Russia’s aborted coup, explained, by Ian Brenner (GZero Daily)

 Russia’s aborted coup, explained

 GZERO Daily , June 28, 2023

Ian Brenner

   

What was Prigozhin thinking?

Anyone who watched Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin over the past few months knows that he had grown progressively unhinged in the run-up to his mutiny, just as his political position had become increasingly untenable.

Prigozhin was furious at the leaders of Russia’s Ministry of Defense, whom he repeatedly accused of sending tens of thousands of Russian soldiers to certain death through their corruption, incompetence, and cowardice. Over 20,000 of his own fighters were killed in the bloody battle for Bakhmut – a town of only 70,000 inhabitants before the war. He publicly blamed Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov for Russia’s casualties and battlefield struggles.

Notably, Russian President Vladimir Putin had largely allowed him to voice his criticism – a remarkable show of tolerance in a country that punishes “discrediting” the army with 5-15 years of jail time. Prigozhin got this dispensation in no small part because it was Wagner’s seasoned troops that had achieved Russia’s most notable battlefield victories in an otherwise sputtering invasion. In part, it was because Prigozhin had always been extremely careful not to criticize Putin directly.

This started to change a couple of weeks ago when the Defense Ministry announced that all paramilitary forces fighting in Ukraine would have to sign contracts directly with the ministry by July 1, ending their autonomy and absorbing them into the regular armed forces. Chechen warlord Ramzan Kadyrov said he and his troops would comply; Prigozhin said Wagner would not, claiming his men didn’t want to fight alongside poorly trained conscripts or under the command of Shoigu and Gerasimov.

Then, at a rare public meeting with military bloggers, Putin reiterated the order, backing the ministry over Prigozhin. You’d think that would’ve been the end of it, but instead of taking the loss, Prigozhin doubled down on his refusal to give up control of Wagner – an unprecedented act of direct insubordination against Putin.

At that point, Prigozhin knew the clock was ticking for him. Knowing he was a dead man walking from the moment he disobeyed Putin’s order, he opted to roll the dice in a last-ditch attempt to force the president to reconsider and salvage his position (and possibly his life) – a decision that smacked more of desperation than of rational calculation.

Why did Prigozhin stop before getting to Moscow?

I think both starting and stopping the mutiny can be understood as desperate acts of self-preservation. This will be one for historians to debate, but I’m inclined to believe Prigozhin probably didn’t set out to overthrow Putin in the first place, as he had neither a plan nor the allies to do so. All he wanted was to prevent Wagner from being disbanded and himself from losing his power.

The biggest reason why I believe this is that Prigozhin couldn’t possibly have thought that an outsider like himself could topple the regime with fewer than 5,000 men. Let’s keep in mind that Prigozhin was a creature of Putin: He was built up by, loyal to, and entirely dependent on the Russian president. He was not a security council insider. He did not have a power base in Moscow. He had no one in or near the Kremlin who was prepared to side with him against Putin.

That’s surely one reason why as his Wagner column drew close to Moscow, we saw no defections in the military, the government, or among the elites. And it’s why when he got thrown a lifeline just as he and his men were about to face certain death at the hands of troops reporting to Putin himself (rather than the Ministry of Defense), he grabbed it with both hands.

Prigozhin likely never had a shot of taking the Kremlin – and he and everyone else knew it all along. What he did have was a modest amount of leverage, which explains why he didn’t get killed and why he thought he could pull the stunt off in the first place. The “march for justice” was an ill-advised bargaining tactic to force Putin to cave on the issue of Wagner’s autonomy.

Why did Putin negotiate a surrender instead of just killing Prigozhin?

I think this is mostly a matter of timing.

The war in Ukraine is at a critical juncture for Russia. The Ukrainian counteroffensive is only just getting started, with fewer than three of Ukraine’s 11 battle-ready divisions positioned to attack currently involved in the fighting. Ukraine has yet to attempt to breach any of Russia’s three defensive lines, instead biding its time while conducting shaping operations and probing attacks on the first line of defense. By contrast, the Russian military is already heavily committed to trying to hold back Ukraine’s counteroffensive, and Putin is highly reluctant to order another mobilization.

A battle against Wagner on Russian soil would have distracted – potentially fatally – from Russia’s defense of its front lines, handing Ukraine a unique window of opportunity to strike while Wagner troops, the Russian army, and Kadyrov’s forces were occupied elsewhere.

Plus, by backing down and refraining from killing Prigozhin immediately, Putin lost little that he hadn’t already lost when Prigozhin initially defied him and marched toward Moscow. At the end of the day, Putin got everything he could’ve wished for: Shoigu and Gerasimov are still in their positions, Wagner is coming under Defense Ministry control, and Prigozhin is defanged and in exile. All without televised bloodshed, and without sacrificing much in terms of warfighting effectiveness given that Wagner had already been rotated out of the front.

The only concession Putin made was allowing Prigozhin, whom he called a “traitor” and “terrorist,” to live – for now. But Prigozhin is (reportedly) in Belarus, essentially a non-sovereign vassal of Russia chock-full of Russian spies, soldiers, and assassins. Putin is free to renege on the deal and kill or arrest him at a time of his choosing. I’d be very surprised if Prigozhin is still a free man by the end of the year.

What are the implications for Putin and Russia going forward?

This was by far the most serious threat to Putin’s 23-year rule.

On the one hand, you’re not supposed to be able to defy Putin in Russia this way and get away with it. Yet the men who shot down and killed an estimated 13 Russian pilots on their way to Moscow were pardoned. And the man who openly defied Putin’s orders, discredited his rationale for the war in Ukraine, and whom Putin declared a traitor on public television, is still alive (even if not for long). Putin has jailed and killed people for a lot less, so this makes him look weak before the Russian public and the elites.

On the other hand, Putin’s regime was tested over the weekend, and the regime ultimately held together. Yes, there were a lot of people who didn’t fire to stop Wagner troops from advancing, but there were virtually no defections inside the Russian government, the military, or among elites. The government is still functioning normally, and the war in Ukraine is going the way it did before the mutiny. Putin is more vulnerable on the back of it, but that’s more a long-term than an immediate issue.

In a way, this feels a bit like an extreme version of Jan. 6 in the United States (pardon the comparison): an event that was previously unthinkable, that shook people’s faith in the system, that exposed a structural weakness in domestic institutions, but that changed little in the country the day after.

The likelihood of regime change in Russia remains near zero … until it happens. But these events show that the tail risks are fatter than we thought.

What does this mean for the war in Ukraine?

The Ukrainians will try to take advantage of Russia’s domestic turmoil to make gains in their counteroffensive. Indeed, just in the last two days, they’ve reportedly seen progress in the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions (although the significance of these gains so far is marginal).

However, I don’t see the events of the weekend dramatically improving Ukraine’s odds on the battlefield in the near future. With the Wagner threat dissolved, Russia won’t need to shift troops from Ukraine to Russia to deal with them. Likewise, Wagner was not operating in the south where the Ukrainian counteroffensive is focused. So in terms of the actual fighting, beyond the effect that the mutiny might have on Russian morale, the overall military impact at this point is limited.

That said, the incident is a problem for Putin’s credibility with elites and the Russian public, and this political vulnerability could make him more sensitive to major battlefield losses in the coming months. If we get to a point later in the summer or fall where Ukraine starts to threaten Crimea or the land bridge, the risk of a major Russian escalation (such as blowing up the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant or using a tactical nuclear weapon) in response would go up. The only thing more dangerous than a strongman is a weak strongman.

The one lesson from this episode is that when push comes to shove, Putin is singularly focused on his own survival, and he is willing and able to accept any outcome to ensure it. This is an important revealed preference because it speaks to the credibility of his stated goals and so-called “red lines” in Ukraine, which in turn matters for how Ukraine and NATO countries think about escalation.

It means that Putin may be willing to tolerate more aggressive behavior from NATO and Ukraine than we imagined if he thinks retaliation would lower his chances of survival. It also means that Putin could consider any outcome for the war, including negotiations, as long as he thinks he can survive it.

__________

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Duas medidas e NENHUM PESO: as notas do Itamaraty merecem um estudo para tese de doutorado (ou mestrado, ou TCC)

 O Itamaraty fez uma nota lamentando as inundações no Chile: 

28 de junho de 2023
Desastres provocados por intensas chuvas no Chile
O governo brasileiro manifesta sua solidariedade ao governo e ao povo chilenos, em razão das perdas humanas e materiais provocadas pelas intensas chuvas na região centro-sul do Chile nos últimos dias.

O Itamaraty não foi capaz de fazer uma ÚNICA nota sobre todas as vitimas causadas pelos bombardeios indiscriminados contra alvos civis na Ucrânia: 

During the past day, the Russian forces shelled eleven oblasts of Ukraine. 
Russian attacks
The number of casualties due to the Russian attack on Kramatorsk has risen to 11, including three children. 61 people have been injured. According to updated information, the strike was carried out with "Iskander" missiles.  
The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) has detained a spotter for the Russian missile strike on Kramatorsk. Yesterday, the man checked whether the café was open and if any visitors were there. He recorded a video and passed the information to the Russian military.  

In Poltava Oblast, on the “anniversary” of the missile strike on the "Amstor" shopping center in Kremenchuk, the enemy attacked the Kremenchuk district again. X-22 missiles hit a dacha cooperative. No impact on critical infrastructure were recorded. A child was injured.
Cherkasy Oblast experienced an enemy aerial attack during the night. Two combat drones were destroyed. However, two more targeted an empty warehouse. 
Russian forces shelled border areas of Chernihiv and Sumy Oblasts.
In Zaporizhzhia Oblast, Russian forces carried out 77 attacks on 16 towns and villages. There were 40 reports of damage to civilian infrastructure. At least 9 people were injured, and one person died from the injuries sustained.
Enemy Shahed drones were shot down over the night in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. 
The Russian army carried out mortar and artillery shelling of at least 8 towns and villages in Kharkiv Oblast. Today, June 28, Russian forces shelled the Vovchansk community, resulting in the deaths of three civilians.
In Luhansk Oblast, the enemy conducted 115 shelling attacks and fired 526 shells within a day.
The Russians targeted areas in 31 towns and villages of Kherson Oblast within a day. Three people were injured.

Definições simples: a de uma tirania, por exemplo - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Definições simples: a de uma tirania, por exemplo

A diferença entre um governo normal e uma tirania é quando o chefe de governo ignora completamente os órgãos de Estado para mandar e desmandar a seu bel prazer, ou quando decide, por exemplo, massacrar o seu próprio povo, ou outros povos, sem nenhum objetivo concreto, a não ser por puro terror e desejo de vingança pessoal.

Putin é exatamente isso e só isso.

Lula ainda não percebeu?

O que mais seria preciso ocorrer, nessas categorias indignas de qualquer postura civilizada, para que ele e o seu assessor para assuntos internacionais se convençam de que eles estão justamente apoiando um criminoso de guerra, um violador do Direito Internacional, um monstro depravado e sedento de sangue?

O BRICS e o tal de Sul Global ainda não estão convencidos disso?

Onde está a consciência moral, ou simplesmente ética, desses mandatários? 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 28/06/2023

The West must prepare for a long overdue reckoning - Chandran Nair (The National Interest)

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, WORLD

The West must prepare for a long overdue reckoning

Chandran Nair

The National Interest June 8, 2023

https://johnmenadue.com/the-west-must-prepare-for-a-long-overdue-reckoning/

Five major trends illustrate how the world is changing, and that the West must grapple with the reality that it can no longer impose its “leadership” on the world as it once did.

The post-Western, multipolar international order is coming to pass. As the world grapples with the implications of this shift in power, the foundations of a great reckoning are taking shape. This reckoning will challenge the long-held beliefs and structures that have sustained Western dominance of the world for the past few hundred years, exposing along the way the nature of the West’s perceived entitlement to lead the global pecking order. The end result will be a significant re-evaluation of international relations as we know it.

This great reckoning will be driven by five major trends, which are compelling Western nations to confront and adapt to a future where power must be shared with the rest in a multipolar world. A failure to recognise, or attempting to strongly resist, these trends could pose significant risks not only to the West itself but also to global stability. Yet future conflicts can be avoided if this period of change is viewed as an opportunity to build a more equitable world, rather than as a crisis that threatens preferred and entrenched privileges.

Five trends to consider

What future awaits the West—a smooth transition toward multipolarity or a period of instability and potential conflict—will largely depend on how policymakers respond to the following five trends.

First is the unravelling of the hitherto telling of history. The West, across its colonial history, has practiced and perfected the selective interpretation and telling of events, choosing to portray itself as the originator of modern civilisation and a benevolent guiding force. This is now changing; information technologies, such as the Internet and social media, have broken the monopoly over information and history once held by Western gatekeeping institutions (media companies, universities, book publishers, and more). As a consequence, people around the world are recognising that history is no longer confined to Western interpretation—including its projection of benevolence.

A significant component of this has been the West’s frequent failure to acknowledge its own imperfect past. Despite amplifying the perceived wrongdoings of others, it has been silent about its own unsavoury moments, such as early American pioneers’ destruction of First Nation cultures, European exploitation of the African continent, or Australia’s treatment of aboriginal peoples. Addressing these historical episodes matters all the more because they affect current behaviour; Western nations also have problems admitting to contemporary mistakes and intentions.

Non-Western nations can now make clear that their own countries and communities have long histories that not only exist despite Western interpretation, but these histories need to be explored, understood, and told. The West must grapple with this trend and its implications, rather than continue to obscure it in denial. Consider the ongoing diplomatic efforts of the Indian government to compel Great Britain to return the treasure stolen from India, including some of the crown jewels.

The second trend is the re-evaluation of the” rules-based” international order. Policymakers in Washington may not like hearing it, but the concept is the subject of much derision around the world and is widely regarded as a tool used by the West to control global affairs and maintain hegemony. There is ample resentment growing against Western nations given the repeated breaching of their own rules, meaning that the legitimacy of this order is being questioned despite its positive aspects.

Coinciding with this growing frustration is the reality that the distribution of power across more nations is transforming the current world order and creating new opportunities and challenges. China has assumed a more prominent position, offering global public goods such as peacemaking and addressing climate change in a manner Western nations are not willing, or able, to do. Similarly, India is beginning to assert itself, as are other smaller nations, like the UAE and Indonesia.

As more countries determine their own trajectories in the twenty-first century, the West must recognise that the international balance of power has shifted. It cannot continue to impose its will on others—the rise of China and other nations is evidence of such. The West must come to terms with this new reality and recognise that a new, more pragmatic, and multipolar approach is needed, where nations pursue foreign policies committed to co-existence, driven by their own best interests rather than aligning themselves with “one side” or the other.

Third is the unmasking of Western “peacekeeping.” Despite portraying itself as the guarantor of global security, much of the world now views the United States‚ and Europe to a lesser extent, as profiting from war rather than being interested in promoting authentic peace. The Western military-industrial complex—particularly the United States’—is so powerful that it is now well-known to drive U.S. foreign policy to the extent that it perpetuates conflicts to thus profit from war.

At present, the United States and its NATO allies are driving the rise in global military spending, with America spending more on defence than the next ten countries combined. It is similarly well known that almost half of the Pentagon’s budget goes to private contractors each year, and the military-industrial complex donates millions of dollars to U.S. Congressional races, resulting in state capture and significant increases in defence budgets.

The rest of the world has realised that the West alone cannot be trusted to lead global peace efforts, especially if a significant portion of their economies are geared to profit from conflict. In light of this, a positive change is occurring, with China brokering ground-breaking peace agreements—between Saudi Arabia and Iran, for example—while world leaders like Indonesia’s Joko Widodo, India’s Narendra Modi, and Brazil’s Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva pitch peaceful resolutions to modern conflicts.

The fourth trend underway is the dethroning of the Western financial superstructure. That the West makes ample use of its financial might for geopolitical advantage and purposes is no great secret—policymakers and experts openly talk about the “weaponisation of finance” and applying sanctions on countries that do not comply with Western intentions. Likewise, the ability of the United States and its allies to freeze and even confiscate the reserves of sovereign states—Afghanistan, Venezuela, Russia—sent shock waves across the world.

Because of this and the West’s own track record of financial greed and impropriety—which resulted in devastating crises such as the 2007–2008 financial crisis and the recent collapse of Silicon Valley Bank, which has had global reverberations—distrust in and a rejection of Western financial structures is growing.

Efforts are now underway to dismantle the exorbitant privilege bestowed on the United States via its currency. De-dollarisation is very much happening, with the currency’s share of global reserves falling to 47 percent last year, down from 73 percent in 2001. Additionally, countries are seeking alternatives to the SWIFT system, which also has been used in aid of Western-based sanctions and thus alarmed the global majority. As countries with stable currencies gain influence, a more multipolar economic order emerges, reshaping geopolitical alliances, economic diplomacy, and the balance of power within international institutions. This change may grant developing nations greater flexibility in managing their currencies and monetary policies and limit the West’s capacity to unilaterally impose sanctions. Moreover, BRICS nations have recently surpassed the G7 in terms of GDP, signalling a redistribution of economic power and hinting at a future of cooperation in trade, investment, infrastructure, and development assistance.

Fifth and finally, there is the notable collapse of the Western press’ credibility. This comes at a critical juncture, as repeated shortcomings in the last few years have heightened global awareness of Western media’s role in perpetuating the West’s preferred aspects of the current world order—often to the detriment of other countries.

For instance, persistent China-bashing in Western headlines has perpetuated an unproductive and fear-mongering narrative of Beijing as a threat to its own citizens and the world at large. The geopolitical contexts of Hong Kong and Taiwan, though complicated affairs, have been particularly and selectively drummed up to push an “us vs. them” narrative, rather than encouraging understanding between the West and China.

Similarly, overwhelmingly one-sided coverage of the Ukrainian conflict regularly overlooks national and regional geopolitical complexities in the long-standing Russian-Ukrainian relationship and the history of NATO expansion in Europe. A lack of reporting on the Nord Stream bombing, which many believe was perpetrated by a Western nation—with reporting to back this claim up—is a glaring hole that has contributed to the lack of trust in Western media from both non-Western and Western readers alike. Only months later is the Western press quietly admitting potential Western culpability, or at the very least, knowledge.

Moreover, inadequate, and biased coverage of non-Western conflicts, such as those in Yemen, Myanmar, and Palestine, has led to global accusations of neglect, bias, and even racism.

The writing on the wall

Western governments operating in an echo chamber of denial need to reach out to their friends across the world and realise what is obvious to everyone except to themselves: that the world is not like what it was in the post-Cold War era. The old ways are finished, and the West simply does not have the political and financial power, not to mention the international legitimacy, it once did. Western nations must adapt to this changing international environment, rather than stubbornly insisting upon business as usual. Failure to do so will make the world a more dangerous place and erode the credibility and influence of the West even further.

Chandran Nair is the Founder and CEO of Global Institute for Tomorrow and a member of the Executive Committee of the Club of Rome. He is the author of “The Sustainable State: The Future of Government, Economy and Society”. His latest book “Dismantling Global White Privilege: Equity for a Post-Western World” will be available from December.

The Sword and the Shield: the history of the KGB - filme-documentário (YouTube)

Uma piadinha soviética da época do stalinismo: 

"A Rússia é um país com três tipos de prisioneiros: os que foram para a cadeia no passado, os que estão indo agora, e os que irão no futuro". 

Agora ela apareceu aqui neste filme

The Sword and the Shield: the history of the KGB

https://ok.ru/videoembed/3358090005017

A política externa enquanto política pública: questões conceituais e operacionais da diplomacia brasileira - Paulo Roberto de Almeida (Revista Crítica & Controle)

 Brevemente, na sua estante digital: 

A política externa enquanto política pública: 
questões conceituais e operacionais da diplomacia brasileira
External policy as a public policy: 
conceptual and operational issues of the Brazilian diplomacy
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 
Revista Crítica & Controle, 2023 
https://seer.ufrgs.br/index.php/criticaecontrole 

Resumo: Ensaio sobre as bases ideais, nos planos conceitual e operacional, de uma política externa como uma das políticas públicas, vinculando métodos, procedimentos e atuação a diferentes exercícios práticos da diplomacia brasileira, e alguns exemplos de outras diplomacias no cenário global contemporâneo. Depois de breve recapitulação histórica sobre a diplomacia brasileira, o ensaio examina primeiro os fundamentos de uma política externa focada estritamente no interesse nacional, em suas diferentes modalidades de implementação, para depois considerar os elementos práticos, teoricamente aplicáveis ao Brasil, ao seguir resumidamente o itinerário da sua política externa e as diplomacias que se sucederam nas duas últimas décadas.
Palavras-chave: Política externa; diplomacia brasileira; fundamentos conceituais; bases operacionais; rupturas e continuidades.

Abstract: Exploratory essay on the ideal basis of an external policy as one of the public policies, on conceptual and operative grounds, connecting its methods and its practical implementation to the actual Brazilian diplomacy, with some references to other foreign policies in the current global context. After a brief description of the historical itinerary of the Brazilian diplomacy, the essay deals at first with the founding elements of an external policy strictly based on the national interest, taking support on a discussion over its practical enforcement, as ideally connected with the Brazilian case, exploring the various actual examples of Brazil’s foreign policies over the last two decades. 
Keywords: Foreign policy; Brazilian diplomacy; conceptual elements; operative basis; stability and discontinuities. 

Bibliografia de história diplomática e de relações exteriores do Brasil - Compilação de Paulo Roberto de Almeida

 4425. “Bibliografia de história diplomática do Brasil”, Brasília, 27 junho 2023, 17 p. Atualização sintética de listas anteriores de referências bibliográficas sobre obras de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil, em especial a partir do trabalho n. 3097/2017. Divulgado via plataforma Academia.edu (link: https://www.academia.edu/103922289/4425_Bibliografia_de_história_diplomática_e_de_relações_exteriores_do_Brasil_2023_).

Bibliografia de história diplomática e de relações exteriores do Brasil

 

Compilação: Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 27/06/2023

 

ABDENUR, Roberto. A política externa brasileira e o ‘sentimento de exclusão’. In: FONSECA JR., Gelson; CASTRO, Sérgio Henrique Nabuco de (orgs.). Temas de Política Externa Brasileira II. 2. ed. São Paulo; Brasília: Paz e Terra; Funag/IPRI. 1997, v. 1, p. 31-46.

ABREU, Alzira Alves et al. (orgs.). Dicionário histórico-biográfico brasileiro. Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 2001, 5 v.

ABREU, Marcelo de Paiva (org.). A ordem do progresso: dois séculos de política econômica no Brasil. 2^a. ed.; Rio de Janeiro: Elsevier, 2014.

__________ . O Brasil e a economia mundial, 1930-1945. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1999.

(...)

VIZENTINI, Paulo G. F. Relações internacionais no Brasil: de Vargas a Lula. São Paulo: Fundação Perseu Abramo, 2003.

__________ . A política externa do regime militar brasileiro: multilateralização, desenvolvimento e construção de uma potência média (1964-1985). Porto Alegre: UFRGS, 1998 (Coleção Relações Internacionais e Integração).

__________ . Relações internacionais e desenvolvimento: o nacionalismo e a política externa independente (1951-1964). Petrópolis: Vozes, 1995.

__________ .  Da Guerra Fria à crise (1945-1992). Porto Alegre: UFRGS, 1992. (Síntese Universitária.)

__________ (org.). A grande crise: a nova (des)ordem internacional dos anos 80 aos 90. Petrópolis: Vozes, 1992.

WEHLING, Arno; WEHLING, Maria José C. Formação do Brasil Colonial. Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1994.

WERNECK SODRÉ, Nelson. Panorama do Segundo Império. São Paulo: Nacional, 1939; 2ª ed.; Rio de Janeiro: Graphia, 1998.

__________ . Formação Histórica do Brasil. São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1962.

 

 

Compilação original: 22/03/2017; versão revista: 27/06/2023

 

Integra disponível na plataforma Academia.edu (link: https://www.academia.edu/103922289/4425_Bibliografia_de_história_diplomática_e_de_relações_exteriores_do_Brasil_2023.

Assembleia Geral Constituinte e Legislativa do Império do Brasil de 1823 - Fundo documental da Câmara dos Deputados

Fundo AC1823 - Assembleia Geral Constituinte e Legislativa do Império do Brasil de 1823

https://arquivohistorico.camara.leg.br/index.php/assembleia-geral-consituinte-e-legislativa-do-imperio-do-brasil-1823 

Área de identificação

Código de referência

BR DFCD AC1823

Título

Assembleia Geral Constituinte e Legislativa do Império do Brasil de 1823

Data(s)

• 17-04-1823 a 12-11-1823 (Produção)

Nível de descrição

Fundo

Dimensão e suporte

3 metros lineares de documentos em suporte de papel correspondente a 3.697 peças, sendo:

12 latas de manuscritos originais
8 volumes de códices.
53 documentos em grandes formatos (tabelas, mapas, bando)
9 volumes de publicações impressas (Diários e Anais)

Área de contextualização

Nome do produtor

Assembleia Geral Constituinte e Legislativa do Império do Brasil 1823

(17-04-1823 a 12-11-1823)

História administrativa

 

Acesso ao hotsite sobre a instituição https://www.camara.leg.br/internet/agencia/infograficos-html5/200-anos-do-parlamento-brasileiro/index.html

Entidade custodiadora

Câmara dos Deputados

História do arquivo

A história da documentação da Assembleia Geral Constituinte e Legislativa do Império de 1823 se inicia com sua custódia pelo Arquivo da Câmara dos Deputados, órgão criado pela Constituição de 1824. Nos anos 80 do século 20, ocorreram duas importantes ... »

Procedência

Considera-se que a documentação do fundo da Assembleia Geral Constituinte e Legislativa do Império do Brasil de 1823 foi transferida à Câmara dos Deputados por meio da “herança de fundos”, que, nos termos do Dicionário Brasileiro de Terminologia ... »

Área de conteúdo e estrutura

Âmbito e conteúdo

Durante sete meses, a Assembleia discutiu inúmeros temas relativos à organização política-administrativa do país e à economia, educação, saúde, segurança nacional entre outros assuntos. O Brasil vivia seu primeiro ano como nação independente e os debates ... »

Avaliação, selecção e eliminação

Toda a documentação deste fundo foi considerada de caráter permanente pela Câmara dos Deputados, em 1986, por meio da publicação da Instrução Normativa nº 1, que considerou todos os documentos anteriores ao ano de 1946 permanentes. Atualmente a ... »

Ingressos adicionais

O fundo é fechado e não foram incorporados documentos encontrados em outras entidades custodiadoras.

Sistema de arranjo

Em sua organização foram identificados 3.697 documentos. Dentre eles, 53 documentos em grandes formatos, 8 volumes de códices e 9 volumes de publicações impressas (Diários e Anais), que, após minucioso trabalho de pesquisa, foram agrupados em dossiês, ... »

Área de condições de acesso e uso

Condições de acesso

Sem restrições de acesso ao conteúdo, documentação totalmente digitalizada.

Os documentos do fundo da Assembleia Geral Constituinte e Legislativa do Império do Brasil de 1823 são públicos e estão custodiados no arquivo permanente da Câmara dos Deputados, ... »

Condiçoes de reprodução

Documentação digitalizada e disponível para consulta e download nesse site.

Idioma do material

• francês
• inglês
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Script do material

• latim

Características físicas e requisitos técnicos

A maior parte da documentação é composta por manuscritos, incluindo tabelas e mapas. A versão digitalizada está em formato PDF.

Instrumentos de descrição

Inventário analítico disponível em formato digital (PDF) http://arquivohistorico.camara.leg.br/atom/AC1823/sobre/Inventario_AnaliticoAcervoConstituinte1823.pdf

Brasil. Congresso Nacional. Câmara dos Deputados. Coordenação de Arquivo. Inventário ... »

Instrumento de pesquisa gerado

assembleia-geral-consituinte-e-legislativa-do-imperio-do-brasil-1823.pdf

Área de documentação associada

Existência e localização de originais

Entidade custodiadora: Câmara dos Deputados (Brasil)
Localização: Brasília

Existência e localização de cópias

Cópias digitais em formato PDF disponíveis neste site.
Cópias de preservação em formato TIFF no repositório digital da Câmara dos Deputados.
Cópias de Anais e Diários em microfilmes no arquivo permanente.

Nota de publicação

Os Annaes do Parlamento Brazileiro da Assemblea Constituinte podem ser acessados em:
Tomo 1 acessível em: https://arquivohistorico.camara.leg.br/atom/AC1823/sobre/annaes/ANNAES-TOMO1.pdf
Tomo 2 acessível em: https://arquivohistorico.camara.leg.br/atom/... »

Área de notas

Nota

MINISTROS E SECRETÁRIOS DE ESTADO DO IMPÉRIO DO BRASIL - 1822-1823 (Parte 1)
In: <i>Organização e programas ministeriais, desde 1822 a 1889,/i... pelo Barão de Javary. Rio de Janeiro, Secretaria da Câmara dos Deputados, 1889 p. 3 a 10.</i>

1º... »

Nota

MINISTROS E SECRETÁRIOS DE ESTADO DO IMPÉRIO DO BRASIL - 1822-1823 (Parte 2)
In: <i>Organização e programas ministeriais, desde 1822 a 1889,/i... pelo Barão de Javary. Rio de Janeiro, Secretaria da Câmara dos Deputados, 1889 p. 3 a 10.</i>

2º ... »

Nota

MINISTROS E SECRETÁRIOS DE ESTADO DO IMPÉRIO DO BRASIL - 1822-1823 (Parte 3)
In: <i>Organização e programas ministeriais, desde 1822 a 1889,/i... pelo Barão de Javary. Rio de Janeiro, Secretaria da Câmara dos Deputados, 1889 p. 3 a 10.</i>

3º ... »

Regras ou convenções utilizadas

ISAD(G) ISAAR(CPF) ISDF ISDIAH

Idioma(s)

• português

Objeto digital metadados

Nome do arquivo

Logomarca_Programa_Memoria_do_Mundo_2013.jpg

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Imagem

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Tamanho do arquivo

109.6 KiB

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20 de fevereiro de 2019 04:49