O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida.

Mostrando postagens com marcador Atlantic Council. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador Atlantic Council. Mostrar todas as postagens

terça-feira, 18 de fevereiro de 2025

Global Foresight 2025 - report by the Atlantic Council

Global Foresight 2025

A report by the Atlantic Council

The GeoStrategy Initiative is pleased to announce the launch of our new Global Foresight 2025 report, the Atlantic Council’s premier foresight publication that analyzes the top trends, risks, and opportunities for the next decade and beyond.

This year's edition presents an analysis of the Atlantic Council's global survey of more than 350 foresight and strategy experts on how human affairs could unfold over the next ten years across geopolitics, the global economy, climate change, technological disruption, and more. It highlights the prospects of another world war, the endgame in Ukraine, nuclear proliferation, the future of US power, and Israeli-Palestinian peace.

Our next-generation foresight scholars uncovered six new "snow leopards" or under-the-radar phenomena that could have major unexpected impacts, for better or worse, in 2025 and beyond. They explore the threat to undersea cables posed by nonstate actors, the expansion of geoengineering, a new powder that removes CO2 from the air, rewilding, quantum batteries, and Gen Z’s susceptibility to misinformation.

Finally, the GeoStrategy Initiative's senior foresight fellows imagined three different scenarios for how the world could transform over the next decade. They analyze what a “Reluctant International Order” could mean for global alliances and institutions, how China’s ascendance to the center of gravity could impact Asia and beyond, and how a world dominated by a climate crisis could shape geopolitics.

We are delighted to share with you the latest edition of Global Foresight, and hope it provokes further conversations on what the world could look like in the next year, decade, and beyond.

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

https://mail.atlanticcouncil.org/NjU5LVdaWC0wNzUAAAGYuTi7sgXXFvkGTtNq-RwHN7UPaSctdYJ4dDayWrc2MVmY3N65-0tm8GRGYrD5U1j199a1QPg=

sexta-feira, 23 de dezembro de 2022

Atlantic Council: previsões para 2023: Global Foresight 2023

Atlantic Council: previsões para 2023

Global Foresight 2023
The Authoritative Forecast for the 
Year Ahead - and Beyond

 
 
 
 

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security is pleased to share the first component of its latest Atlantic Council Strategy PaperGlobal Foresight 2023.  

Read Here

 

This is the second edition of the Scowcroft Center's annual Global Foresight report. For the past decade, the center has been home to one of the world's premier strategic foresight shops. 

 

We are excited to share the first part of this year's installment (which is part of the Atlantic Council Strategy Papers series): our ranking of 2023's top risks and opportunities. This year, we have asked the leaders of the Atlantic Council's sixteen programs and centers to predict the biggest global risks and opportunities that 2023 could bring. 

 

What should we watch for in the year ahead? Potential risks include: 

  • Democracies descend into instability: Some democratic countries are heading into 2023 with highly divided societies, shaky institutions, and question marks hanging over their political leaders. Over the past several years, for example, we have seen repeated changes in leadership in the United Kingdom and Israel, and disputed elections in the United States and Brazil, all of which could be ominous signs for the health of global democracy.  
  • The internet splits forever: Watch for a slow roll toward two internets: one designed to facilitate government control with built-in surveillance, and one that’s free, open, and secure—or at least trying to be. 
  • Support for Ukraine plummets: Though support has held steady thus far, several variables affect the resolve of US, European, and other allied governments—and voters—to continue paying the costs of arming Ukraine and isolating Russia over the coming year. Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threats, energy prices and associated cost-of-living crises, and a looming recession all threaten the backing Ukraine needs to win the war. 

Potential opportunities on the horizon include: 
  • The transition away from fossil fuels hits an inflection point: 2023 could be a bellwether year for the energy transition—and net-zero greenhouse-gas emissions could be within sight by 2050 if we play our cards right.   
  • The European Union acts more like a great power: After Russia’s invasion, and with more hawkish views on China in ascendance, Europeans broadly agree on the question of the EU’s relationship with power, even if the EU still lacks instruments for exercising hard power.  
  • Funding for climate resilience doubles: While countries pledged $230 million to help the places most vulnerable to a changing climate adapt at the 2022 UN climate summit, private investors on the sidelines discussed new ways to channel capital to cities and regions facing extreme heat.   

In the first week of 2023, we will be sharing the second and third components of Global Foresight: our expert survey of the world's leading geopolitical and foresight experts, and our list of Snow Leopards, which are under-the-radar phenomena that we should be monitoring.
 
 
 
 

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world. The Center honors General Brent Scowcroft’s legacy of service and embodies his ethos of nonpartisan commitment to the cause of security, support for US leadership in cooperation with allies and partners, and dedication to the mentorship of the next generation of leaders.


Another world-shaking, world-reordering war in Europe. Brewing fears of war on an even greater scale in Asia. A coronation in China and political upheaval across the democratic world. Climate-induced catastrophes and emboldened movements to mitigate and adapt to them. The worst energy crisis in a half century and worst food crisis in over a decade. Spiraling inflation and the specter of global recession. A less acute but still-raging, still-hugely disruptive pandemic. Epochal ferment in social media and technology more broadly.

Recently, the leaders of the Atlantic Council’s sixteen programs and centers gathered to take stock of these and other developments and trends over the past year, peer into the future, and predict the biggest global risks and opportunities that 2023 could bring.

The results of this foresight exercise are below. Each scenario is assigned a probability; “medium” means a 50/50 chance that the scenario will occur within the next year. Many lower-probability but highly consequential scenarios are included because—as has been so vividly demonstrated this past year—those types of events tend to be some of the most disruptive and transformative. And keep in mind: Forecasts are not destiny. Political leaders and policymakers have agency in shaping whether and how these scenarios play out in the coming year or beyond. The primary purpose of assessing global risks and opportunities, in fact, is to gain insight into how to avert unwanted outcomes and achieve desired ones. To that end, don’t miss the policy prescriptions mixed into many of the entries below.

Top risks: 

1) A surge in climate adaptation curtails progress on cutting emissions, locking in at least 1.5 degrees of warming. HIGH

2) Iran becomes a nuclear-weapons power. HIGH

3) The United States loses Colombia—and with it, increasingly, Latin America. MEDIUM

4) The internet splinters entirely and irrevocably. LOW

5) The United States and its allies give up on Ukraine and acquiesce to a Russian victory there. LOW

6) Jihadists construct a “terrorist bridge” from the Red Sea to the Atlantic. MEDIUM

7) A crisis just short of war erupts over Taiwan. LOW-MEDIUM

8) Countries—and not just US adversaries—move away from the dollar faster than anticipated. LOW-MEDIUM

9) New momentum builds for US withdrawal from the Middle East—and this time it doesn’t meet resistance. LOW-MEDIUM

10) Developing countries suffer a wave of defaults and economic hardship. MEDIUM

11) A growing trust deficit destabilizes democracies from within. MEDIUM

12) US tech policy toward China drives a wedge in the transatlantic relationship. MEDIUM-HIGH


Top opportunities: 

1) Ukraine wins—and becomes part of the institutional West. MEDIUM

2) The transition away from fossil fuels reaches an inflection point. LOW-MEDIUM

3) Turkey emerges as a security guarantor in the Black Sea. MEDIUM

4) The United States demonstrates that “America is back” economically in Asia. LOW-MEDIUM

5) Putin loses—abroad and at home. LOW-MEDIUM

6) The European Union starts acting like a great power. MEDIUM

7) A push for EU expansion boosts the democratic world. MEDIUM

8) Venezuelan oil comes online, relieving pressure on global energy markets. HIGH

9) High-skilled visa reform finally happens in the United States. MEDIUM

10) Funding for climate adaptation and resilience dramatically accelerates and doubles in size. MEDIUM

11) Climate change accomplishes what nothing else will: Unite South Asian nations. LOW

12) 

segunda-feira, 29 de agosto de 2022

Great-Power War Is Coming? - Matthew Kroenig, Atlantic Council (Foreign Policy)

Que os generais do Pentágono sejam paranóicos, isso é normal. Eles são pagos para serem paranóicos. Que eles estejam se preparando para uma guerra contra um império competitivo, que eles consideram ser um adversário mortal, é burro e estúpido, mas é o esperado de generais paranoicos. 
Mas, que acadêmicos brilhantes tenham se rendido a essa paranoia e, mais do que isso, que eles estejam se preparando, até desejando, e de certa forma incitando um embate direto entre os dois impérios, isso não é apenas preocupante, mas é assustador.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

 

Dear Colleagues,

I am writing to send you my latest article, "International Relations Theory Suggests Great-Power War Is Coming," in Foreign Policy. For decades international relations theory gave us reason to believe there would be peace among the great powers. Now, nearly all the sources of stability are unraveling.

For my academic colleagues, this could make a good addition to your Introduction to IR syllabus. I rushed to finish before the start of the semester. I hope you find it useful. 

Best,

Mat

https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/27/international-relations-theory-suggests-great-power-war-is-coming/?tpcc=recirc_latest062921

 

International Relations Theory Suggests Great-Power War is Coming 

August 27, 2022 

By Matthew Kroenig

 

This week, thousands of university students around the world will begin their introduction to international relations courses for the first time. If their professors are attuned to the ways the world has changed in recent years, they will be teaching them that the major theories of international relations warn that great-power conflict is coming.

For decades, international relations theory provided reasons for optimism—that the major powers could enjoy mostly cooperative relations and resolve their differences short of armed conflict.

Realist IR theories focus on power, and for decades, they maintained that the bipolar world of the Cold War and the unipolar post-Cold War world dominated by the United States were relatively simple systems not prone to wars of miscalculation. They also held that nuclear weapons raised the cost of conflict and made war among the major powers unthinkable.

Meanwhile, liberal theorists argued that a triumvirate of causal variables (institutions, interdependence, and democracy) facilitated cooperation and mitigated conflict. The dense set of international institutions and agreements (the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, etc.) established after World War II—and expanded and depended on since the end of the Cold War—provided forums for major powers to work out their differences peacefully.

Moreover, economic globalization made armed conflict too costly. Why quarrel when business is good and everyone is getting rich? Finally, according to this theory, democracies are less likely to fight and more likely to cooperate, and the major waves of democratization around the world over the past 70 years have made the globe a more peaceful place.

At the same time, constructivist scholars explained how new ideas, norms, and identities have transformed international politics in a more positive direction. In the past, piracy, slavery, torture, and wars of aggression were common practices. Over the years, however, strengthening human rights norms and taboos against the use of weapons of mass destruction placed guardrails on international conflict.

Unfortunately, nearly all of these pacifying forces appear to be unraveling before our eyes. The major driving forces of international politics, according to IR theory, suggest that the new Cold War among the United States, China, and Russia is unlikely to be peaceful.

Let us begin with power politics. We are entering a more multipolar world. To be sure, the United States is still the world’s leading power, according to nearly all objective measures, but China has risen to occupy a strong second-place position in military and economic might. Europe is an economic and regulatory superpower in its own right. A more aggressive Russia maintains the largest nuclear weapons stockpile on Earth. And major powers in the developing world—such as India, Indonesia, South Africa, and Brazil—are choosing a nonaligned path.

Realists argue that multipolar systems are unstable and prone to major wars of miscalculation. World War I is a classic example.

Multipolar systems are unstable in part because each country must worry about multiple potential adversaries. Indeed, at present, the U.S. Defense Department frets about possible simultaneous conflicts with Russia in Europe and China in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, U.S. President Joe Biden has stated that the use of military force remains on the table as a last resort to deal with Iran’s nuclear program. A three-front war is not out of the question.

Wars of miscalculation often result when states underestimate their adversary. States doubt their opponent’s power or resolve to fight, so they test them. Sometimes, the enemy is bluffing, and the challenge pays off. If the enemy is determined to defend its interests, however, major war can result. Russian President Vladimir Putin likely miscalculated in launching an invasion of Ukraine, incorrectly assuming that war would be easy. Some realist scholars warned for some time that a Russian invasion of Ukraine was coming, and there is still the possibility that the war in Ukraine could spill across NATO’s borders, turning this conflict into a direct U.S.-Russia conflagration.

In addition, there is the danger that Chinese President Xi Jinping might miscalculate over Taiwan. Washington’s confusing “strategic ambiguity” policy as to whether it would defend the island only adds to the instability. Biden has said he would defend Taiwan, but his own White House contradicted him. Many leaders are confused, including possibly Xi. He might mistakenly believe he could get away with an attack on Taiwan—only to have the United States intervene violently to stop him.

Moreover, after several U.S. presidents have threatened “all options on the table” for the Iranian nuclear program without backing it up, Tehran might assume that it can make a dash for the bomb without a U.S. response. If Iran is mistaken in doubting Biden’s resolve, war could result.

Realists also focus on shifts in the balance of power and worry about the rise of China and the relative decline of the United States. Power transition theory says that the fall of a dominant great power and the rise of an ascendant challenger often results in war. Some experts worry that Washington and Beijing may be falling into this “Thucydides Trap.”

Their dysfunctional autocratic systems make it unlikely that Beijing or Moscow will usurp global leadership from the United States anytime soon, but a closer look at the historical record shows that challengers sometimes start wars of aggression when their expansive ambitions are thwarted. Like Germany in World War I and Japan in World War II, Russia may be lashing out to reverse its decline, and China may also be weak and dangerous.

Some people might argue that nuclear deterrence will still work, but military technology is changing. The world is experiencing a “Fourth Industrial Revolution” as new technologies—such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing and communications, additive manufacturing, robotics, hypersonic missiles, directed energy, and others—promise to transform the global economy, societies, and the battlefield.

Many defense experts believe we are on the eve of a new revolution in military affairs. It is possible that these new technologies could, like tanks and aircraft on the eve of World War II, give an advantage to militaries that go on the offense, making war more likely. At a minimum, these new weapons systems could confuse assessments of the balance of power, contributing to the above risks of miscalculation.

China, for example, is leading in several of these technologies, including hypersonic missiles, certain applications for artificial intelligence, and quantum computing. These advantages—or even the false perception in Beijing that these advantages might exist—could tempt China to invade Taiwan.

Even liberalism, a more optimistic theory in general, provides a reason for pessimism. To be sure, liberals are right that institutions, economic interdependence, and democracy have facilitated cooperation within the liberal world order. The United States and its democratic allies in North America, Europe, and East Asia are more united than ever before. But these same factors are increasingly sparking conflict on the fault lines between the liberal and illiberal world orders.

In the new Cold War, international institutions have simply become new arenas for competition. Russia and China are infiltrating these institutions and turning them against their intended purposes. Who can forget Russia chairing a meeting of the United Nations Security Council as its armies invaded Ukraine in February? Similarly, China used its influence in the World Health Organization to stymie an effective investigation into COVID-19’s origins. And dictators vie for seats on the U.N. Human Rights Council to ensure their egregious human rights abuses escape scrutiny. Instead of facilitating cooperation, international institutions are increasingly exacerbating conflict.

Liberal scholars also argue that economic interdependence mitigates conflict. But this theory always had a chicken-and-egg problem. Is trade driving good relations, or are good relations driving trade? We are seeing the answer play out in real time.

The free world is recognizing that it is too economically dependent on its enemies in Moscow and Beijing, and it is decoupling as fast as it can. Western corporations pulled out of Russia overnight. New legislation and regulations in the United States, Europe, and Japan are restricting trade and investment in China. It is simply irrational for Wall Street to invest in Chinese technology companies that are working with China’s People’s Liberation Army to develop weapons intended to kill Americans.

But China is also decoupling from the free world. Xi is prohibiting Chinese tech firms from listing on Wall Street, for example, because he doesn’t want to share proprietary information with Western powers. The economic interdependence between the liberal and illiberal worlds that has served as a ballast against conflict is now eroding.

Democratic peace theory says democracies cooperate with other democracies. But the central fault line in the international system today, as Biden explains, is “the battle between democracy and autocracy.”

To be sure, the United States still maintains cordial relations with some nondemocracies, such as Saudi Arabia. But the world order is increasingly divided with the United States and its status quo-oriented democratic allies in NATO, Japan, South Korea, and Australia on one side and the revisionist autocracies of China, Russia, and Iran on the other. One does not need a stethoscope to detect the echoes of the free world’s conflict against Nazi Germany, fascist Italy, and imperial Japan.

Finally, constructivist arguments about the pacifying effects of global norms were always plagued with doubts about whether these norms were truly universal. As China engages in genocide in Xinjiang and Russia issues bloodcurdling nuclear threats and castrates prisoners of war in Ukraine, we now have our gruesome answer.

Moreover, constructivists might note that the democracy versus autocracy cleavage in international politics is not simply an issue of governance but of ways of life. The speeches and writings of Xi and Putin are often ideological rants about the superiority of autocratic systems and the failings of democracy. Like it or not—we are back in a 20th-century contest over whether democratic or autocratic governments can better deliver for their people, adding a more dangerous ideological element to this competition.

Fortunately, there is some good news. The best understanding of international politics may be found in a combination of theories. Much of humanity prefers a liberal international order, and this order is only made possible by the realist military power of the United States and its democratic allies. Moreover, 2,500 years of theory and history suggest that democracies tend to win these hard-power competitions and autocracies flame out disastrously in the end.

Unfortunately, the clarifying moments that bend history in an arc toward justice often only emerge after major-power wars.

Let’s hope that today’s incoming students are not reminiscing at their graduation ceremonies about where they were when World War III began. But IR theory gives us plenty of reasons to be concerned.

 

Matthew Kroenig is acting director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a professor in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. His latest book is The Return of Great Power Rivalry: Democracy Versus Autocracy From the Ancient World to the U.S. and China

 

 

 

quinta-feira, 21 de abril de 2022

China’s discourse power operations in the Global South - Kenton Thibaut (Atlantic Council)

Report

Atlantic Council, April 20, 2022

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/chinas-discourse-power-operations-in-the-global-south/

China’s discourse power operations in the Global South

By Kenton Thibaut

As China’s military and economic power has grown, so too has its investment in propaganda and influence operations. Following Xi Jinping’s rise to power and China’s adoption of a more confrontational foreign policy, the country saw a need to sway global public opinion in its favor. Beijing refers to this as “discourse power,” a strategy to increase China’s standing on the world stage by promoting pro-China narratives while criticizing geopolitical rivals. The end goal is to shape a world that is more amenable to China’s expressions, and expansion, of power.

China sees the Global South as an important vector for enhancing discourse power and has deployed a number of tactics to disseminate Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-approved narratives there. Two pillars of its strategy include “using international friends for international propaganda” (通过国际友人开展国际传播) and “borrowing a boat out to sea (借船出海).” The first pillar relies on co-opting the voices of foreigners (and foreign leaders) to spread pro-China messaging. The second pillar relies on using international platforms to spread Chinese propaganda in target environments. This includes expanding China’s media footprint, conducting propaganda campaigns, and leveraging Beijing’s influence to gain government support for its initiatives in international forums like the United Nations. 

The logic behind this strategy is that, as China has begun to take a more active role in global affairs, Beijing has seen the need to address the potential for collective mobilization in response to its behavior. China understands that countries like the United States and the United Kingdom are assessing its expansionism and have already moved to counter its influence. By gaining control of the narrative to depict its expanding role in the world as legitimate, rules-based, and win-win, China is seeking to shift the burden of proof onto Western countries and silence potential critics. Xi outlined this strategy in a May 2021 speech to the Central Committee, emphasizing that China must “expand [its] international communication through international friends,” adding that these “foreign friends” will be the country’s “top soldiers of propaganda against the enemy” as China rises.

To this end, one focus of China’s global discourse power push has been to foster buy-in from leaders in the Global South for Chinese-defined norms. This includes its principles of “non-interference” in other countries’ internal affairs and on a concept of “human rights” that actively subordinates personal and civic freedoms in favor of state-centered economic development. It is meant to stand in opposition to a Western human rights framework that China criticizes as having been used for interventionist ends, for example, in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Beijing also sees control over the media environment as critical for enhancing its discourse power so that it can spread a positive “China story” (讲好中国故事). In doing so, it is better able to promote its image as a responsible power and gain support for China’s model of international relations—one that privileges state sovereignty over universal human rights, government control over public discourse, and authoritarianism over democracy. As Chinese scholars Mi Guanghong and Mi Yang put it, “strengthening the dissemination, influence and creativity of external propaganda is [in the fundamental interests of] the country, with profound practical significance.”

China’s discourse power strategy also involves creating multilateral regional organizations to advance its interests. This includes the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Africa, the Forum of China and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (China-CELAC Forum) in Latin America, and the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF) in the Middle East. China leverages its position in these forums to gain support for its international initiatives, to deepen its economic and political engagement, and to promote state narratives. For example, one concept central to China’s discourse power strategy is its vision to build a “community with a shared future”—language Chinese officials and diplomats often use in Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)-connected engagements with foreign counterparts to signify China’s pursuit of a multilateral approach to international relations as an alternative to the “unilateral” approach taken by the United States. This strategy is what Chinese scholars call the “subcutaneous injection” theory of communications—winning international “friends” who understand their own local contexts and are able to “tell China’s story” to allow for a more “immediate and quick” dissemination of Chinese discourse priorities in the region.

The regions addressed in this report—Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East—are located in the Global South, which is at the forefront of China’s discourse power push. This is for a number of reasons: China sees waning US involvement in these regions as an opportunity for it to win “international friends” as great-power competition increases; emerging economies offer fruitful opportunities to expand the scope and depth of the BRI, a massive predominantly infrastructure initiative; and Beijing wants to convince others of its “peaceful rise” in order to assuage growing concerns over its increasingly visible global presence. 

Yet these areas of the world have received less attention in public policy and research spaces than Chinese propaganda efforts in Western countries. In the meantime, the impacts of Chinese discourse power operations in these regions are affecting democratic norms and behaviors by constraining the space for organic civil society discourse and by further entrenching existing autocratic regimes. This report aims to shed light on China’s activities in these regions and to offer an initial assessment of the impacts of its efforts.

The first section of this report will provide an overview of Chinese discourse power operations, including its origins and aims. The second section is comprised of three regional subsections that focus on Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, respectively. Each subsection includes a broad overview of how the region fits into China’s global discourse power strategy and features an associated country case study. The case studies highlight recent Chinese influence campaigns and their effects on domestic political, social, and media environments.

The third and final section of this report synthesizes trends and themes, offering a preliminary assessment of their potential implications and impact.

Related Experts: Kenton ThibautSimin KargarDaniel Suárez PérezAndy CarvinIain RobertsonEmerson T. Brooking, and Jean le Roux

Download the Report: 

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Chinas_Discourse_Power_in_the_Global_South.pdf 

sexta-feira, 11 de fevereiro de 2022

Ucrânia: a Rússia revitaliza a OTAN - Ana Palacio (Atlantic Council)

 New Atlanticist

Why NATO will endure well beyond today’s crises

After the disastrous abandonment of Afghanistan, after years of bickering over the 2 percent of gross domestic product target for defense spending, and after French President Emmanuel Macron deemed the Alliance brain dead, NATO is front and center on the geopolitical stage and reclaiming relevance in the current cacophony. On June 29 and 30, the Alliance will meet in Madrid with two major issues on the agenda: the upcoming expiration of the Secretary General’s mandate on October 1 this year and the articulation of a new Strategic Concept, an outline of action that allies typically establish every ten years, though the current one was released in 2010.

It is therefore time to go above the noise and take stock of NATO’s purpose—created by the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty—and the philosophy that conceived it. General Lord Hastings Ismay, NATO’s first Secretary General, is credited with coining the often-repeated shorthand description of the project’s raison d’être when he first took office in 1952: “Keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” In other words, in the face of Soviet expansionism, rebuild the continent by avoiding the resurgence of nationalist militarism in Europe. This endeavor convinced US President Harry S. Truman to, instead of bringing US troops back home as soon as hostilities ended, consolidate their presence in Europe. In keeping with the architecture for peace developed after World War II, the United States bet on Europe—and Europe bet on the protection offered by Washington.

The will of the twelve North Atlantic Treaty signatories (ten European countries plus Canada and the United States) was to advance the architecture of the international liberal system. With express mention of the recently formed United Nations, the preamble could not be clearer: Its founding impulse is to bring together countries founded on “democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law” in order to “promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.”

Both a political and military partnership, NATO is focused on collective defense, as touted in Article 5 of its founding treaty, which clearly states, “if such an armed attack occurs, each of [the members]… will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith… such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”

Afghanistan has been a topic of almost constant conversation in the past year, owing to the United States’ haphazard departure in August 2021 with some NATO allies sayingthey weren’t consulted. But in the hubbub of August’s events, a crucial fact was forgotten: NATO allies had been in Afghanistan since the first (and only) time that Article 5 has been invoked—following the September 11 attacks. Beyond being an attack on the United States, 9/11 represented a challenge to the very core of the North Atlantic Treaty: democracy and the multilateral order. And it forced NATO allies to develop an awareness of the potential for new, unconventional threats—that is, those outside traditional warfare.

Just as the beginning of the Afghanistan operation marked a symbolic milestone, so, too, did its end. While former President Donald Trump damaged the image of the US presidency in the eyes of the world, those who hated the United States still had a general respect for the White House. However, since the scenes from Kabul’s airport, Washington has been perceived as an unreliable partner shedding its Atlantic ties to concentrate on the Indo-Pacific: Some fear it is evidence of its abdication of global leadership. But the United States’ ability to respond to global challenges and the integration of values ​​in its foreign policy should not be underestimated. After all, Uncle Sam has bounced back from other difficult situations in recent history—Vietnam comes to mind.

In that vein, the United States’ and NATO’s coordinated responses to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s December 17 ultimatum offer Moscow a serious and in-depth dialogue on arms control and strategic stability, but proclaim transatlantic commitment and steadfastness; a resounding rejection of Russian demands; and reaffirmation of the centrality of the principles of sovereignty, the inviolability of borders, and territorial integrity. They direct the Kremlin to refrain from the threat and use of force. Finally, and critically, both reiterate countries’ right to choose or change their security arrangements—to decide their future without external interference. This right is laid out in NATO’s well-known Open-Door Policy which prompted one of Putin’s classic responses of convolution: “They say—a policy of ‘open doors.’ Where did it come from? NATO has an open-door policy. Where is it stated? Nowhere.”

As for Europeans, the situation in Ukraine has made internal contradictions come to a head. From the outset, the European Union (EU) has been largely absent from the dialogue with Moscow, barring Macron’s bravado-riven bilateral conversations and his insights into the “contemporary traumas of this great people [Russians] and great nation.” Europe’s energy has been focused on grandiloquent speeches (unsurprisingly, primarily in French) and pompous formulas: while “strategic autonomy” loses momentum in Brussels talks, the term “Strategic Compass” is gaining ground after the European Council promised to adopt—within six weeks—what it has described as a road map to turning the Union into a more effective international security actor by 2030 and to strengthening its strategic sovereignty. Per a lesson from Aesop’s Fables, the mountain will give birth to another mouse—unless there is a miracle here, this speech promising great things will amount to little.

Europeans do not perceive danger in the same way across the board for historical and geographic reasons. Furthermore, there is the concerning about-facing—such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s recent visit to Moscow and his statements that Putin’s requests for security guarantees are “normal” despite the fact that they include proposals to block NATO weapons and forces from NATO members who joined after 1997, which includes Hungary. Allies also have to face the weakening of the democratic link within the organization, and particularly within the EU. Finally, Europeans have not accepted that defense must be paid for. All of the above serves as a backdrop for pessimistic outbursts such as Macron’s.

The Kremlin has spent years toward Putin’s objective of undermining the West but, more specifically, Europe and its future—the democratic system. And Putin makes no attempt to hide it with his litany of aggressive statements, weaponization of energy, Russo-Georgian war in 2008, and invasion of Crimea in 2014. But Ukraine seems to be the straw that broke the camel’s back. Procrastination in the face of “gradualism” is not a solution for NATO. It is time for an analysis of the range of Russia’s capabilities that the current situation has confirmed: misinformation, hybrid attacks, new technologies (including cyberattacks), “little green men,” and mercenaries. Those are gray areas that the Strategic Concept will have to clarify due to their impact on the interpretation of Article 5.

In addition to the risk posed by non-state actors and terrorism, the working hypothesis in the run-up to the NATO meeting in Madrid is that tension with Russia will not disappear soon (regardless of the outcome of the current crisis), underscoring the need for a solid defense and reach to the east, and a realistic approach in the Mediterranean and Africa. Likewise, Europeans must develop a common policy towards China: In a dialogue organized by the Atlantic Council, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg highlighted both the need for North America and Europe to maintain unity in the face of new threats, as well as the challenge of addressing “the security consequences of the rise of China.”

Putin, in his efforts to destroy the liberal international order, has shaken the foundations of NATO. It would be ironic—and welcome—for the crisis over Ukraine to reinvigorate the Alliance.


A version of this article originally appeared in El Mundo. It has been translated from Spanish by the staff of Palacio y Asociados and is reprinted here with the author’s and publisher’s permission.

Ana Palacio is a former minister of foreign affairs of Spain and former senior vice president and general counsel of the World Bank Group. She is also a visiting professor at the Edmund E. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a member of the Atlantic Council’s Board of Directors.