Um dia na vida da guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a Ucrânia: 1/05/2024 (Centre for Defence Strategies - CDS)

Russia's war on Ukraine. 01.05.24

 In the operational zone of the Ukrainian Operational-Strategic Group of Forces (OSG) "Khortytsia", on the Kupyansk direction, the Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled 6 enemy attacks in the areas of Berestove, Stelmakhivka and east of Kopanka. On the Lyman direction, they repelled 21 attacks in the areas of Novoyehorivka, Hrekivka, Makiivka, Nevske, Terny, and Serebriansk Forest. On the Bakhmut direction, the Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled 33 Russian attacks in the areas of Bilohorivka, Verkhnyokamianske, Rozdolivka, Spirne, Novyi, Klishchiivka, Andriivka, and Chasiv Yar. 

 

In the "Tavriya" OSG operational zone on the Avdiivka direction, the Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled 33 enemy attacks in the areas of Arkhanhelske, Keramik, Sokil, Umanske, Semenivka, Yasnobrodivks, and Netaylove. On the Novopavlivka direction, they continued to hold back the enemy in the areas of Heorhiivka, Praskoviivka, and Urozhaine, where the adversary, supported by aviation, attempted to breach Ukrainian troops' defenses 18 times. On the Orikhiv direction, the enemy, supported by aviation, attacked the positions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces 5 times in the area of Staromayorske, Robotyne and southwest of Bilohirya.

In the operational zone of the "Odesa" OSG on the Kherson direction, the enemy remains determined to dislodge the units of the Ukrainian Defense Forces from the bridgeheads on the left bank of the Dnipro River and launched 2 unsuccessful attacks.

General conclusion: 

·     The command of the Russian forces is executing a significant troop movement between operational directions.

·     The adversary's command has initiated the repositioning of operational-tactical and army aviation assets from forward airbases, including those situated deep within the operational theater, to the interior of Russian territory following the delivery of long-range strike capabilities, such as ATACMS missiles, to the Ukrainian Defense Forces. The overall strength of enemy aviation units deployed directly at forward airbases has decreased from 303-305 units of combat and special aviation to 280-283 units.

·     Russian troops persist in maneuvering around Chasiv Yar from the flanks via Bohdanivka in the northeast and Ivanivske in the east, bolstering their presence to advance towards the Siversky Donets-Donbas Canal. The frequency of attacks on Chasiv Yar surpasses those on the Avdiivka direction, where the adversary has temporarily halted its push.

·     The adversary's tactics near Chasiv Yar remain consistent, resembling the operation near Bakhmut: initially, positions are assaulted by "Storm-Z" and "Storm-V" punitive units followed by assault landing units that consolidate their gains.

·     Russian forces are advancing near Keramik to move towards Arkhanhelske, while also attempting to push westward from Ocheretyne towards Sokol and southwest towards Novopokrovske – Novoselivka Persha.

·     The adversary's tactics in the Ocheretyne and Novokalynove areas have shifted. The enemy seeks unmined gaps between the Ukrainian defense positions, attacking through them and advancing northward, parallel to the Ukrainian defensive line.

·     The adversary's attempts to consolidate their positions northwest of Avdiivka force them to choose between advancing westward towards Pokrovsk or moving north to support the grouping operating near Chasiv Yar.

·     The "Tavriya" OSG command, not waiting for tactical losses, replaced several forward units with fresh ones, indicating the presence of reserves and proper control of the situation by the OSG command staff.

·     Mechanical malfunction was detected in GLSDB ammunition, causing the separation section of the deployment block to fail, leading to GBU-39 misses. The Ukrainian Defense Forces have suspended the use of GBU-39 until the manufacturer resolves the issue, which is unrelated to GPS signal interference.

·     Anonymous Telegram channels spread false information about an alleged emergency at the Khmelnytskyi Nuclear Power Plant which reportedly resulted in increased radiation levels in the Khmelnytskyi and Rivne regions.

Change in the line of contact (LoC):

·     There were 122 combat engagements on various fronts.

·     On the Kupyansk direction, Russian forces attacked positions held by the Ukrainian Defense Forces in the central and southeast sectors of Kyslivka, but only managed to advance in the eastern sector. Positional battles persisted in the areas of Berestove, Krokhmalne, Stelmakhivka, Kopanka, Raihorodka, Tverdokhlibove, Novoserhiivka, Novoyehorivka, Hrekivka, and Nevske.

·     On the Lyman direction, the Ukrainian Defense Forces regained control over previously lost positions near Kreminna, advanced east of Yampolivka, reclaiming positions along the windbreaks in that area.

·     Positional battles persisted in the areas of Terny, Torske, Zarichne, near the Serebriansk Forest, and near Bilohorivka.

·     On the Bakhmut direction, the Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled attacks by the enemy’s 6th and 123rd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigades of the 2nd Army Corps in the areas of Verkhnyokamianske and Rozdolivka. Russian forces advanced to the eastern bank of the Siversky Donets-Donbas Canal south of Chasiv Yar, where underground sections of the canal are located. Enemy special operations forces intensified their activities during the night. Battles persisted near the “Novyi” neighborhood, Ivanivske, Klishchiivka, Andriivka, New York, Shumy, and Pivdenne. The enemy aviation continued to strike the area of the "Kanal" neighborhood.

·     On the Avdiivka direction, the adversary is focused on achieving tactical success near Ocheretyne and Novokalynove. The enemy's penetration into Ukrainian defenses is assessed by the following indicators: 2.7 km along the front and 1.52 km in depth north of Novokalynove, 1.75 km along the front and 1.15 km in depth northwest of Ocheretyne towards Novooleksandrivka. The adversary advanced west of Semenivka and Berdychi.

·     Battles persisted near Arkhanhelske, Sokol, Solovyove, Umanske, and Netaylove. Russian forces near Ocheretyne are located 13 km from the T0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway.

·     On the Novopavlivka direction, Russian forces have advanced up to 450 meters along the front line of up to 1 kilometer on the northeast outskirts of Krasnohorivka. Combat operations were ongoing in the areas of Heorhiivka, Paraskoviivka, and Kostyantynivka. The 39th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 68th Army Corps of the enemy is advancing near Novomykhailivka.

·     On the Berdyansk direction, units of the 5th Separate Tank Brigade of the 36th Army advanced up to 1 km near Staromayorske. The intensity of combat in the area of Velyka Novosilka has increased. Enemy aircraft are striking Ukrainian positions in this area with glide bombs. Positional battles persisted in the areas of Staromayorske, Urozhaine, Pryiutne, and Novodarivka.

·     On the Orikhiv direction, the 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division of the 58th Army have advanced to the western outskirts of Robotyne. Combat operations were ongoing northwest of Verbove. Enemy aviation operates at low altitudes, exploiting the limited capabilities of the Air Defense Forces of the Ukrainian Defense Forces on this direction.

·     On the Kherson direction, the enemy launched mass shelling of Nestryha Island, attempted to land a landing force there, and recapture lost positions but suffered losses and retreated. Russian forces also unsuccessfully attacked Ukrainian positions near Krynky.

·     In the Black Sea-Azov naval operational area, the enemy naval group on combat duty consists of:

o  Mediterranean Sea: 2 ships, including 1 “Kalibr” sea launched cruise missile carrier. The total salvo is 16 cruise missiles.

Changes in the enemy disposition:

·     The operational deployment of enemy "Sever (North)" Operational Grouping in its operational zone on the territory of the Russian Federation (border areas of Bryansk, Kursk, and Belgorod Oblasts of the Russian Federation) continues, with completion expected by May 7-8. The 128th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division, and the 197th Separated C2 Battalion of the 44th Army Corps have arrived in Kursk Oblast. The 44th Army Corps comprises up to 3,700 personnel and up to 450 units of military equipment. The " Sever (North)" Operational Grouping has already deployed up to 50,000 personnel.

·     The relocation of the 76th Airborne Division from the operational zone of the "Dnieper" Operational Grouping on the Orikhiv direction either to the "Zapad (West)" Operational Grouping in Luhansk Oblast or to the "South" Operational Grouping on the Kramatorsk direction is ongoing. One airborne battalion is currently in transit.

·     Four Su-30SM fighters and four Su-25 attack aircraft have been moved from Eisk to Privolzhsky, Armavir airbases. Eight Su-25 attack aircraft from Taganrog are now at Budenovsk. Four MiG-31BM fighters from Primorsko-Akhtarsk have been redeployed to Privolzhsky. Two Su-35 fighters from Tikhoretsk are now stationed at Akhtubinsk. Five Su-30SM fighters from Krymsk are relocated to Privolzhsky. Four Su-25 attack aircraft from Millerovo are transferred to Budennovsk. Five Su-30SM fighters and five Su-24M bombers from Saki are now at Eisk. Two Su-35 fighters from Baltimore (Voronezh) are relocated to Lipetsk. After a missile strike by the Ukrainian Defense Forces on Kushchevskaya, up to seven Su-35 fighters from Akhtubinsk are moved. Overall, during the day 43 aircraft of various types were withdrawn from the area targeted by the Ukrainian Defense Forces.

Escalation indicators:

·     The enemy is intensifying its efforts in the vicinity of Ocheretyne and increasing pressure on the flanks of this breach.

Possible operation situation developments:

·     The forces of the 20th and 25th Army are unable to complete the forming operation on the Lyman direction and will not be able to occupy a favorable starting position for the offensive on Lyman and the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration before the beginning of summer.

·     The adversary may attempt to bypass Chasiv Yar without directly assaulting the city, by operating from the south and southeast, while simultaneously forming a northern flank for the Toretsk operation. Russian forces may decide to advance north of the salient near Ocheretyne along the N20 Donetsk-Kostyantynivka highway to put pressure on the Ukrainian Defense Forces defending in the area of Toretsk, and possibly threaten the "Tavriya" OSG operational rear and the areas west of Chasiv Yar.

·     The "Center" Operational Grouping command is focused on executing the following operational plan: to establish conditions for the blockade and encirclement of the Kurakhove area or to create advantageous circumstances for launching an offensive operation to encircle "Tavriya" OSG’s defense in Toretsk area from the south.

·     The enemy's "Vostok" Operational Grouping is gearing up for active operations on the southern flank of the Kurakhove-Vuhledar bulge of the Ukrainian Defense Forces in coordination with the left flank of the "Yug" Operational Grouping, which is currently attempting to break through towards Kurakhove through Hryhorivka and Paraskoviivka-Kostyantynivka along the Vovcha and Sukhi Yaly Rivers.

·     The isolation or complete capture of Kostyantynivka will significantly impair the Defense Forces' ability to maintain the frontline in the southern part of Donetsk Oblast, as it will disrupt the main logistical route along Highway N-20.

·     In the imminent timeframe, the adversary will attempt to reach the Stara Mykolaivka-Sukha Balka line.

Russian operational losses from 24.02.22 to 05.01.24  

Personnel - almost 469,840 (+1120); 

Tanks 7,312 (+5); 

Armored combat vehicles – 14,067 (+21); 

Artillery systems – 12,024 (+13);

Multiple rocket launchers (MLRS) – 1,053 (0);

Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 780 (+1);

Vehicles and fuel tanks – 16,175 (+33);

Aircraft - 348 (0);

Helicopters – 325 (0);

UAV operational and tactical level – 9,538 (+7);

Intercepted cruise missiles – 2,126 (0);

Boats/ships – 27 (0).

Humanitarian+general:

·     According to information provided by the Situation Center of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Russian forces shelled 10 regions of Ukraine over the past day. A total of 121 towns and villages and 138 infrastructure objects were attacked with various types of weapons. The number of casualties is being updated/clarified.

·     Four people were injured as a result of Russian artillery shelling and a kamikaze drone strike on Nikopol in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast that occurred on the evening of April 30.

·     During the night of May 1st, Russian occupying forces launched three Iskander-M ballistic missiles targeting densely populated areas of the city of Odesa. Three people were killed, and three others were injured in the attack.

·     At 10:00 on May 1, Russian forces carried out airstrikes using guided aerial bombs targeting a car and a private residence in the village of Zolochiv, Bogodukhiv district, Kharkiv Oblast. The attack resulted in two fatalities and nine injuries. Around 16:10, the Russian army also shelled the village of Lyptsi. A 78-year-old woman sustained shrapnel wounds and later died.

·     On the morning of May 1st, Russian military forces launched an attack on the village of Kalynove in Donetsk Oblast, resulting in the death of one individual and injuring two others. In the afternoon, Russian forces struck the city of Hirnyk in Donetsk Oblast with "Uragan" missile systems. A man and a woman were killed, while six others sustained injuries.

·     One girl and two boys have been successfully brought back from the temporarily occupied territory of Kherson Oblast to the area under Ukrainian control. The 11-year-old girl was deprived of parental care and was at risk of ending up in an occupied orphanage. Accompanying her were two boys, aged 9 and 13. They were being cared for by their older adult brother on the occupied territory, who was at risk of being conscripted into the Russian army.

·     Ukrainian court sentenced a serviceman from the 94th Operational Deployment Regiment of the Russian National Guard to 12 years in prison for raping a female resident of the occupied Kherson Oblast.

·     Ivan Fedorov, the head of the Zaporizhzhia Regional Administration, announced plans to construct five underground schools in Zaporizhzhia city and the surrounding district. The objective is to offer the option for all interested children to resume in-person learning. Ultimately, the plan includes the establishment of 10 underground schools.

Centre for Defence Strategies (CDS) is a Ukrainian security think tank. We operate since 2020. We publish this brief daily. If you would like to subscribe, please send us an email at cds.dailybrief@gmail.com

Ukraine could face defeat in 2024. Here's how that might look - Frank Gardner BBC

Uma possibilidade bem real, dada a falta de apoio militar e econômico do Ocidente e de suas hesitações em atacar a Rússia diretamente, ou de estrangulá-la economicamente de forma mais efetiva. (PRA)

Ukraine could face defeat in 2024. Here's how that might look

By Frank Gardner

BBC security correspondent, April 12, 2024

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68778338

The former commander of the UK's Joint Forces Command has warned that Ukraine could face defeat by Russia in 2024.

General Sir Richard Barrons has told the BBC there is "a serious risk" of Ukraine losing the war this year. 

The reason, he says, is "because Ukraine may come to feel it can't win".

"And when it gets to that point, why will people want to fight and die any longer, just to defend the indefensible?"

Ukraine is not yet at that point. 

But its forces are running critically low on ammunition, troops and air defences. Its much-heralded counter-offensive last year failed to dislodge the Russians from ground they had seized and now Moscow is gearing up for a summer offensive. 

So what will that look like and what are its likely strategic objectives?

"The shape of the Russian offensive that's going to come is pretty clear," says Gen Barrons. 

"We are seeing Russia batter away at the front line, employing a five-to-one advantage in artillery, ammunition, and a surplus of people reinforced by the use of newish weapons."

These include the FAB glide bomb, an adapted Soviet-era "dumb bomb" fitted with fins, GPS guidance and 1500kg of high explosive, that is wreaking havoc on Ukrainian defences.

"At some point this summer," says Gen Barrons, "we expect to see a major Russian offensive, with the intent of doing more than smash forward with small gains to perhaps try and break through the Ukrainian lines. 

"And if that happens we would run the risk of Russian forces breaking through and then exploiting into areas of Ukraine where the Ukrainian armed forces cannot stop them."

But where? 

Last year the Russians knew exactly where Ukraine was likely to attack - from the direction of Zaporizhzhia south towards the Sea of Azov. They planned accordingly and successfully blunted Ukraine's advance. 

Now the boot is on the other foot as Russia masses its troops and keeps Kyiv guessing where it is going to attack next.

"One of the challenges the Ukrainians have," says Dr Jack Watling, senior research fellow in land warfare at the Whitehall thinktank the Royal United Services Institute (Rusi), "is that the Russians can choose where they commit their forces. 

"It's a very long front line and the Ukrainians need to be able to defend all of it."

Which, of course, they cannot.

"The Ukrainian military will lose ground," says Dr Watling. "The question is: how much and which population centres are going to be affected?"

It is quite possible that Russia's General Staff have yet to go firm on which direction to designate as their main effort. But it is possible to broadly break down their various options into three broad locations.

Kharkiv

"Kharkiv," says Dr Watling, "is certainly vulnerable."

As Ukraine's second city, situated perilously close to the Russian border, Kharkiv is a tempting goal for Moscow. 

It is currently being pummelled daily with Russian missile strikes, with Ukraine unable to field sufficient air defences to ward off the lethal mix of drones, cruise and ballistic missiles aimed in its direction. 

"I think the offensive this year will have breaking out of the Donbas as its first objective," adds Gen Barrons, "and their eye will be on Kharkiv which is 29km [18 miles] or so from the Russian border, a major prize."

Could Ukraine still function as a viable entity if Kharkiv were to fall? Yes, say analysts, but it would be a catastrophic blow to both its morale and its economy.

The Donbas

The area of eastern Ukraine known collectively as the Donbas has been at war since 2014, when Moscow-backed separatists declared themselves "people's republics". 

In 2022 Russia illegally annexed the two Donbas oblasts, or provinces, of Donetsk and Luhansk. This is where most of the fighting on land has been taking place over the past 18 months. 

Ukraine has, controversially, expended enormous efforts, in both manpower and resources, in trying to hold on to first the town of Bakhmut, and then Avdiivka. 

It has lost both, as well as some of its best fighting troops, in the attempt.  

Kyiv has countered that its resistance has inflicted disproportionately high casualties on the Russians. 

That is true, with the battlefield in these places being dubbed "the meat grinder". 

But Moscow has plenty more troops to throw into the fight - and Ukraine does not.

The Commander of US Forces in Europe, General Christopher Cavoli, has warned that unless the US rushes significantly more weapons and ammunition to Ukraine then its forces will be outgunned on the battlefield by ten to one.

Mass matters. The Russian army's tactics, leadership and equipment may be inferior to Ukraine's, but it has such superiority in numbers, especially artillery, that if it does nothing else this year, its default option will be to keep pushing Ukraine's forces back in a westward direction, taking village after village.

Zaporizhzhia

This, too, is a tempting prize for Moscow. 

The southern Ukrainian city of more than 700,000 (in peacetime) sits dangerously close to the Russian front lines.

It is also something of a thorn in Russia's side given that it is the capital of an oblast of the same name that Russia has illegally annexed, and yet the city is still living freely in Ukrainian hands.

But the formidable defences that Russia built south of Zaporizhzhia last year, in the correct expectation of a Ukrainian attack, would now complicate a Russian advance from there. 

The so-called Surovikin Line, consisting of triple layers of defences, is laced with the largest, most densely packed minefield in the world. Russia could partially dismantle this but its preparations would probably be detected. 

Russia's strategic objective this year may not even be territorial. It could simply be to crush Ukraine's fighting spirit and convince its Western backers that this war is a lost cause. 

Dr Jack Watling believes the Russian objective is "to try to generate a sense of hopelessness". 

"This [Russian] offensive will not decisively end the conflict, irrespective of how it goes for either side," he says.

Gen Barrons is also sceptical that, despite the dire situation Ukraine now finds itself in, Russia will automatically drive home its advantage with a decisive advance. 

"I think the most likely outcome is that Russia will have made gains, but will not have managed to break through. 

"It will not have forces that are big enough or good enough to punch all the way through to the river [Dnipro]... but the war will have turned in Russia's favour."

One thing is certain: Russia's President Vladimir Putin has no intention of giving up on his assault on Ukraine. 

He is like a poker player gambling all his chips on a win. He is counting on the West failing to supply Ukraine with the sufficient means to defend itself. 

Despite all the Nato summits, all the conferences and all the stirring speeches, there is a chance he may be right. 

Como lidar com o imperialismo expansionista russo-putinesco na Europa? - Sven Biscop (Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations_

 The phrase above applies to the European (and Belgian) elections, but also to the EU and its candidate countries. If the EU is not ready to do for Georgia and Moldova what it is doing for Ukraine, if necessary, it should not have invited them in. This is the argument of my new Egmont Commentary, which I hope will be of interest.

Best wishes,

 

Sven 

Prof. Dr. Sven Biscop   Director – Europe in the World Programme, Egmont Professor – Ghent University  Associate Member – Royal Academy for Overseas Sciences    Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations Rue des Petits Carmes 15, B-1000 Brussels + 32 473 31 68 23   s.biscop@egmontinstitute.be

 

If Russia “Protects” Transnistria, Will the EU Defend Moldova? And Georgia?

https://www.egmontinstitute.be/if-russia-protects-transnistria-will-the-eu-defend-moldova-and-georgia/

If Russia “Protects” Transnistria, Will the EU Defend Moldova? And Georgia?

By Sven Biscop

 (5 March 2024) 

In

 

• Commentaries

• EU and strategic partners,
 
• EU strategy and foreign policy,
 
• Europe in the world,
 
• European defence / NATO

 

On 28 February 2024, the day before Putin’s annual speech in parliament, Transnistria asked Russia for protection against Moldova, the state from which the region has broken away. Fabricating a threat against a kindred people as a pretext for invasion: the playbook is well known. That is how Russia has justified its wars against Georgia and Ukraine, and how it threatens the Baltic States. But the playbook is much older: in 1938-9, the purported plight of the Sudeten Germans was Hitler’s pretext for dismembering Czechoslovakia. There are parallels – but they do not run in Russia’s favour.

 

Minsk Is Not Munich

There are differences too. Russia already is in Transnistria, with some 1500 troops that have been there since 1992. And the EU already is in Moldova, with an EU Partnership Mission (EUPM) of up to 40 security officials, launched in April 2023 to assist with building resilience against hybrid actions. The West is not abandoning anybody, therefore. Indeed, Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands have only just opened an embassy in Chisinau, and Greece and Spain will follow shortly.

Perhaps Putin had understood the Minsk Agreements that France and Germany mediated between Ukraine and Russia in 2014-5 as a Munich moment: the first step towards the West letting Ukraine go. But then he overlooked another accord: the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, also signed in 2014, by which (wittingly or unwittingly) Europe committed itself to the survival of Ukraine, whatever the future might bring. Putin should have remembered that when Nazi Germany violated the Munich Agreement, Britain and France could indeed not prevent the destruction of Czechoslovakia – but they did then offer a security guarantee to Poland and went to War when Hitler invaded it. In a similar vein, Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine provoked the EU and the US into non-belligerent yet massive and indeed vital support for Kyiv. In June 2022, the EU accepted both Ukraine and Moldova as candidates for membership, cementing its commitment.

 

But the War Might Yet Expand

Putin did not actually mention Moldova in his speech. Perhaps the Transnistrian call for help is a sign of desperation more than anything else, as things have been going bad for the leadership ever since Ukraine closed the border when war started. Transnistria being where it is, Russia can difficultly reinforce or supply its troops there, and Russia has of course failed to link it up with the territory that it occupies in Ukraine. Nevertheless, if Putin felt it necessary to create a diversion, the troops currently in Transnistria could cause havoc. And already today Russia is engaged in a massive subversion campaign in Moldova. The call for protection is itself an example of that. Is the EUPM sufficient to bolster the country?

The EU also has to worry about Georgia, which in December 2023 became a candidate for membership as well. There too, Russian troops shore up breakaway regions: Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Those border on Russia, however; it is Georgia that is isolated, in a military sense. The Montreux Convention limits access via the Black Sea, and while the country does border on fellow EU candidate Turkey, the latter (though a NATO Ally) has its own special relationship with Russia. In case of renewed hostilities, how would the EU (and the US) get military support to Georgia? And in Georgia too, massive Russian influence operations are underway.

Even Armenia now appears to be hoping for some sort of security support from Europe. Armenia was gravely disappointed with Russia’s lack of support when in September 2023 Azerbaijan in a swift war took control of Nagorno-Karabakh. in February 2024, Armenia suspended its membership of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), its military alliance with Russia. Azerbaijan, at the same time, is a key partner of the EU’s Global Gateway. The EU need not choose sides between them; it needs a strategy for regional stability.

 

Defend Your Candidate!

Accepting a country as a candidate creates obligations towards it, and it alters the geopolitical position of the EU, almost as much as actual enlargement.

Enlargement always was a geopolitical project, but never before has it been actively contested by another great power. In the past, the EU has accepted as candidates countries that came out of war, on the Balkans, but never a country currently at war, like Ukraine, or facing a great risk of war, like Georgia and Moldova. In geopolitical terms, these were three buffer states in between the EU and Russia. Ukraine and Moldova have now become border states – they are the frontier of the West; Georgia, however, is a geopolitical outpost. The security guarantee contained in Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union does not yet apply, of course. But the EU can also not just stand idly by when a candidate is threatened or aggressed, in a military or a hybrid way – not without greatly damaging its credibility. And if the EU is not seen to stand up for its candidates, other powers might begin to doubt even the strength of solidarity between current Member States, to the detriment of deterrence.

By accepting new candidates, the EU has de facto altered its geopolitical situation. That must now be reflected in an updated strategy. At the very least, the EU should prepare contingency plans for non-belligerent support to Georgia and Moldova, up to the same massive scale as for Ukraine if necessary. That will require courage and resources. But if the EU is not willing to defend them, it should not have accorded candidate status to countries facing such a high risk of conflict. Geopolitics and strategy is not a game for the meek or the miserly.

 

Sven Biscop cannot help seeing historical analogies – he has just read too many books.