Book review: Robin M. Allers on Mathieu Segers, 'The Origins of European Integration: The Pre-History of Today's European Union, 1937–1951'

 

H-Diplo: New posted content

Allers on Segers, 'The Origins of European Integration: The Pre-History of Today's European Union, 1937–1951' [Review]

H-Net Reviews

Segers, Mathieu.  The Origins of European Integration: The Pre-History of Today's European Union, 1937–1951. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023. 244 pp. $29.99 (paper), ISBN 9781009379427.

Reviewed by Robin M. Allers (Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies)
Published on H-Diplo (November, 2024)
Commissioned by Seth Offenbach (Bronx Community College, The City University of New York)

Printable Version: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showpdf.php?id=60570

Anyone studying the European Union has come across the policymakers and planners who are commonly known as its founding fathers. Thousands of books and articles have been written about and programs, universities, and buildings are named after the Frenchmen Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, the German Konrad Adenauer, the Belgian Paul Henri Spaak, the Italian Alcide de Gasperi, and a handful of others. These individuals, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, conceived and implemented the truly revolutionary plan to bring former wartime enemies together in a Western European community and to pool their coal and steel industries in a new organizational construct that combined intergovernmental and supranational elements. Textbooks and general introductions to the history of the European Union usually start with a chapter on the first steps of this integration process, which started in the late 1940s as part of broader conversations on the postwar international order.[1] Most also include some pages or paragraphs on earlier plans for a united Europe, going back to the interwar years and the Second World War, when resistance movements, as well as individuals, groups, and governments in exile, took part in discussions about the postwar international order and different schemes for European cooperation, many of them motivated by a dream to prevent future wars.[2] The lasting fame of the founding fathers, who the historian Alan S. Milward sarcastically called “the European Saints,” is due to the fact that they, with the help of the United States, designed and implemented organizational structures that, at least partly, achieved these dreams in the western part of Europe.[3]

This “pre-history of today’s European Union” is the theme of this book that seeks to “re-discover the history of the origins and beginnings of the present-day Europe of European integration” (pp. 4-5). More specifically, it wants to “open the complex genealogy” of Western Europe by analyzing the discussions about Europe’s postwar future as “a battle of blueprints” and describing the interaction of thinkers, movers, and shakers as a virtual “European Republic of Planning” (pp. 18, 3, 5).

The author, Mathieu Segers, tragically passed away after completing this work, which, according to his own account, is the product of ten years of research. With the book, he builds on his earlier studies on Dutch and German European policy while at the same time synthesizing research conducted as part of a multiyear project on the historiography of European history and European integration with a focus on emotions and ecclesiastical actors.[4] In addition to an impressive mastery of the existing literature on European integration, European and transatlantic policy networks, and intellectual debates in resistance movements among economists and in ecclesiastical circles, the book is based on a significant number of published and unpublished sources from British, Dutch, German, and EU archives. Segers aims at tackling two weaknesses in the historiography that have been identified in recent years: much of the literature remains state centrist and there is a lack of focus on ideas. By bringing together different trends, perspectives, and approaches, he wants to discover new links between the history and the prehistory of European integration. His approach builds on three insights from recent literature. First, governments were unable to control the process that emerged out of the myriads of ideas for postwar cooperation. Second, to find the roots of the integration process one needs to go further back in history, to the interwar years and to the dissolution of empires. Third, historical analysis must delve beneath the surface of day-to-day politics, diplomacy, and institution building and take a closer look at the battle of ideas and of concepts. Segers wants to enrich these new trends with the addition of two “innovative conceptual elements”: a focus on the psychological sphere of “emotions” (that is, intellectual struggles at the individual and collective levels) and more attention on leading ecclesiastics and their networks (pp. 16, 37).

The author’s ambition to combine and introduce several new approaches and concepts and to shift between different levels of analysis makes his book at times challenging to follow. Therefore, I would not recommend using it as a first introduction to the prehistory of European integration. The book’s ambitious approach and complex design are also reflected in a rather complicated structure. Following three and a half pages of acknowledgments and a ten-page prologue, a thirty-two-page introduction—titled “The Genealogy of Western Europe”—presents the book’s main themes, discusses the historiography, and outlines the book’s structure. The following eight chapters (episodes) are divided into two parts before the book ends with a conclusion and an epilogue. While this book might not be suitable for first-year college students, scholars who seek to gain a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of which ideas influenced the first steps in the process of European integration and how these ideas transformed into concrete plans and eventually successful policy initiatives will find a trove of material that future accounts of the process of European integration will not be able to ignore.

The first part, “Beyond Americanisation (1937-1947),” looks at the battle of ideas during the Second World War and in the first years of the postwar period. Here, the reader gets a detailed understanding of how schools of thought like Anglo-Saxon market liberalism, the Austrian school of economics, Keynesianism, and ordoliberalism debated economic, monetary, and social as well as moral and ethical questions. Intellectuals like Joseph Schumpeter, Friedrich Hayek, John Maynard Keynes, Walter Lippman, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Wilhelm Röpke not only shaped academic debates but also became influential policy advisers. Some moved between the academic world and official roles. The father of Germany’s Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle), Ludwig Erhard, was a professor of economics and an adviser to the US military government in Bavaria before he became minister of economics and later chancellor of the Federal Republic. A transnational network, the Mont Pélerin Society, founded in 1947, became “an influential ideas-incubator-hub for the post-war liberal order of the west.” The Bonhoeffer Kreis, a “religiously motivated working group” named after the theologian and anti-Nazi dissident Dietrich Bonhoeffer, had connections to so-called Freiburg Circles in which the ordoliberal ideas that would shape both German economic policy and the blueprints of European integration developed (p. 182). At the same time, Christian democracy rose to a dominant position as a new political family to which many of the most important thinkers and policymakers of Western Europe felt attached. Somewhat surprising (although understandable given the focus on the forces that would later shape the emerging European communities), Segers says little about discussions on postwar Europe among socialists and social democrats in exile. To be sure, many of them were in opposition to the way European integration materialized in the 1950s, yet some, like the German Chancellor Willy Brandt, shared the dream of a “united states of Europe” already during his Scandinavian exile. In the late 1960s and 1970s, he became key to the process of European integration as foreign minister and chancellor.[5] The Italian social democrat Altiero Spinelli, who in 1941 co-drafted and secretly distributed a manifesto for a free and united Europe, figures on the EU’s own list of founding fathers.[6]

The second part, “The Making of European Integration (1947-1951),” analyzes how ideas became “blueprints” and follows the first steps of institution building in the context of the emerging Cold War, from the Marshall Plan and the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) via the European Payments Union (EPU) to the launch of the Schuman Plan and the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). In this part, the reader learns more about how ideas and discussions “converged into a pragmatic and growing transatlantic and western European consensus about the institutional design, practical planning, and moral embedding of this future Europe” (p. 19). Segers sees leading planners like Monnet as a “new elite of experts” whose “legacy ... acquired mythical quality,” and he emphasizes the role of US diplomats and policymakers in the emergence of Western Europe as an economic and political pillar of the new transatlantic community (pp. 204, 4). But this is also the story of a seminal change from bilateralism to multilateralism and from global to more regional approaches in international relations. During the late 1940s, American plans for the postwar world developed from a “One World” approach that had led to the conception of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Bretton Woods system for monetary management to more regional approaches. Under the pressure of the geopolitical realities of the Cold War, detailed, tailor-made models for “building Europe” won over “building Atlantis.” Other key developments of this phase were the United Kingdom’s disappearance from discussions about European integration and the emergence of the Franco-German “engine” as a new power center in Western Europe. The conclusion is followed by an epilogue that uses the exchange between “two highly influential friends in the transatlantic Anglo-Saxon epicentre of this extraordinary period in the history of the West and Europe”—the American diplomat George Kennan and the Oxford philosopher Isiah Berlin—to reflect on the book’s conclusions “in a more essayistic way” (p. 45).

Whether or not one finds the introduction of new terms like “European Republic of planning” or the focus on “emotions” convincing, Seger’s book makes an important contribution to the prehistory of the European integration process in several areas. It contributes to the intellectual history of the early twentieth century and it enriches our understanding of planning (and the planners behind it), it is an important addition to the study of transatlantic relations in the crucial phase of transition from postwar to Cold War, and it adds new insights to the institutional history of European and Western cooperation. Both as a synthesis of earlier research and because of its novel approaches and hitherto unpublished material, the book will be indispensable for those who want to understand how different ideas and schools of thought influenced the planning for the postwar international order and for the reconstruction of Europe. It is a must-read for scholars studying how the interaction of intellectuals, academics, planners, and policymakers contributed to the emergence of the European Union that we know today. While the book provides a detailed analysis of the prehistory of European integration, it also provokes reflection on current challenges to European cooperation and international relations.

Notes

[1]. Still one of the best introductions in English is Desmond Dinan, Europe Recast: A History of the European Union, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Lynn Riener Publishers, 2014).

[2]. Dinan, Europe Recast, 1-5.

[3]. Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2000), 318.

[4]. Funded by the Dutch Research Council, the “Blueprints of Hope” project had its closing conference in early 2024. See Dutch Research Council, “Blueprints of Hope: Designing Post-War Europe; Ideas, Emotions, Networks and Negotiations (1930-1963),” accessed October 22, 2024, https://www.nwo.nl/en/projects/360-52-190.

[5]. See the dissertation by Pénélope Léa Patry, “Willy Brandts frühe Europavorstellungen aus dem skandinavischen Exil (1933-1947): Entstehung und Ausformung eines außenpolitischen Bewusstseins zwischen Internationalismus und Europäismus” (PhD diss., L’université de Lyon, 2019), which was awarded the Willy Brandt Prize by the Chancellor Willy Brandt Foundation for 2024 (see https://willy-brandt.de/en/willy-brandt/research/research-funding/). See also Jan De Graaf, Socialism across the Iron Curtain: Socialist Parties in East and West and the Reconstruction of Europe after 1945(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

[6]. European Commission, “The Founding Fathers and Other Stories from the Past,” 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/comm/items/625131/en.

Robin Allers is associate professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS) and program director for the master’s program at the Norwegian Defence University College (FHS). He earned his PhD in history at the University of Hamburg with a dissertation on German-Norwegian relations and the first enlargement of the European Communities in the era of Willy Brandt as foreign minister and chancellor. His current research and teaching focuses on European security and Norway’s security and defense relations with close allies.

Citation: Robin M. Allers. Review of Segers, Mathieu. The Origins of European Integration: The Pre-History of Today's European Union, 1937–1951. H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews. November, 2024.
URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=60570

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.

Book review: Ruth Elizabeth Gordon: Development Disrupted: The Global South in the Twenty-First Century, by Fathimath Musthaq (H-Diplo)

Impossível fazer uma análise coerente, adequada, significativa, de duas coisas inexistentes: um Global South, que é um conceito fantasioso, não uma realidade, e UMA economia desse Sul Global, coisa absolutamente sem sentido. Uma terceira coisa totalmente sem sentido é pretender falar de um "processo de desenvolvimento" – o que é isso, para uma multitude de 150 países? – em "ruptura", ou interrompido NO SÉCULO XXI, que está apenas começando.

Loucuras acadêmicas acontecem. Essa pode ser uma delas.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

H-Diplo: New posted content

Musthaq on Gordon, 'Development Disrupted: The Global South in the Twenty-First Century' [Review]

H-Net Reviews

Gordon, Ruth Elizabeth.  Development Disrupted: The Global South in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022. 254 pp. $105.00 (cloth), ISBN 9781108424172.$27.99 (paper), ISBN 9781108439527.

Reviewed by Fathimath Musthaq (Reed College)
Published on H-Diplo (May, 2024)
Commissioned by Seth Offenbach (Bronx Community College, The City University of New York)

Printable Version: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showpdf.php?id=59722

September 11, 2023, marked the fiftieth anniversary of the CIA-assisted overthrow of Chile’s democratically elected socialist president, Salvador Allende. In his short time as president, Allende worked tirelessly to secure technology sovereignty for Chile, something that countries of the Global South continue to struggle with to this day. Allende was an ardent advocate of the 1969 Andean Pact, signed between Colombia, Ecuador, Chile, Peru, and Bolivia, to create a free trade bloc to collectively pursue industrialization. Central to the pact was finding ways to access technology more affordably, by curbing the influence of multinational corporations and fostering the domestic market. Inspired by the Santiago School of Technology’s thesis that countries needed technology sovereignty for realizing growth, Allende nationalized the State Development Corporation (Corfo) that housed the powerful Institute for Technological Research, tasked with assisting private firms and government ministries in acquiring technological capacity.[1] During this time, Allende launched the National Electronics Company whose goal was to build a semiconductor plant. While these plans unfortunately never came to fruition, the necessity of technology sovereignty to development became well established in the development discourse coming out of Latin America during this time.

Ruth Elizabeth Gordon’s Development Disrupted: The Global South in the Twenty-First Century echoes the centrality of technology to development but approaches the issue from a less state-oriented and more market-based perspective. Gordon begins with the claim that “development is ripe for disruption,” thanks to rapidly advancing technology. The book seeks to uncover these disruptions, which Gordon argues is “a very good news story, not perfect by any means, but progress nonetheless” (p. 1). People in the Global South are configuring new ways to have basic needs met, thanks to technology: digital wallets provide payments systems for unbanked masses, while online platforms provide the latest market prices for rural farmers, allowing them to obtain better prices, and digital platforms allow teachers and students to acquire knowledge and training from afar. As a self-avowed “techno optimist,” Gordon celebrates the proliferation of technology-aided solutions to long-standing development challenges (p. ix).

Gordon begins the book by providing an account of the history of development, starting in the 1940s with US president Harry Truman’s IV Point Program. In chapter 1, she introduces the reader to various international actors and ideologies that have shaped development over the decades, which she dubs as cycles of “conventional wisdom” (p. 8). In chapter 2, she juxtaposes development models espoused by international financial institutions (IFIs), primarily the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, to the East Asian developmental (EAD) state, with the conclusion that the latter was more successful in facilitating development, thanks to active industrial and financial policy and competent bureaucracies, among other things. The account in this first part of the book does not touch on the contentious issue of technology transfer, surprising given that from the perspective of the Global South, technology transfer was a longstanding issue in the period covered here, for example, in the Andean Pact mentioned above and in the 1974 New International Economic Order that explicitly called on rich Global North countries to share technology with the Global South.[2] Similarly, in the discussion of EAD states, the centrality of technology-management to the success of the development state, through the acquisition of foreign licenses and investment in research and development, is overlooked.[3] Locating the failures and shortcomings of existing development models to resolve the sticky issue of technology transfer would have nicely motivated the rest of the chapters.

Part 2 of the book is where Gordon begins to engage with the concept of “disruption.” Interestingly, however, the disruption she alludes to here is not technological but more cultural and ideological. In chapter 3, she introduces the actors that are disrupting development: middle-income Global South countries, of which China is treated as a special case, and philanthropic organizations and donors primarily based in the West. Along with a vast and burgeoning literature, Gordon details how Chinese lending differs from IFI lending, the subject of chapter 4. Whereas IFIs turned to “soft infrastructure such as free market reforms, good governance, human rights, and other matters” in the 1990s, Chinese lending has primarily focused on large infrastructure projects and resource extraction, rendering them appealing partners to many African countries seeking such investment (p. 91). China, along with other Global South lenders, Gordon argues, embraces a lending model built on horizontal ties and partnerships, which is, in turn, informed by “mutual benefit, non-interference, and respect for the sovereignty of their partners/recipients” (p. 83).

Chapter 5 introduces the second disrupter: private Western donors that operate considerably differently from traditional donors. Identifying this new trend as “philanthrocapitalism,” Gordon contends that while there are many criticisms to be made of philanthrocapitalism (for example, lack of accountability, absence of transparency), she is more interested in articulating its “positive impacts” since the traditional development model is in severe need of disruption (pp. 110, 111). For Gordon, what is exciting about the turn to philanthrocapitalism is how it has energized a range of financial flows to yield various blended finance instruments, such as public private partnerships that hold the promise of meeting basic needs in the Global South. She agrees with proponents of such models who assume a double coincidence between “business principles” and “social transformation” (p. 110). The optimism Gordon espouses, however, seems unwarranted in light of the growing literature in political economy that identifies “de-risking” as a poor development strategy, given that it prioritizes profit incentives over social purpose in the execution of development projects. Gordon highlights some of these concerns in the chapter but appears to subordinate these to the benefits provided by an increase in financial flows (in her words, “more resources”) to the Global South (p. 122). This argument would have benefited from a demonstration of more specific instances where philanthropists take on risky projects avoided by governments. In practice, what we tend to see more often, under a “de-risking” logic, is states taking on various risks associated with development projects in order to entice investors, which carries with it fiscal implications and equity concerns.[4]

Gordon’s optimism extends not only to new initiatives inaugurated under the banner of philanthrocapitalism but also to the capitalists themselves. One of the running assumptions in this chapter is that tech billionaires can innovate (or “disrupt”) philanthropy just as well as they innovate for the market. The book includes a very short case study of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, which, Gordon claims, has “literally disrupted the [global health] space” (p. 122). She notes generous funding, new technologies, and new methods of service delivery as underpinning this disruption. However, the application of the idea is cursory, and the role of technology in the disruption process is not examined.

Part 3 is the heart of the book, which is why it is unfortunate that it comes so late. Here is the first time Gordon provides a definition of “disruption,” and only in a footnote (p. 149n1). For a concept that appears in the title and in the introduction as a central idea, it would have been helpful to the reader if there was a more complete discussion of this concept much sooner. Some of the key markers of “disruption” are that products or services are offered to “non-consumers” (for example, the unbanked) even if the product is a lesser version of the more established version, but because it is also more adaptable and simpler, it triggers a migration from incumbents to the disruptive innovator. Before describing her case studies, in chapter 6, Gordon provides a sweeping account of how technology shapes development through its exponential rate of progress, digitization, and leapfrogging in a so-called Fourth Industrial Revolution. In chapter 7, she summons evidence for technology-led disruptions in finance, education, agriculture, and health care. Throughout, she centers the power of the mobile phone as a platform for information sharing and enabling basic service delivery.

The book first outlines the case of M-Pesa, which was introduced in Kenya in 2007 to provide banking services to a largely unbanked population. Its rapid success was evident in the fact that within 2.5 years of its inauguration, the platform enrolled 8.5 million users and registered 3.7 billion US dollars in transactions (p. 158). She also identifies mobile learning through Text2Teaching (first inaugurated in the Philippines), MoMaths (in South Africa), and Dr. Maths projects (in South Africa) as effective teaching and learning models. The assessment of these platforms, however, seems prematurely optimistic. Since the COVID-19 pandemic, numerous studies have documented an association between remote learning and decline in student learning and academic behavior.[5] While remote learning may be the only option for some in the Global South, it is important to note the downsides of remote learning so that a vision of collective learning can be defended, nurtured, and foregrounded, and not sidelined because mobile learning is more cost effective and easier to implement.

Chapter 8 is different from the rest of the book. It is a stand-alone chapter on climate change, it is mostly descriptive, and it covers some elementary facts about climate change and international coordination over climate action. A few pages at the end of the chapter touch on the ideas of “environmental leapfrogging” and “energy leapfrogging,” noting the importance of China and India moving from a simple model of technology transfer to strengthening domestic innovative capacities to make technologies more context suitable (pp. 209, 210).

One of the defining aspects of the book is how it (re)conceives development. Gordon espouses a development that is centered on the delivery of basic needs, an approach that in many ways resonates with Amartya Sen’s “capabilities approach” (in Development as Freedom [rep. ed. 2000]) that places emphasis on human well-being. The subject of Gordon’s book, however, is more about how we get there, which involves technology developed in local contexts. In the final chapter of the book, Gordon acknowledges a major issue with pursuing technology-led development: jobless growth. For countries in the Global South, premature deindustrialization, thanks to technology, “removes a rung in the development ladder” (p. 229). But she remains optimistic, positing the possibility that Global South countries could potentially “leapfrog” over industrialization. Local innovators that respond to local problems, she portends, may be one way to do this. She writes, “Rather than depending on the robust R&D that produces the state of the art technology that is found in Global North environs, emerging countries must ... focus on solving practical problems” where the solutions may be “quite basic” (p. 233). In fact, in her own words, “one of the most exciting things about the technological revolution” in the Global South is “that it is bottom-up rather than top-down, thus returning power to local entities, individuals, and entrepreneurs” (p. 235).

While offering a unique view of development, Gordon’s conception of development through technology carries with it problematic assumptions. First is the assumption that a profit-oriented private sector can be a long-term solution to development woes. Meeting basic needs is certainly part of the development agenda, but for many in the Global South, development means more than that. According to 1950s Latin American structuralists, it is about creating the conditions for the delivery of basic and complex needs on a long-term sustainable basis. In other words, development has to be about building the capacities of countries to carve out autonomous development paths by reducing dependence on external sources. As a result, the state often plays an important role, even if that role changes over time. Gordon’s account in the second half of the book is largely silent on the role of the state, which is surprising since she champions EAD states in the first part of the book. Private tech-led solutions also introduce precariousness to basic service delivery. For example, with privately delivered services such as M-Pesa, there is no guarantee that terms of service will evolve over time to deliver a better, more accessible product. One thing we have observed with platforms like Uber is that once they acquire a considerable market share, prices go up.[6] Reliance on the private sector for basic service delivery makes uncertain the continuity of the service and its accessibility.

Second, the assumption that locally produced technologies can address development issues at the needed scale seems premature. Throughout the book, there is little acknowledgment of the contentious geopolitics around technology production and access. In the 1950s, Latin American structuralists identified lack of technological capacity as a major impediment to autonomous industrialization.[7] Technological capacity itself is determined, as Evgeny Morozov argues, by the history of geoeconomic and geopolitical struggles, that is, how much power and sovereignty a country possesses in the global economy.[8] Without technology sovereignty, southern economies face falling terms of trade and endure unequal exchange. The dependency school posited that the South’s technological dependence reinforced the development of the center at the expense of the periphery. The case of Indonesia, recently highlighted in the scholarship as a success story, is instructive. After China and India, Indonesia has the largest share of labor in global value chains (GVCs) and has significantly increased the share of value added manufacturing driven by foreign direct investment (FDI).[9] Yet Indonesia’s industrialization is hemmed in by hierarchical structures of foreign corporate control, the result being that industrialization in Indonesia reflects the interests of Japanese multinational corporations (MNCs) more than the needs of the Indonesian economy.[10] The recent trade war between the United States and China over semiconductor chips (with the US government banning the sale of chips made in the United States or involving US technology to Chinese company Huawei) demonstrates the importance of geopolitics to the acquisition of technology. A third issue is how our privacy may be compromised by migrating basic service delivery to privately owned online platforms that mine data for sale. While loss of privacy may be increasingly treated like a forgone conclusion in a world so interconnected, it remains a central issue to our capacity to live free lives, as Shoshana Zuboff argues in her book The Age of Surveillance Capitalism (2019).

Gordon’s book is heavy on details and sparse on analysis. A stronger analytical framework that centers technology could have helped avoid some of the book’s oversights, such as the contentious issue of technology transfer and the geopolitics of technology production. Notwithstanding these lacunas, the book is a serious invitation to consider the power and possibilities of technology for the Global South.

Notes

[1]. Evgeny Morozov, “The Lessons of Chile’s Struggle against Big Tech,” New Statesman (blog), September 9, 2023, https://www.newstatesman.com/the-weekend-essay/2023/09/salvador-allende-fight-big-tech.

[2]. UN General Assembly, Resolution 3201, Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, 1974, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/2775/download.

[3]. Alice H. Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

[4]. Daniela Gabor and Ndongo Samba Sylla, “Derisking Developmentalism: A Tale of Green Hydrogen,” Development and Change 54, no. 5 (2023): 1169-96, https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12779.

[5]. Jill V. Klosky, Julie A. Gazmararian, Olivia Casimir, and Sarah C. Blake, “Effects of Remote Education during the COVID-19 Pandemic on Young Children’s Learning and Academic Behavior in Georgia: Perceptions of Parents and School Administrators,” Journal of School Health 92, no. 7 (2022): 656–64, https://doi.org/10.1111/josh.13185.

[6]. Len Sherman, “Uber’s New Math: Increase Prices and Squeeze Driver Pay,” Forbes, January 16, 2023, https://www.forbes.com/sites/lensherman/2023/01/16/ubers-new-math-increase-prices-and-squeeze-driver-pay/.

[7]. Raúl Prebisch, “The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems,” Sede de la CEPAL en Santiago (Estudios e Investigaciones), Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), April 27, 1950, https://econpapers.repec.org/paper/ecrcol093/29973.htm.

[8]. Morozov, “Lessons of Chile’s Struggle.”

[9]. Intan Suwandi, “Value Chains: The New Economic Imperialism,” Monthly Review (blog), September 3, 2019, https://monthlyreview.org/product/value-chains/.

[10]. Ingrid Harvold Kvangraven, “Beyond the Stereotype: Restating the Relevance of the Dependency Research Programme,” Development and Change 52, no. 1 (2021): 76–112, https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12593.

Fathimath Musthaq is assistant professor of political science at Reed College, Portland. Her primary interests are in central banking and financialization in the Global South, development and dependency, and international monetary reform.

Citation: Fathimath Musthaq. Review of Gordon, Ruth Elizabeth. Development Disrupted: The Global South in the Twenty-First Century. H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews. May, 2024.
URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=59722

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.