Uma lagrima para... Dave Brubeck

Desde crianca, devo ter ouvido Take Five milhares de vezes. Nunca me cansei de ouvir.
Thanks Dave...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Dave Brubeck, U.S. Jazz Pianist, ‘Take Five’ Artist, Dies at 91

By David Henry - Dec 5, 2012 3:15 PM GMT-0200

• Facebook Share
• LinkedIn
• Google +1
• 1 COMMENT
• Print
• QUEUE
  
  

  Q

Dave Brubeck, the U.S. pianist and composer whose quartet produced the first jazz album that sold more than 1 million copies and was best known for the melodic composition “Take Five,” has died. He was 91.

He died today of heart failure, the Associated Press reported, citing his manager Russell Gloyd.

Enlarge image

Dave Brubeck performs along with his Dave Brubeck Quartet in this file photo. Photographer: Timm Schamberger/AFP via Getty Images

Enlarge image

In this circa 1950 photo, jazz musicians Dave Brubeck, left, Cal Tjader, center, and Ron Crotty play piano, drums, and bass, respectively, while rehearsing in a studio. Brubeck has died. He was 91. Source: Metronome via Getty Images

Enlarge image

2009 Kennedy Center honorees and Dave Brubeck, right, and Bruce Springsteen engage in conversation as they and the other honorees prepare to pose for the formal group photo following the Artist's Dinner at the United States Department of State on December 5, 2009 in Washington, D.C. Drubeck has died. He was 91. Photographer: Ron Sachs/Pool via Getty Images

Brubeck’s experimental recordings and unorthodox time signatures broke new ground in the 1950s, inspiring a generation of musicians and delivering jazz to a wider audience. His cool, West Coast sound defied traditional forms by playing in two keys at once, a harmonic approach that gave jazz a new angle.

The band stayed together for 16 years and was one of the most popular in jazz history, winning a cult following among students through regular performances on university campuses. Brubeck’s works such as “The Duke” and “In Your Own Sweet Way” became standards of the genre, while “Time Out” set a precedent for jazz music by selling more than 1 million records after it was released in 1959.

Brubeck performed for Pope John Paul II and for eight U.S. presidents, including Ronald Reagan, whose 1988 summit with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow included a concert by the jazz maestro. Brubeck also toured at the invitation of the U.S. State Department in a goodwill capacity, even performing behind the Iron Curtain in 1958 at a time of Cold War tension. In 1954, he became the first jazz musician to appear on the cover of Time magazine.

Early Years

David Warren Brubeck was born Dec. 6, 1920, in Concord,California, near San Francisco. His father was a cattleman and his mother taught music and played piano. At age 12, Brubeck moved with his family to a ranch that his father managed near the Sierra Nevada Mountains. There the young musician honed his piano skills in local bands before enrolling as a student of veterinary medicine at the College of the Pacific in Stockton, California. He later changed his major to music after abandoning his plans to become a rancher.

After serving in the U.S. Army under General George Patton during World War II, Brubeck attended Mills College in Oakland, California, where he was taught by classical composer Darius Milhaud. He recorded with fellow students as an experimental jazz octet, which included Paul Desmond, whose partnership with Brubeck produced tunes for about two decades. Alto saxophonist Desmond was the composer of “Take Five,” which was named after its unusual 5/4 time signature.

Brubeck said in a Public Broadcasting Service interview in 2001 that he almost gave up jazz as a career because of the hardships his lifestyle inflicted on his young family. To avoid the cost of a motel room at $8 a night, they once rented a place in the mountains above Salt Lake City, Utah, where the house had a dirt floor and the children had to be washed in a stream.

The Quartet

In 1951, the Dave Brubeck Quartet was formed with Desmond on alto saxophone, Joe Dodge on drums and Bob Bates on bass. The latter two were then replaced by Eugene Wright and Joe Morello. Wright, a black American, was the subject of discrimination by club owners, prompting Brubeck to cancel several concerts in protest. He and his wife, Iola, a lyricist, also composed an anti-racism piece called “The Real Ambassadors,” which featured jazz great Louis Armstrong.

After the quartet’s break-up in 1967, Brubeck appeared in a band with Gerry Mulligan and later formed a group with three of his own sons: Darius, Chris and Danny. He continued to tour the world in later years, playing concerts across Europe. His 80th birthday was celebrated by a joint performance with the London Symphony Orchestra.

Brubeck received the National Medal of the Arts, presented at the White House, and he won a Grammy in 1996 for lifetime achievements. The Brubeck Institute, whose honorary chairman is actor Clint Eastwood, was created by the University of the Pacific to support jazz students and promote Brubeck’s music.

“Once when asked how I would like to be remembered, I answered, ‘As someone who opened doors,’” Brubeck said.

Ilusoes brasileiras sobre a China - Sean Burges

Uma nova abordagem nas relações Brasil-China

Sean W. Burges

O Estado de São Paulo, 05 de dezembro de 2012

Como vários outros países do mundo, o Brasil tenta, a duras penas, fazer frente às exportações chinesas. O Conselho Empresarial Brasil-China (CEBC) organizou sua quarta conferência anual em São Paulo com o intuito de formular respostas a esse desafio. Algumas histórias interessantes foram relatadas, mas não muitas novas ideias foram apresentadas. O mais preocupante, porém, é que pareceu haver pouco reconhecimento dos sutis sinais de alerta de que a China vem manobrando o Brasil para uma posição subordinada, transformando-o num Estado vassalo.
O embaixador da China no Brasil, Li Jinzhang, usou uma mistura de recados oblíquos e antigas estratégias imperiais para sublinhar discretamente as posições relativas de poder dos dois países e os limites às aspirações brasileiras quanto à relação bilateral. Jinzhang falou deliberadamente em mandarim, não no português que esperaríamos de um embaixador num importante global player como o Brasil. Para ser generoso, é possível que seu português - uma língua que se sabe de difícil domínio para os chineses - não estivesse à altura de apresentação pública tão importante. Então por que não usar uma segunda língua comum, como o inglês, que é o idioma internacional dos negócios e da diplomacia? A mensagem era clara: vocês têm de vir até nós e se adaptar aos nossos modos e prioridades.
Pequenas alusões ao fato de que o ator predominante na relação bilateral é a China foram acompanhadas de advertências sutis aos industriais brasileiros que se queixam das importações chinesas e pedem a Brasília a adoção de mais medidas protecionistas. Jinzhang contou a história de um vilarejo chinês que, como o Brasil, era uma comunidade predominantemente agrária. Com muito trabalho e inovação, o vilarejo transformou-se numa potência industrial e agora contribui com pouco mais de 2% das exportações chinesas. Ainda que transmitida com gentileza, a lição às lideranças empresariais brasileiras foi muito simples: não reduziremos o ritmo de nossas exportações, cabe a vocês inovar e competir conosco. Mais arrepiante para a liderança do agronegócio do Brasil, Jinzhang também observou que a principal meta do novo governo em Pequim é garantir a segurança alimentar e o objetivo último, neste caso, é a autossuficiência.
Um aspecto implícito no discurso de encerramento proferido pelo presidente da CEBC, o embaixador Sergio Amaral, foi uma réplica ao desafio chinês. Infelizmente, a proposta de Amaral, que sugeriu revigorar as iniciativas de integração econômica da América Latina a fim de criar um mercado interno mais amplo e estabelecer um patamar comum de tarifas altas para excluir produtos chineses, é uma ideia antiga que não deu certo. Mais ainda, a proposta é um delírio que ignora por completo que Chile, Peru, Colômbia e México se reuniram para formar a Aliança do Pacífico justamente com a ideia de se voltarem para o oeste e olhar para a China, e não a leste, para o Brasil.
O interessante é que a história de Jingzhang sobre a cidadezinha agrícola chinesa que se transformou graças à inovação aponta um passo adiante para o Brasil, que envolva uma direção muito diversa para sua política externa e maiores, mas produtivas, alterações no pensamento empresarial do País. Há duas diretrizes concretas de ação.
Em primeiro lugar, o Brasil precisa aumentar sua taxa de inovação. O programa Ciência sem Fronteiras ajudará, mas não basta. Lições da experiência chinesa devem ser acrescentadas à receita. A industrialização na China apoiou-se em sucessivas ondas de investimento direto estrangeiro (IDE), que traziam tecnologia e novos processos - as empresas chinesas engajaram-se num amplo processo de colaboração internacional para estimular a inovação. Graças ao Ciência sem Fronteiras as universidades brasileiras já começam a experimentar algo semelhante por meio de um relacionamento ativo com universidades dos EUA, do Reino Unido, do Canadá, da Europa e até com a instituição a que pertenço, a Universidade Nacional da Austrália. As empresas devem seguir essa trilha e procurar parceiros dinâmicos, com os quais novos mercados, produtos e processos possam ser explorados e desenvolvidos. O governo brasileiro poderia contribuir ativamente para isso com programas criativos em instituições como o BNDES ou novas linhas de financiamento do Banco do Brasil ou da Caixa Econômica Federal.
Em segundo lugar, o Brasil precisa adotar nova abordagem para lidar com a China. Uma opção que não funcionará é a rota que potências intermediárias como Austrália e Canadá usam há muito tempo para administrar as relações bilaterais com os EUA. Não há comunhão de interesses para tornar isso viável com o Bric China. Em vez disso, dever-se-ia dar atenção a uma estratégia sofisticada de "equilíbrio" envolvendo uma parceria com Austrália e Canadá. Por que esses dois países? Ambos são relativamente pequenos e cortejam ativamente o Brasil, o que os torna administráveis. Mais importante ainda, para o impacto disso nas percepções chinesas, é que eles são outros dois grandes exportadores de minerais e alimentos para a China. Com Austrália, Brasil e Canadá - um novo grupo de países ABC - operando de forma independente, a China pode adotar uma estratégia do tipo "dividir para conquistar". O resultado é que as tarifas chinesas deixam entrar matérias-primas de forma mais barata, mas deixam de fora produtos de maior valor agregado em seu mercado. Isso faz dos países ABC celeiros para os consumidores chineses. A ação coletiva pode ser uma maneira de reverter esse processo e forçar concessões de Pequim.
A China será, sem dúvida, um dos principais parceiros econômicos do Brasil até o resto deste século. O perigo é que, se depender de desgastados modelos de integração e de uma abordagem excessivamente individualista no relacionamento com Pequim, o Brasil será rapidamente empurrado de volta a uma posição periférica e passará a funcionar como pouco mais que uma despensa da China.

SEAN W. BURGES, CANADENSE - É PESQUISADOR SÊNIOR DO CENTRO NACIONAL DE ESTUDOS LATINO-AMERICANOS DA UNIVERSIDADE NACIONAL DA AUSTRÁLIA.

Berlin: 775 anos; a tentativa sovietica de unificacao comunista em 1945 (Der Spiegel)

From SPIEGEL GESCHICHTE

• 
  The article you are reading originally appeared in German in issue 5/2012 of SPIEGEL GESCHICHTE.
• Content of SPIEGEL GESCHICHTE 5/2012
•  
• 12/05/2012

• Before the Wall The Soviet Fight for Postwar Berlin

  

  

  Corbis
  Although Berlin was split into four sectors in 1945, the Soviets were determined to see a unified city under their control. Their tactics for undermining the other occupying powers ranged from seductive to brutal, and a desperate blockade backfired into a 40-year divide.
  
  Editor's Note: Berlin is currently celebrating its 775th anniversary. In the coming days, SPIEGEL ONLINE International will be publishing a series of stories on the history of Germany 's capital. This is the fifth part of the series. The first , second , third and fourth parts can be read here.
  

  ---

  The first edition of the Deutsche Volkszeitung, which appeared on newsstands in the devastated city of Berlin on June 13, 1945, brought some intriguing news. The newspaper contained the first postwar appeal by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany. It read: "The path of forcing the Soviet system on Germany would be wrong." The Communist Party of Germany (KPD), which had advocated a "Soviet Germany" until 1933, was now calling for the establishment of "a parliamentary democratic republic with all democratic freedoms and rights for the people."  
• 
  Of course, most Berliners gave little thought to the future structure of the nation as they wandered hungrily through the ruins. KPD Chairman Wilhelm Pieck's son Arthur, a captain in the Red Army, described the mood among residents of the German capital in a confidential letter to his father on May 7, 1945: "The food situation is catastrophic. There is no electricity and no water. The few pumps or wells are insufficient, and people stand in line all day at the pumps and in front of the few shops. Although everyone is happy that the bombing has stopped and the war is now over for Berliners, the mood is gloomy and depressed. Men and women alike cry very easily. Most people have lost everything, their homes, possessions and money, and have nothing left." Very few Berliners paid any attention to a poster describing "Order No. 2" of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SMAD), dated June 10, 1945, which provided for the formation of "anti-fascist" parties. Four parties were established in Berlin within a few weeks. In addition to the Communists, they included the Social Democratic Party (SPD), a Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and a Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Stalin wanted to set the course before the Western allies, as agreed in July 1945, took over the western half of Berlin as occupying powers.
  On May 19, the Soviets appointed a Berlin municipal administration, headed by nonpartisan civilian Arthur Werner. The engineer, in office until October 1946, was a figurehead, while KPD officials like Arthur Pieck and Karl Maron, who would later become the East German interior minister, held key positions in the city administration.
  The new city administration restored the power supply, and it opened theaters, schools and, in August, the German State Opera. It also tried to fight dysentery and typhus epidemics that began in July, killing thousands of emaciated Berliners.
  KPD spokesman Walter Ulbricht urged his comrades to "create a new, trusting relationship" with the Social Democrats, with the aim of quickly merging the two parties. The SPD, and initially its leader in the eastern zone, Otto Grotewohl, opposed a merger under pressure. But Grotewohl, an amateur painter who was determined to bring about harmony, soon began to blur the contours of Soviet policy.
  Making Communists Out of Democrats
  A secret directive from the SMAD information administration, issued in the spring of 1946, showed how important a single, unified party headquartered in Berlin was to Moscow. It stated that all regional divisions were to submit a report on preparations foxr a unity party by 10 p.m. every evening.
  The information administration included several hundred experienced Red Army veterans who had worked in units "operating within the armed forces and population of the enemy" during the war. The head of the information administration was Colonel Sergei Tyulpanov, an economist and social scientist who had studied in Heidelberg for a while and lived on Ehrenfels Street in Berlin's eastern Karlshorst neighborhood.
  Tyulpanov was Stalin's most effective ideological warrior in Germany because he made the impression that he was not a rigid Stalinist. This is how Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, the conqueror of Berlin, described Tyulpanov's mission in a May 1945 speech to party officials at the Soviet garrison in the German capital: "We have taken Berlin by storm, but now we must win the souls of the Germans. It will be a difficult struggle, and now this is precisely where our front line lies."
  Tyulpanov's weapon was amiability. When he met with Berlin's leading Social Democrats, he was gregarious and full of smiles, asking them whether they had any special requests. Sometimes those requests could include a BMW, such as the one that was given to Max Fechner, an SPD politician who would later become East Germany's justice minister.
  Many SPD officials in the eastern section of Berlin acquiesced, sometimes because they were coerced and sometimes in the hope that they could dominate the new party. Still, Berlin's Social Democrats wanted the general membership to vote on a possible merger with the KPD.
  However, the Soviets barred the SPD's East Berlin members from participating. The outcome of the vote in the western sectors shows why: On March 31, 1946, only 2,937 of the 32,547 Social Democrats in West Berlin voted for an immediate merger, 14,763 voted for an alliance between the SPD and the KPD, and 5,559 voted against either an alliance or merger.
  Nevertheless, the SPD and KPD Unity Party convention, held on April 21-22, 1946, at the Admiralspalast theater, became an emotional event for the more than 1,000 delegates and hundreds of guests. In front of portraits of August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht, as well as a banner that read "Onward Socialists, Let Us Close the Ranks," the audience heard Beethoven's "Fidelio" overture and Grotewohl's promise that the decades-long "battle between brothers" had now come to an end.
  Democracy Fails for the Socialists
  The Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), which counted some 1.3 million members when it was founded, insisted that it didn't want´a "single-party system." Instead, it advocated the "expansion of self-administration on the basis of democratic elections."
  Half a year later, citizens of the German capital, including those in its eastern half, were indeed allowed to vote freely on the composition of a city council. The politicians on the ballot in October 1946 were Christian Democrats, Liberals, Social Democrats and members of the SED. The result was a disaster for the latter, with only 20 percent voting for the SED and 48.7 percent for the SPD. Even in the Soviet sector, the SED received only 30 percent of the vote. It was to be the last free election in the eastern sector for more than 43 years, until the March 1990 election of the East German Volkskammer, or People's Parliament.
  Life became increasingly difficult in the eastern sector for those Social Democrats who had joined the SED. At the second SED convention, held in September 1947, Pieck announced: "The Soviet peoples have shown us the way to make socialism a reality." In June 1948, when the SED called for the "eradication of harmful and hostile elements" in its "new type of party," panic erupted among the Berlin members. Many Social Democrats fled to the West, including, in October 1948, Erich Gniffke, a member of the SED Central Secretariat.
  Gniffke criticized the SED for pursuing "a policy of deceiving itself and others." Christian Democrats and liberals who had come to terms with the Soviet occupying power in the east also came under growing pressure.
  At first, the Soviets tried their hand at what Tyulpanov called "positive methods." Moscow's governors hosted lavish banquets for poorly nourished officials of the CDU and the Liberal Democratic Party. Ernst Lemmer, a CDU politician in Berlin, later recalled the scenes of hollow-cheeked guests feasting on saddles of mutton and roast suckling pig. With the vodka flowing profusely, Soviet officers kept their guests in good spirits with toasts to the "great German people." Under these circumstances, many a middle-class politician soon found his defenses weakening.
  The majority of Berliners were starving and freezing, especially during the harsh winter of 1946 to 1947. Coal was in short supply, the so-called "fat rations" issued through ration books were deplorably small, and tuberculosis was spreading throughout the city. Berlin had mutated into a slum.
  
  
• Part 2: The Carrot-and-Stick Approach
  
  In this situation, the Soviets used a system of rewards and punishments. A secret Tyulpanov dossier from April of 1948 reveals how the Soviets tried to entice reluctant politicians with food. "The most progressive leaders of the LDP," the document reads, were to frequently receive "food packages, food stamps, gifts and sometimes money, as an expression of 'concern for their health.'" On the other hand, "compromising material" was to be used against "leaders and party officials with reactionary views," as well as against the press, for the purpose of "cleansing the party leadership."
  Anyone who fell into disfavor with the Soviets had to flee. In December 1947, the Soviets deposed Berlin CDU leaders Lemmer and Jakob Kaiser, who just three months prior had portrayed their party as a "breakwater against Marxism" at a CDU convention in eastern Berlin. In early 1948, Berlin's CDUn was split into two parts, one in the west and one controlled by the Soviets. The branch in East Berlin issued the slogan: "Ex oriente pax," or "peace from the East." The LDP was also split in two at the beginning of 1948.
  In early 1947, Berliners already had an idea of what was in store for them. In a March 1947 cable to Moscow classified as "secret," Tyulpanov reported: "There is a vigorous discussion within the population of Berlin over whether Germany will remain a single country or be broken into pieces. At the same time, there is a growing fear that Germany could be divided up due to the opposing political views and ambitions of the Allies."
  Berliners faced the dilemma of having to align themselves with either the United States or the Soviet Union. In September 1948, Tyulpanov, writing in the SMAD newspaper Tägliche Rundschau under the German pseudonym "R. Schmidt," demanded that Berliners show loyalty to Moscow: "It is very clear that, in a zone occupied by the troops of a socialist country, only truly democratic parties stand a chance of further development."
  Behind this statement stood the threat of violence. In Berlin's eastern sector, the Soviets also had personnel who knew how to treat political adversaries with ruthlessness.
  In January 1946, the Soviet State Security office in Germany, headquartered in Berlin, managed 2,230 employees and 2,304 German informants. Ivan Serov headed the German branch. The short general, son of a czarist prison supervisor, specialized in the deportation and subjugation of resistant peoples, from the Baltic Sea to the Caucasus.
  Eastern German Prisons Swell
  In Germany, he remained true to his reputation. In July 1947, there were more than 60,000 prisoners in camps in the Soviet occupation zone awaiting a court sentence. These prison camps included "Special Camp No. 3" on Genslerstrasse in Berlin's Hohenschönhausen district.
  Until late 1945, the camp was primarily used to incarcerate low-ranking Nazi officials as well as prominent sympathizers, such as actor Heinrich George, who had played leading roles in films meant to boost morale during the war, such as "Kolberg." But starting in 1946 and 1947, more and more Social Democrats, Christian Democrats and Liberals ended up in the cells without heat, running water or windows.
  Many inmates didn't make it. According to official statistics, 886 prisoners died in Hohenschönhausen between July 1945 and October 1946 alone, most as a result of malnutrition and disease.
  In the Soviet-controlled sector of Berlin, the phrase "they picked him up" was synonymous with the despotic rule under which Soviet citizens had already suffered in the past. By March 1948, 6,455 Berliners had "disappeared." Neither attorneys nor courts could do these people any good, and the families often never learned what had happened to their loved ones.
  As documents from Moscow that were long kept secret reveal, Soviet generals were fully aware of the devastating consequences of these methods. Major General Ivan Kolesnitchenko, the head of the SMAD in the eastern state of Thuringia, wrote in a November 1948 report: "The 'disappearance' of people as a result of the activities of our operative sectors is already the cause of great dissatisfaction within the German population. I would venture to say that this approach by our security officials elicits severe anti-Soviet propaganda and hatred of us among the Germans."
  The Soviet occupying power faced a dilemma: Its option of a neutral Germany, with Berlin as its undivided capital, was obsolete by December 1947, in the wake of failed negotiations among the foreign ministers of the United States, the Soviet Union, France and Great Britain over the future of Germany.
  Soviets Misjudge the Berlin Airlift
  The Americans and the British prepared for the creation of a West German nation, one that would be part of an alliance they dominated. A key step in this direction was the monetary reform enacted in the western zones on June 20, 1948. The Soviets responded by cutting off the road and rail connections between West Germany and West Berlin.
  Meanwhile, emissaries from Moscow were explaining the purpose of the measures to SMAD staff. As Alexander Galkin, who is now 90 and was a major in the SMAD at the time, recalls: "We were told that the Soviet zone was being destabilized by the presence of Western troops in this zone, West Berlin, and that the troops were an interfering factor and had to disappear."
  But Galkin sensed early on that the blockade would fail. "It could only have been devised by people who knew nothing about the mood in the western part of Berlin, or the transport potential of the British and American air forces," he said.
  At the end of June, the Western Allies began bringing supplies into West Berlin through three air corridors. The "raisin bombers," as West Berliners soon called them, brought grain, powdered milk, flour, coal, gasoline and medical supplies to the western part of the city. Authorities in East Berlin used their weekly newsreel, "Der Augenzeuge" ("The Eyewitness") to remind Germans of the Allied bombardments ("Back then, these philanthropists showed up with bombs and phosphorus"), but the propaganda was ineffective in West Berlin.
  While American Douglas DC-3s roared over the skies of Berlin, the city was breaking into two parts. When the Berlin city council refused to defer to the SED, the party began organizing riots against the assembly, starting in late August 1948. On September 6, the delegates moved the city's parliament to West Berlin, despite the protests of the SED parliamentary group.
  Three days later, Mayor Ernst Reuter, speaking at a rally of more than 300,000 people in front of the Reichstag building, made an appeal to the West for solidarity: "You people of the world, you people of America, England, France and Italy! Look upon this city and recognize that you may not surrender this city and this people -- that you cannot surrender them!" The partition had begun. In November 1948, the SED formed a separate "Democratic Municipal Administration," by acclamation of coerced "workers."
  Blockade Over, Division Just Beginning
  It's an irony of history that the Communists in East Berlin chose as their mayor Friedrich Ebert, the son of the first president of the Weimar Republic and a former Social Democrat, while a former top Communist official, Ernst Reuter, led the resistance against the Soviets in the West. In Lenin's day, Reuter was a people's commissar in the USSR's Volga German Republic, and in 1921 he was briefly the general secretary of the KPD.
  The political air war over Berlin ended in defeat for the Soviets. On May 12, 1949, after about 280,000 airlift flights, sometimes at the rate of one flight a minute, the Soviets ended the blockade. It had cost 39 Britons, 31 Americans and 13 Germans their lives.
  

  West Berliners, relieved that they had escaped Stalin's grasp, tried to ignore the other side. The city was divided for the long term. West Berlin remained a dependent entity and a protectorate of the occupying powers for decades. The occupiers' intelligence agencies could spy on Germans as they pleased, and they had veto power over the appointment of department heads, including those at the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Germany's domestic intelligence agency. The SED, which now controlled East Berlin, initially emphasized patriotic fervor. "As the mayor of Greater Berlin," Ebert said at an SED party conference in January 1949, "I repeat the pledge of the people of the capital not to end the fight for German unity and the creation of a unified, democratic republic with Berlin as its capital a single hour before this goal is achieved and the banner of German unity and German freedom flies over the entire country."
  But Ebert could hardly have imagined the circumstances under which German unity would be achieved 40 years later.
  
  Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan

Brics e Brasil: aguando o entusiasmo dos neofitos

O Bric, depois Brics, é notoriamente artificial, feito com objetivos unicamente políticos, reunindo supostas grandes economias que não eram, nem pretenderiam ser, hegemônicas (ainda que isso seja altamente questionável).
Foi cantado em prosa e verso por muita gente, ainda hoje, aliás, e não se sabe bem o que produziu de diferente, de positivo, ou de realmente inovador na agenda diplomática, política e econômica do mundo atual.
Ainda é uma promessa, mesmo que não se saiba bem do que, exatamente.
Parece que sua função, no momento, é a de ser alternativo ao G7 e aos velhos "hegemônicos", o que é ser do contra, não exatamente a favor de algo. A ver, a ver...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasil não tem estrutura nem ambição para ser rico, diz economista indiano
J.R. Penteado
Do UOL, em São Paulo, 03/12/2012

O diretor de mercados emergentes do Morgan Stanley, o economista Ruchir Sharma
Indiano da cidade de Wellington, no extremo oeste da Índia, o atual diretor de mercados emergentes do Morgan Stanley, o economista Ruchir Sharma, adota um discurso cético quando se põe a falar sobre o Brasil.

A despeito dos últimos dez anos de crescimento econômico praticamente ininterrupto, Sharma descrê do discurso que vê o país rumo ao status de uma nação desenvolvida.

“Eu não creio que o Brasil esteja no caminho certo, ao menos por enquanto”, afirmou em entrevista concedida ao UOL por email. Os motivos já fazem parte de uma análise clássica: excesso de impostos, altos gastos do governo, falta de investimento em infraestrutura e presença muito forte do Estado na economia.

Sharma também diz que falta uma certa “dose de ambição” para o Brasil ser rico.

Segundo o economista, o país também depende demais dos países importadores de commodities (como minério de ferro), sobretudo da China.

Ele ainda ressalta que o crescimento da Bolsa de Valores do Brasil para os próximos anos deve estar abaixo dos demais países emergentes, que devem registrar uma alta na casa dos 10%.

Sharma ainda critica o acrônimo Bric –termo cunhado por um analista do banco concorrente Goldman Sachs e que coloca Brasil, Rússia, Índia e China dentro de um mesmo grupo. “Esses países são as maiores economias de suas respectivas regiões, mas, para além disso, não possuem mais nada em comum”, diz.

Ele afirma que dificilmente os países em desenvolvimento vão  se tornar ricos. “Seria muito bom se todos os pobres pudessem alcançar os padrões de vida dos ricos, e nós pudéssemos acabar em um mundo onde todos estariam no topo. [Mas] temo que não veja isso acontecer, certamente não no futuro previsível.”

Ruchir Sharma acabou de lançar o livro “Os Rumos da Prosperidade”, pela  Editora Campus, em que faz uma análise da economia dos países emergentes e sua relação com o resto do globo.

A seguir, leia os principais trechos da entrevista.

UOL - O sr.  diz que não faz sentido agrupar Brasil, China, Rússia e Índia em um único bloco. Por quê?
Ruchir Sharma - Esses países são as maiores economias de suas respectivas regiões, mas, para além disso, não possuem mais nada em comum. Todos os quatro estão em diferentes estágios de desenvolvimento –a Índia tem uma renda per capita próxima de US$ 1.500, a China, perto US$ de 6.000. Brasil e Rússia possuem rendas per capia próximas de US$ 12.000. Então eles encaram desafios bem diferentes.

Entre eles há importadores e exportadores de commodities [matéria-prima, como minério de ferro, usado para fabricar aço], produtores fortes e fracos de manufaturas, e por aí vai. Economias precisam ser compreendidas como casos individuais, e talvez o pior impacto de conceitos “marqueteiros” como o de “Bric” tenha sido o encorajamento do péssimo hábito de se pensar as nações emergentes como uma categoria sem rosto ou como subcategorias com acrônimos sem sentido.

O sr. acha que está totalmente furada a previsão de que os Brics superarão, até 2050, o PIB e a renda per capta do G-6 (EUA, Japão, Reino Unido, Alemanha, França e Itália)?
Eu nem chego a discutir essa previsão, como, aliás, me rebelo contra toda essa moda de fazer previsões a longo prazo. Eu sei que praticar futurologia é até divertido, que pretender enxergar o próximo século é irresistivelmente gratificante para alguns, mas também não deixa de ser intelectualmente desonesto. Será que essas pessoas que ficam fazendo tais previsões serão responsabilizadas pelo que falam?

Existe uma boa razão para que pessoas sérias, aquelas incumbidas de fazer as coisas acontecer no mundo real –CEOs, grandes investidores- foquem apenas nos próximos três a cinco anos, no máximo dez anos, enquanto toda essa moda de previsões a longo prazo são proferidas principalmente por “experts”, professores e marqueteiros.

Para além do período de cinco a dez anos, muitas das mudanças que podem ser previstas irão ocorrer juntamente com resultados impossíveis de previsão –eleições de novos governos, o aparecimento de novos competidores (como a China depois de 1980), ou de uma nova tecnologia (a internet depois de 1990).

A certeza desses importantes mas completamente imprevisíveis acontecimentos torna previsões de longo prazo totalmente sem sentido.

O sr. acha que só a China tem o potencial para exercer um crescimento estável e forte até 2050 ou nem mesmo esse país?
Eu analiso a China apenas para o próximo período de cinco a dez anos, e por muito tempo tenho pensado que o país estava prestes a desacelerar seu ritmo de dois dígitos de crescimento visto na última década. Toda nação que alcançou um crescimento rápido e sustentável por ao menos três décadas, incluindo Japão, Coreia do Sul e Taiwan, continuou a crescer, mas desacelerou significativamente em três ou quatro pontos percentuais quando atingiu um estágio similar de desenvolvimento no qual a China está hoje.

Nesse ponto, a economia é simplesmente muito grande para crescer tão rápido, e é assim que a China está agora.

Quais seriam os efeitos no Brasil se gigantes como a China reduzissem suas importações?
Nós estamos vendo isso agora. O Brasil tem confiado fortemente na exportação das commodities para países consumidores liderados pela China, e a desaceleração desse país é um grande motivo que nos faz ver o crescimento no Brasil escorregar para 2%, e o crescimento na Rússia escorregar para 3% a 4%. Ambos os países têm feito muito pouco para melhorar o ambiente de investimento doméstico, e o investimento deles em relação ao PIB continua muito devagar para estimular qualquer crescimento econômico mais rápido.

Na sua visão, poucos países alcançarão o estágio de nações desenvolvidas. O Brasil será um deles?
Eu não creio que o Brasil esteja no caminho certo, ao menos por enquanto. Um de seus grandes problemas é seu grande histórico de tributação e gastos em níveis muito altos, não acompanhados de suficiente investimento produtivo –fatores que deixaram o país com uma infraestrutura muito fraca, e, portanto, com uma tendência de crescimento em um ritmo muito devagar.

Outro problema é que o Brasil, instigado por seu histórico de instabilidade econômica, tem estado nos últimos anos mais preocupado com a estabilidade do que produzir crescimento –o que o deixa fundamentalmente menos ambicioso que muitos mercados emergentes.
E, por último, o Brasil ainda possui a mania de resolver seus problemas com a mão do Estado: a parte do Estado na economia do Brasil é muito alta para um país com seu nível de renda, comparado aos Estados de Bem-Estar Social avançados na Europa. Basicamente, o Brasil precisa de uma reforma estrutural profunda, que reduza seus impostos e gastos com encargos, e uma dose de ambição para se colocar em um movimento de arranque.

Se economias de países importadores como a China desacelerarem, como o Brasil poderia escapar de seus efeitos negativos em tal situação?
Eu acho que o Brasil poderia começar com o básico que eu falei acima. A atual situação é apenas um sintoma de problemas mais profundos com o papel do Estado, com o impacto de seu histórico, com as décadas de tendências de investimento ultrapassadas, a má infraestrutura etc.

Quais são as perspectivas para a Bolsa de Valores brasileira nos próximos anos?
Nossas previsões dizem que as Bolsas do mundo em desenvolvimento devem crescer por volta de 10% em média em dólar, por ano, nos próximos cinco anos. Não tenho uma previsão específica para o Brasil, mas acho que o país deve ficar abaixo de outros mercados emergentes, especialmente em dólar, já que a moeda ainda está muito cara.

O sr. defende que as diferenças entre a renda per capita dos países ricos e a dos países pobres voltaram para os níveis na década de 50.
Foi Armínio Fraga, ex-presidente do Banco Central do Brasil (1999-2002), que me mostrou que a renda per capita do país havia crescido de 12% para 25% da renda per capita americana durante o primeiro boom de crescimento dos anos 50 e 60, caiu para 16% durante as décadas seguintes.