Os 28 pontos do Plano Trump-Putin para a capitulação da Ucrânia comentados por um especialista no assunto:
The Witkoff-Dmitriev peace plan annotated
Lawrence Freedman
Nov 21, 2025
https://samf.substack.com/p/the-witkoff-dmitriev-peace-plan-annotated
We now know a bit more about the process which led to the new peace plan and we now have a copy of its contents, to which I will turn soon.
Yesterday I noted that the plan, which was largely drafted by Steve Witkoff and Kirll Dmitriev, neither of whom are professional diplomats, was slanted in Russia’s favour, had been leaked by Dmitriev apparently to give it a push, had not been negotiated with either Kyiv or Moscow, and that many provisions were unclear even though the stories insisted that it was to be presented to Kyiv as a fait accompli.
With more reporting since I posted it seems that the proposal is more developed and has involved more people around the Trump administration. My guess is that as people looked at the plan it was starting to get pushback (possibly from Ukrainians) and that Dmitriev leaked it to give it a higher status and invest it with momentum, but that is only a guess.
At any rate if that is what was intended it succeeded as it is now being discussed as something real and in play. But it is clearly insufficiently developed to be presented as a fait accompli, and contrary to the original leaks, that will not now happen. This is not least because the Russians have been blindsided and are unhappy with the process and some of the content. So it is up for consultation and discussion with both sides.
We can now go further because a copy of the ‘28 point plan’ is in circulation, which I assess below. In key provisions, most importantly the territorial, but also in limiting the Ukrainian army and keeping Ukraine out of NATO, it reflects a Russian ‘wish list’, but it is only to fair to acknowledge that in some respects, notably on security guarantees and reconstruction, it tries to offer something to Ukraine. The effort appears to be one of trying to come up with a package that could work for both sides, though requiring both to make concessions.
By the nature of the conflict, the most important concessions come from Ukraine as it was the victim of aggression and it is its territory and not Russia’s that is occupied. But there is a lot in this that Russia still won’t like or at least will want to reframe. As important, it’s a dog’s breakfast, with some strange provisions, leaving open many questions for contentious interpretation and potential reframing.
I’ve provided annotations, noting the issues it raises. Others I’m sure will pick up points I’ve missed.
Ukraine’s sovereignty will be confirmed.
A full and comprehensive non-aggression agreement will be concluded between Russia, Ukraine, and Europe. All ambiguities of the past 30 years will be considered resolved.
[What ambiguities? Promises of non-aggression have been made before, for example in the 1997 Founding Act, so while these are good things to say it remains unclear how much they can be trusted]
Russia is expected not to invade neighboring countries, and NATO will not expand further.
[No membership of NATO for Ukraine, and also in this formulation, any other potential candidates, has been a feature of Trump plans from the start. What is ‘an expectation not to invade.’ It imposes no obligations. A simple ‘will not’ would suffice.]
A dialogue between Russia and NATO, mediated by the United States, will be held to address all security issues and create conditions for de-escalation, in order to ensure global security and increase opportunities for cooperation and future economic development.
[How can the US ‘mediate’ a dialogue between Russia and an alliance of which it is a part? Otherwise similar aspirations have been found in previous treaties].
Ukraine will receive reliable security guarantees.
[More on this below].
The size of the Armed Forces of Ukraine will be limited to 600,000 personnel.
[This is more than envisaged under previous Russian proposals - in 2022 it was 85,000 - but why is it needed for a sovereign country? There is no mention of limitations on particular classes of weapons - aircraft, tanks etc. There are no restrictions envisaged on Russian forces.]
Ukraine agrees to enshrine in its constitution that it will not join NATO, and NATO agrees to include a provision in its charters that Ukraine will not be admitted in the future.
[Ukraine aspires to join NATO. Its constitution can be changed to preclude that, though this will be contentious. It can then be changed back again at a later date. If this is referring to the 1949 Washington Treaty that was signed and sealed in 1949. It has only been amended to take account of new members. The NATO Council could certainly promise not to admit Ukraine, although it could also change its mind].
NATO agrees not to station troops in Ukraine.
[There goes the Coalition of the Willing (CoW), or at least the part of the plan that envisaged small European military contingents backing up Ukrainian front line forces (which would now also be limited).]
European fighter jets will be stationed in Poland.
[It’s an odd statement, as it is up to Poland, but I presume this is intended to rescue the part of the CoW plan that envisaged air support that could impose a no-fly zone. I can’t imagine Russia will be delighted by this but in practice it could happen anyway. No mention of potential role for CoW naval forces.]
U.S. guarantee:
The United States will receive compensation for providing the guarantee.
[What does this mean? From whom, in what form and how much? A security guarantee is a promise to act in certain contingencies. It doesn’t cost much to make the promise. This plays to Trump’s transactional view of alliance security but it is a weird insertion in a peace treaty]
▪️ If Ukraine invades Russia, it will lose the guarantee.
[Of course unlikely but remember that the Russian pretext for the full-scale invasion was that Ukrainian forces were ‘invading’ the Luhansk enclave]
▪️ If Russia invades Ukraine, then in addition to a decisive and coordinated military response, all global sanctions will be reinstated, recognition of new territory and all other benefits of this deal will be revoked.
[Well unless the US intends to do it all by itself ‘decisive and coordinated’ means a NATO response and not just a US one (so does NATO get compensated?). In fact this has more automaticity than NATO’s Article V. So Ukraine should be happy with this but for the same reason Russia will not. Once sanctions have been removed it will not be easy to reinstate them. If Ukrainian territories have been integrated into Russia does that mean that the US would lead a fight to get them back or just withdraw recognition?]
▪️ If Ukraine, without cause, launches a missile at Moscow or Saint Petersburg, the security guarantee will be considered void.
[But Rostov would be OK? And what would be sufficient cause to justify a missile launch? Another weird clause.]
Ukraine has the right to EU membership and will receive short-term preferential access to the European market while this issue is under consideration.
That is up to EU but nice if Russia conceded as this whole wretched business began when Putin tried to stop Ukraine signing an association agreement with the EU in 2013]
A powerful global package for Ukraine’s reconstruction, including but not limited to:
a. Creation of a Ukraine Development Fund to invest in fast-growing sectors, including technology, data centers, and artificial intelligence.
b. The United States will cooperate with Ukraine to jointly restore, develop, modernize, and operate Ukraine’s gas infrastructure, including pipelines and storage.
c. Joint efforts to rebuild war-affected territories to restore, reconstruct, and modernize cities and residential areas.
d. Infrastructure development.
e. Extraction of minerals and natural resources.
f. The World Bank will develop a special financing package to accelerate these efforts.
[In principle all good but this will require a lot of money. (e) presumably refers to the US-agreement on minerals but it is not explicit]
Russia will be reintegrated into the global economy:
a. Sanctions relief will be discussed and agreed upon gradually and individually.
b. The United States will conclude a long-term economic cooperation agreement aimed at mutual development in the spheres of energy, natural resources, infrastructure, artificial intelligence, data centers, Arctic rare-earth mining projects, and other mutually beneficial corporate opportunities.
c. Russia will be invited to return to the G8.
[Not surprising but Russia will worry that (a) will be a slow process, and it is very dependent upon EU and UK so they will need to agree package. This is their major leverage over the fate of this plan
Equally it is not for the US to decide alone if Russia can rejoin the G7. It has to be agreed by the other members]
Frozen assets will be used as follows:
US$100 billion of frozen Russian assets will be invested in U.S.-led efforts for Ukraine’s reconstruction and investment. The United States will receive 50% of the profits from this initiative.
Europe will add US$100 billion to increase the investment available for Ukraine’s reconstruction. European frozen assets will be unfrozen.
The remaining frozen Russian assets will be invested in a separate U.S.–Russia investment vehicle that will implement joint projects in designated areas. This fund will aim to strengthen relations and increase shared interests to create a strong incentive not to return to conflict.
[I can’t believe that Russia will agree to any of this. They want their assets back. Equally Ukraine wants them as reparations for all the losses they have suffered - and even then it will not be enough. What is with the US making a profit from this?]
A joint U.S.–Russia security working group will be established to facilitate and ensure implementation of all provisions of this agreement.
[At the very least Ukraine should also be part of this process, otherwise it is wholly reliant on the US to look after its interests when it has been doing the mediating. Russia will continue to accuse Ukraine of breaking provisions and Ukraine needs to be able to defend its position and point to areas of Russian non-compliance. As drafted denies Ukraine any agency over the implementation ]
Russia will codify a non-aggression policy toward Europe and Ukraine.
[Following the UN Charter would be a start. I’ve no idea what this could mean. Non-aggression should not be conditional.]
The United States and Russia will agree to extend nuclear non-proliferation and arms control treaties, including the START I Treaty.
[The non-proliferation is not time limited so it does not need extension. I presume they mean New START rather than START 1, and its extension would be welcome.]
Ukraine agrees to remain a non-nuclear state in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant will be put into operation under IAEA supervision, and the electricity produced will be distributed equally between Russia and Ukraine — 50:50.
[This assume Zaporizhzhia remains de facto part of Russia see below]
Both countries commit to implementing educational programs in schools and society aimed at fostering understanding and tolerance of different cultures and eliminating racism and prejudice:
a. Ukraine will adopt EU rules on religious tolerance and protection of linguistic minorities.
b. Both countries will agree to abolish all discriminatory measures and guarantee the rights of Ukrainian and Russian media and education.
c. All Nazi ideology and activity must be rejected and prohibited.
[Well good luck with all of that if it is supposed to apply to Russia. As the Kremlin has adopted its own self-serving definition of what constitutes Nazi ideology and activity (more or less anything hostile to Russia) we can only guess how this would be used. Equally interesting to see how Ukrainian rights are to be protected in Russia.]
Territories:
a. Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk will be recognized as de facto Russian, including by the United States.
b. Kherson and Zaporizhzhia will be frozen along the line of contact, effectively granting de facto recognition along that line.
c. Russia will relinquish other agreed territories it controls outside the five regions.
d. Ukrainian forces will withdraw from the part of Donetsk Oblast they currently control, and this withdrawal zone will be considered a neutral demilitarized buffer zone, internationally recognized as territory belonging to the Russian Federation. Russian forces will not enter this demilitarized zone.
[This meets Russia’s core territorial demand, although with some strange twists. De facto is less than de jure. It normally refers to a situation that exists in reality and cannot easily be changed, but is not necessarily recognized in law. In the event of a ceasefire being agreed it was always safest to assume that the occupied territories would become de facto Russian, without being recognised as such by Ukraine or the wider international community (as with Crimea). De jure refers to situations that are legally recognised and have official status. Russia has incorporated the four claimed oblasts into its constitution and wants them officially recognised. At any rate you don’t formally recognise something as de facto - it just is. So this would be meaningless. Russia will want de jure.
Turning the remaining part of Donetsk into a neutral demilitarised zone is an odd sort of compromise. First this is full of Ukrainian defences, including minefields (there are no reference to demining anywhere in the document). Demilitarising it would be no small matter. And if it is part of Russia - even if de facto - how can it be neutral. Ukrainians also live there. Are they supposed to abandon their homes or become Russian or have some limbo status because they are in neutral territory?]
After future territorial arrangements are agreed, both Russia and Ukraine commit not to alter them by force. Any security guarantees will not apply if this obligation is violated.
Russia will not obstruct Ukraine’s use of the Dnipro River for commercial activities, and agreements will be reached on the free transport of grain through the Black Sea.
[There were agreements on this in the past which Russia abandoned]
A humanitarian committee will be created to resolve outstanding issues:
a. All remaining prisoners and bodies will be exchanged on an “all for all” basis.
b. All civilian detainees and hostages, including children, will be returned.
c. A family reunification program will be implemented.
d. Measures will be taken to alleviate the suffering of victims of the conflict.
[Hard to object but not exactly strong on detail]
Ukraine will hold elections in 100 days.
[There is a need for Ukrainian elections but it also requires the conditions for them to be conducted safely. Can the residents of Donetsk vote? At rate elections are up to the Ukrainians as a sovereign country. Why not include a demand for free and fair Russian elections?]
All parties involved in this conflict will receive full amnesty for actions during the war and agree not to bring claims or pursue grievances in the future.
[War crimes go unpunished].
This agreement will be legally binding.
Its implementation will be monitored and guaranteed by a Peace Council chaired by President Donald J. Trump. Sanctions will be imposed for violations.
[This is modelled on Gaza. How does it relate to point 15 or indeed the other provisions on guarantees? What happens when Trump goes? Who will be on this Peace Council? What will be the terms of reference? Most peace treaties will have provisions to deal with disputes and if necessary provide for arbitration. With Gaza the Trump plan was backed by the great majority of regional states and the aim was to write Hamas out of the script. The military and political relationships were quite different.]
Once all parties accept this memorandum, a ceasefire will take effect immediately after both sides withdraw to the agreed points for the start of the agreement’s implementation.
Wisely Zelenskyy has said he’ll work with the Americans on the plan. He might as well wait until the Russians formulate a response. For now their reaction has been muted. If the Russians just accepted it they could claim a sort of victory but it would not quite be on their terms. As I surmised yesterday and have shown above this is not a fully developed plan which could be presented, as was the Gaza plan, on a take it or leave it basis. Even then Netanyahu fiddled with the details at the end.
This is a plan that even if there was no change to the underlying principles and concessions would require a lot more work, and so will delay a ceasefire. As soon as both sides can object and amend that will lead to a protracted negotiation and so even more delay. The advantage is that having a plan set down allows one to see the pitfalls. It does not necessarily enable one to see a way though them.
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domingo, 23 de novembro de 2025
The Witkoff-Dmitriev peace plan annotated - Lawrence Freedman
terça-feira, 18 de março de 2025
The Fragile Axis of Upheaval (China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia) - Christopher S. Chivvis (Foreign Affairs)
The Fragile Axis of Upheaval
Foreign Affairs, March 18, 2025
CHRISTOPHER S. CHIVVIS is Director of the American Statecraft Program and a Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Even regional wars have geopolitical consequences, and when it comes to Russia’s war on Ukraine, the most important of these has been the formation of a loose entente among China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. Some U.S. national security experts have taken to calling this group “the axis of upheaval” or “the axis of autocracy,” warning that the United States must center this entente in its foreign policy and focus on containing or defeating it. It is not only Washington policymakers who worry about a new, well-coordinated anti-American bloc: in a November 2024 U.S. public opinion poll by the Ronald Reagan Institute, 86 percent of respondents agreed that they were either “extremely” or “somewhat” concerned by the increased cooperation between these U.S. adversaries.
There is no question that these countries threaten U.S. interests, or that their cooperation has strengthened lately. But the axis framing overstates the depth and permanence of their alignment. The coalition has been strengthened by the Ukraine war, but its members’ interests are less well fitted than they appear on the surface. Washington should not lump these countries together. Historically, when countries roll separate threats into a monolithic one, it is a strategic mistake. U.S. leaders need to make a more nuanced and accurate analysis of the threats that they pose, or else the fear of an axis of autocracies could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. When the war ends, the United States and its allies should seize opportunities to loosen the coalition’s war-forged bonds.
INTERIM ORDER
Cooperation among these four countries is not entirely new. North Korea has been dependent on China for almost 75 years. Moscow’s relationships with both Beijing and Tehran were often rocky during the Cold War, but the Soviet Union’s 1991 collapse opened the door to rapprochements. During Donald Trump’s first presidency, signs that China and Russia were deepening their partnership began emerging. Russia and Iran, meanwhile, found themselves on the same side of the Syrian civil war after Moscow intervened in 2015 to support Bashar al-Assad’s regime.
The war in Ukraine, however, has poured high-octane accelerant on these embers of cooperation, and the resulting collaborations have damaged Western interests. There is no question that Russia’s recent cooperation with China, Iran, and North Korea has helped the Kremlin resist the West’s military and economic pressures. Iran’s provision of drones and medium-range ballistic missiles in return for Russian intelligence and fighter aircraft allowed Russia to hammer Ukraine’s military and civilian infrastructure without depleting its stocks of other weapons and weakening its defenses against NATO. By contributing 11,000 troops as well as munitions, artillery, and missiles to Russia’s war effort, North Korea has helped Russia gradually push back the Ukrainian occupation of Kursk; Russia’s compensations of oil, fighter aircraft and potentially other weapons blunt the effect of international sanctions on North Korea and may embolden Pyongyang to further provoke Seoul. And Beijing’s decision to look the other way as Chinese firms supply Moscow with dual-use goods (in exchange for certain defense technologies and less expensive energy) has helped Russia produce advanced weaponry despite Western sanctions.
In June 2024, Russia and North Korea signed a mutual defense treaty. Iran and Russia have promised to strengthen their economic cooperation and, in January, signed their own defense agreement. China, Iran, and North Korea—like many other countries around the world—have also refused to join U.S.-led sanctions on Russia. Meanwhile, Russia has blocked UN sanctions monitors from continuing their work in North Korea.
These four countries will no doubt continue to parrot one another’s criticisms of the United States well after the war in Ukraine ends. For the most part, however, the forms of cooperation that have most worried Washington have directly involved that war, and its end will attenuate the coalition’s most important new bonds. It is not at all uncommon for wartime coalitions to fall apart once a war ends, and after the war, the Kremlin is likely to renege on some of its wartime promises. Russia will have less need to pay off Iran, for example. Likewise, as the pressure to refill its depleted supply of troops dissipates, the Kremlin will become less keen to get entangled in North Korea’s conflicts in East Asia.
Beijing’s wartime support for Moscow was already restrained and conditional: going too far to back Russia’s war would have damaged China’s relations with Europe and exposed it to secondary sanctions. China’s support has also been driven by fear that a Russian defeat could yield a Western-oriented Kremlin or chaos on the Chinese-Russian border. Once the war ends, however, that fear will recede, and with it, China’s enthusiasm for materially supporting Russia. If Russian energy begins to flow back toward Europe, that would also loosen the economic bond the war generated between these two powers.
REVERSE TIDES
When the wartime closeness of these countries is projected linearly into the future, their divergent national interests become obscured. China, for example, has long sought closer relations with the EU; deepening its partnership with Russia impedes this strategic objective. China and Ukraine once had a productive bilateral relationship, and both may wish to return to it once the war is over. Russia, meanwhile, is suspicious of China’s growing economic influence in Central Asia, which the Kremlin considers its own privileged sphere. These tensions are likely to resurface once the war is over. Notably, China almost certainly would prefer to be at the center of a reformed global order, not at the center of a coalition whose other three members are economic and political pariahs.
Some analysts claim that a common autocratic ideology will bind China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia together in the long term. But autocracy is not an ideology. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and its Marxist-Leninist allies were bound by a real ideology that not only called for revolution across the liberal capitalist world but also offered a utopian vision for a new global order. No such common cause binds Iran’s religious theocracy, Russia’s neoimperialist nationalism, the hereditary despotism of North Korea’s regime, and the blend of nationalism, Confucianism, and Marxism-Leninism that animates the Chinese Communist Party. Instead, this coalition is bound by a fear of the United States and an objection to an international order that they believe reflects U.S. preferences. Although many other states share this critique of the international order, the varied ideologies of this coalition offer no positive vision that could replace the existing system.
Furthermore, although Washington has conceived of its autocratic adversaries as a cohesive unit, almost all their cooperation has been through bilateral channels. If the war in Ukraine continues, some military institutionalization might grow out of it, but right now, the institutional foundations of the autocracies’ relationships are very weak. What has been cast as an axis is actually six overlapping bilateral relationships. Since 2019, for example, China, Iran, and Russia have occasionally conducted joint military exercises in a trilateral format, but these exercises had little strategic relevance. These states have not congealed into anything remotely resembling the Warsaw Pact. In the absence of new institutions, coordinated action will be much more difficult.
DIVIDE AND NEUTRALIZE
Even though the bonds that unite China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia are currently weak, they could still strengthen with time. Western countries need to adopt a statecraft that reduces this risk. Their first step should be to focus on ending the war in Ukraine. Trump has initiated an ambitious and controversial opening to Moscow that may result in a cease-fire and a negotiated settlement. Trump has indulged in overly optimistic rhetoric about Moscow’s sincerity, and questions about his true aims linger. Nevertheless, a cease-fire would greatly reduce the pressures that bind the so-called axis of upheaval together. If U.S. leaders negotiate with Moscow, that would also signal to Beijing that they are willing to consider wider-ranging negotiations with it, and these could further disrupt the coalition.
Indeed, the second way to loosen the coalition’s bonds is for the United States to stabilize or improve its own relations with China, by far the most powerful member of the group. Steering the U.S.-Chinese relationship toward more stability will be hard, but—perhaps as part of a larger deal on trade and investment—Trump could reassure Beijing that the United States does not want outright economic decoupling or to change the status quo on Taiwan. China needs the other three coalition powers far less than they need China, which means it may be the most willing to make its own deal with the United States.
Stabilizing relations with Beijing is thus a more realistic near-term goal than trying to bring Russia swiftly back into the European fold. Too sudden and dramatic a U-turn in U.S.-Russian relations would alienate key U.S. allies in Europe and needlessly entrench a transatlantic rift. It would be similarly unwise for the United States to take the Kremlin’s assurances about Ukraine or Europe at face value, given Russia’s deep grievances toward the West and its leaders’ proclivity for deception. With a cease-fire in place, however, the United States and Europe could consider making limited improvements to their economic relations with Russia, which would help attenuate Russia’s ties with China. And just as an end to the war in Ukraine would almost certainly weaken the coalition’s bonds, so would a new nuclear agreement between the United States and Iran that reduces the need to launch military strikes against Tehran’s nuclear program and allows the country to find outlets for its oil other than China.
UNTIE THE KNOT
If, however, the United States insists on treating this new coalition’s emergence as if it were a revival of the Warsaw Pact, the putative axis of autocracies will probably coalesce and end up posing a much greater danger. Russia and China once supported international nonproliferation efforts, including attempts to prevent Iran and North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons. China and Russia should not want a global nuclear cascade, but if the United States remains implacably hostile to them, that might lead Moscow to adopt an “if you can’t stop them, help them” approach and back Pyongyang’s and Tehran’s nuclear programs. Both Iran and North Korea could then use Russian nuclear and missile technology to develop advanced weapons that would hamper the U.S. military’s response options in East Asia and the Middle East—and even threaten the American homeland.
Of equal concern is the possibility that China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia will use their wartime cooperation as a model for opportunistic coordination in the future. In general, autocratic countries struggle to make the kind of credible commitments that joint military planning requires, but a coordinated attack on U.S. interests in multiple regions might still emerge through improvisation. For example, if China attacks Taiwan, and the United States comes to the island’s defense, Russia could take advantage of Washington’s distraction to seize a slice of the Baltic states, and Iran could see an opportunity to attack Israel. Such a multifront assault on U.S. allies would stretch American resources to the maximum or beyond it.
These possibilities make it important for the United States to get its strategy right today. Bundling the threats the four so-called axis states pose is politically convenient in Washington, because it placates interest groups in the U.S. national security ecosphere that would otherwise compete for resources. But the hidden costs will be high.
Fear generates an impulse to fight back against U.S. adversaries on all possible fronts. But if a country gives in to the impulse to fight everywhere all at once it sows the seeds of its own decline. Before World War I, for example, Germany tried to challenge the United Kingdom at sea while also dominating France and Russia on the European continent. It ended up fatally overstretched. Likewise, when Japan in the 1930s attempted to meet both its army’s aspirations for an Asian empire and its navy’s demands for a Pacific fleet, it ended up bogged down in China and at war with the world’s foremost industrial power, the United States. Instead of treating China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia as an inexorable bloc, the United States and its allies should work to loosen their ties by exploiting the fissures that the war in Ukraine has concealed.
domingo, 24 de novembro de 2024
Stephen Kotkin: Russia, Back to the USSR or back to the Tsarist Empire? - Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies
Stephen Kotkin: Russia, Back to the USSR or back to the Tsarist Empire?
Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University
https://www.youtube.com/live/jJSDdCPpbto?si=S19lYQG0-n2LZbH0
Please join the inaugural event in our new speaker series "Russia: In Search of a New Paradigm — Conversations With Yevgenia Albats" to hear historian Stephen Kotkin and our eminent host discuss Russia's latest shift to aggressive militarism.
Why has Russia evolved into an aggressive militaristic power? Was this the inevitable result of its past imperialist history or an outcome of mistakes made after the Soviet collapse? Will Vladimir Putin pursue all-out war in Europe? What are the meaningful similarities and differences between today and the Cold War era? Is it time to think about averting a new Armageddon?
These and many other questions will lie at the heart of the conversation.
0:00 Welcoming Speech by Eve Blau
4:00 Introduction by Dmitry Gorenburg
7:53 Overview by Yevgenia Albats
9:13 What Was Putin's Rationale for the Invasion of Ukraine?
14:17 Stephen Kotkin's Analysis of the Beginning of the War
31:04 Yevgenia Albats Inquires about Putin's Mind
32:02 Stephen Kotkin Discusses Putin's Political Career
1:01:21 Yevgenia Albats and Stephen Kotkin Discuss Russia's Place in the World
1:04:31 Yevgenia Albats Presents Angela Merkel's Analysis
1:07:06 Stephen Kotkin Comments on Merkel's Analysis and the Russian Economy
1:19:03 Yevgenia Albats and Stephen Kotkin Address Trump's Policies
1:21:13 Yevgenia Albats on Russian Elites
1:24:26 Stephen Kotkin Explains the Behavior of Russian Elites
1:41:06 Yevgenia Albats and Stephen Kotkin Discuss Possibilities of War in Europe
1:47:30 Stephen Kotkin on the Use of Nuclear Weapons
1:54:09 Q&A with Audience Members
sexta-feira, 27 de setembro de 2024
The war is going badly. Ukraine and its allies must change course - The Economist leader
Zelensky in Washington
The war is going badly. Ukraine and its allies must change course
Time for credible war aims—and NATO membership
The Economist, September 26, 2024
IF UKRAINE AND its Western backers are to win, they must first have the courage to admit that they are losing. In the past two years Russia and Ukraine have fought a costly war of attrition. That is unsustainable. When Volodymyr Zelensky travelled to America to see President Joe Biden this week, he brought a “plan for victory”, expected to contain a fresh call for arms and money. In fact, Ukraine needs something far more ambitious: an urgent change of course.
A measure of Ukraine’s declining fortunes is Russia’s advance in the east, particularly around the city of Pokrovsk. So far, it is slow and costly. Recent estimates of Russian losses run at about 1,200 killed and wounded a day, on top of the total of 500,000. But Ukraine, with a fifth as many people as Russia, is hurting too. Its lines could crumble before Russia’s war effort is exhausted.
Ukraine is also struggling off the battlefield. Russia has destroyed so much of the power grid that Ukrainians will face the freezing winter with daily blackouts of up to 16 hours. People are tired of war. The army is struggling to mobilise and train enough troops to hold the line, let alone retake territory. There is a growing gap between the total victory many Ukrainians say they want, and their willingness or ability to fight for it.
Abroad, fatigue is setting in. The hard right in Germany and France argue that supporting Ukraine is a waste of money. Donald Trump could well become president of the United States. He is capable of anything, but his words suggest that he wants to sell out Ukraine to Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin.
If Mr Zelensky continues to defy reality by insisting that Ukraine’s army can take back all the land Russia has stolen since 2014, he will drive away Ukraine’s backers and further divide Ukrainian society. Whether or not Mr Trump wins in November, the only hope of keeping American and European support and uniting Ukrainians is for a new approach that starts with leaders stating honestly what victory means.
As The Economist has long argued, Mr Putin attacked Ukraine not for its territory, but to stop it becoming a prosperous, Western- leaning democracy. Ukraine’s partners need to get Mr Zelensky to persuade his people that this remains the most important prize in this war. However much Mr Zelensky wants to drive Russia from all Ukraine, including Crimea, he does not have the men or arms to do it. Neither he nor the West should recognise Russia’s bogus claim to the occupied territories; rather, they should retain reunification as an aspiration.
In return for Mr Zelensky embracing this grim truth, Western leaders need to make his overriding war aim credible by ensuring that Ukraine has the military capacity and security guarantees it needs. If Ukraine can convincingly deny Russia any prospect of advancing further on the battlefield, it will be able to demonstrate the futility of further big offensives. Whether or not a formal peace deal is signed, that is the only way to wind down the fighting and ensure the security on which Ukraine’s prosperity and democracy will ultimately rest.
This will require greater supplies of the weaponry Mr Zelensky is asking for. Ukraine needs long-range missiles that can hit military targets deep in Russia and air defences to protect its infrastructure. Crucially, it also needs to make its own weapons. Today, the country’s arms industry has orders worth $7bn, only about a third of its potential capacity. Weapons firms from America and some European countries have been stepping in; others should, too. The supply of home-made weapons is more dependable and cheaper than Western-made ones. It can also be more innovative. Ukraine has around 250 drone companies, some of them world leaders— including makers of the long-range machines that may have been behind a recent hit on a huge arms dump in Russia’s Tver province.
The second way to make Ukraine’s defence credible is for Mr Biden to say Ukraine must be invited to join NATO now, even if it is divided and, possibly, without a formal armistice. Mr Biden is known to be cautious about this. Such a declaration from him, endorsed by leaders in Britain, France and Germany, would go far beyond today’s open-ended words about an “irrevocable path” to membership.
This would be controversial, because NATO’s members are expected to support each other if one of them is attacked. In opening a debate about this Article 5 guarantee, Mr Biden could make clear that it would not cover Ukrainian territory Russia occupies today, as with East Germany when West Germany joined NATO in 1955; and that Ukraine would not necessarily garrison foreign NATO troops in peacetime, as with Norway in 1949.
NATO membership entails risks. If Russia struck Ukraine again, America could face a terrible dilemma: to back Ukraine and risk war with a nuclear foe; or refuse and weaken its alliances around the world. However, abandoning Ukraine would also weaken all of America’s alliances—one reason China, Iran and North Korea are backing Russia. Mr Putin is clear that he sees the real enemy as the West. It is deluded to think that leaving Ukraine to be defeated will bring peace.
Indeed, a dysfunctional Ukraine could itself become a dangerous neighbour. Already, corruption and nationalism are on the rise. If Ukrainians feel betrayed, Mr Putin may radicalise battle-hardened militias against the West and NATO. He managed something similar in Donbas where, after 2014, he turned some Russian-speaking Ukrainians into partisans ready to go to war against their compatriots.
For too long, the West has hidden behind the pretence that if Ukraine set the goals, it would decide what arms to supply. Yet Mr Zelensky cannot define victory without knowing the level of Western support. By contrast, the plan outlined above is self- reinforcing. A firmer promise of NATO membership would help Mr Zelensky redefine victory; a credible war aim would deter Russia; NATO would benefit from Ukraine’s revamped arms industry. Forging a new victory plan asks a lot of Mr Zelensky and Western leaders. But if they demur, they will usher in Ukraine’s defeat. And that would be much worse.
sábado, 13 de abril de 2024
Financial Times on Russia: a special edition April 10, 2024
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segunda-feira, 19 de fevereiro de 2024
Gazprom grapples with collapse in sales to Europe -Financial Times
Gazprom grapples with collapse in sales to Europe
quarta-feira, 31 de janeiro de 2024
Sanções econômicas como arma de guerra - Palestra de Paulo Roberto de Almeida, a convite de Vladimir Aras (2022)
Sanções econômicas como arma de guerra
Palestra de Paulo Roberto de Almeida, a convite de Vladimir Aras
Eis o texto citado na minha alocução:
4131. “Consequências econômicas da guerra da Ucrânia”, Brasília, 19 abril 2022, 18 p. Notas para desenvolvimento oral em palestra-debate promovida no canal Instagram do Instituto Direito e Inovação (prof. Vladimir Aras), no dia 21/04/22. Nova versão reformatada e acrescida do trabalho 4132, sob o título “A guerra da Ucrânia e as sanções econômicas multilaterais”, com sumário, anexo e bibliografia. Divulgado preliminarmente na plataforma Academia.edu (link: https://www.academia.edu/77013457/AguerradaUcrâniaeassançõeseconômicasmultilaterais2022) e anunciado no blog Diplomatizzando (20/04/2022; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2022/04/a-guerra-da-ucrania-e-as-sancoes.html). Transmissão via Instagram (21/04/2022; 16:00-17:06; link: https://www.instagram.com/tv/CcoEemiljnq/?igshid=YmMyMTA2M2Y=); (Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/p/CcoEemiljnq/).
domingo, 28 de janeiro de 2024
The most dangerous European scenario - Jakub Janda
From @JakubJanda:
“THE MOST DANGEROUS EUROPEAN SCENARIO:
Jakub Janda
Jan 27, 20333
(based on my private talks with many European political and military leaders)
If the United States would end its material military support to Ukraine in short and mid-term, it could mean the following cascade of (worst case) events:
- since Europe is unable to deliver weapons & ammo Ukraine needs in near-close quality and quantity, Ukrainian defenders will have to first select to which attackers they shoot at, later this will become a strategic problem forcing Ukrainian leadership to search for any form of cease-fire
- why would terrorist Russia agree on any cease-fire or keep such promise if they would see their own strategic initiative and Ukraine desperately lacking defensive weps and ammo? Russia would keep attacking until Ukraine has to plead for capitulation, likely leading to internal political instability in Ukraine
- during this process, we can expect several million Ukrainians running West in panic, flooding Central and part of Western Europe, leading to natural rise of far-right (which is always a Russian fifth column), shaking internal stability of European NATO member states
- since most of Europe lacks large and modern air force able to deterring Russia, we will be (as always) dependent on the decisions of the American President. Those hundreds of F-35s ordered by European nations will be coming after like 2028/2030, so we have at least 4-5 year gap when much of Europe is really vulnerable.
- Even if brave countries like Poland, Sweden, Finland or Baltic republics spend as much as they urgently can, our strategic balance of (military and political) power to Russian terrorists is not favourable to Europeans, if we cannot be sure about American strategic decisions after January 2025
- we see a lot of symbolic actions by large European economies (Germany, France, Italy, Spain), but are they running their defense industry and spending to semi-war levels like Russia does? Not at all, because they are not scared by the most realistic change of Russian attack on EU/NATO countries in last four decades. Why? Because they are not in the first line and many within their economic establishments still hope to get back to “normal” business with Russia. We are facing the most dangerous split over strategic plans across European allies now.
So, supporting Ukrainian defenders with everything we have got is the only realistic change we have to keep this war from erupting in a geostrategic disaster for Europe.”
quinta-feira, 25 de janeiro de 2024
Ucrânia ataca pontos sensíveis da infraestrutura econômica russa - Tendar
From X, January 24, 2024
The strike against Russian oil facilities in Tuapse, Russia, only days after the successful strike against the Ust-Luga terminal removes all doubt that we are dealing with a targeted effort to eliminate all major Russian oil and gas ports, so that they are rendered useless for any operations.
When looking at the Russian oil and gas pipeline map, then you will notice that almost all of them head West. There is a small pipeline going east, but it is not connected to the main oil fields in Western Siberia and only small in size. Russia's economic lifeline goes all the way West. In the past, this was the matter of problems for the West, since Russia used this power to blackmail Europe. Now, its close proximity has become the source of weakness.
Among all of those pipelines only 5 end in Russian sea ports. Every other pipeline, especially the Druzhba pipeline, enters Western (NATO) territory and are therefore subject of sanctions or worse. The Druzhba pipeline goes anyway partly through Ukrainian territory and the rest such as the pumping stations are anyway in firing range.
3 of the pipelines end near Sankt Petersburg in the Baltic Sea, 2 of them go the Black Sea. Among of them, Ukraine successfully struck 2 already. Ust-Luga is inoperable for the next weeks or even months. Shipping companies will increasingly reconsider sending their vessels to those ports which are military targets.
This will be a big headache for the Russian war effort. The current attacks are still small in size, using a handful of drones, but already caused considerable damage. When Ukraine starts mass-hitting those ports, then the Russian air defense will not be able to stop the outcome, even when destroying 99% of all drones.
The National Geographic map is from 2006 and yet not much has changed since then. The major difference I see is the extension of the natural gas pipeline grid of which some have been turned into "sea water pipelines". The irony behind that speak for itself. Putin and his oligarchs never ever anticipated this situation, like everything since February 2022. Everything what Moscow does makes a bad situation worse and I'm sure that sooner or later somebody in Putin's circle (of which nobody is a saint but simply tired of this vicious cycle) will do the math that it is easier to remove Putin than remove the Ukraine will for freedom and independence.
#Ukraine #Russia #Oil #NaturalGas
segunda-feira, 22 de janeiro de 2024
The global consequences of the war in Ukraine - Joschka Fischer (Social Europe)
The global consequences of the war in Ukraine
JOSCHKA FISCHER
That Russia lacks the means to achieve its neo-imperial vision will not stop it from pursuing it to the bitter end.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24th 2022 changed everything for Ukraine, for Europe and for global politics. The world entered a new era of great-power rivalry in which war could no longer be excluded. Apart from the immediate victims, Russia’s aggression most concerned Europe. A great power seeking to extinguish an independent smaller country by force challenges the core principles upon which the European order of states has organised itself for decades.
The war of Vladimir Putin, the Russian president, stands in stark contrast to the self-dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, which occurred in a largely non-violent manner. Since the Mikhail Gorbachev ‘miracle’—when the Soviet Union started pursuing liberalising reforms under him in the 1980s—Europeans had begun to imagine that Immanuel Kant’s vision of perpetual peace on the continent might be possible. It was not.
Historical revision
The problem was that many Russian elites’ interpretation of the globally significant events of the late 1980s could not be more opposed to Kant’s idea. They saw the demise of the great Russian empire (which the Soviets had recreated) as a devastating defeat. Though they had no choice but to accept the humiliation, they told themselves they would do so only temporarily until the balance of power had changed. Then the great historical revision could begin.
Thus, the 2022 attack on Ukraine should be viewed as merely the most ambitious of the revisionist wars Russia has waged since Putin came to power. We can expect many more, especially if Donald Trump returns to the White House and effectively withdraws the United States from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
But Putin’s latest war not only changed the rules of coexistence on the European continent; it also changed the global order. By triggering a sweeping remilitarisation of foreign policy, the war has seemingly returned us to a time, deep in the 20th century, when wars of conquest were a staple of the great-power toolkit. Now, as then, might makes right.
Cold war
Even during the decades-long cold war, there was no risk of a ‘new Sarajevo’—the political fuse that detonated the first world war—because the standoff between two nuclear superpowers subordinated all other interests, ideologies and political conflicts. What mattered were the superpowers’ own claims to power and stability within the territories they controlled. The risk of another world war had been replaced by the risk of mutually assured destruction, which functioned as an automatic stabiliser within the bipolar system of the cold war.
Behind Putin’s war on Ukraine is the neo-imperial goal that many Russian elites share: to make Russia great again by reversing the results of the collapse of the Soviet Union. On December 8th 1991, the presidents of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine met in Białowieża National Park and agreed to dissolve the Soviet Union, reducing a ‘superpower’ to a regional (albeit still nuclear-armed) power in the form of the Russian Federation.
No, Putin does not want to revive the communist Soviet Union. Today’s Russian elite knows that the Soviet system could not be sustained. Putin has embraced autocracy, oligarchy and empire to restore Russia’s status as a global power, but he also knows that Russia lacks the economic and technological prerequisites to achieve this on its own.
For its part, Ukraine wants to join the west—meaning the European Union and the transatlantic security community of NATO. Should it succeed, it would probably be lost to Russia for good, and its own embrace of western values would pose a grave danger to Putin’s regime. Ukraine’s modernisation would lead Russians to ask why their political system had consistently failed to achieve similar results. From a ‘Great Russia’ perspective, it would compound the disaster of 1991. That is why the stakes in Ukraine are so high, and why it is so hard to imagine the conflict ending through compromise.
Junior partner
Even in the case of an armistice along the frozen front line, neither Russia nor Ukraine will distance themselves politically from their true war aims. The Kremlin will not give up on the complete conquest and subjugation (if not annexation) of Ukraine, and Ukraine will not abandon its goal of liberating all its territory (including Crimea) and joining the EU and NATO. An armistice thus would be a volatile interim solution involving the defence of a highly dangerous ‘line of control’ on which Ukraine’s freedom and Europe’s security depended.
Since Russia no longer has the economic, military and technological capabilities to compete for the top spot on the world stage, its only option is to become a permanent junior partner to China, implying quasi-voluntary submission under a kind of second Mongol vassalage. Let us not forget: Russia survived two attacks from the west in the 19th and 20th centuries—by Napoleon I and Adolf Hitler, respectively. The only invaders who have conquered it were the Mongols in the winter of 1237-38. Throughout Russia’s history, its vulnerability in the east has had far-reaching consequences.
The main geopolitical divide of the 21st century will centre on the Sino-American rivalry. Though Russia will hold a junior position, it nonetheless will play an important role as a supplier of raw materials and—owing to its dreams of empire—as a permanent security risk. Whether this will be enough to satisfy Russian elites’ self-image is an open question.
Joschka Fischer
Joschka Fischer was Germany’s foreign minister and vice-chancellor from 1998 to 2005 and a leader in the German Green Party for almost 20 years.
Joschka Fischer was Germany’s foreign minister and vice-chancellor from 1998 to 2005 and a leader in the German Green Party for almost 20 years.
Copyright Project Syndicate 2024, ‘The global consequences of the war in Ukraine’