What Ukraine Needs for Its Counteroffensive - Hudson Institute

What Ukraine Needs for Its Counteroffensive

Hudson Institute, May 5, 2023 

Ukraine’s spring counteroffensive may soon begin, but its armed forces still lack certain weapon systems that could prove decisive in overwhelming Russia’s entrenched troops. Hudson Institute experts have long argued that the United States should equip Kyiv with a range of weapons and equipment—some of which the Biden administration has thus far withheld—for Ukraine to liberate its territory. 

As the world awaits Ukraine’s counteroffensive, the US should move with speed to arm Ukraine with the following items: 

• 155mm Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICM): DPICMs possess a 155mm-class artillery shell that sprays grenade-like munitions with a shrapnel-like effect. These cover a larger area than traditional artillery shells, making them highly effective against fortified positions. DPICMs would help Ukraine penetrate Russian defenses and serve as an artillery force multiplier that could propel operational breakthroughs.
• Maneuver Short Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD): This capability integrates air defense guns, air defense artillery, and missiles into highly mobile platforms that accompany principal maneuver units. Ukraine has received a few of these capabilities—12 Avengers with Stinger missiles and 37 Flakpanzer Gepard systems with 35-mm twin aircraft cannons—but a large-scale counteroffensive would benefit from many more.
• MQ-9 Reaper Drones and MQ-1C Gray Eagles: MQ-9s would allow Ukraine to eliminate Russian artillery stationed inside the Donbas or Crimea. MQ-9s, which can carry AIM-9X Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, would also shoot down Iranian-supplied drones at a lower cost while deterring future attacks. With hundreds of these units scheduled for retirement, MQ-9s would provide a sizable boost to Ukraine’s air defenses at minimal cost to US readiness. For its part, MQ-1C Gray Eagles would enable Ukraine to attack command centers and supply lines in addition to providing real-time intelligence for targeting. Both drones would give Ukraine a naval deterrent in the Black Sea, which it currently lacks.
• Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) Systems: Large numbers of AMRAAM missiles for the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS) can serve a similar purpose as an F-16 at a much lower cost, offering crucial protection against withering Russian airstrikes.
• M1150 Assault Breacher Vehicle (ABV): This heavily armored and highly mobile platform is equipped with a mine plow and demolition charge systems that would detonate Russian explosives from safe distances, clearing the way for follow-on combat formations to penetrate heavily mined areas of operation.
• M198 Howitzer: The M198 would provide Kyiv with a powerful 155mm-class asset without pulling equipment from operational American combat formations’ arsenals; open-source writings suggest that Washington has up to hundreds of these assets in storage. While the M198 is aged by US standards, it would stack up well with other Cold War-era artillery being used in the conflict.
• MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS): Western-supplied Multiple Launch Rocket Systems and Turkey’s TB-2 drones proved critical in Ukraine’s past offensives. ATACMS come with the benefit of more than triple the range of Ukraine’s High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, and would enable Ukraine to strike critical targets and launch sites now out of reach. 

Without these systems and munitions, Ukraine will be waging its upcoming counteroffensive at an unnecessary disadvantage. While offensive operations may soon commence, they will not be over quickly. It is not too late for the US government to supply Kyiv with the arsenal it needs to regain its territory and push back Putin’s invading army. The time to act is now.

How China’s Nuclear Ambitions Will Change Deterrence - Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. (The Economist, Hudson Institute)

O mundo será mais instável a 3, ou a 3 e meio (EUA, Rússia, China, UE), do que ele foi a dois: EUA e União Soviética. O desafio nuclear dos três grandes é o de não cair na busca infinita de dissuasão a três, isto é, de um contra os outros dois....

How China’s Nuclear Ambitions Will Change Deterrence

Shifting from a bipolar system to a tripolar one.

Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr.

China is expanding its nuclear arsenal, from a few hundred weapons to roughly 1,000 by 2030. It may have 1,550 warheads or more by the mid-2030s—the limit agreed to by Russia and America in a deal originally signed between them in 2010. This Chinese buildup is changing geopolitics. The American-Russian bipolar nuclear system, which has dominated the nuclear balance for over half a century, is evolving into a less stable tripolar system that risks undermining long-standing pillars of deterrence and triggering a nuclear arms race.

All this comes as America prepares to modernize its ageing “triad” of nuclear-weapons delivery systems (land-based and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and long-range bombers). China’s gambit raises questions over how best to proceed, as a tripolar system will erode several critical pillars of deterrence that proved effective in the bipolar system.

One pillar of deterrence, “parity”—a rough equivalence in nuclear forces—has been a cornerstone of all arms agreements between America and Russia over the past half-century. It is rooted in the belief that if neither power enjoys a significant advantage, each is less likely to use its nuclear weapons. As a senior Russian official declared in 2021, parity “stabilizes the entire system of international relations”. The need to maintain parity is particularly important for America, which seeks not only to deter nuclear attacks against itself, but also against crucial allies such as Australia, Germany, Japan and South Korea that lack nuclear forces of their own.

China’s decision to “superpower-size” its nuclear arsenal suggests Beijing seeks nuclear parity with America and Russia. Parity can be enjoyed by both rivals in a bipolar system. But it cannot be achieved in a tripolar system, because it is not possible for each member to match the combined arsenals of its two rivals. Any attempt to do so risks triggering an arms race with no possible end state, or winner.

A similar problem exists with respect to another pillar of the bipolar system, known as “assured destruction”. It holds that deterrence is strengthened when a country’s nuclear forces can survive an all-out surprise attack and still retain enough weapons to inflict unacceptable damage on its opponent’s society in a retaliatory strike. During the cold war one American estimate concluded that 400 weapons would suffice as an assured-destruction capability against such an attack by the Soviet Union.

But what about maintaining an assured-destruction capability against both Russia and China? America will need a substantially larger cache of weapons so that a surviving force could provide an assured destruction capability in a tripolar system. As with maintaining parity, this state of affairs could cause Moscow and Beijing to build up their arsenals too, resulting in an open-ended arms race.

Some argue that maintaining parity and assured destruction does not matter much, noting that China maintained a “minimal” nuclear deterrent of a few hundred weapons for decades. But when it comes to nuclear weapons, it seems Beijing has never been comfortable being a distant third to Russia and America. Others say that half of America’s deployed nuclear weapons could be placed on submarines, which are exceedingly difficult to detect. But this assumes that America’s submarines will remain undetectable over service lives lasting half a century, despite the proliferation of increasingly advanced detection technology. It also ignores the fact that, at any given moment, roughly half of American submarines may be in port where they are not stealthy sharks, but sitting ducks.

Although the shift from a bipolar to a tripolar nuclear system risks destabilizing the fragile balance of power, we have at least some understanding of how things will change. Yet we are only in the early stages of thinking through the tripolar system’s characteristics and their implications. A similar intellectual enterprise early in the bipolar era by some of the West’s best strategic thinkers paid great dividends for America’s security, and that of its allies. This kind of effort is needed now.

Fortunately there is time for this, as it will take the better part of a decade before China reaches the force levels of America and Russia. There is no need to rush pell-mell into new arms-control agreements or to expand America’s arsenal. The first step is to understand the dynamics of a tripolar nuclear system and what they mean for security. Only then should America consider whether or not, for example, to sign a follow-on agreement to the New START treaty (the Russian-American deal limiting each side to 1,550 warheads) when it expires in 2026.

America should keep its options open and its powder dry. This means energetically pursuing the administration’s plans to modernize the country’s triad of nuclear delivery systems until America has a clearer picture of how best to ensure its security in a tripolar system. The modernization program, even in its most expensive years, would probably consume less than 7% of the defense budget.

Modernization creates the possibility for serious negotiations with the Chinese and the Russians, who are already modernizing their nuclear forces. They will have far less incentive to negotiate if America allows its triad to age into obsolescence.

Proceeding with triad modernization will also enable America to expand its arsenal should China and Russia blow past the New START treaty’s 1,550-warhead limit. Exercising this option will require a “warm” industrial base with active production lines. As the Pentagon is discovering after transferring large quantities of munitions to Ukraine, its inability to boost production to meet unanticipated needs risks compromising America’s security, and that of its allies. Hence the importance of triad modernization as the best way to hedge against an uncertain future.

Read in The Economist.

Could Putin Use Weapons of Mass Destruction? - Bryan Clark, David Asher, Rebeccah Heinrichs, William Schneider, Kenneth Weinstein (Hudson Institute)

Hudson Institute:

Could Putin Use Weapons of Mass Destruction?

 

1. If Putin Uses Nuclear Weapons, It Will Be to Send a Message [Bryan Clark]

 

"The level of destruction from nuclear weapons can be high enough to give Putin a military advantage. But the problem is, an advantage in what? A contaminated area that Russian forces will not be able to deploy into? 

"It's more likely that you would see a nuclear weapon being used in a demonstration of some sort, whether it's an air defense demonstration or going after some ancillary target that might induce some casualties but isn't a mass casualty event. That would allow Putin to show that he has broken the nuclear taboo. For Russia, breaking the nuclear taboo opens up this whole set of options that they might employ in the future. For them, it's very useful from a messaging perspective.

"The U.S. needs to learn from this experience and think more carefully about how we persistently engage our opponents or adversaries, and show our willingness to do things at lower levels of escalation and maybe even at higher ones. And take some small risks that allow us to convey resolve, to a much greater degree than we have up till now."

 

2.  Russia Refuses To Rule Out Possible WMD Use [David Asher]

 

"Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov said recently that if this becomes an existential crisis for Vladimir Putin, nuclear weapons use is not ruled out. This is the first we've had the Putin regime talk about it four, five, six times. Why? Everything else they've talked about, they've delivered on. Let's not forget that.

"My fear is that Putin decides to do something ahistorical, atypical, but in his mind, great. And that could be the use of something that would try to decapitate the Zelensky regime. Just because nobody has used a nuclear weapon doesn't mean that Putin thinks it's verboten. He might do it just because he thinks it's going to shift the entire power balance, and then he immediately opens negotiations and says it'll never ever happen again, or will say, 'Oh, it was a mistake. Some general went off and did it,' ala Dr. Strangelove, and then Putin shoots the guy in the head."

 

3.  Russia Is Effectively Employing Nuclear Coercion [Rebeccah Heinrichs]

 

"The Russians are using nuclear coercion, and it's working on the U.S. in terms of how unwilling or risk-averse it's making this administration. Russia moved one of its massive strategic military exercises that used nuclear delivery systems to coincide right before the invasion, when the United States had a long-planned Minuteman III test. This administration essentially decided, even though the Russians would have known about the U.S. exercises in advance and it would not be a surprise, 'We can't plan it to be happening during the invasion.'

"The administration decided to not move forward with the Minuteman III test because they wanted to signal that they would not go back-and-forth with these nuclear threats. Unfortunately, I think this affirmed in Russian minds that the U.S. is intimidated by the thought of nuclear employment. This increases the power that the threats of nuclear weapons have over the United States and how we might respond in Ukraine."

 

4. Putin Aims To Build a Russian Empire, Not Recreate the Soviet Union [William Schneider]

 

"In thinking about Putin’s possible nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons use, it's important to bear in mind Putin's aims. They are not to produce a neutral Ukraine. They are not to keep Ukraine out of NATO. It is to absorb Ukraine into a Russian empire. And his vision of a so-called Russian world, which would be a Eurasian-Russian empire that is unlike the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was shaped by Stalin to be a multinational empire led by the communist ideology. Putin sees it as an all-Russian empire that would be based on Russian ethnicity. And as the late Zbigniew Brzezińskii said, Ukraine is the key to preventing the reemergence of a facsimile of the former Soviet Union."

 

5. Policymakers Must 'Think About the Unthinkable' [Kenneth Weinstein]

 

"In recent days we’ve seen policymakers, most notably President Biden openly and many more behind closed doors, speculate about the potential use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons by Russian forces. While the use of WMD might not be likely, it is a possibility that policymakers in the U.S. and Europe need to grapple with, as an ominous editorial in The Economist recently noted. Like The Economist, which cited Hudson Institute founder Herman Kahn and his 44-step ladder of nuclear escalation, we're also following in Herman's footsteps.

"Herman, of course, was famous for 'thinking about the unthinkable' in his classic 1962 book in which he made a very simple but controversial case: 'Thermonuclear war may seem unthinkable, immoral, insane, hideous, or highly unlikely, but it is not impossible. To act intelligently, we must learn as much as we can about the risks. We may therefore be able to avoid nuclear war. We may even be able to avoid the crises that bring us to the brink of nuclear war.'"

 

Excerpts are drawn from the Hudson event, "Thinking About the Unthinkable in Ukraine: Could Putin Use Weapons of Mass Destruction?"
Quotes have been edited for clarity and length. 

60 anos de "Pensando no Impensável" de Herman Khan, e do Hudson Institute, um dos melhores think tanks paranóicos dos EUA

O Hudson Institute é um dos mais antigos think tanks paranóicos dos EUA, e um dos de melhor qualidade, sem deixar de ser paranóicos. Mas os soviéticos também eram, o que diminui um pouco a culpa dos gringos. Lembro-me de quando Herman Khan veio ao Brasil, no início da ditadura militar, com seu sonho impossível de unir as três grandes bacias hidrográficas, ou pelo menos a platina e a amazônica por meio de grandes lagos no interior do Brasil. A ideia era tão maluco que acho que nem os militares mais americanófilos toparam sequer considerar a hipótese.

No seu livro O Ano 2000, feito em meados dos anos 1960, com dados econômicos do Brasil do início da década, ele previa o Brasil ainda muito pobre no ano 2000 justamente. Por causa do livro, Roberto Campos e Mario Henrique Simonsen escreveram dois livros, Brasil 2001 e depois Brasil 2002, prevendo um futuro brilhante para o Brasil. Todos eles erraram: o Brasil não ficou tão pobre quanto previa Herman Khan, mas tampouco chegou à prosperidade como aventavam Campos e Simonsen. Creio que com algum esforços dos petistas e do Bolsonaro estamos chegando novamente na pobreza. 

Acho que o Herman Khan ganhou pelo menos essa, não porque ele acertou, mas porque o Brasil errou muito mais do que deveria ou poderia.

O Hudson Institute tem como motos "Security. Freedom. Prosperity". Tudo muito bem, apesar de que eu inverteria a ordem dos fatores, mas ele representa um mundo à parte, válido apenas para os americanos, que veem o mundo segundo uma "geografia" muito simples, não a terra plana, mas uma terra feita de duas partes bem distintas: America and the ROW, Rest of the World. Os americanos estão tão entranhados num mundo que só é o deles, que se enganam quanto ao resto do mundo.

Eles são tão "bolcheviques" na defesa do capitalismo quanto o eram os verdadeiros bolcheviques na defesa do comunismo. No fundo, eles estão certos em defender o capitalismo, as liberdades, a economia de mercado, como sinais de prosperidade, mas o fazem com o fundamentalismo dos true believers na redenção dos pagãos, como foram (e ainda são) muitos "missionários" da verdadeira fé, querendo convertes os demais. Deveriam mostrar pelo exemplo, não pela imposição. Essa geografia simplória deles atrapalha um bocado na política externa e na diplomacia.

Espero que pelos próximos 60 anos, "humbled" pela China, eles mudem sua visão do mundo, pois já são três ou quatro gerações que se acreditam estar na vanguard do mundo e como "farol da democracia". Se não houver uma guerra, eles vão começar a repensar sua relação com o mundo, que começa por uma tomada de consciência de suas deficiências internas, a tal prosperidade que lhes faz ainda falta.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

No images? Click here   Hudson founders Herman Kahn and Max Singer pictured during the Institute's early years.  video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dA4qq6jyOTc Hudson Institute celebrated its 60th anniversary this week, marking more than half a century of policy research dedicated to keeping America and its allies secure, free, and prosperous. Founded in 1961, Hudson Institute was established to foster a better understanding of deterrence in the atomic age and create the conditions for the free world to triumph over communism. Its founder Herman Kahn, a leading defense intellectual of the atomic age, wrote the groundbreaking book Thinking About the Unthinkable, which urged policymakers to plan for nuclear war to prevent it from occurring. This approach to tackling the most challenging foreign policy issues has informed Hudson’s decades-long tradition of unconventional thinking. Watch our anniversary video and read key excerpts from Thinking About the Unthinkableto learn more.   60th Anniversary Video Thinking About the Unthinkable         Thinking About the Unthinkable with Herman Kahn     Key excerpts from Herman Kahn's 1962 book Thinking About the Unthinkable.   1. Approach National Security with Dispassionate Clarity   Critics frequently refer to the icy rationality of the Hudson Institute, the Rand Corporation, and other such organizations. I’m always tempted to ask in reply, “Would you prefer a warm, human error? Do you feel better with a nice emotional mistake?” We cannot expect good discussion of security problems if we are going to label every attempt at detachment as callous, every attempt at objectivity as immoral. Such attitudes not only block discussion of the immediate issues, they lead to a disunity and fragmentation of the intellectual community that can be disastrous to the democratic dialogue between specialist and layman. The former tends to withdraw to secret and private discussions; the latter becomes more and more innocent, or naive, and more likely to be outraged if he is ever exposed to a professional discussion.   2. The Risks of Modern Technology Must Not Be Ignored   Reality may be so unpleasant that decision makers would prefer not to face it; but to a great extent this reality has been forced on them, or has come uninvited. Thanks to our ever-increasing technology, we are living in a terrible and dangerous world; but, unlike the lady in the cartoon we cannot say, “Stop the world, I want to get off.” We cannot get off. Even the most utopian of today’s visionaries will have to concede that the mere existence of modern technology involves a risk to civilization that would have been unthinkable twenty-five years ago.   3. 'Unthinkable' Scenarios Must Be Given Serious Consideration   Many intelligent and sincere people are willing to argue that it is immoral to think and even more immoral to write in detail about having to fight a thermonuclear war...We Americans and many people throughout the world are not prepared to face reality, that we transfer our horror of thermonuclear war to reports about the realities of thermonuclear war. In our times, thermonuclear war may seem unthinkable, immoral, insane, hideous, or highly unlikely, but it is not impossible. To act intelligently we must learn as much as we can about the risks...We must appreciate these possibilities. We cannot wish them away. Nor should we overestimate and assume the worst is inevitable. This leads only to defeatism, inadequate preparations (because they seem useless), and pressures toward either preventive war or undue accommodation.   Quotes may be edited for clarity and length.   60th Anniversary Video Thinking About the Unthinkable     Hudson Institute celebrated its 60th anniversary with a reception in New York City on Wednesday evening with a discussion featuring Hudson Distinguished Fellows Walter Russell Mead and Kenneth R. Weinstein and Senior Fellows Nadia Schadlow and Michael Doran, moderated by Hudson President and CEO John P. Walters.

Go Deeper

Deter Russia by Arming NATO Allies

As Russian troops mass on the border with Ukraine, the U.S. must act urgently to protect states on the front line and restore deterrence in Europe, writes Hudson Senior Fellow William Schneider in The Wall Street Journal. The failure to stand firm against Russian aggression risks destroying the entire postwar security system in Europe.  Read

The Realistic Path to Deterring China

The blurred line between peace and war exemplified by China's gray-zone military operations renders the Pentagon’s traditional planning constructs obsolete, write Hudson Senior Fellows Bryan Clark and Dan Pattin National Review. As the Pentagon completes its new defense strategy, it should ensure that the U.S. military looks beyond the Taiwan Strait to focus on reducing the Chinese military's operational confidence. Read

The Diminishing Path to Growth: Can Xi Jinping Avoid Crisis during China's Economic Transition?

Predictions that China’s integration into the global market would transform the country into a responsible stakeholder have foundered on the reality of Xi Jinping's increasingly mercantilist economic policies. Is the country headed towards financial catastrophe? Hudson Senior Fellow Thomas Duesterberg assesses the economic challenges faced by China in a new policy memo.  Read

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A nova Guerra Fria Econômica e a previsível derrota dos EUA - Hudson Institute

O Hudson Institute é o mais próximo que se pode ter de think tank alinhado ao establishment político-intelectual dos EUA, e aqui eles analisam as "modestas vitórias" – na verdade uma batalha de retaguarda – que os EUA contabilizam contra o inevitável avanço da China em diversos quadrantes da geopolítica mundial.
Se os EUA continuarem tão inutilmente confrontacionais em relação à China, só se pode antecipar novas derrotas econômicas e tecnológicas da antiga futura potência hegemônica do século XXI, que está retrocedendo antes mesmo de terminar a segunda década do século.
Quanto à China, não vejo nenhum problema no que os imperialismos ocidentais sempre apontaram, uma vez que eles se dedicaram nos últimos cem anos, ou mais, a fazer exatamente o que fazem os chineses antes, com uma distinção, para o bem e para o mal: os ocidentais também chegavam com noções de direitos humanos, democracia, liberdade de expressão e coisas tais, o que os chineses ignoram solenemente, mas tampouco intentam exportar para outros o seu modelo autocrático de dominação política. O que lhe interessa é fazer negócios, ganhar dinheiro, explorar vantagens comerciais para se apropriar de segredos tecnológicos, enfim, fazer aquilo que todo capitalista que se respeita faz, ou seja, ganhar sempre que possível, ganhar bastante, ganhar exageradamente.
Não se trata de algo imoral, apenas de comportamentos amorais, desejo de ganho, o que todo ser humano exibe quando não pretende ser benemerente, desprendido, generoso, humano...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Poços de Caldas, 26 de outubro de 2019

Huawei advertising wraps the bell tower of the Kaiser Wilhelm memorial church in Berlin on March 28, 2019. The parish will use revenues from the advertising of Huawei for the restructuring of the building. (TOBIAS SCHWARZ/AFP/Getty Images)

The recent US-China trade deal, dubbed "tremendous" by President Trump, may only offer modest victories. In the deal, China offered to purchase massive amounts of agricultural commodities, refrain from currency manipulation, and offer the US better access to their financial services markets. But Beijing demurred on core issues like state subsidies and forced technology transfers, while offering vague assurances of intellectual property protections. Analysts remain skeptical that the October 11 accord marks a truce in the trade war.

In his latest briefing memo, Hudson fellow and former Department of Commerce assistant secretary Tom Duesterberg breaks down the latest on US-China trade, with an eye towards Europe's role in assuring Beijing's cooperation.

 

Read the Briefing Memo

 

Go Deeper: Hudson Experts on China

 

Listen

Interview: Mike Pompeo joins The Realignment

US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo joined Hudson's podcast The Realignment to discuss how recent events have brought China’s influence over American culture and business into the mainstream consciousness.

 

Read

China, 5G, and Dominance of the Global "Infosphere"

Beijing's investments in 5G have paved the "digital road" of China's Belt-and-Road Infrastructure. In this briefing memo, Bill Schneider examines how 5G technology is the gateway to controlling the world's expanding infosphere.

 

 

This week, the Solomon Islands blocked an attempt by a Chinese company to lease a South Pacific Island with a deep-water port. Defense Secretary Mark Esper lauds it as "an important decision to reinforce sovereignty, transparency, and the rule of law."  

To learn why this decision has major ramifications for the US, read John Lee's recent report, "The Use of Aid to Counter China's 'Djibouti Strategy' in the South Pacific."

Read

 

 

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Hudson Institute alimenta a paranoia nuclear americana

Lieutenant General Robert Ashley Jr., the director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, joined Hudson this week to share the latest findings on Russia and China's efforts to modernize their nuclear stockpiles. 

General Ashley's keynote remarks were followed by a panel discussion with senior government officials, including Dr. James Anderson, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans and Capabilities; Tim Morrison, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Weapons of Mass Destruction and Biodefense, National Security Council; and Thomas DiNanno, Deputy Assistant Secretary For Defense Policy, Emerging Threats, And Outreach, Bureau Of Arms Control, Verification And Compliance, U.S. Department of State.

If you missed this can't-miss event, catch up with our transcript and event video.

Read Transcript

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Watch Event

 

Key Quotes from Lt. Gen. Ashley's Remarks

Russia's stockpile of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, already large and diverse, is being modernized with an eye towards greater accuracy, longer ranges and lower yields to suit their potential war-fighting role. 

The United States believes that Russia probably is not adhering to the nuclear testing moratorium in a manner consistent with the zero-yield standard. Our understanding of nuclear weapon development leads us to believe Russia's testing activities would help it improve its nuclear weapon capabilities. The United States, by contrast, has forgone such benefits by upholding a zero-yield standard. 

The U.S. has determined that Russia's actions have strained key pillars of arms control architecture. These include the Chemical Weapons Convention, Open Skies Treaty, the Vienna documents, and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. 

With its announcement of a new nuclear-capable strategic bomber, China soon will field its own version of a nuclear triad, demonstrating China's commitment to expanding the role and centrality of nuclear forces in Beijing's military aspirations. And like Russia, China is also working to field nuclear theater-range precision-strike systems. While China's overall arsenal is assessed to be much smaller than Russia's, this does not make this trend any less concerning.

Over the next decade, China will likely at least double the size of its nuclear stockpile in the course of implementing the most rapid expansion and diversification of its nuclear arsenal in China's history. Last year, China launched more ballistic missiles for testing and training than the rest of the world combined.

 

Click Here for the Latest on Russia and China's Nuclear Ambitions

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