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Mostrando postagens com marcador Ukraine War. Mostrar todas as postagens
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domingo, 5 de fevereiro de 2023

Lies and corruption: Sailor of the Black Sea flagship “Moskva” Alexander gives new revealing insights that contributed to seal the Moskva’s fate - Chris Snow (Medium)

 Uma história inacreditável, real e surpreendente, sobre o despreparo, corrupção e total inoperância no comando nas Forças Armadas da Rússia. Um trecho do relato do "marinheiro Alexander": 

"At one point, two loud explosions sounded, and the lights went out abruptly. Currently, I was in the cockpit and resting after the watch. Panic began, there were no commands or alarm on the broadcast for ten minutes, and then the senior assistant commander, Captain 2nd rank Gudkov, announced the gathering of personnel in the ship’s dining room, the appointment of emergency groups and the beginning of the struggle for survivability. There was darkness and smoke all around. As it turned out, the first missile hit between the galley and the dining room, and the second between the post of the Osa-MA air defense system and the torpedo tube, by the way, it is still not clear why it did not detonate."

Cabe ler por inteiro...

Medium, Jan 4, 2023

More than six months have passed since the inglorious death of the flagship of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea. Putin could not admit the fact of the loss of “Moscow” on the Kremlin TV, so the multi-layered lies hid any reliable information in its abyss. Lies accompanied the cruiser from the very beginning to the very end.

The Russian Volunteer Corps posted a unique interview with a survivor of the Moskva flagship Cruiser.

This interview also mentions pre-war events as well as the exact time of its sinking. This is an eyewitness report of one of the former crew members who is now fighting for Ukraine.

Purported image of Moskva on her final day afloat. Analysts suggest that the image is consistent with the vessel’s configuration and Ukrainian accounts of the strike (Unknown source)

The sailor’s name is Alexander, and he got on the cruiser Moskva long before Putin’s Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Here is the translation of the report in which he gives extensive background information about the incident from April last year. (Personal comments in brackets)

The story begins in June 2021, the Moskva sailed to the Mediterranean Sea, where it participated in the tracking of the British aircraft carrier Queen Elizabeth, during which we had a fire in a barbette with AAU (automatic artillery installation) AK-630 ammunition, back then the automatic fire extinguishing system worked, and the explosion was avoided.

There were a lot of problems. For example, we had the main complex of the flag radar, which should illuminate the airspace at up to 480 km, but in fact, every 30 minutes, there was an overheating with its subsequent shutdown. In addition to the flag radar, the cruiser had Nadir radar complexes located in the bow and stern, as well as Vympel complexes on the starboard and port sides.

Absolutely all radar complexes of the ship overheated due to improper maintenance and control.

The same "flag" saw nothing but highway civilian aircraft as it couldn’t even give out a non-existent target. The rest of the radars cover a 15 to 45 km radius. For all these reasons, until the sinking of the ship, it was necessary to monitor the airspace with the help of civilian programs on a laptop.

Subsequent deployments out to sea ended almost identically - failure after failure. In the fall of 2021, we went to the sea to monitor NATO and Ukrainian ships participating in exercises in the Black Sea.

The ship's gunners were tasked with hitting an artificial surface target with an AK-130 and AK-630 AU artillery piece. By the way, the first ended with a blackout on the entire ship during the rotation of the gun, and the second - ended in an unsuccessful firing and desynchronization of two AK-630 complexes (they were supposed to work in pairs but decided to turn in opposite directions of each other).

In addition to the terrible technical condition, there were simply inhumane conditions for the life of the crew on board.

During a twenty-day deployment in the Mediterranean, "one and a half" liter of fresh water were given out per person for three days. In addition, there were meals of poor quality. Fresh water was supplied twice a day - in the morning and before the break. Even then, only for 20 minutes. For a crew of more than 400 people.

Since the water reserves in the tanks are limited, and the desalination machines for seawater simply did not work (they worked only in documents and reports).

The food on bord was generally tolerable if you didn’t notice the cockroaches in the rice and compote. There was an incident on the tenth day after the ship left for the Mediterranean sea, namely the disappearance of mugs from the dining room, because of which the deputy commander of the ship for educational work, Captain 2nd rank Vakula ordered to remove all mugs from the dining room before arriving at the base.

An extensive report on with a lot of facts and figures about the ship and the Russian Navy in general

Since I touched on the topic of army idiocy, it is worth talking about constant training, anxiety, and performing tasks that are in no way connected with reality.

All the drills done on the cruiser were fiction. Everything was done to ensure that photo reports on the "work" done lay on the table of Kuprin (the commander of the ship) and to those higher up.

Photo reports, photo reports, and once again photo reports... this is the essence of the entire army of the Russian Federation, it does not matter whether you are able to professionally perform your work or not, here only a beautiful picture and what your’re painting in the journal of combat training is important.

For example, the Osa-MA air defense system. These systems have been repaired since 2014, and according to the documents, they were fully operational according to the reports provided.

One of the few manifestations of a sober assessment of the situation was the recognition by the command of the “Moscow” of the non-combat capability of the PU Sam system S-300F “Fort”, because, as it turned out, there are no missiles for it in the Black Sea Fleet.

The main missile system is PU PRKR P-1000 "Vulcan" in the amount of 16 pieces. It was almost impossible to launch due to an insufficient supply of electricity and compressed air. I am generally silent about anti-submarine weapons.

The war started while we were out at sea on a routine patrol mission

Or at least it was supposed to be a routine mission to patrol the oil rigs near Snake Island, but when we woke up on the morning of February 24, we were informed of the beginning of a "special military operation." Many that morning could not even imagine that Russia would start a real war.

How lies destroy armies

My thoughts were only about what is happening now in Ukraine - the country in which my relatives live.

At that time, we did not know about the missile strikes and thought that everything was happening within the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine.

After some time, the Moskva approached the island of Zmeiny, and the ZKK on the VPR, Captain 2nd rank Vakula, picked up a radio and began his shameful speech, in response to which he was sent along with the ship by a Ukrainian border guard.

Au AK-130 barely worked on the island, and on its last legs, the ship went to the raid along the patrol line.

The famous clip

After the events near the island of Zmeiny, "Moskva" came to the port of Sevastopol back to its base. Afterward, we were interviewed by "plainclothes men," and non-disclosure documents were signed by some crew members.

The crew was then released on leave, but the lion’s share remained, as some of the sailors were sent on deployment to the 810th Marine Brigade, where they were assembled in January for exercises as part of infantry rifle units. Soon, those who were there on deployment were sent to the Kherson direction.

Corruption has been rampant ever since in the Russian army and the Navy which is normally among the absolute elite of every army seems to be heavily compromised

In April 2022, the cruiser was sent to Odessa to patrol the water area. At least this information was given to the crew.

We had lunch on the ship. It was 14:15 Moscow time on the clock. Half of the personnel rested in their crew cabins, and the other was assigned to watches and outfits. There was no alarm or targets on the radar.

At one point, two loud explosions sounded, and the lights went out abruptly. Currently, I was in the cockpit and resting after the watch. Panic began, there were no commands or alarm on the broadcast for ten minutes, and then the senior assistant commander, Captain 2nd rank Gudkov, announced the gathering of personnel in the ship’s dining room, the appointment of emergency groups and the beginning of the struggle for survivability. There was darkness and smoke all around. As it turned out, the first missile hit between the galley and the dining room, and the second between the post of the Osa-MA air defense system and the torpedo tube, by the way, it is still not clear why it did not detonate.

Starpom was informed that it was impossible to collect the wounded in the dining room because the blast wave had cut through the corridors and doors, and a hole appeared on the side of the ship. It is not entirely clear what exactly the commander of the ship was doing at this time, but the only one who made decisions and did something at that moment was the Starpom. (a naval rank in Russia)

Then the next order came - contract soldiers and midshipmen were to drop life rafts from the upper tiers, and officers and remaining midshipmen were to evacuate conscripts to the stern of the ship to transfer them to the frigate "Admiral Essen", on board of which was the commander of the 30th division of surface ships, Captain 1st rank Tronev.

In total, the struggle for survivability lasted until 20:00 and stopped when the fire spread to the commander’s bridge and Vulcan missile systems. By that time, the division commander was on board the cruiser and ordered to end the struggle for survivability and evacuation.

During the evacuation, the body of senior midshipman Vakhrushev was found in a helicopter hangar. He took conscripts out of the holds until the last moment, but he himself did not have enough time to escape. Vakhrushev was according to the Kremlin, the only one who died because of the "fire."

In fact, at least 30 crew members died (according to tame estimates), these were mainly conscripts who were in the holds, the entire galley outfit along with the deputy of my unit and, possibly, those who could not get out of their posts. (Link to conscripts and training here for those interested in learning more about this topic)

After these events I have just described, we were told the official version: There was a fire. That’s it.

I can’t fathom how cynical these people are to stand there and blatantly lie to those who have seen everything with their own eyes. Who lost their friends and acquaintances.

Again, everyone signed a non-disclosure agreement, and maybe you are wondering what the former crew members of the cruiser "Moskva" think about this? They don’t think anything at all about it!

A guy from my unit in the first days after the sinking of the cruiser told relatives and friends in social networks about what had happened, and, as a result, he withdrew from wherever he could.

He then had to report to special security forces with IDs (korochka), after which he simply stopped communicating and disappeared from the social network.

To my great regret, this tragedy did not free the guys from the morass of propaganda, but on the contrary. The topic of the death of the "Moskva" has become almost taboo among the former crew.

As the cruiser’s last exit was not a combat exit, but only a patrol one, and therefore, none of those on the Moskva received any bonuses or compensations.

The Kremlin does not recognize the dead sailors for two reasons:

  • The first is legal - in the so-called SVO, according to the regime, conscripts do not participate.

Let the enemy know that there are many of us, and we have long been in his rear.

I really hope that I was able to somehow help in the fight against the lies pouring into the ears of Russians and, despite the fear of being caught or killed, we will fight for the freedom of Ukraine and the liberation of Russia! (Alexander, former member of the Russian navy)

Summary and Conclusion:

I consider this a most fascinating bit of information and very revealing. A few things really stood out in my opinion:

1. The lack of training, maintenance, and combat readiness. "Photo reports - the essence of the entire army of the Russian Federation. "
2. How they lie and cheat their own kind. Just to avoid paying reparations to relatives by calling this “a non-combat exit”
3. "The huge blow to the image of the dictator "

It is reasonable to presume that the entire Russian navy is as rotten to the core as the rest of the Russian army eaten up from the inside by corruption and “Vranjo” a culture of lies and deception from the lowest to the highest ranks.

I cannot help but wonder, perhaps dangerously, how good any of their strategic rocket forces are. There have been credible reports that none of the ICBM silos are loaded as they fill with water. Also, there have been reports of batches by soldiers who are part of the missile forces surfacing in Ukraine.

It is definitely most revealing that most of their training drills are purely fabricated for propaganda purposes. That should give you a hint on why an army this big and with so much on paper advantage can lose in such a decisive way against its much smaller neighbor.

Dear reader, thank you for reading my article, be sure to leave a clap or a comment and if you wish to join medium, I would be very happy if you would consider using my referral link to support me and my writing or leave a small tip.

Also, please consider following me on medium if you want to read more of my work in the future.

Press the clap button for 15 seconds you can clap 50 times at once.

Take care and be well.

Post scriptum

A suicide note was found on a dead soldier in Luhansk, making it apparent how awful the Russian forces must treat their own. It doesn’t fit with the rest of the article, so I attached it here, but beware it is gruesome and bleak.

"Goodbye. darling, in the time that I’m here, I have seen hell. There were not so many deaths in Chechnya or even Afghanistan. Seas of human meat. But that’s not why I depart. We here, Russian people, are nobody, and Chechens rule. They drink, they are unhinged, and they rape, they give beatings to everyone and noone is going to do anything about it. Kitty, they took all the money you sent, and they did a thing to me. This is to let you know that I resisted. Remember that you and I owe nothing to anyone. This is the only way out. Love, see you after death”

Additional sources

Strength of the Russian navy

Ian Bremer takes the two sides on Ukraine war

Ponderando os dois lados... 

Time favors ... Ukraine or Russia?

Illustration of Volodymyr Zelensky & Vladimir Putin between a tightrope
 Luisa Vieira

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been grinding on for nearly a year (or nearly a decade if you ask the Ukrainians). In this time, momentum has swung back and forth between Russia and Ukraine. But now, the front lines have stabilized, making gains harder to come by for both sides.

There’s consensus that in the near term, Moscow will be unlikely to achieve its war aims and Kyiv will be equally unlikely to liberate all its territory. A lasting ceasefire, let alone a negotiated settlement, remains as distant as ever because neither country is willing to make territorial concessions as long as they believe they can achieve a stronger negotiating position through continued fighting. And both sides still believe defeat is unthinkable and victory is at least possible (if not likely).

There’s no end in sight to what seems to be evolving into a war of attrition. Which raises the critical question: Who has the advantage in a drawn-out war, Russia or Ukraine?

Let’s look at both sides of the argument.

Time is on Ukraine’s side

Ukraine can continue to defend itself and retake territory for as long as the United States and Europe keep the guns and dollars flowing. Despite suffering massive losses, Ukraine currently has better offensive and defensive capabilities than it did on Feb. 24, 2022. Ukrainians’ will to fight is intact, and their forces are better armed, better trained, and better led than their Russian counterparts. Ukraine’s successful counteroffensives last summer and fall put Russia on the defensive; advanced Western weaponry (including armored vehicles and air-defense systems) will help Ukraine make further inroads into Russian-held territory and put Kyiv in a better negotiating position.

Western support for Ukraine isn’t crumbling.Despite the costs of support and the side effects of the war, public opinion in the West remains steadfast in backing military and financial aid for Kyiv. In the US, only a minority of the Republican caucus opposes it. In Europe, support has held even in countries with new populist governments like Italy. Meanwhile, Germany is decoupling from Russian gas remarkably quickly and will survive the winter just fine – a sign that Russia’s biggest source of leverage over European countries is effectively over.

Russia’s military will continue to underperform Ukraine’s. Moscow lost some of its best men and equipment in the first months of the invasion; it’s now running short of important military capabilities, and its ability to replenish them is constrained by decades of underinvestment, corruption, and now sanctions. Much of the equipment it has left in storage is of low quality or in poor condition, and conscripts lack the motivation and training of professional and volunteer soldiers. The manpower and matériel Russia can throw at the war going forward are decidedly inferior to what it fielded last Feb. 24.

Mounting economic woes will erode Russia’s ability and willingness to fight. Russia’s economy shrunk by 3.5% in 2022 and it’ll do so by a similar or greater amount this year. While high oil prices have thus far cushioned the blow felt by most Russians, the impact of sanctions will grow significantly over time. Some of the toughest measures — export controls, the oil embargo, the price cap on Russian crude — are only now starting to take effect. The long-run erosion of living standards and productive capacity due to Russia’s decoupling from advanced industrial economies will be acute and permanent. This will make it hard for Russia to reconstitute its defense industrial base, blunting its war effort. Most importantly, combined with mounting casualties, it will reduce popular and elite support for the war and put pressure on Putin to de-escalate.

Time is on Russia’s side

Ukraine needs ever-more-powerful Western weapons to sustain the fight, but Western support will dry up sooner rather than later. Ukraine’s military capabilities are almost entirely dependent on continued support from the West and especially from the United States. But Western publics will get weary of the war as the costs mount and the risk of World War III becomes more apparent. With Republicans in control of the House, a growing GOP bloc opposed to aid for Ukraine, and a Republican president potentially taking office in 2025, Washington’s commitment to Kyiv can only weaken. The moment US support withers, so will Europe’s… and Kyiv’s ability to defend itself.

Even with continued Western support, Russia can win on the battlefield. Russian troops are no longer on the back foot. Now that they’ve had time to fortify their defensive positions and fill their ranks with better-trained conscripts, Ukraine won’t be able to repeat the kinds of successful offensives it achieved last year. While Kyiv may have overperformed in the early days of the war, a drawn-out conflict favors the more powerful belligerent. Both sides have taken severe losses, but Russia is a larger country with much more manpower, equipment, and military-industrial capacity it can throw at the war. Western weapons notwithstanding, Ukraine is likely to run out of men long before Russia does.

Unlike Ukraine and the West, Russia has the staying power to survive a protracted conflict. The West has used up most of the leverage it had against Russia, yet sanctions haven’t succeeded in crippling Russia’s economy or military. Moscow continues to have strong commercial or security ties with China, Iran, India, and many developing countries, and it maintains the ability to produce weapons domestically without imported components. Most ordinary Russians haven’t seen their living standards decline, and they continue to buy into the Kremlin’s pro-war propaganda. But even if that were to change, Putin’s ability to crush dissent means domestic political stability isn’t under threat; he can afford to continue piling pressure on Ukraine and the West at minimal risk to his rule.

Why it matters ...

Because the answer determines the pace and volume of Western aid to Ukraine.

When Kyiv launched a successful counteroffensive that won back swaths of Russian-occupied territory last summer and fall, Ukraine’s backers believed that the longer the fighting went on, the more likely Ukraine would emerge victorious. Accordingly, they carefully calibrated their support for Kyiv to avoid provoking the Russians unnecessarily. Now that the Russians have gotten their act together a bit, many have come to believe time is on Moscow’s side. This explains why the West finally agreed to deliver tanks in the hopes of achieving a quicker end to the conflict (or at least ensuring the Ukrainians could continue to effectively defend themselves).

Trouble is, Ukraine definitely can’t win without steadily incremental support from the West, but the level and path of Western support both depends on and determines Western leaders’ beliefs about the trajectory of the war. As calls for fighter jets come into play, this isn’t getting any easier.

Readers, tell me what you think.

sexta-feira, 4 de novembro de 2022

Ukraine War, 4 November 2022: Air War Update, Part 1, Basics - Tom Cooper (Medium)

 Tom Cooper

Nov 4, 2022

Ukraine War, 4 November 2022: Air War Update, Part 1, Basics

Today, I’ll try start a ‘mini-series’ of features addressing questions like,

- What is going in the air war over Ukraine?

- What is happening with both air forces?

Explaining this — and understanding it — requires ‘going back to the point 1’.

Point 1: BASICS

The Point 1 about air power deployed in this war is the fact that both sides are operating aircraft types actually, and essentially, developed during the Soviet times. Sure, types like Sukhoi Su-30, Su-34, and Su-35 came into being after the dissolution of the USSR, and some of stuff operated by Ukrainians is ‘heavily upgraded’, too. But, keep in mind: all the Russian Su-30/32/35-Wunderwaffen are all still based on the Sukhoi Su-27, developed back in the 1970s. The same is valid for, for example, the few heavily modified Ukrainian MiG-29MUs.

As next, one needs to keep in mind that in the former USSR, and in the Russian Federation, there is just one authority responsible for conceptualising future combat aircraft, and for ordering them. That is the GenStab. GenStab is the sole military procurement authority and thus responsible for the development and acquisition of everything — every single piece of equipment, every weapons system, every bullet, every screw, every spade, every aircraft, every ship, and every intercontinental ballistic missile purchased for the Russian armed forces.

Sure, during the Soviet times, there used to be a lot of different design bureaus (OKBs) of combat aircraft: Lavochkin, MiG, Sukhoi, Yakovlev — all remain famous until this very day. There were lots of factories manufacturing their designs, too. But, none of OKBs was researching and developing any combat aircraft without an order from the GenStab, and no factory was manufacturing any. That was that way back in the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s…. 1980s, and remains that way until this very day: nothing in the Russian armed forces happens without an amen from the GenStab.

Until the mid-2010s (yes, around the times of the first invasion of Ukraine), the GenStab was preparing all of its specifications on basis of experiences from the Second World War.

When it comes to air power, one of crucial experiences from the Second World War was that an average tactical combat aircraft had a ‘service life’ — or ‘life expectancy’ — of about 120 to 160 hours. Means: statistically, one could expect the majority of combat aircraft to get shot down, or be badly damaged within 120–160 hours of combat operations; or the battle or campaign in question was over by the time the aircraft was flown for 120–160 hours. Then, the operational tempo would decrease and thus there was time to subject the surviving aircraft to complex maintenance.

The latter was of advantage also because designing and manufacturing aircraft that were ‘simple’ to maintain for these 120–160 hours, made things easier for units operating them, and for the logistics system. The units did not require having personnel qualified to run complex maintenance, did not need being equipped with expensive maintenance facilities, and the logistics system only had to care about ‘simpler’ spare parts (say: tyres, braking parachutes, cockpit canopies, etc.).

Result?

For the last 70+ years, all the Soviet/Russian combat aircraft were made to last some 150–200 hours. In this regards, it didn’t matter if this was a MiG-15, or MiG-21, or, say, MiG-25. And, sure, by the 1970s-1980s, they’ve improved their manufacturing quality to the degree where types like MiG-29s and Su-27s (and their equipment, like engines) were made to last up to 400 hours. With few ‘tricks’ — like down-tuning engines — one could stretch that up to 600 hours. Was ‘handy’ in peace-time, saving lots of money, but, be sure: at war, the engines would’ve been uprated to their max thrust as first.

Foremost, the essential idea was still the same. Even the latest types of combat aircraft could be flown intensively for these 120–160 or 400 hours, and with minimal maintenance. But, after being flown for as much, they had to be subjected to overhauls: essentially, complete re-building of every single airframe. All their major assemblies (engines, piping, radars etc.) had to be replaced.

(BTW, this is one of reasons why the Soviets really operated over 12,000 tactical combat aircraft as of the 1970s and 1980s — which is a figure plenty of youngsters have a problem with, nowadays: a third of the fleet was undergoing overhauls at any given moment; which in turn means that ‘only’ about 8,000 were actually available.)

EXCEPTION FROM THE RULE

First major improvement in this regards….or the sole exception — happened in just one case: the one case where a Soviet/Russian-designed jet was not only adapted, but actually custom-developed to customer’s specifications and requirements. That was in the mid-1990s, when India requested Sukhoi (and paid it) to convert its Su-27UB two-seat conversion trainer with combat capability into a powerful multi-role fighter-bomber, resulting in the Su-30MKI. This project forced the Russians into stretching that ‘service life’ of their combat jets (and their equipment) up to 800 and then 1000 hours; into developing ergonomic cockpits; into adapting foreign computers to improve their avionics etc., etc., etc.

Notably: this was the sole case where it was not the GenStab to place the order for development of a new combat aircraft, but a foreign customer that did so — and that in something like 100 years of Soviet/Russian aviation industry.

But, don’t worry: it was already in 2006 that Putin made an end with all such practices, when ordering — per decree, as usually — all the Russian aviation-designing- and manufacturing companies to be merged into the corporation abbreviated with OAK. After all, he ‘had to’ bring the ‘chaos under control’, i.e. make it sure he’s going to cash his cut from the income of the companies in question.


Now pay attention: essentially, within the OAK — i.e. along Putin’s decree establishing the same — foreign customers had (and still have) no say any more in the development of future combat aircraft.

With hindsight, it can be said that exactly this is what, actually, ‘killed’ the Su-57.

Reason?

Because Putin’s decree creating the OAK was prohibiting a situation where India could seriously influence the requirements, and thus the design of the new jet. Ultimately, and between others, it resulted in a situation where the Russians refused to develop what the Indians demanded them to develop, and were ready to pay for, and created a situation where Indians were not ready to pay for something they did not need.

Without Indian funding, and without Putin being ready to ‘waste’ more of ‘his’ money (stolen from Russia) — Sukhoi….erm… OAK couldn’t afford completing the development of all the necessary avionics and engines.

CONCLUSION

Conclusion from all of this is ‘on hand’: had this war lasted 3–14 days, as originally planned by Putin, ‘no problem’. The VKS would’ve been flying as much as possible and necessary: it could’ve deployed all of its might against Ukraine, and the OAK would have had no problems with keeping it operational, i.e. overhauling it once the ‘campaign’ would have been over.

However, with this war going on for more than eight months — it simply can’t.

Yes, sure, the VKS is still flying up to 200 sorties a day, but this is putting an immense strain on available airframes, requiring one third of them to undergo overhauls. And, when these overhauls are undertaken in a big rush, and under the local conditions in regards of quality management…. well, then the Sukhoi-Wunderwaffen are crashing and lots of people die — exactly like it recently happened to two of them, both during post-overhaul test-flights.

…and since in Putin’s Russia one cannot blame the ‘System Putin’ for all of this, well, it’s seagulls to blame, or whatever else…


Ukraine War, November 3, 2022: combats in land - Tom Cooper (Medium)

 Tom Cooper is a great military commentator about Russia's War of Aggression against Ukraine. This one is from Medium.

 

Tom Cooper

Medium, Nov 3, 2022

Ukraine War, 3 November 2022

Today was the 253rd day of Putin’s 3-day-invasion of Ukraine — and I’m going to take a closer look at different sections of the frontline.


STRATEGIC

Early on 29 October, Ukrainians hit the Russian Black Sea Fleet in the port of Sevastopol with semi-submerged, remotely controlled vessels. It’s not entirely sure what did they hit, but there are strong indications that two warships were targeted, including at least one Krivak-class frigate. Here I would recommend following this Twitter thread for further info.

The Keystone Cops in Moscow explained that the attack didn’t happen, then that they have repulsed it. Conclusion is obvious: they couldn’t suffer any kind of losses because they have repulsed an attack that didn’t happen — and, therefore, because nothing has happened, Moscow suspended its participation in the grain export deal. Then, less than 48 hours later, it recalled that decision: supposedly, Ukraine offered ‘written guarantees’ it wouldn’t attack any of Russian Navy warships controlling the ‘safe corridor’ for ships exporting Ukrainian grain…

What? You think the Russian foreign policy is making 0 sense? Silly you… and, therefore, Moscow is meanwhile eagerly accusing Kyiv of preparing either a dirt bomb attack, or some sort of a major incident at the Enerhodar NPP. You know, because Ukrainians are badly in need of poisoning half their country with radioactivity… not because the infrastructure of the NPP has been modified so much, the last 20+ years, the Russians can’t connect it to their own power grid any more. No, no. Therefore, the Russians have shelled the NPP’s power supply, today, cutting it off. The cooling of five reactors is now depending on diesel-powered generators: there’s enough fuel for these to work for 14 days…

Ah yes: and after failing to mobilise even 90,000 reservists — due to complete disorganisation, caused by widespread corruption (thank you, Putin) — the VSRF has launched its autumn draft: 120,000 conscripts will be drafted — and deployed to fight in Ukraine. Because, you know, Ukraine is Russia, so it’s OK if they fight there: that’s not violating any of Putin’s laws… makes as much sense as NATO supplying 14 different artillery systems, 50 different types of vehicles, and about a dozen of different air defence systems to the ZSU: nothing better but making logistics more complex in the middle of a war…

Meanwhile, Surovikin’s Missile Offensive is going on. There are days with lots of activity (like on 31 October, when Ukrainians claimed to shave shot down 44 out of 55 Russian cruise missiles and LPGMs fired at Ukraine), and then there are relatively quiet days, ‘in between’. Generally, this offensive is said to be targeting the Ukrainian power grid. However, four S-300s fired at Mykolaiv yesterday, have hit a gymnasium, a college, and a college dorm. Similarly, in Nikopol, on the western bank of the Dnipro, the Russians deployed in the Enerhodar area continued shelling schools and kindergartens. Thus, that itch in my small toe tells me, there ‘might be’ a slightly different purpose in what is done there — though still ‘perfectly’ in sense of Putin’s plot for the entire future of Ukraine.

The last few days were quite full of reports about heavy losses of VKS helicopters. For example, on 31 October, Ukrainians claimed three (yes: 3) Ka-52s as shot down in the Kherson area (including this one). Arguably, this one was actually shot down weeks ago, but this ex-Belarusian Mi-8MTKO-1 (possibly operated by the Wagner PCM), was shot down on the 31st. Moreover, a video surfaced purportedly shown somebody planting explosive charges on a Ka-52 at the Veretye AB, in the Pskov Oblast.

Regarding the Ukrainian Air Force: this is lately flying 14 to 20 air strikes a day, mostly against targets in Kherson Oblast. Apparently, it lost one Mi-8 on 31 October.


WESTERN LUHANSK

At the tactical level, for me it’s kind of hard to get used to the ‘new battlefield’ — especially so in western Luhansk: after months of reporting about fighting for Izyum, then Severodonetsk, then Lysyschansk, then along the Siversky Donets River and on approaches to Slovyansk etc., the frontline is now almost 100km further EAST. Sure, I’ve reported about Ukrainian offensives on the Oskil River and beyond it, back in September and early October, but still… Moreover, except with rain and resulting mud, Ukrainians seem to still be busy recovering all the stuff the Russians have left behind when fleeing. For example, this 2S5 Giantsint-S was captured with a full load of ammo calibre 152mm.

Furthermore, it’s hard to describe what exactly is going on along this section of the frontline. Essentially, both sides are reporting ‘local counterattacks’, lots of shelling, too, but not really a ‘lot’ in terms of big-style action. That said, east of Kupyansk, and after smashing something like a dozen of VSRF’s BTGs back in late September, Ukrainians seems to have crossed the large empty area immediately east of that town to reach Pershotravneve, Orlyanske, Kyslivka, and Kotlyarivka, but haven’t liberated any of the villages in question. Further south, there are rumours — and then rumours ‘spread’ by quite good sources — about Ukrainians being much closer to the Svatove than generally reported. However, the mass of such posts in the social media is removed shortly after, and then…. ‘nothing happened’. We’ll see what comes out there.

Further south from there, the frontline has stabilised down the western side of the T1303 highway, that is, approximately: from Kuzemivka to Kolomychykha, then down to Raihorodka and Kovalivka (all of these are still under the Russian control.

The Russians are still controlling Kremina, and from there regularly sending their reservists into attacks in direction of Torske. Surely enough, the latter was claimed as (re-)captured by all the possible Putin-fans over a month ago, but, somehow, turns out to still be under Ukrainian control. Read: could be something is exaggerating there. At least a bit, and probably because of all the losses the VSRF has suffered in that area…


DONBASS

Since about two weeks, the Russians are back to offensive in the Siversk area. The last two days, they have reached Bilohorivka (on the Siversky Donets, 10km west of Lysychansk). Haven’t taken the place, but seems to have captured few ruined homes on its eastern side.

Three months of Russian assaults on Bakhmut have resulted in profound changes of the frontline in that area. The 93rd Mech pushed the Russians back in the Soledar area, but don’t worry: they’re still assaulting the eastern side of Bakhmut, still assaulting Ivanhrad and Opytne south of Bakhmut. With other words: exactly as predicted by all the possible Putin-fans: the VSRF has ‘secured’ this ‘strategically important town and area’… or not at all. I know, it’s not fair to make jokes, then lots of people there are suffering — and terribly at that. On 3 November, they lost a Su-25 in that area(apparently, pilot ejected safely). But really, I haven’t ‘seen’ any dumber, idiotic, and more pointless ‘military operation’ of this kind since the IRGC’s idiocy best-known as Karbala-4, back in December 1986…

Further east/south-east, and like since eight months now, the Russians are assaulting Avdiivka, Opytne, Vodyane, Pervomaiske, Nevelske, Krasnohorivka, Marinka- AFAIK, Ukrainians might be withdrawing from Opytne, but Vodyane and Avdiivka are holding as well as all the months already. Certainly enough, some of Russian descriptions of their assaults on Pavlivka are reminding me of excerpts from Tolstoy’s War and Peace: the 37th explanation for their failure to capture the village was something about bad weather….and darkness of the night…

Unsurprisingly, all of this is resulting in lots of Ukrainian videos shown tanks and artillery of the VSRF getting blown up. Here the winning contender for the traditional, monthly turret-tossing contest, and here another reason for the Russian tankmen to complain about the lack of tank-vs-tank combat in this war…

Perhaps Surovikin is determined to offer us a classic example of ‘Putin’s Military Strategy’, as is going to be taught at the Academy of the GenStab for the next few hundreds of years? Read: why try something new, when one can go on squandering thousands of mobilised reservists to continue bolstering a failure?


SOUTH

The ‘biiiig’ Russian offensive on Vuhledar and Hulaypole is so successful, that….well, yes: at first, the situation was tense: 3–4 days ago, the Russians attacked Novomykhalivka, Pavlivka, even Vuhledar…. Have suffered heavy losses and meanwhile it’s Ukrainians that are attacking Marfopil.


KHERSON

There is a constant flow of reports about some sort of Russian withdrawal from Kherson. For example: they should have removed several checkpoints around the Kherson city, they should have removed their flag from the city hall of Kherson, they should be withdrawing a growing number of troops from the right bank of the Dnipro River etc. AFAIK, there’re still lots of VSRF and VDV troops there, though, and Ukrainians continue pounding targets in the area of the Antonovsky Bridge (moreover, they blew up a Russian POL depot in Chornobaivka, two days ago). Foremost, the Russian group of forces south of Davydiv Brid remains where it was, and then in force (and has recovered some terrain, the last 2–3 weeks), the entire 7th VDV Division is still in the oblast, and most of positions are holding out. Thus, sorry, not buying that (or if, then only once ZSU marches into Kherson).

…and that’s about it. At least I haven’t found much more firm data, the last few days: hope, I didn’t miss anyting important.

--


terça-feira, 13 de setembro de 2022

The Ukraine war has reached a turning point - Gideon Rachman (Financial Times)

 PUTIN NÃO VAI USAR A ARMA NUCLEAR. Mesmo seus generais mais servis não o permitirão, pois sabem que o seu poder vai acabar se o fizerem. Aliás contra quem, ou contra o quê eles usariam a arma nuclear? Em Kiev, em cidades ucranianas?

O que Putin vai fazer é causar o máximo de destruição material possível na Ucrânia e o máximo de perdas humanas, mas o seu caso vai se agravar num novo Nuremberg, no TPI, possivelmente.

Acredito que a derrota humilhante da sua Operação Militar Especial vai levá-lo a ser retirado do poder, mas a Rússia ainda vai permanecer como um "império do mal", como dizia Ronald Reagan durante algum tempo ainda.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

 

Financial Times, Londres – 13.9.2022

The Ukraine war has reached a turning point

After Russia’s setbacks a new and dangerous phase of the conflict is beginning

Gideon Rachman

 

The sight of Russian troops in headlong retreat in Ukraine is stunning — but it should not be surprising. 

This war has gone badly for Russia from the outset. Vladimir Putin failed to achieve the lightning victory that he was aiming for on February 24. By April, the Russians had been forced into a humiliating retreat after making incursions towards Kyiv. 

The limited gains Russia has made over the past six months have come at a terrible cost. The original invasion force mustered by the Kremlin was around 200,000 troops. The US estimated last month that 70,000-80,000 of that force has been killed or wounded since the beginning of the invasion.

Unwilling to acknowledge that Russia is at war, Putin has refused to institute conscriptionBy contrast, Ukraine has mobilised its entire adult male population. As a result, Ukraine now probably has more troops on the battlefield than Russia.

The Ukrainians also have the advantage in morale and munitions. They are fighting to defend their own country. The supply of advanced weaponry from the US and Europe — in particular, accurate long-range missiles — means they are now better equipped than the Russians. 

The prospect of Russian defeat is real and exhilarating. But Ukraine’s advances also open a new and dangerous phase in the conflict. 

The pictures of weeping civilians embracing Ukrainian soldiers as they liberate towns and villages from the Russians underline what this war is all about. Permanent Russian occupation would snuff out political freedom and would be enforced with killings, torture and deportations. 

An easy Russian victory in Ukraine would also have opened the door to further aggression against its neighbours — including Moldova and perhaps even Nato members Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. That prospect was alarming enough to persuade Finland and Sweden to apply for Nato membership. 

If Russia is defeated, the invasion threat hovering over the rest of Europe will recede. The global political atmosphere will also change. Russian defeat will go down badly in Beijing and Mar-a-Lago. In the weeks before the invasion, China announced a friendship “without limits” with Russia. Donald Trump chortled that Vladimir Putin was a “genius”. That judgment now looks not just immoral, but stupid. 

But some caution is in order. Almost a fifth of Ukraine is still occupied. The Russians will try to regroup and the Ukrainians could over-reach. 

The really complex question is what happens if Russia is facing a humiliating defeat — perhaps including the loss of Crimea, which was occupied in 2014 amid much rejoicing in Moscow? 

Rather than accept defeat, Putin may try to escalate. His options, however, look limited and unappealing. The refusal to call a general mobilisation must reflect nervousness about the opposition that could stir in Russian society. Calling up troops, training and equipping them will take many weeks — and the war is moving fast. 

From the beginning of the conflict, Putin has hinted that Russia might use nuclear weapons. The White House has always viewed this possibility seriously. As the war has dragged on and gone badly for Russia, fears that Putin might resort to nuclear weapons have receded a little, but they have not gone away. As one senior western policymaker put it to me last week: “We have to remember that almost every Russian military exercise we’ve observed has involved the use of nuclear weapons.” 

Using nuclear weapons in Ukraine would, however, create the obvious danger that Russia itself would be contaminated by the fallout. The global political reaction would be very negative and a western military response, probably non-nuclear, would be all but inevitable. 

Like Russian leaders in the past, Putin is hoping that winter will come to his rescue. Russia’s recent announcement that it will stop almost all gas supplies to Europe is clearly intended to freeze the western supporters of Ukraine into submission. 

But Putin needs a lot to go right for the gas gambit to work. A very cold winter or a surge in political protests in the west would help. Neither can be relied upon. The German government says the country “is now better prepared for a halt to Russian supplies” and that the total gas storage level is almost 87 per cent. Energy price subsidies are being rolled out across Europe. 

So the Russian leader’s position looks perilous. From the start some western leaders have quietly hoped that Putin would lose power as a result of the war. President Joe Biden even blurted it out. 

But if Putin is deposed, perhaps by a palace coup, his replacement is more likely to be a hardline nationalist than a liberal. The most vocal dissent being expressed in Russia is from militarists and nationalists — calling for escalation of the war. One theory doing the rounds in western intelligence circles is that the murder of Daria Dugina, a nationalist journalist, was organised by the Russian security services as a warning to Putin’s ultra-right critics. 

A defeated Russia would not disappear off the map. And it would still possess large numbers of nuclear weapons, as well as a replenished stock of grievances.

So many dangers clearly lie ahead. But sometimes good news has to be recognised for what it is. In what has been a bleak year, the Ukrainian military victories of the past week are certainly that.