Uma visão pessimista sobre a guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a Ucrânia - Scott C. Dunn (Medium)

 

The Historians Could Still Be Awfully Wrong About the War in Ukraine

Past performance is no guarantee of future results.

ScottCDunn

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5 min read·Dec 21, 2022

https://scottcdunn.medium.com/the-historians-could-still-be-awfully-wrong-about-the-war-in-ukraine-f7993abe3d40

I’ve had a few historians dog me about my articles on Ukraine. They insist that history is dispositive. They tell me that what worked for other countries will work for Russia, too. They offer the following prescription with a fair amount of uniformity and confidence: Nothing but a humiliating defeat will cure Russia of its poor behavior.

I will admit that the overwhelming and undisputable defeat of Germany and Japan did bring about some peace in the wake of the Second World War. But we still had wars after that. We had wars in Korea and Vietnam. We had Iraq, twice. Bosnia-Herzegovina, too. We took forever to get out of Afghanistan.

All of them involved the United States in some way or another. America seems to be a common element in wars around the world. That’s one reason I’m not convinced that the war in Ukraine will end if Russia were to just leave Ukraine.

Some of the historians I’ve encountered seem to think that Russia would fit the same pattern. All we have to do is deliver a humiliating defeat, followed by a big dose of disarmament, and Voila! you have peace.

But I’ve tempered my enthusiasm for war. I don’t believe in the optimists who tell me, “Look, Scott. If you could just get on board and believe what we believe, we could have unity with Ukraine. We need everyone to be on the same page so that we can help Ukraine win this war. Do you want yours with ice or room temperature?”

I’m not sure that Ukraine winning this war will bring peace.

The historians would seem to have history on their side. But those same historians seem quick to discount the uncertainty of human beings. We’re a quirky and unpredictable lot. Yes, there is a lot that can be predicted about us in peace. But in war, not so much.

When people are pressed into a mode of fight or flight, they begin to consider solutions that they would not consider in periods of peace. Historians know what I’m talking about. They know of Winston Churchill’s warning about war:

“Never, never, never believe any war will be smooth and easy, or that any one who embarks on that strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes he will encounter. The Statesman who yields to war fever must realise that once the signal is given, he is no longer the master of policy but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable events….

“I have always urged fighting wars and other contentions with might and main till overwhelming victory, and then offering the hand of friendship to the vanquished. Thus, I have always been against the Pacifists during the quarrel, and against the Jingoes at its close.” — My Early Life, 1930

Historians will mostly agree with Churchill on war. But in this war, I see absolutely zero sentiments for the part about offering the hand of friendship to Russia if and when the war should end. I have been aghast at all the ill will toward Russia. By the talk I’ve seen of the war around here, there is zero enthusiasm for friendship with Russia after the war. Zero acknowledgment of all of the forces at work against them.

Who bothers to ask the question, “Gosh, if America didn’t continually threaten Russia with nuclear weapons, would Russia even have an arsenal of nuclear weapons, too?”

Sometimes I wonder if Russia would be a different country if the United States had courted Russia the way they did China. They were both communist countries. Each got a different treatment with different outcomes.

China became a massive industrial trading partner. Russia became a fossil fuels giant. One had to build something from nothing. The other could just extract what they had to sell from the ground.

Russia isn’t operating in a vacuum. They are responding to what we do. To say that Russia is entirely at fault for the war they are in now, lets us off the hook. To say that only Putin can end the war by leaving Ukraine lets us off the hook. To say that the only solution is a complete and total humiliation of Russia is dangerous.

That might have worked in the 20th century. But technology has changed. People have changed. The world has grown older if not wiser. Russia has found access to advanced technology despite the sanctions.

Russia also has friends that can help them and support them in its war effort in ways that America or Europe can do little about. There is still a great deal of uncertainty about what Russia has and what it can deliver to the war.

I believe that there is greater certainty in negotiating for peace than in escalating the war. Every time I bring this up, I get the same refrain in reply: once we have defeated Russia, we can talk about negotiations.

If you defeat Russia and disarm it, a power vacuum will be created, and we have no way of knowing who or what will move into the vacuum to restore the power. Human power. Unpredictable human power. You know, like Afghanistan. We came, we fought, and we left Afghanistan with greater suffering than before.

Some people think it’s just Putin’s war. He wants it all back to the way it was in 1991. If only we got rid of Putin…

Eliminating Putin will very likely give rise to passionate and political insurgencies with lots and lots of guns. God knows what they will do if they get their hands on nuclear weapons in Russia.

At least if you start negotiating for peace now, you bring the temperature down. You allow cooler heads to prevail. When negotiations begin, both sides can air their complaints. Both sides can declare what it is that they really want and see if the other side can deliver. At least in negotiations, both sides are talking to each other.

You won’t have that if you escalate the war. And if you annihilate Russia’s army, as some have expressed a desire to do, you don’t really get the full picture in negotiations. If one side has an overwhelming victory, the other side will never be heard for fear of reprisal. Resentments will simmer for generations.

Starting negotiations now, before either side has declared victory, or either side has been completely destroyed, will allow enough room for both sides to air their grievances, and make their desires known. That’s information. That information can lead to greater certainty about future events.

Nothing says commitment better than making a clear statement about what one truly desires. Once we make our desires known, we commit to them. You can’t have that kind of certainty in an escalating war. You won’t get that kind of commitment in a war that could soon widen to engulf Europe.

So go on, tell me how we’re going to escalate the war. Tell me how we’re going to defeat Russia. We’re ten months into it now. All those predictions about how Russia is going to run out of weapons, run out of missiles, run out of men, seem to be off a bit. That’s uncertainty.

Start negotiations now and peace could be a thing by spring.

Write on.

scottcdunn.medium.com

The Historians Could Still Be Awfully Wrong About the War in Ukraine - ScottCDunn (Medium)

 Mais um artigo sobre um dos muitos aspectos da guerra da Rússia contra a Ucrânia.

The Historians Could Still Be Awfully Wrong About the War in Ukraine

Past performance is no guarantee of future results.

 ScottCDunn

Medium, May 5, 2023,

I’ve had a few historians dog me about my articles on Ukraine. They insist that history is dispositive. They tell me that what worked for other countries will work for Russia, too. They offer the following prescription with a fair amount of uniformity and confidence: Nothing but a humiliating defeat will cure Russia of its poor behavior.

I will admit that the overwhelming and undisputable defeat of Germany and Japan did bring about some peace in the wake of the Second World War. But we still had wars after that. We had wars in Korea and Vietnam. We had Iraq, twice. Bosnia-Herzegovina, too. We took forever to get out of Afghanistan.

All of them involved the United States in some way or another. America seems to be a common element in wars around the world. That’s one reason I’m not convinced that the war in Ukraine will end if Russia were to just leave Ukraine.

Some of the historians I’ve encountered seem to think that Russia would fit the same pattern. All we have to do is deliver a humiliating defeat, followed by a big dose of disarmament, and Voila! you have peace.

But I’ve tempered my enthusiasm for war. I don’t believe in the optimists who tell me, “Look, Scott. If you could just get on board and believe what we believe, we could have unity with Ukraine. We need everyone to be on the same page so that we can help Ukraine win this war. Do you want yours with ice or room temperature?”

I’m not sure that Ukraine winning this war will bring peace.

The historians would seem to have history on their side. But those same historians seem quick to discount the uncertainty of human beings. We’re a quirky and unpredictable lot. Yes, there is a lot that can be predicted about us in peace. But in war, not so much.

When people are pressed into a mode of fight or flight, they begin to consider solutions that they would not consider in periods of peace. Historians know what I’m talking about. They know of Winston Churchill’s warning about war:

“Never, never, never believe any war will be smooth and easy, or that any one who embarks on that strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes he will encounter. The Statesman who yields to war fever must realise that once the signal is given, he is no longer the master of policy but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable events….

“I have always urged fighting wars and other contentions with might and main till overwhelming victory, and then offering the hand of friendship to the vanquished. Thus, I have always been against the Pacifists during the quarrel, and against the Jingoes at its close.” — My Early Life, 1930

Historians will mostly agree with Churchill on war. But in this war, I see absolutely zero sentiments for the part about offering the hand of friendship to Russia if and when the war should end. I have been aghast at all the ill will toward Russia. By the talk I’ve seen of the war around here, there is zero enthusiasm for friendship with Russia after the war. Zero acknowledgment of all of the forces at work against them.

Who bothers to ask the question, “Gosh, if America didn’t continually threaten Russia with nuclear weapons, would Russia even have an arsenal of nuclear weapons, too?”

Sometimes I wonder if Russia would be a different country if the United States had courted Russia the way they did China. They were both communist countries. Each got a different treatment with different outcomes.

China became a massive industrial trading partner. Russia became a fossil fuels giant. One had to build something from nothing. The other could just extract what they had to sell from the ground.

Russia isn’t operating in a vacuum. They are responding to what we do. To say that Russia is entirely at fault for the war they are in now, lets us off the hook. To say that only Putin can end the war by leaving Ukraine lets us off the hook. To say that the only solution is a complete and total humiliation of Russia is dangerous.

That might have worked in the 20th century. But technology has changed. People have changed. The world has grown older if not wiser. Russia has found access to advanced technology despite the sanctions.

Russia also has friends that can help them and support them in its war effort in ways that America or Europe can do little about. There is still a great deal of uncertainty about what Russia has and what it can deliver to the war.

I believe that there is greater certainty in negotiating for peace than in escalating the war. Every time I bring this up, I get the same refrain in reply: once we have defeated Russia, we can talk about negotiations.

If you defeat Russia and disarm it, a power vacuum will be created, and we have no way of knowing who or what will move into the vacuum to restore the power. Human power. Unpredictable human power. You know, like Afghanistan. We came, we fought, and we left Afghanistan with greater suffering than before.

Some people think it’s just Putin’s war. He wants it all back to the way it was in 1991. If only we got rid of Putin…

Eliminating Putin will very likely give rise to passionate and political insurgencies with lots and lots of guns. God knows what they will do if they get their hands on nuclear weapons in Russia.

At least if you start negotiating for peace now, you bring the temperature down. You allow cooler heads to prevail. When negotiations begin, both sides can air their complaints. Both sides can declare what it is that they really want and see if the other side can deliver. At least in negotiations, both sides are talking to each other.

You won’t have that if you escalate the war. And if you annihilate Russia’s army, as some have expressed a desire to do, you don’t really get the full picture in negotiations. If one side has an overwhelming victory, the other side will never be heard for fear of reprisal. Resentments will simmer for generations.

Starting negotiations now, before either side has declared victory, or either side has been completely destroyed, will allow enough room for both sides to air their grievances, and make their desires known. That’s information. That information can lead to greater certainty about future events.

Nothing says commitment better than making a clear statement about what one truly desires. Once we make our desires known, we commit to them. You can’t have that kind of certainty in an escalating war. You won’t get that kind of commitment in a war that could soon widen to engulf Europe.

So go on, tell me how we’re going to escalate the war. Tell me how we’re going to defeat Russia. We’re ten months into it now. All those predictions about how Russia is going to run out of weapons, run out of missiles, run out of men, seem to be off a bit. That’s uncertainty.

Start negotiations now and peace could be a thing by spring.

Write on.

Join Medium with my referral link - ScottCDunn

Read every story from Scott Dunn (and thousands of other writers on Medium). Your membership fee directly supports…

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Military Balance 2023: The Ukraine war: some early lessons, by The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)

The International Institute for Strategic Studies 

Military Balance 2023

Excerpts from the report

The Ukraine war: some early lessons (p. 10-13)

In late 2021 and early 2022, US national-security officials engaged in a series of briefings to Ukrainian and European leaders, relating intelligence assessments about Russia’s intent to mount a full-scale invasion. Intelligence assessments were declassified with the judgement that Russia was planning an attack and that Moscow was plotting to stage a ‘false flag’ attack as a pretext for this. Although for many governments these did not appear to dramatically ‘move the needle’ in the weeks leading up to 24 February, there is a case to be made that such ‘intelligence diplomacy’ strategies may in future gain more traction, not least because of what Russia’s invasion implied about US intelligence penetration of Russian decision-making circles and the accuracy of its assessment in this case. That said, gaining such information may be more difficult elsewhere.

It is unclear whether governments have integrated this rapid declassification process such that it will automatically be employed in the next crisis, or even that they see a requirement for this. Processes have been established that would make it easier to share intelligence assessments and it is becoming easier to share information with trusted partners. Nonetheless, briefings like these, including the declassification of intelligence information and making this available to the public, have value in keeping populations informed and helping to shape narratives. They are particularly valuable when civilians are being asked to endure degrees of hardship because of wars else- were, as in the energy crisis in Europe in the winter of 2022. And they are important when civilians receive information from so many sources, some of varied analytical provenance, that can often provide information faster than governments have tradition- ally been able to, often because they are restricted by classification constraints. Moreover, there has been a wealth of open-source information on the war in Ukraine produced by citizen analysts and private firms, making use of commercially available satellite systems to deliver imagery-based assessments that were until recently the preserve of governments.

Questions of analysis

The war raises other questions relating to military capability assessments, in that Russia’s military power was in many quarters misjudged. A caveat is needed: some elements of the armed forces have been used only sparingly, such as the submarine service, while the strategic-bomber force has for the most part been able to launch its stand-off munitions – even if some of these have appeared to be sub-optimal. However, Russia’s military exercises, for instance, were more scripted than they appeared. This was widely understood to be the case for large-scale strategic exercises like Zapad, but not so much for Russia’s snap exercises – designed to test combat readiness – that had become a feature since Sergei Shoigu became defence minister in 2012. The same goes for Ukraine, where there was generally an underestimation of the capa- bility of its still-nascent non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps and, more broadly, of the fighting potential and ‘will’ of its armed forces and society. This calls for stricter application of structured analyt- ical techniques to avoid cognitive biases like mirror- imaging. But this is challenging when it is difficult to gain access to armed forces and harder still when these forces are themselves deceived by their own reporting. It calls for techniques, possibly including environmental scanning, that could lead to thorough study of societies as well as their armed forces, and for more regular and more qualitative assessments of military capability.

For instance, while Russia has sunk considerable sums into its post-2008 military-modernisation process, it may be that the effectiveness of these investments has been reduced by the impact of Russia’s political culture and of corruption. Alongside poor military and political leadership, further revelations of entrenched corruption in Russia’s armed forces will not help to improve mutual trust. In advanced Western armed forces this is seen as an important factor in helping to enable effective military leadership at all levels. Indeed, the war has highlighted the importance of the human factor in war and reinforced the value of investing in personnel, including the competence of commanders at all levels and adequate individual and collective training, without which investments in equipment can be wasted.

After 2014, Ukraine’s armed forces embarked on a programme to train and professionalise its troops, including the development of a profes- sional NCO cadre. With the support of NATO and individual member states, through vehicles such as NATO’s Ukraine Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP), four areas were addressed for bilateral support from allies: basic training; train-the-trainer courses; the development of a professional NCO career system; and the creation of professional military education systems for NCOs. Reports on the progress of Ukraine’s military reform were in many cases mixed, though the demonstration under fire of Ukraine’s military adaptability and resil- ience indicates not only that more structured analysis would have been helpful here, but also that such reforms can bring results in traditionally hierarchical post-Soviet armed forces. However, it is important to also consider that the impressive performance of Ukraine’s forces has been against a Russian adversary that has proven surprisingly poor, so caution should be taken in judging whether all of Ukraine’s forces have improved to the same degree, or that they have overcome all of the challenges associated with their post-Soviet heritage.

However, in Russia, achieving effective change in this regard will require political will, as well as improvements in education and training. But devolving and encouraging independent decision-making seems to conflict with the type of control and governance that has characterised President Putin’s rule. This may be a risk in other authoritarian states too, perhaps including China, though circumstances are different there (for instance, China has had prominent anti-corruption initiatives), and again, much depends on the quality of the enemy these forces would face. Nonetheless, this is a problem for the Russian armed forces moving forward. The ground forces now need to rebuild while engaged in a high-intensity fight. Many of its most experienced troops were lost in the early months of the war, and it is unclear not only how Russia will address the issue of adequately training and then integrating new troops into existing units, but also whether its military culture can change enough in future so that its troops can become mili- tarily effective against a peer adversary.

Military matters

The war in Ukraine has shown how important it is for armed forces to be able to adapt. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces adapted during combat, though with varying degrees of success. After failing in its initial attempt to seize the country with a dispersed set of multiple axes of advance and an optimistic ‘thunder run’ approach, Russia reshaped its offensives towards the east. Russia’s failure to gain control of the air meant it had to resort to greater use of stand-off weaponry and, towards the end of 2022, to augment these with uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) and direct-attack munitions sourced from Iran. Ukraine, for its part, has also rapidly sourced and used direct-attack munitions and has developed a capacity to fuse information from small UAVs to improve the capability of its artillery forces. It also dispersed its air force and maintained combat effec- tiveness and has also developed a capability to attack Russian targets at-reach using UAVs and missiles. These include the attacks on the Russian Black Sea Fleet flagship Moskva and some of Russia’s strategic- bomber bases, and at closer ranges using direct-attack munitions. Attacks like these have highlighted risks to static locations including supply bases and head- quarters and also troop concentrations; it appears to be increasingly difficult to hide on the battlefield.

The war has also been a stark reminder of the importance of magazine depth, evidenced by high usage rates for guided weapons and artillery ammunition and the severe attrition of armour. It indicates that any future military capability that relies exclu- sively on precision weapons will not only likely be costly, but will also need careful replenishment planning. This may require some production lines to remain open that would otherwise close, and government and industry to work together on suit- able procurement mechanisms. It may also require striking a balance between mass and capability. There is greater concern over supply-chain issues because of the war – concerns which had already been expressed during the coronavirus pandemic. There are now additional concerns relating to sourcing and traceability in the lower levels of the supply chain. Along with interest in supply chain assurance, this is also leading to a reconsideration in some countries over what supply chains and compo- nents may need to be onshored. At the same time, industrial capacity issues highlight potential near- term difficulties in increasing production to replace Western materiel supplied to Ukraine.

Moreover, concerns over supply-chain vulnerabilities form only one aspect of resilience. There is also now greater focus than for decades on the resilience of critical national infrastructure and of societies to state-based threats, including from physical attack as well as from cyber and broader disinformation threats. However, effectively tackling these challenges requires long-term government attention, including in the education sphere, and a joined-up approach within government and between govern- ment, the private-sector business community and broader society.

The war has illustrated the continuing importance of the combined-arms approach to warfare – including the integration of UAV and counter-UAV capabilities into land units, and also how increasingly pervasive surveillance can pose risk for manoeuvre forces. Furthermore, it has highlighted the importance of long-range precision artillery and also the armour versus anti-armour fight. Fitting active-protection systems to armoured vehicles can reduce the threat from anti-armour systems, but not eliminate it. Urban operations have highlighted the continued importance of capabilities, and training, suitable for this terrain. Meanwhile, the war suggests that both unguided and smart ammunition have complementary roles. Large amounts of both conventional unguided ammunition and precision weapons have been expended. Anti-armour weapons illustrate the benefits but also the costs of precision, with concerns expressed not only over whether Ukraine may run out of stocks of Western supplied anti-armour systems, but also about national stocks and defence-industrial capacity in countries that have supplied such systems to Ukraine.

Neither combatant in Ukraine has secured overall air superiority. Ground-based air defence has proved effective in limiting freedom of action and losses have been inflicted, while Russia’s comparative lack of modern short- and medium-range air-launched precision-guided munitions has been exposed. The importance of ISR has also been highlighted, along-side the ability to rapidly distribute information from the sensor to the shooter. And the vulnerability of helicopters to air defences has been apparent on both sides. But while air forces have looked to the war for lessons in 2022, some key developments in aerospace technology have more direct relevance elsewhere. The unveiling in December of the new US strategic bomber, the B-21, was clearly focused on Asia-Pacific contingencies; it was anticipated that China’s next- generation bomber would also be shown. In areas such as combat-aircraft design and manufacture, a problem for Washington’s allies and partners is that its requirements mean its designs will be at a price point that few of them will be willing or able to accept. In turn, this may lead groups of nations to team up in order to deliver advanced capabilities. However, the more diverse their requirements, the harder it will be to produce systems on time that are affordable and able to meet all their needs.

In the maritime domain, Russia’s navy has been embarrassed by Ukrainian tactics, but it was not really configured to face an opponent with very limited naval capability but adept at using naval guerrilla tactics. Rather, it was designed to hold at bay an opponent with significant naval depen- dence. For all the setbacks, Russia was at the end of 2022 still essentially enforcing a distant blockade of Ukraine’s trade. This underscores global energy and resource interdependence, and the importance of maritime trade flows and sea lanes of communication, as well as the potential of blockades. More broadly, for navies as for land and air forces, Ukraine has brought home the need to consider attrition, magazine depth and sustainment ability. It has also brought home the threat of unconventional tactics and emerging technologies, and critical undersea infrastructure vulnerabilities.

Money counts

In the wake of the disruption caused by the corona-virus pandemic, the global economic climate is again fraught. Surging inflation, commodity-price spikes, supply-chain crises and heightened economic uncertainty resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have derailed an economic recovery that, in some countries, was far from complete. Inflation rates increased globally in 2021 as a result of higher energy costs, a recovery in demand and ongoing pandemic-related supply-chain disruptions.

The war had led some countries in Europe to increase their defence spending, and others elsewere to take the opportunity to revise defence strategies. In 2022, around 20 countries in Europe pledged to increase defence spending, with varying degrees of size and immediacy. Nonetheless, the difficult global economic environment that will persist in the short term will impose constraints on public expenditure, not least the higher cost of debt financing in light of increased interest rates designed to curb inflation.

Global defence expenditure grew in nominal terms in 2021 and 2022 but higher rates of inflation meant expenditure fell in real terms in both years. In recent years, high inflation eroded defence spending in real terms in countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa and Russia and Eurasia, but this trend is now more widespread. Europe and Asia were the only regions globally to continue to exhibit defence-spending growth in real terms in 2021 with Russia and Eurasia joining them in 2022 as war fuelled above-inflation increases in the region.

For some governments, such as those in Europe and Asia, security challenges continue to sharpen even as the value of their defence investments is being undercut. This makes it more important not only to spend wisely and ensure that procurements deliver on time and on budget, but also to see that full use is made of the possibilities deriving from collaborative equipment development and from defence and mili- tary partnerships.

(...)

Relatório completo neste link: 

https://www.academia.edu/97372811/The_Military_Balance_2023_International_Institute_for_Strategic_Studies

Sanctions haven’t stopped Russia, but a new oil ban could cut deeper - Jeanne Whalen and Catherine Belton (The Washington Post)

Sanctions haven’t stopped Russia, but a new oil ban could cut deeper

Russia may be the most sanctioned country in human history, yet the economic toll hasn’t deterred Putin’s assault on Ukraine so far

By Jeanne Whalen and Catherine Belton

 The Washington Post, February 15, 2023 

In the weeks before Russia invaded Ukraine nearly a year ago, President Biden sought to head it off by warning Russian President Vladimir Putin of “economic consequences like none he’s ever seen.”

As the Kremlin nonetheless began its assault on Feb. 24, the United States and dozens of allies were ready, unleashing a battery of sanctions and trade restrictions aimed at crippling Russia’s finances, isolating its economy and making pariahs of Putin-aligned elites.

The initial impact of sanctions looked deadly, causing the ruble to crash, the banking system to shudder and companies worldwide to stop exporting vital goods to Russia.

But one year later, Russia has remained more resilient than many expected, thanks to its oil and gas exports, deft maneuvering by its central bank and a recent rebound in trade with China and others that has allowed some banned technology to sneak through. Western sanctions have deeply wounded Russia’s economy and military and caused friction among elites — but not enough to change Putin’s calculus and end the war.

With more than 3,000 individuals and entities targeted by the U.S. alone, Russia could be the most sanctioned country “in human history,” a group of economists and Russia experts wrote in a report published in January by the nonprofit Free Russia Foundation. Despite some economic weakness, Russia has continued its military assault on Ukraine.

“Instead of growth we have a decline. But saying all of that, it’s definitely not a collapse, it’s not a disaster. We may not say that the Russian economy is in tatters, that it is destroyed, that Putin lacks funds to continue his war. No, it’s not true,” Sergey Aleksashenko, former first deputy chairman of Russia’s central bank, said at a panel discussion in Washington last month.

There are signs Putin’s luck could be starting to run out, as Western countries slap tough limits on Russia’s energy exports, which they had initially avoided out of fear that it would paralyze Europe and exacerbate global inflation. Since early December, new restrictions on Russia’s oil exports have helped widen the country’s budget deficit, prompting emergency revenue-raising measures by the Kremlin and contributing to a 19 percent drop in the ruble.

Russia’s business ties to the West took 30 years to build and one week to shatter

James O’Brien, head of the Office of Sanctions Coordination at the State Department, said sanctions are meeting their aim of sapping Russia of the finances and technology it needs to support its military. But the measures, he added, are just “one tool to stop the war.”

“They have to work with the other tools,” he said in an interview. “I think we are limiting Russia’s options on the battlefield, and its resources to restore what it’s doing on the battlefield. And that, combined with military assistance and civilian support for Ukraine, is what will win this war.”

Russia’s position looked dire in the early days of the invasion, as Western governments froze a large portion of the country’s hard currency reserves, sanctioned financial institutions and kicked major banks out of SWIFT, the international payments system that is the backbone of global banking.

The measures sparked financial panic, prompting long queues outside ATMs as Russians feared a ruble crash and cash shortages.

“There was a real risk of a bank run at the beginning of the war and shortly after the sanctions were imposed,” said Alexandra Prokopenko, at the time an adviser to the Central Bank’s first deputy chairwoman, now living in exile in the West.

Former prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov declared on Twitter that the freezing of the central bank reserves would leave the government without the means to support the ruble. “They will turn on the printing press. Hyperinflation and catastrophe for the economy is not far away,” he said.

But swift countermeasures by Russia’s central bank soon restored a measure of stability. Officials closed down markets, hiked the main interest rate to 20 percent, and imposed draconian restrictions on currency exchange, withdrawals and hard-currency transfers overseas. The measures reversed the ruble’s slide.

“It was real hard 24 hours work behind closed doors,” said Prokopenko, the former central bank official, who left the country in late March. “It wasn’t panicked. But everyone was shocked after the invasion … No one expected full-scale invasion and real war.”

Western sanctions and export restrictions also initially froze much of the world’s trade with Russia, causing a collapse in the country’s imports.

The measures banned companies globally from selling Russia computer chips and other high-tech goods it needed to build weapons and military vehicles. They also severed so many banking links that Russian importers had trouble paying overseas counterparts. By April, Russia’s imports were 43 percent below prewar levels, according to a recent report by the think tank Silverado Policy Accelerator.

The restrictions clobbered Russia’s military-industrial base, according to U.S. officials, who say that Russia’s recent reliance on older weaponry demonstrates that it can’t replenish its munitions. “They started off with some of their most sophisticated weapons and they are now using essentially retreads. They are using equipment that in some cases has been around for many decades,” Don Graves, deputy secretary of commerce, said in an interview.

“They’re also having to basically pull components out of a whole range of appliances. So we see them dismantling dishwashers and washing machines and electric breast pumps to get the components they need to keep their military moving forward, to keep their planes and weapons systems working,” Graves said, declining to detail the source of that intelligence but saying he had a “very high degree of confidence” in it.

Sanctions forcing Russia to use appliance parts in military gear, U.S. says

While Russia’s military continues to wreak destruction on Ukraine, a lack of modern armaments is holding it back, said Alan Estevez, a former Pentagon official now overseeing export controls as Commerce Department undersecretary for industry and security. “It’s much harder to take out a HIMARS battery without a precision guided weapon because you need to target the exact point in order to do that,” he said in an interview, referring to a type of missile launcher that the United States is supplying to Ukraine.

But thanks partly to Russia’s revived trade with China, the export controls are proving leaky.

By November, chip exports to Russia from China and Hong Kong alone had grown to 55 percent of median prewar chip exports from all countries, according to export data analyzed by Silverado Policy Accelerator.

Data reviewed by the Commerce Department show a 70 percent drop in the value of chips going to Russia after the war, Estevez said. But “it should be 100 percent,” he said, noting that any chip now traveling to Russia “would be a likely violation” of the rules.

“Frankly right now evasion is my number one priority with regard to Russia — closing those networks,” he said. “We are talking to the countries where lots of this trade goes on … When we see it we’re going to shut it down.” He said the United States is certain that “the highest-end chips are not getting through.”

The biggest failure in the effort to wallop Russia, experts agree, was the West’s reluctance to go after the country’s biggest cash cow — oil and gas exports. The United States quickly banned imports of Russian energy, but Europe’s dependence on pipelines from Siberia was much harder to break. The continent imported about 40 percent of its gas and a quarter of its oil from Russia.

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Soon after Russia invaded, the European Commission proposed cutting Russian gas imports by two-thirds by the end of 2022. But German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and others dismissed the idea of an immediate oil and gas boycott, worried that it would leave Europe in the dark and exacerbate already soaring global inflation.

“I think the thinking was, let’s try these financial-sector sanctions and trade controls and in the meantime we try to prepare for oil and gas measures,” said Elina Ribakova, deputy chief economist at the Institute of International Finance.

Europe’s continued purchases helped create a cash bonanza for Russia amid a sharp rise in global oil prices last spring. Far from draining the Kremlin’s war chest, Europe was helping fill it anew.

By June, the European Union adopted a measure to ban most Russian oil imports starting on Dec. 5, and to prohibit E.U. companies from insuring or financing Russian oil shipments to any buyer worldwide.

The decision “terrified the Biden administration” because it came as U.S. gas prices were spiking to $5 a gallon, said Bob McNally, an energy consultant and former adviser to President George W. Bush, who was following the discussions closely in Washington. U.S. officials worried that Europe would block too much Russian oil from the global market and inflate prices even more, he said.

Treasury Secretary Janet L. Yellen went on a global tour promoting a modification she’d first floated in the spring — price caps that she argued would lower Russia’s revenue but prevent energy price spikes. Soon, a deal was reached: Europe would proceed with its import ban but allow companies to insure Russian oil shipments elsewhere so long as the buyers paid Russia no more than $60 a barrel.

“We were supportive of Europe moving towards energy independence from Russia, and thought that the best way to accomplish that was both with the import ban, but adding the price cap to it,” Deputy Treasury Secretary Wally Adeyemo said.

Those measures, which began Dec. 5, are now starting to bite. Russia’s oil and gas revenue plummeted by 46 percent in January from a year earlier, which, together with soaring spending on the war, caused the budget deficit to balloon.

Janis Kluge, an economist at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, predicts Russia’s budget deficit could reach five percent of GDP this year, up from two percent last year, due to the drop in energy exports and the rapidly falling tax take from the declining economy.

Economists say this will put even greater pressure on the ruble, which has already fallen since the oil embargo.

Despite rising budget deficits, the Kremlin will be able to continue funding its war machine for several more years to come, Kluge argued. The authorities are cutting spending this year on nonmilitary items such as road construction and education, “things that don’t make a difference in the next year but do over a longer future,” Kluge said. The government has also been raising money by issuing domestic debt and imposing windfall taxes on energy companies, including a payment of 1.2 trillion rubles (about $16.5 billion) Gazprom was forced to pay.

To cover the deficit this year, Russia is also expected to dip into its rainy day fund, the National Wealth Fund, now consisting mostly of Chinese yuan and gold. But economists say the fund could be depleted over the next two years.

“All of this together tells you the sanctions are a problem,” Kluge said. “But because the war is such a huge priority, it will not be the reason that makes Putin reconsider his Ukraine strategy. Yet.”

Some Russians see bigger troubles mounting. Putin has often touted Russia’s lower than expected drop in GDP last year as demonstrating that sanctions aren’t working. Western economists estimate the economy contracted between 2.2 percentand 3.5 percent, versus initial forecasts of ten percent or more. However, those headline figures could mask a deeper recession, due to signs of weakness in household and corporate spending, as well as Russia’s manufacturing and gas sectors, Russian business executives, officials and economists say.

“There is the official statistical drop, but unofficially it could be deeper,” said a senior Russian financial official who spoke on the condition of anonymity to avoid reprisals, citing a recent survey showing that Russian companies were in “survival mode” and “not making any serious investments.”

A collapse in Russian auto production last year, as factories struggled to import parts, is another ominous sign for the economy. So is the 9.3 percent drop in retail spending in the second half of 2022, compared with a year earlier, which suggests households are “in crisis mode,” Kluge said.

Increased spending on weapons production, meanwhile, has helped offset a big decline in industrial production. “The military industrial complex is helping the Russian government and Russian propaganda maintain the illusion that everything is ok, but in reality it is adding nothing in terms of people’s well being and productivity,” Prokopenko said.

Government figures show an unemployment rate of just 3.9 percent, but that reflects Russian companies’ practice of keeping employees on unpaid leave rather than firing them, the senior finance official said. Analysts at the consulting firm Finexpertiza estimated that the level of “hidden unemployment” reached almost 13 percent in the third quarter last year.

“The tension is felt practically everywhere,” said one Russian state official close to diplomatic circles, who declined to be named out of fear of reprisals. “There is construction that is not completed; equipment that never arrives. There is a lack of money among the population who are facing all these difficulties.”

Putin, unaccustomed to losing, is increasingly isolated as war falters

As the outlook has worsened, the government has begun classifying some economic data that used to be released. Most recently, Russia’s gas production and export numbers were deemed secret, after production fell by 19.6 percent in the first eleven and a half months of 2022 compared with 2021. Economists say some of the official economic data appears to be being manipulated. “They are certainly lying about the overall economic picture,” said Ben Hilgenstock, senior economist at the Kyiv School of Economics.

For much of the Russian elite, the sanctions — and Putin’s war — have shattered three decades of empire building and integration with the West. “No one approves of the war. Everyone considers it to be a mistake. But no one sees a way out,” said one Russian billionaire who declined to be named. Even those among Putin’s closest inner circle are increasingly dissatisfied with developments, said the Russian state official. That includes Igor Sechin, Putin’s deputy since the early 1990s and now president of oil giant Rosneft, and Sergei Chemezov, who served with Putin in the KGB in east Germany in the late 80s and now heads the state arms conglomerate, the official said. “The businesses that they built over all these years are under enormous pressure due to the sanctions. What can they be happy about?” the official said. Amid all the friction, western officials and some economists said they believed sanctions were working — even if the net impact has not deterred Putin from funding his war. “The way I think about sanctions is that we are shaking the tree on which the regime sits,” said Kluge. “We can’t really tell what’s going to come out of it, what’s going to happen. We are not shaking it enough for it to fall down. But we’re creating problems for them. It consumes a lot of political energy in Moscow. And it makes it clear to everyone, to all insiders, that it was a huge mistake to start this invasion.