O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida.

domingo, 19 de abril de 2020

NHS e SUS - João Paulo Charleau (Nexo Jornal)

O que é e como funciona o SUS britânico

Após sair da UTI, Boris Johnson diz que deve a vida ao sistema público de saúde do Reino Unido, que cresce em importância na epidemia do novo coronavírus
FOTO: PHIL NOBLE/REUTERS - 09.04.2020
Médicas, cinco mulheres com roupas azuis, aplaudem NHS no Reino Unido
 PROFISSIONAIS DE SAÚDE PARTICIPAM DE ATO EM DEFESA DO SISTEMA PÚBLICO DE SAÚDE BRITÂNICO DURANTE A PANDEMIA
O primeiro-ministro britânico, Boris Johnson, disse no domingo (12) que deve sua vida ao NHS (sigla em inglês do Sistema Nacional de Saúde), o equivalente britânico ao SUS (Sistema Único de Saúde) do Brasil.
“O NHS é o coração pulsante de nosso país. É o melhor que esse país tem. É invencível. É potencializado pelo amor”, disse Johnson num vídeo postado em suas redes sociais, depois de receber alta do hospital em que passou uma semana internado por causa do novo coronavírus, parte dela na UTI (Unidade de Terapia Intensiva).
O premiê agradeceu nominalmente dois funcionários – Jenny, da Nova Zelândia, e Luis, de Portugal – que prestaram assistência nos trabalhos de oxigenação a Johnson num momento crítico de sua internação. “Eu sei que, ao longo de todo o país, 24 horas por dia, em cada segundo de cada hora, há centenas de milhares de funcionários do NHS trabalhando com a mesma dedicação e o mesmo afinco que Jenny e Luis”, disse. 
“O NHS salvou minha vida, sem dúvida. É difícil encontrar palavras para expressar minha gratidão”
Boris Johnson 
primeiro-ministro do Reino Unido, em 12 de abril de 2020
A homenagem prestada por Johnson ao NHS é a coroação – que parte de um governante economicamente liberal – de um sistema público de saúde que há 72 anos é mantido com impostos pagos por 66 milhões de britânicos para atender pacientes de todo o país, sem nenhum tipo de conta a ser paga pelo usuário na ponta.
O período excepcional da pandemia, que até terça-feira (14) havia deixado mais de 89 mil contaminados e 11 mil mortos no Reino Unido, veio reforçar o apreço que britânicos de todos os matizes políticos e ideológicos têm por seu modelo de saúde pública. 
Os planos privados de saúde existem no Reino Unido, mas são tão restritos que são considerados um negócio de nicho, usado sobretudo por pessoas que querem poder escolher seus médicos não por proximidade geográfica, como determina o NHS, mas por outras preferências.
A situação contrasta com a de países como os EUA, onde não existe um sistema universal de saúde. No contexto americano, 27,5 milhões de pessoas não dispõem de renda para pagar por um plano privado, e, por isso, têm normalmente que deixar de se tratar ou contrair dívidas de longo prazo.
No Brasil, por outro lado, existe um sistema único de saúde como o britânico, mas ainda assim mais de 47 milhões de pessoas contratam planos privados, na esperança de prescindir dos serviços públicos, tidos como superlotados ou insuficientes.
O presidente Jair Bolsonaro recebe cuidados médicos do hospital privado Albert Einstein, em São Paulo, ou do Hospital das Forças Armadas, que atende militares da ativa e reformados, como ele, em Brasília.

Como o NHS foi criado

O equivalente ao SUS britânico nasceu em 1948, três anos depois do fim da Segunda Guerra Mundial (1939-1945), quando um Reino Unido devastado – sobretudo as cidades portuárias e a capital, Londres, duramente atingida pelos bombardeios aéreos da Alemanha nazista – tentavam se reerguer dos escombros.
A discussão sobre a necessidade de criar um sistema único de saúde no Reino Unido vem desde pelo menos 1909, com a ideia sendo defendida tanto pela esquerda quanto pela direita, com nuances. Em 1934, por exemplo, a proposta foi feita por membros da Associação Médica Socialista. Dez anos depois, em 1944, foi defendida por parlamentares do Partido Conservador.
Aneurin Beva, um parlamentar trabalhista vindo de uma família de trabalhadores da mineração, é considerado o padrinho do NHS em seu formato atual. A ideia que ele defendia estava baseada em três princípios vigentes ainda hoje: que atenda a necessidade de todos, que seja gratuito na ponta e cujo acesso seja medido pela necessidade do paciente, não por sua capacidade de pagar pelo serviço.
FOTO: HANNAH MCKAY/REUTERS - 14.04.2020
Com recortes infantis colados na vitrine de uma loja, há um arco-íris colorido a mão. Abaixo, em inglês, está escrito: "Obrigado NHS + trabalhadores vitais". Por trás da vitrine, é possível ver capas de alguns livros expostos.
 CARTAZ INFANTIL COM HOMENAGEM AO SISTEMA DE SAÚDE PÚBLICO BRITÂNICO, EM LONDRES
Assim como o SUS no Brasil, o NHS também oferece atenção universal em saúde para todos os que residam em território nacional, o que, no caso do Reino Unido, se aplica a Inglaterra, Escócia, Irlanda do Norte e País de Gales.
Além dos nacionais britânicos, o sistema atende também estrangeiros que tenham visto de permanência válido no país e cidadãos de outros países europeus com os quais o Reino Unido tem acordos de reciprocidade nessa área. Os demais são submetidos a entrevistas para decidir seus casos e, frequentemente, são cobrados pelo atendimento antes de iniciá-lo ou assinam termos com os quais se comprometem a pagar mais tarde.
Os britânicos afirmam que o NHS é o quinto maior empregador do mundo, atrás do Departamento de Estado Americano, das Forças Armadas da China, do Walmart e do McDonald’s, nesta ordem. De cada 20 trabalhadores britânicos, um trabalha para o sistema público de saúde, que tem 1,6 milhões de empregados em todo o Reino Unido.
Segundo dados de 2015, o NHS realiza aproximadamente 381 milhões de consultas anuais. O orçamento do sistema equivale a mais de US$ 170 bilhões por ano. Desse total, 98,8% dos recursos vêm de impostos gerais, cobrados de britânicos e residentes. O restante vem de pagamentos avulsos feitos por pessoas que usam o sistema sem estar registrado nele, como estrangeiros com vistos de curta duração, por exemplo.
O pagamento de pessoal consome 60% dos recursos, enquanto 20% é gasto com compra de insumos e medicamentos, e o restante com equipamentos, manutenção, administração e limpeza.

O papel dos imigrantes no NHS

Em seu discurso de agradecimento ao NHS, Johnson citou nominalmente alguns médicos e enfermeiras, sendo que dois deles, Jenny e Luis, mereceram deferência especial. Ambos são imigrantes. Ela é neozelandesa e ele é português.
A condição de Jenny e Luis está longe de ser rara no NHS, pois um terço dos médicos que trabalham no sistema são estrangeiros. Os dois maiores grupos são de europeus (21 mil) e de indianos (21 mil também). O peso dos estrangeiros no sistema foi um dos argumentos dos que se opuseram à saída britânica da União Europeia, o chamado Brexit, sacramentado com apoio decisivo do mesmo Johnson que agora agradeceu aos enfermeiros imigrantes lotados no NHS.
Em 2018, a agência de mensuração da opinião pública Mintel perguntou aos britânicos quais as organizações das quais eles mais se orgulham. O NHS foi o vencedor com 54% das respostas, na frente da “história britânica” (38%), das Forças Armadas (34%) e da Família Real (28%). 

A comparação entre o NHS e o SUS 

Para entender como o NHS britânico funciona na prática, e quais suas semelhanças e diferenças em relação ao SUS brasileiro, o Nexoconversou por telefone, na terça-feira (14), com o português João Nunes, que é doutor em relações internacionais com especialização em temas de saúde pública e saúde global, além de professor na Universidade de York, no norte da Inglaterra. 

O que tem de diferente e o que tem de semelhante entre o NHS britânico e o SUS brasileiro?

JOÃO NUNES Ambos são sistemas nos quais há um financiamento através dos impostos. O Estado repassa as verbas para os Estados e municípios, distritos, enfim. A diferença está no acolhimento. No sistema britânico, o cidadão está cadastrado em função de sua área de residência, tendo como referência uma clínica privada de várias especialidades. Todo mundo tem de estar cadastrado em um médico generalista de sua área de residência. O cidadão sempre consulta esse médico generalista de referência em primeiro lugar. O médico é privado, mas o cidadão não paga por essa consulta. É o médico que, em seguida, cobra o honorário do NHS. Todo encaminhamento para um especialista é feito sob recomendação desse médico de referência.
No Brasil, ao contrário, a pessoa vai aos ambulatórios, às unidades básicas de saúde para fazer as consultas. 
Em ambos os casos, os cidadãos vão a hospitais em casos de urgência. Em ambos também o cidadão não paga por medicamentos e consultas, quando receitados por médicos e hospitais que fazem parte da rede pública.

Por que há a percepção de que o sistema público de saúde do Reino Unido funciona bem, enquanto o sistema público de saúde do Brasil funciona mal?

JOÃO NUNES O sistema público de saúde britânico não funciona tão bem assim. Há problemas. Um exemplo simples: o processo de marcar consultas pode demorar semanas e, quando a consulta acontece, pode durar só 15 minutos. É um sistema que tem suas imperfeições, tem problemas de financiamento, de recursos, e do grau de satisfação e de demanda de seus funcionários, que não recebem bons salários nem reconhecimento à altura, especialmente no caso dos enfermeiros e dos médicos em início de carreira.
Esse é um sistema que tem diferença de funcionamento em relação ao sistema brasileiro pela forma como ele está desenhado, mas não só isso. O Brasil tem um perfil epidemiológico muito diferente do Reino Unido. Combina doenças de países em desenvolvimento, como as doenças transmitidas por mosquitos, as doenças de parasitas, as doenças tropicais, com doenças ditas de países desenvolvidos, como são as doenças respiratórias e cardíacas. Além disso, o Brasil tem uma imensa diversidade territorial e econômica.
O SUS é bem descentralizado, o que tem vantagens e desvantagens. Ele depende da administração local para a gestão dos recursos e implementação das ações. Ele tem que ser um sistema descentralizado para responder às demandas, mas, ao mesmo tempo, isso torna o sistema muito dependente do nível local – depende então se há ou não há probidade política local, ou se a autoridade local gasta a verba em saúde ou em outras coisas. No Brasil depende muitas vezes da boa vontade do implementador local, portanto.

O fato de os convênios privados serem usados por uma grande parcela da população no Brasil influencia a qualidade do SUS?

JOÃO NUNES Sim. Há uma diferença muito grande entre os dois sistemas que é a existência muito maior de planos privados no Brasil. O percentual da população que usa sistema privado no Brasil é muito maior que na Europa. No Reino Unido, o plano privado te dá o direito de escolher seu médico de referência. Mas o peso do gasto privado na Europa é muito menor. O Brasil tem um peso muito grande dos planos privados.
No caso brasileiro, houve uma campanha gradual de deslegitimação do SUS. Não é algo apenas das elites, mas das pessoas mais pobres também. Muitas vezes essas pessoas têm razão, pois elas não encontram respostas a todas as suas demandas, é verdade. Mas depois se criou a ideia de que você tem que procurar o plano privado para resolver seus problemas. Tornou-se uma profecia auto-cumprida. O SUS tornou-se muito mais vulnerável a ataques e a tentativas de desmantelamento.
Perceba que os ministros da Saúde no Brasil, desde pelo menos o governo Michel Temer, têm uma agenda de privatização. O problema é um determinado senso comum que foi criado com muita eficácia no Brasil de que o serviço público não presta e o serviço privado é que é bom. Há carências na ponta, é verdade; muitas pessoas não encontram a resolutividade necessária. Porém, há também uma campanha deliberada de deslegitimação. 
Hoje, o Programa de Saúde da Família, que prevê o emprego dos agentes comunitários de saúde, está com inúmeros problemas. Outro programa em dificuldade é o Programa Mais Médicos, que permitiu que pessoas que nunca tinham tido contato com um médico tivessem pela primeira vez. Entretanto, o programa foi extinto por razões ideológicas. As tentativas de arrumar o SUS foram atacadas e minadas, em alguns casos simplesmente acabadas.
Já aqui no Reino Unido impera uma ideia de “nosso NHS”, como um tesouro nacional, um patrimônio comum, que é uma conquista importante que deve ser protegida por todos, por todos os políticos, à direita e à esquerda. Há um consenso sobre isso. Para muitos políticos, é apenas retórica, mas ainda assim funciona para o eleitorado, que acredita nesse patrimônio. Mesmo na campanha do Brexit, Johnson fez como principal promessa – uma promessa falsa, na verdade – de que sairia da União Europeia e transferiria o dinheiro gasto com o bloco para o NHS. Ele sabia que essa promessa teria uma ressonância junto à população, sobretudo os mais idosos.

Teria algum peso se os políticos usassem o sistema público no Brasil, como fez Boris Johnson no Reino Unido? Acha que eles deviam ser obrigados a isso?

JOÃO NUNES Faria uma enorme diferença. Temos tantos exemplos de políticos e de personalidades brasileiras que vão para hospitais privados de referência e não usam o SUS.
Sobre obrigar os políticos a usar o SUS, é certo que provocaria mudanças, mas a questão é que essa parece ser uma medida atentatória à liberdade da pessoa escolher onde ela quer receber seus cuidados de saúde, e nós deveríamos evitar esse tipo de situação. 
Deveria, isso sim, haver uma expectativa de que esses políticos utilizassem o SUS quando tivessem problemas de saúde, assim como acontece no Reino Unido. Aqui ninguém teria entendido se o premiê tivesse se tratado num hospital privado. No Brasil não ocorreria a ninguém perguntar “por que o presidente não foi ao SUS?”
Muitas pessoas não sabem, mas, em muitas especialidades, o melhor está na rede pública, tanto no Brasil quanto na Europa. Porém, criou-se uma campanha de deslegitimação que foi muito bem sucedida, em colar a imagem de ruim no hospital público, quando, em muitos casos, é exatamente o contrário. Há casos em que o hospital privado transfere a pessoa para o hospital público quando complica. Os melhores profissionais de saúde no Brasil estão muitas vezes na rede pública.
Seria bom que presidente, os governadores e os prefeitos usassem o SUS, assim como deviam usar o sistema de transporte público ou de escolas públicas. A pessoa que responde pelos serviços públicos deveria ser a primeira a usar os serviços públicos.
João Paulo Charleaux é repórter especial do Nexo e escreve de Paris

China vs USA - Niall Ferguson

China vs USA: who will win the Corona war?
Niall Ferguson
The Spectator, May 2020

This article is in The Spectator’s May 2020 US edition. Subscribe here to get yours.
The COVID-19 pandemic came along just as Cold War Two was getting under way between the United States and the People’s Republic of China — the superpowers of our time — with the European Union and a good many other US allies quietly hoping to be non-aligned. Far from propelling Beijing and Washington towards détente in the face of a common enemy, the new plague has only intensified the Cold War. For the first time, China’s campaign of disinformation has been on a Russian level, with wild anti-American conspiracy theories being disseminated by senior Foreign Ministry officials. As is well known, President Donald Trump retaliated by calling Sars-CoV-2 (the pathogen that causes the disease COVID-19) the ‘Chinese virus’ until persuaded to desist by his son-in-law Jared Kushner and the Chinese ambassador to Washington.
To some naive observers, China is going to win the corona wars. Yes, the virus may have originated in Wuhan, perhaps in one of the local wet markets where live wild animals are sold for their meat, or, more plausibly, in one of two biological research laboratories located in the city. Finally, after an initially disastrous Chernobyl-like sequence of events, the Chinese government has been able to get the contagion under control with remarkable speed — and now seeks to bend the online narrative in its favor, recasting itself as the savior rather than scourge of mankind.
I am not convinced. True, this may not be Xi Jinping’s Chernobyl. Unlike its Soviet counterpart in 1986, the Chinese Communist party has the ability to weather the storm and to restart the industrial core of its economy. Yet there is no plausible way that Xi can now meet his cherished goal of China’s economy this year becoming twice the size it was in 2010. That would need growth of at least five percent and COVID-19 has blown a hole in that target. Nor is Xi politically unassailable.
But that is not to say that the US will somehow emerge from the pandemic panic with its global primacy intact. It is not just that Trump bungled his response to the crisis (though he certainly did). Much more troubling is the realization that the parts of the federal government that are responsible for handling a crisis like this — supposedly, the genuine experts — bungled it too.
The Department of Health and Human Services is a mansion with many houses, but the ones that were charged with pandemic preparedness appear to have failed abjectly: not only the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, but also the Food and Drug Administration and the Public Health Service, as well as the National Disaster Medical System.
This is not for want of legislation. In 2006 Congress passed a Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act, in 2013 a Reauthorization Act of the same name, and in June last year a Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness and Advanced Innovations Act. In October 2015 the bipartisan Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense, co-chaired by Joe Lieberman and Tom Ridge, published its first report, calling for better integration of the agencies responsible for biodefense. Last year, it was renamed the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense ‘to more accurately reflect its work and the urgency of its mission’. On paper, the US was the most pandemic-prepped country in the world.
So let’s not pretend that the pandemic illustrates the case for big government. The US already has big government. And this is what it does: agencies, laws, reports, PowerPoint presentations…and then — when the endlessly discussed crisis actually happens — paralysis, followed by panic.
Today, the US has fallen back on the old 20th-century playbook of pandemic pluralism (states do their own thing; in some states a lot of people die), but combining it with the 2009-10 playbook of financial crisis management. The result is insane. A large chunk of the economy has been shut down by government order. The national debt is exploding, along with the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve.
Trump makes wild claims that he can reopen the economy over the heads of state governors. He plays tacky propaganda videos to the press corps he now holds captive. Meanwhile, we are nowhere near having the amount of testing — or the technology of contact tracing — that we need to end the lockdowns. As this debacle plays out, it is like watching the realization of all my earlier visions of the endgame of American empire — in Colossus (2004), Civilization (2011) and The Great Degeneration (2012) — but in fast forward.
History shows that plagues tend to be bad for big empires with weak frontiers: ask the Roman emperors Marcus Aurelius and Justinian. City-states are generally better at excluding pathogens, though there are many exceptions to that rule, from Periclean Athens onwards.
One reason all attempts to reunify Europe failed — from the time of Charlemagne to the time of Napoleon — was that recurrent pandemics incentivized the persistence of smaller polities, often with serious city walls and, by the 18th century, fortified borders (such as the Habsburg frontier at the Balkans). As no one European empire was able to beat the rest (typhus tended to terminate major military campaigns before a decisive outcome could be achieved), Europeans found it easier to conquer other peoples overseas. Those beyond the shores of Eurasia were easily overthrown because the unfamiliar European pathogens that accompanied the conquistadors and pilgrim fathers did most of the work. In the words of John Archdale, governor of Carolina in the 1690s, ‘the Hand of God [has been] eminently seen in thinning the Indians, to make room for the English’.
The west European maritime empires of the 19th and 20th centuries were exceptional because they set out to vanquish not only native populations but also pathogens. As the tropical medicine expert Sir Rubert William Boyce put it in 1910, whether or not there would be a European presence in the tropics boiled down to this: ‘Mosquito or Man’. ‘The future of imperialism,’ the Canadian doctor John L. Todd wrote in 1905, ‘lay in the microscope.’
Yet the strengths that once made western societies so dominant have waned. Our public institutions have so decayed that they cannot cope with a novel coronavirus that is both more contagious and more deadly than influenza, even when the emergence of such a pathogen was quite likely. (Just three years ago, for example, Britain’s astronomer royal Lord Rees bet the Harvard psychologist Steven Pinker that ‘a bioterror or bioerror’ would ‘lead to one million casualties in a single event within a six-month period starting no later than December 31 2020’. Lord Rees may yet win that bet. Alas, the stake was only $400.)
Last year, the new Global Health Security Index ranked the US first and the UK second in the world in terms of their ‘global health security capabilities’. Wrong. A new league table of coronavirus health safety by the Deep Knowledge Group puts Israel, Singapore, New Zealand, Hong Kong and Taiwan at the top. (Iceland deserves an honorable mention, too.)
The key point is that there are diseconomies of scale when a new pathogen is on the loose. Four of those small countries, in their different ways, had reasons to be paranoid in general and laser-focused on the danger of a coronavirus made in China. They had learned the lessons of Sars and Mers (also caused by coronaviruses). By contrast, the big global players — China, the United States and the EU — have all done terribly, each in their own distinctive way.
What will the political outcome be? It is clearly more likely that Trump loses in November than that Xi is overthrown by his party rivals, so you should probably bet on that outcome. Like Warren Harding in 1920 (the post-war, post influenza election), Joe Biden — who now carries Barack Obama’s endorsement — is Mr Normalcy. All he needs to do is avoid dying. For Beijing, of course, President Biden would be a dream come true, as he was the only pro-Chinese candidate in the Democratic primary field, aside from Mike Bloomberg. The big question is who would succeed Biden if he keels over (as Harding did). Heaven help us if it’s another person with the name Warren.
But be careful what you wish for, General Secretary Xi. There cannot be a hegemonic transition unless (as with the US and the UK circa 1945) the rising power is ready for prime time. China isn’t. As Gideon Rachman of the Financial Times pointed out, nobody wants its currency and not many people want its education.
No, however much Trump and Xi may clash over COVID-19, the winners in the short run are none of the above empires. The winners are the city-states. Of course, Israel, Singapore and Taiwan cannot punch that much above their weights; great power status is beyond their grasp. The question is who gains from this stunning demonstration that in a pandemic, small is beautiful. On balance, I would say the centrifugal forces unleashed by the pandemic are a much bigger threat to a monolithic one-party state than to a federal system already in need of some decentralization. Any victory Xi seems to win in the corona wars will be pyrrhic. After the debacle, the US will have the chance seriously to address the two biggest defects of its system: the confusion of politics with showbiz (which produced Trump) and the chronic sclerosis of the deep state (which also produced Trump).
A final reflection. As the data on COVID-19 mortality by age cohort shows, this is no virus for old men. When the dust clears in about 12 months’ time — when there’s a vaccine and therapies — the world will be halfway to herd immunity anyway, because lockdowns are just intolerable for more than a couple of months. Between now and then, I fear, a lot of elderly and infirm people will be carried off early, along with many doctors and nurses, who are most exposed to the virus, plus a smallish proportion of plain unlucky younger people.
The nasty, barely writable truth is that, as a result, the problem of aging societies and rising dependency rates will have been solved: people over 70 will go back to being considered ineligible for high office and other positions of responsibility. Young people, who have been the economic losers since 2008, will find themselves the winners — assuming the central banks eventually lose their bizarre fight to inflate asset prices above wages.
Now, in this new post-plague world, where will the best opportunities be for the world’s ambitious young people? China? Europe? Or America? You know the answer. And to which of the three empires do the successful city-states, even now — even after all the bungling — feel the most loyalty? You know that answer, too.
Niall Ferguson is the Milbank Family Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford, and managing director of Greenmantle. He is a weekly Comment columnist for the Sunday Times of London. This article is in The Spectator’s May 2020 US edition. Subscribe here to get yours.

sábado, 18 de abril de 2020

Trabalho mais recente publicado: Energia no Brasil e no mundo - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

O quadro global das questões energéticas: o Brasil e o mundo

Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Contribuição a livro coletivo. Publicado in: 
José Alexandre Altahyde Hage (org.): Política energética no Brasil: sua participação no desenvolvimento e no relacionamento internacional (Curitiba: Editora Appris, 2020, 370 p.; ISBN: 978-85-473-4201-2; ISBN digital978-85-473-4202-9), pp. 13-40; disponível no site da Editora (link: https://www.editoraappris.com.br/produto/3756-poltica-energtica-no-brasil-sua-participao-no-desenvolvimento-e-no-relacionamento-internacional).
Relação de Publicados n. 1343.




Apresentação da Editora: 
A energia é uma promissora forma de o Brasil obter ganhos na economia internacional. Petróleo, gás natural e etanol podem trazer ao país recursos tão necessários ao necessário desenvolvimento, à criação de empregos de qualidade, pesquisa e industrialização em base avançada tecnológica. Além disso, a dimensão da energia não é apenas nacional, que interessa apenas ao Brasil; é também questão internacional, pois depende de acordos diplomáticos que o país integra.


Sumário 

PREFÁCIO, 7
Paulo Cesar Manduca, Núcleo Interdisciplinar de Planejamento Energético, Unicamp

INTRODUÇÃO, 11
José Alexandre Altahyde Hage

1. O QUADRO GLOBAL DAS QUESTÕES ENERGÉTICAS: O BRASIL E O MUNDO, 13
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
2. BALANÇO SUL-AMERICANO: O GÁS NATURAL COMO VETOR DE INTEGRAÇÃO ENERGÉTICA DO CONE SUL, 41
Edmilson Moutinho dos Santos
Bruna Eloy de Amorim
Drielli Peyerl
Hirdan Katarina de Medeiros Costa
3. A CONSTRUÇÃO DA POLÍTICA ENERGÉTICA NO BRASIL: AVANÇOS E IMPASSES EM UM ESTADO EM DESENVOLVIMENTO, 77
José Alexandre Altahyde Hage
Paulo Cesar Manduca
Ronaldo Montesano Canesin
4. SEGURANÇA ENERGÉTICA E REGIMES JURÍDICOS REGULATÓRIOS NO SEGMENTO DE E&P DO SETOR DE HIDROCARBONETOS, 99
Carolina Leister
José Raymundo N. Chiappin
5. CONTROVÉRSIAS ACERCA DOS SIGNIFICADOS E DAS PRÁTICAS POLÍTICAS DE SEGURANÇA ENERGÉTICA, 145
Iure Paiva

6. CONTEÚDO LOCAL NO SETOR DE PETRÓLEO E GÁS: DEBATE E PRÁTICA NO BRASIL DE 2000 A 2017, 173
Giorgio Romano Schutte
7. POLÍTICA DE DUTOS NO BRASIL, 209
Alencar Chaves Braga
Carolina Leister
8. POLÍTICAS PARA BIOCOMBUSTÍVEIS NO BRASIL, 235
Glória Pinho
Arnaldo Cesar da Silva Walter
9. O ETANOL NO MUNDO: POTENCIAIS DESAFIOS, 263
Eduardo L. Leão de Sousa
Geraldine Kutas
Leticia Phillips
10. A CONSTRUÇÃO DO BRASIL ATÔMICO: DE 1950 ATÉ 1971, 285
Helen Miranda Nunes
11. O PROGRAMA NUCLEAR BRASILEIRO A PARTIR DE 1975: CONCEPÇÃO ESTRATÉGICA E DESTINO ENERGÉTICO, 307
Vanessa Braga Matijascic

SOBRE OS AUTORES, 331
(...)

Paulo Roberto de Almeida, doutor em Ciências Sociais pela Universidade Livre de Bruxelas, Bélgica, e diplomata de carreira. 
Email: pralmeida@me.com 
Orcid: 0000-0003-4324-6863

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Jonathan Spence: uma vida devotada à história da China

Jonathan Spence

Jefferson Lecture

2010

Jonathan Spence
Photo caption
For over fifty years, Jonathan Spence has been studying and writing about China. His books and articles form a body of work notable for groundbreaking research, fine literary quality, and extraordinary public value. If the West understands the culture and history of China better now than it did a half century ago, Jonathan Spence is one of the people to be thanked.
He was born in Surrey, England, in 1936. His father worked in publishing and edited one of Joseph Conrad’s books. His mother was a lover of French literature. He followed his brothers—one of whom became a classicist, the other a chemical engineer—to Winchester College, where he won the History Prize. At Clare College, Cambridge, he became a coeditor of the storied undergraduate magazine Granta, editor of the student paper, and a writer of parodies. When he graduated in 1959, an academic career seemed certain, though he had not yet settled on a field of study.
A fellowship established by Paul Mellon brought Spence to Yale University, where he encountered the China scholar Mary Wright. She and her husband, Arthur Wright, also a China scholar, had just accepted professorships at Yale. While talking to the Wrights, Spence recently recalled in Humanities magazine, “I suddenly thought this would be fun to explore. So I plunged into the equivalent of Chinese History One and Basic Chinese Language One.”
Mary Wright became his mentor and sent the young scholar off to Australia to study with Fang Chao-ying, an important Chinese historian. Spence then became the first Western scholar to use secret Qing dynasty documents collected at the Palace Museum in Taiwan. His prizewinning dissertation was published as Ts’ao Yin and the K’ang-hsi Emperor: Bondservant and Master. As recalled by his late colleague and longtime friend Frederic E. Wakeman Jr., the China scholar Joseph R. Levenson remarked of this work, “Qing historical studies will never be the same. Besides, the man writes like an angel.”
Spence’s next book was a compelling review of Western attempts “To Change China,” as the title put it, from the Italian Jesuits who came in the late sixteenth century to American military experts in World War II. A historian of great breadth, Spence also showed he was capable of important research and elegant writing on discrete figures and events. Emperor of China: Self-Portrait of K’ang-Hsiused the seventeenth-century Qing emperor’s own words from public and private documents to create a kind of autobiography in translation, a marked example of Spence’s light and yet generous hand with quoted material. Nor was his writing to be limited to a cast of the great and the famous. In The Death of Woman Wang, published in 1978, Spence wrote the annals of the Chinese county of T’an-ch’eng in the seventeenth century, as it suffered through a terrible string of famines, floods, plagues, and bandit attacks.
Even as he has ventured further into both large and subtle aspects of Chinese history, Spence has shown a remarkable talent for addressing the larger public. “His greatest achievement,” notes Professor David Mungello of Baylor University, “has been to blend careful scholarship with beautifully crafted books on China. In the process, he has attracted the greatest reading audience of any China historian in the United States. Perhaps in part because of his origins in Britain, he is a historian in the nineteenth-century grand style of British historians, which is to say that he seeks to make history meaningful and fascinating to the broadest range of readers.”
Spence’s writings over the years have ranged from the life and missionary career of Matteo Ricci (1552–1610) to works on the Taiping Rebellion, the Chinese Revolution, and Mao Zedong. If China is his first subject, then perhaps Western understanding of China is his second, and to it he returned in his 1998 work The Chan’s Great Continent. Spence’s magnum opus, however, remains a book that took shape in the lecture hall at Yale, where his survey lectures on Chinese history drew hundreds of students, some not even enrolled in the course. The Search for Modern China, a New York Times bestseller published in 1990, begins with the last days of the Ming dynasty and ends, almost four centuries later, in the 1980s amidst the economic reforms of Deng Xiaoping and student demonstrations in Tiananmen Square.
Spence, who became an American citizen in 2000, has received numerous accolades in his long career. He won a Guggenheim fellowship in 1979, received the Harold D. Vursell Award from the American Academy of Arts and Letters in 1983, and a MacArthur fellowship in 1988, the same year he was appointed to the Council of Scholars for the Library of Congress. In 1993, Yale named him a Sterling Professor of History. He has received honorary degrees, from, among others, the Chinese University of Hong Kong and Oxford University. Spence was made a corresponding member of the British Academy in 1997, and Queen Elizabeth II named him, in 2001, a Companion of the Order of St. Michael and St. George. In 2003, he received the Sidney Hook Award from the Phi Beta Kappa Society. In 2004 and 2005, he served as president of the American Historical Association.
The Making of Jonathan Spence
BY FREDERIC E. WAKEMAN JR.
Jonathan D. Spence, Sterling Professor of History at Yale University, was born in England on August 11, 1936, the son of Dermot and Muriel Crailsham Spence. His was a lettered family. Professor Spence’s maternal grandfather taught at Clifton College in Bristol during the Great War, and his mother, who attended secondary school in London, was a passionate student of French language and literature. Dermot Spence had attended Oxford and Heidelberg universities in the late 1920s and spoke excellent German. He also worked at a publishing house and art gallery, and was editor of one of Joseph Conrad’s works. One of Jonathan Spence’s two older brothers was a classicist and the other a chemical engineer. His sister, a filmmaker, is also a professional translator of French, German, and Italian.
When he was thirteen, Professor Spence matriculated at Winchester College, one of the oldest public schools in England, founded by William of Wykeham, Bishop of Winchester and High Chancellor of England. As Jonathan once pointed out to me, in 1382, the very year Winchester College was established in Hampshire, on the other side of the world in Jiangnan, the Hongwu Emperor (r. 1368–98) was suppressing the Hu Weiyong uprising and abolishing the post of chief councilor of the Ming dynasty. Somehow Jonathan’s world-spanning historical consciousness seemed all the more appropriate when I remembered that another global historian, Arnold J. Toynbee, had been an Old Wykehamist as well.
Raised in the “soft” Anglicanism of the college, he attended compulsory chapel eight times a week, amusing himself by reading the services in French and German psalters that he slipped into the oratory. Summer holidays were typically spent in France with an exchange family, living in a rural chateau where he spent long afternoons at tennis and watched the bats swoop for insects in the dusk.
Back at school he pursued his studies passionately. Even now, Spence remembers Winchester as an intellectual hothouse, a kind of “high-octane preparation for Oxford and Cambridge.” Though only a fees-paying “commoner,” while his father and older brother were stipended “scholars” (to use the college’s own medieval distinction), Jonathan survived at Winchester, winning the History Prize. He read widely and composed poetry, but considered himself a better literary critic than a creative writer. By the time he graduated from the college in 1954 and completed a two-year tour of military duty as a second lieutenant stationed in Germany, he was ready to go up to Clare College at Cambridge.
Clare College was “magical.” “Excited and reckless,” young Spence quickly became a member of the top intellectual stratum of the university. Not only was he a coeditor of the literary magazine Granta; in his second year he was also named editor of Cambridge’s student newspaper, Varsity. The outgoing editor facetiously wrote of him: “Jonathan Spence is slim, sallow and vague.” At that time he wanted most to be a novelist. He later modestly claimed that he realized he had “nothing to say,” and instead turned to writing parodies, a form he had mastered at Winchester. He was not yet clear about his métier by the time he took his BA degree in 1959.
Spence arrived at Yale University with a Mellon fellowship that supported an exchange of top-ranking students between Yale and Clare College. Though mainly working in history, he was still uncertain about his calling until he took a course with Professor Mary Wright. Arthur and Mary Clabaugh Wright had only recently left Stanford for Yale, where they each accepted professorships in Chinese history. John King Fairbank later described the intellectual dynasty that was being formed at that time:
When I began teaching Chinese history at Harvard in 1936, my first students turned out to be the brightest I would ever have—Theodore White as an undergraduate and Mary Clabaugh as a PhD candidate. Mary Clabaugh was a Vassar graduate from Tuscaloosa who came to study international history but turned to China when she heard about it. She married another Harvard graduate student in Chinese history, Arthur F. Wright. Twenty years later, when both Wrights were invited from Stanford to come to Yale as professors of history, Mary Wright found her brightest student in the person of Jonathan Spence, a young Englishman from Winchester College and Cambridge University, who had just come to Yale. Hearing Mary Wright’s lectures, he chose Chinese studies, and she arranged for his unusual talent to be specially trained under the master of Ch’ing (Manchu) dynasty biography, Fang Chao-ying. Fang was then in Australia, where Jonathan Spence was sent to work with him.
Under Fang Chao-ying’s guidance, Spence became the first scholar in the West to make use of the Qing secret memorials collected in the National Palace Museum in Taiwan. His PhD dissertation received the John Addison Porter Prize in 1965 and was published by the Yale University Press under the title Ts’ao Yin and the K’ang-hsi Emperor: Bondservant and Master. I remember how excited my own mentor, Joseph R. Levenson, was by Jonathan’s precocious masterpiece. “Qing historical studies,” he told me, “will never be the same.”
“Besides,” he added, “the man writes like an angel.”
Spence joined the Yale faculty in 1966 as an assistant professor of history. In 1968, he was appointed an associate professor; and, in 1971, after publishing a second book, To Change China: Western Advisers in China, 1620–1960, he was promoted to professor. Five years later, he was named George Burton Adams Professor of History.
In 1974 and 1978, Spence published two extraordinary books, nearly back to back. Chinese historians had long hoped for a personal portrait of one of the great Qing emperors. Professor Harold L. Kahn had written a striking study of the Qianlong Emperor (r. 1736–96), but it was more about the monarch’s persona than the individual himself. In Emperor of China: Self-Portrait of K’ang-hsi (Knopf, 1974), Jonathan gave us the monarch in his own words. Kangxi spoke directly to the reader—or so it seemed. The book was controversial, because the emperor’s speech was a collage from myriad sources in different contexts. But Kangxi’s voice was vivid and compelling, and the book broke out of the confines of a conventional audience of Chinese specialists to reach a much larger public. The same was true for The Death of Woman Wang, published in 1978, which soon was featured on most college reading lists in Chinese history. Students were not only introduced to a more vivid and colorful China than they expected; they also were privileged to view Qing society from the bottom up, as Spence gave voice to those who left no written records and whose lives had to be reconstructed from local gazetteers, magistrates’ handbooks, and storytellers’ tales.
Like many fine historians who combine narrative description and critical analysis, Spence has a special and unique eye for the telling detail. Often he begins with an image that has captured his imagination. I remember one evening with him, walking across the Wesleyan campus in Middletown, Connecticut. When I asked him what he was working on at the moment, Jonathan’s eyes narrowed, as though he were looking into the distance. “I’ve discovered a marvelous source,” he murmured. “About the murder of a woman née Wang: a body crumpled in the snow. . . .” Or later, as he was writing The Question of Hu, the figure of a hapless man from Foshan locked up like a lunatic in the asylum at Charenton materialized in his mind’s eye. Jonathan simply sees what most of us overlook. In one of the opening chapters of God’s Chinese Son: The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan, published in 1996, he describes the foreign factories along Canton’s bustling waterfront. Much of this was familiar to me, as I had perused the same sources for an earlier work of my own. But I realized when I read Spence’s narrative that I lacked his sensitivity to many of the sights and sounds that struck contemporaries, and especially to the frisson of seeing a baby abandoned in a basket under the pedestrians’ feet.
Spence combines his critical imagination with a scrupulous attention to the sources. Whether in the collection of essays on the Ming-Qing transition he edited with John E. Wills, or in The Gate of Heavenly Peace: The Chinese and Their Revolution, 1895–1980, published in 1981, or in The Memory Palace of Matteo Ricci, published in1984, Spence bases his work on solid and sedulous reading—especially of newly discovered archival materials. One of the best examples of this is his 1996 study of Hong Xiuquan and Taiping Christianity, God’s Chinese Son. As he explains in his preface, the book was born of the recent discoveries of heretofore unknown Taiping sources in the British Library by our mutual colleague Wang Qingcheng, the former director of the Modern History Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. In 1996, the same year God’s Chinese Sonappeared, Professor Spence and his wife Chin Annping, who earned her PhD at Columbia in classical Chinese philosophy, also published The Chinese Century: A Photographic History of the Last Hundred Years.
At Yale, Spence is famous for his undergraduate lecture course in Chinese history, which has regularly been one of the humanities offerings in the college with the highest enrollments. Although it is impossible to reproduce Spence’s dazzling lecture style in book form, the content of the course reached a much larger audience when he published in 1990 his Search for Modern China, now perhaps the most widely used Chinese history textbook in American universities.
As a fervent admirer of Professor Spence, I envy his extraordinary discipline as a writer, which helps account for his prolific output. I happened to be his and Annping’s dinner guest at their house in West Haven the day he put the finishing touches on God’s Chinese Son. After toasting the new book, I idly asked Jonathan what he planned to write next. I was surprised when he responded without hesitation. In that uniquely ruminative way of his, he said, almost dreamily: “I want to write about cold. I see a Manchu warrior skating on a frozen pond. And the steam of a war horse’s panting in the dry cold of a North China winter.” The picture was so immediately vivid that I halfway expected him to leave me at the dinner table and go upstairs to write, picking up a fresh sheet of paper for his sprawling longhand even before the latest manuscript had been sent off to the publisher. Other books have intervened since then, but I am still waiting confidently for him to bring that cold landscape to life one way or another.
Spence has earned his writing time on his own. That is, he has “bought” most of his triennial research leaves with his administrative contributions to Yale University. From 1973 to 1975, he was director of graduate studies in history. From 1977 to 1979, he served as chair of the Council on East Asian Studies, and also as director of the Division of Humanities from 1980 to 1982. He chaired the Department of History from 1983 to 1986, and during the 1988–89 academic year, he was acting director of the Whitney Humanities Center. Named Sterling Professor of History in 1993, he currently serves on the governing board of Yale University Press. By dint of such superb university citizenship, Jonathan was able to earn leaves three years apart; if those did not suffice, he often took advances or leave without pay. For at least twenty years he has never applied for a grant. During the interim between leaves, he typically reads for the next book: The Chan’s Great Continent: China in Western Minds appeared in 1998, Mao Zedong in 1999, and Treason by the Book in 2001.
The world has recognized Professor Spence’s eminence. He has received eight honorary degrees from various colleges in the United States and from the Chinese University of Hong Kong. In 2003, Spence received an honorary degree from Oxford University. He was also invited to become a visiting professor at Peking University and an honorary professor at Nanjing University. In 2001, he was named CMG (Companion of the Most Distinguished Order of St. Michael and St. George) on the Queen of England’s Birthday Honours List.
In 1978, he received the William C. DeVane Medal of the Yale Chapter of Phi Beta Kappa; in 1979, a Guggenheim Fellowship; in 1982, the Los Angeles Times History Prize; and in 1983, the Vursel Prize of the American Academy and Institute of Arts and Letters. Spence was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1985 and was named a MacArthur Fellow in 1988, the same year he was appointed to the Council of Scholars at the Library of Congress. In 1993, he was elected a member of the American Philosophical Society, and in 1997 was named a corresponding fellow of the British Academy.