselves."

Rome: A Cultural, Visual, and Personal History
 
author: Robert Hughes 
title: Rome: A Cultural, Visual, and Personal History 
publisher: Vintage Books, a division of Random House, Inc. 
date: Copyright 2011 Robert Hughes 
page(s): 18 

terça-feira, 8 de setembro de 2020

Hume and the Rise of Capitalism - Margareth Schabas, Carl Wennerlind (University of Chicago Press)

Due to the Scholar’s Strike in the USA, the book launch event for Schabas and Wennerlind's A Philosopher’s Economist: Hume and the Rise of Capitalism scheduled for Tuesday September 8th, Noon CST, has been postponed for exactly one week.  It will be held on September 15th, same time.  It may also be necessary to re-register.  If you already have registered, EventBrite will send you the link. 

https://www.eventbrite.com/e/margaret-schabas-and-carl-wennerlind-in-conversation-with-don-garrett-tickets-115218593916?aff=erelexpmlt  

A Philosopher’s Economist

HUME AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM

A Philosopher’s Economist
666

MARGARET SCHABAS AND CARL WENNERLIND

328 pages | 1 halftone | 6 x 9 | © 2020
Although David Hume’s contributions to philosophy are firmly established, his economics has been largely overlooked. A Philosopher’s Economist offers the definitive account of Hume’s “worldly philosophy” and argues that economics was a central preoccupation of his life and work. Margaret Schabas and Carl Wennerlind show that Hume made important contributions to the science of economics, notably on money, trade, and public finance.  Hume’s astute understanding of human behavior provided an important foundation for his economics and proved essential to his analysis of the ethical and political dimensions of capitalism. Hume also linked his economic theory with policy recommendations and sought to influence people in power. While in favor of the modern commercial world, believing that it had and would continue to raise standards of living, promote peaceful relations, and foster moral refinement, Hume was not an unqualified enthusiast. He recognized many of the underlying injustices of capitalism, its tendencies to promote avarice and inequality, as well as its potential for political instability and absolutism.
 
Hume’s imprint on modern economics is profound and far reaching, whether through his close friend Adam Smith or later admirers such as John Maynard Keynes and Friedrich Hayek. Schabas and Wennerlind’s book compels us to reconsider the centrality and legacy of Hume’s economic thought—for both his time and ours—and thus serves as an important springboard for reflections on the philosophical underpinnings of economics. Close
List of Abbreviations and Modifications
Preface

Introduction
Chapter 1. “A Rising Reputation”: Hume’s Lifelong Pursuit of Economics
Chapter 2. “A Cautious Observation of Human Life”: Hume on the Science of Economics
Chapter 3. “A More Virtuous Age”: Hume on Property and Commerce
Chapter 4. “That Indissoluble Chain of Industry, Knowledge, and Humanity”: Hume on Economic and Moral Improvement
Chapter 5. “Little Yellow or White Pieces”: Hume on Money and Banking
Chapter 6. “A Prayer for France”: Hume on International Trade and Public Finance
Chapter 7. “Our Most Excellent Friend”: Hume’s Imprint on Economics
 
Acknowledgments
Notes
Bibliography
Index

quinta-feira, 20 de fevereiro de 2020

Lições da Revolução Francesa - John O. McGinnis (Law and Liberty)

Lessons of the French Revolution

Other than the American Revolution, the French Revolution is the political event of modernity with the longest-lasting influence. Both revolutions created new regimes (although only America’s lasted) and advanced political ideals that still resonate around the world. It is not a surprise that famous politicians of recent times still assess an upheaval that occurred 200 years ago in a different nation than their own: “It resulted in a lot of headless corpses and a tyrant” was Margaret Thatcher’s verdict on its 200th birthday. Zhou Enlai was less certain, suggesting that even after 175 years, it was “too soon to tell” about the revolution’s ultimate significance.
Thus, it is always worth learning more about the French Revolution, and Jeremy Popkin’s The New World Begins is the most important English language history of this epochal event since Simon Schama’s Citizens appeared 30 years ago. Its fair-minded and fast-paced recounting of the events allows for a reassessment of the Revolution’s causes and of its value. Popkin provides a brilliant frame for understanding what sparked and sustained the revolt by contrasting the life of Louis XVI, the French King who lost his head, with one of his subjects, Jacques Menetra, a skilled glazier who left a full memoir of his own life in the turbulent times.
Louis XVI was not unintelligent, but his entire education and routine left him unfit to understand his nation, let alone deal shrewdly with a political cataclysm. His lessons as a youngster focused on the glorious past of his ancestors, and his routine as an adult confined his experience, giving him few opportunities to meet with people outside fawning courtiers. It is thus not surprising that Bourbons like Louis “learned nothing and forgot nothing” in Talleyrand’s well-known jibe. Incredibly, Louis XVI journeyed outside the environs of Paris only once before his failed attempt to escape abroad in 1791.
In contrast, Menetra traveled around much of France. While he was not well-educated, he was literate and skilled in creating social (not to mention sexual) networks wherever he went. The country, Popkin implies, was full of Menetras. Their collective power and intelligence overmatched a monarchy that had few reliable sources of information and a self-understanding that was at least a century out of date.
Nevertheless, I believe Popkin could have done more with his framing device by briefly juxtaposing Menetra with a skilled and propertied artisan of the American colonies just prior to their Revolution. The important contrast there is that for all his worldliness Menetra had no experience of popular government. Even those colonists who did not vote heard through newspapers about their colonial assemblies, and many Americans of Menetra’s class actually participated in governance. The representative assemblies of colonial America before its revolution thus sharply contrast with the complete absence of any popular input into government in France.
To be sure, the French monarchy was not absolutist. The most important restraints on its power were thirteen “parlements” that sat throughout the country. These were not legislatures, however, but judges, often holding hereditary office. While they sometimes opposed the King, they were nobles themselves, not republican schoolmasters educating their countrymen in the exercise of popular responsibility. When in 1789 the King summoned an Estates General, a legislative assembly composed of the three classes of nobles, religious officials, and commoners, it was the first time it had met since 1612!
As a result, people like Menetra had no sense of the give-and-take of representative government, and no appreciation of pluralism. The absence of this tradition helps explain why the Revolution, from the taking of the Bastille on, was again and again propelled by popular uprisings when part of the population either became incensed at some turn of events or was manipulated to support a faction in the National Assembly, the body that rapidly succeeded the Estates General when the commoners declared themselves a unicameral assembly. Americans were skilled at compromise because of their long experience of representation in the colonies, but the French relied on direct and violent action, being wholly unschooled in any institution of representative government.
Edmund Burke observed that French philosphes abetted the violence of the Revolution because their abstract theories did not grow organically from political experience. But France had not even fledgling democratic experience on which their political philosophers could draw. As Bernard Bailyn makes clear in his great book, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, many of the English political philosophers on which the colonists relied were themselves practical statesmen, like the Earl of Shaftesbury, or at least advisors to such statesmen, like John Locke. In contrast, Jean-Jacques Rousseau—the patron philosopher of the Revolution—had no substantial connection to politicians. His theory of the General Will, which posits that there is a collective will for the general good that can be sharply distinguished from the view of particular groups within society, discouraged compromise because it made it easier for any faction to fancy itself the sole reflection of that general will. When American statesmen like John Adams read his works, they thought him mad.
Popkin’s narrative shows how many of the famous actors in the Revolution—from Georges Danton to Maximillian Robespierre—were borne along by the current of a people unlearned in democracy. As a result, the leaders of the Revolution had little choice but to engage in conspiracies against other factions, because they rightly feared that other factions would also seek to conspire against them, mobilizing the French street at the first opportunity. Danton still has statues in his honor in France and is often contrasted as the good revolutionary compared to the bloodthirsty Robespierre (much like Lenin was once contrasted with Stalin). But in this book, Danton comes across as just a less deft (and more corrupt) schemer in the days of the Terror. Indeed, Robespierre is shown to be more moderate than this reputation. There were politicians farther to his left who were even more eager to destroy the past, whatever the cost, particularly when it came to the Catholic Church. Robespierre tried to restrain them.
My greatest disagreement with this outstanding achievement of narrative history is the author’s ultimately positive assessment of the French Revolution. At one point he somewhat excuses the Terror, while lamenting its dreadful excesses, by noting that the Revolution could probably not have survived without it. But on balance, why was the survival of the Revolution desirable? For instance, if Louis XVI had escaped (and it was his lack of ruthlessness in refusing to leave his family behind that doomed his attempt) and had come back with an army to put down the rebellion, the world and France would likely have been better off in the short and long term. Louis XVI was more moderate than the Bourbon brothers who succeeded him after the Restoration and could well have begun the transition to a constitutional monarchy. In any event, the current of the times was such that transition would have occurred.
As it was, the immediate legacy of the revolution was a military dictatorship under Napoleon that killed millions of the French and other Europeans in wars of conquest. That dictatorship—predicted by Edmund Burke ten years earlier—was a direct reaction to the continual chaos of the Revolution. And Napoleon’s wars were a continuation of the wars of revolutionary liberation that began almost as soon as the Bastille fell.
Even in peace and even in its home country, the legacy of the revolution continues to be an unfortunate one. When democratically elected French leaders try to make needed political reforms against vested interests, like unaffordable pensions for select groups, they are generally defeated by strikes and illegal disruptions. The spirit of the Revolution lives on in France as an impediment to democratic compromise and, even more ironically, as a protector of anachronistic privilege.

John O. McGinnis is the George C. Dix Professor in Constitutional Law at Northwestern University. His book Accelerating Democracy was published by Princeton University Press in 2012. McGinnis is also the coauthor with Mike Rappaport of Originalism and the Good Constitution published by Harvard University Press in 2013 . He is a graduate of Harvard College, Balliol College, Oxford, and Harvard Law School. He has published in leading law reviews, including the Harvard, Chicago, and Stanford Law Reviews and the Yale Law Journal, and in journals of opinion, including National Affairs and National Review.

terça-feira, 11 de fevereiro de 2020

Viva a burguesia: uma história global Christof Dejung, David Motadel, Jürgen Osterhammel

The Global Bourgeoisie

The Rise of the Middle Classes in the Age of Empire

Christof DejungDavid MotadelJürgen Osterhammel


The Global Bourgeoisie: The Rise of the Middle Classes in the Age of Empire While the nineteenth century has been described as the golden age of the European bourgeoisie, the emergence of the middle class and bourgeois culture was by no means exclusive to Europe. The Global Bourgeoisie explores the rise of the middle classes around the world during the age of empire. Bringing together eminent scholars, this landmark essay collection compares middle-class formation in various regions, highlighting differences and similarities, and assesses the extent to which bourgeois growth was tied to the increasing exchange of ideas and goods. The contributors indicate that the middle class was from its very beginning, even in Europe, the result of international connections and entanglements.
The first global history of the middle class 
Essays are grouped into six thematic sections: the political history of middle-class formation, the impact of imperial rule on the colonial middle class, the role of capitalism, the influence of religion, the obstacles to the middle class beyond the Western and colonial world, and, lastly, reflections on the creation of bourgeois cultures and global social history. Placing the establishment of middle-class society into historical context, this book shows how the triumph or destabilization of bourgeois values can shape the liberal world order.
The Global Bourgeoisie irrevocably changes the understanding of how an important social class came to be.
  • Princeton University PressNovember 2019
  • ISBN: 9780691189918
  • Title: The Global Bourgeoisie
  • Author: Christof Dejung; David Motadel; Jürgen Osterhammel
  • Imprint: Princeton University Press

In The Press

"The Global Bourgeoisie provides a comparative view of the middle classes and bourgeois cultures that emerged during the nineteenth century. Examining their interconnections, differences, and similarities, this seminal reference gives a profound inside look into diverse parts of the world."—Angelika Epple, Bielefeld University 

About The Author

Christof Dejung is professor of modern history at the University of Bern. David Motadel is associate professor of international history at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Jürgen Osterhammel is professor emeritus of modern and contemporary history at the University of Konstanz.

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