Despotas esclarecidos: ja tivemos, ao que parece (algumas ate bonitas...)

Catherine the Great's Lessons for Despots

By ROBERT K. MASSIE

The Wall Street Journal, November 12, 2011

Russia's erudite empress tried to redeem absolute rule; 

her failures highlight dangers still present today

One by one, the despots are falling. Some remain: in Syria, Yemen, Iran, North Korea, Zimbabwe, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and elsewhere. The word "despot" applies to rule by a single person, wielding absolute power, and we use it as a term of condemnation.

Everett Collection

Catherine the Great, depicted above (right) by Julia Ormond in the TV movie 'Young Catherine,' promoted liberal ideas ahead of her time.

But it is useful to remember that its connotation was not always negative. For most of the past millennium, most nations on Earth were governed by rulers who could be described as despots. Some were popular and accepted; others hated; a few overthrown. Some were even called "benevolent."

Perhaps the most remarkable member of this last (and admittedly small) class was Catherine the Great, who became Empress of Russia in 1762 and ruled for more than three decades. Like her contemporary, Thomas Jefferson, she was an avid student of the Enlightenment, the European intellectual movement whose ideas about the social contract and human rights have so strongly shaped our own notions of the legitimate role of government.

Catherine tried—sometimes she succeeded, other times she failed—to bring key elements of this liberalizing influence to her own vast empire. Today, her efforts, and even her failures, remain instructive.

Born an obscure German princess, Catherine was sent to Russia at the age of 14 because the Empress Elizabeth, the daughter of Peter the Great, needed a young woman to reproduce with her nephew and heir (the infant would become the back-up heir). At 16, Catherine married, but for the next nine years her husband slept beside her without touching her.

Finally, Elizabeth offered Catherine a choice between two young courtiers to act as a surrogate father for the necessary child. A baby boy was born, but the empress, overjoyed, rushed into the birthing room, snatched the infant from the mother and carried him off. During the first eight months of her son's life, Catherine saw him briefly three times.

Bereft of husband and child, a lonely Catherine began to read the histories, philosophy and literature of Greece and Rome and of the Enlightenment. Montesquieu's "The Spirit of Laws," which analyzed the strengths and weaknesses of despotic rule, had a powerful impact on her. She was particularly interested in his thesis that the conduct of a specific despot could partially redeem that form of rule. Thereafter, she attributed to herself a "republican soul" of the kind advocated by Montesquieu.

Voltaire, the venerated patriarch of the Enlightenment, had concluded that a despotic government might well be the best possible form of government—if it were reasonable. But to be reasonable, he said, it must be enlightened; if enlightened, it could be both efficient and benevolent. Soon after ascending to the throne, Catherine began a correspondence with Voltaire that eventually extended to hundreds of letters over more than 20 years.

In 1766, the new empress told Voltaire that she was writing an "Instruction," intended to serve as a guide for a complete rewriting of the outdated Russian legal code. She began by stating that "Russia is a European state"; this was intended to exorcise the nation's traditional sense of geographic and cultural isolation. She went on to write that "the equality of citizens consists in the fact that all are subject to the same laws."

On the great issue of crime and punishment, Catherine declared that "it is better to prevent than punish crimes." She wished to restrict capital punishment only to cases involving political murder, sedition, treason or civil war. She rejected the use of torture, traditionally used in Russia to extract confessions, obtain evidence and determine guilt. As she wrote, "the accused party on the rack, while in the agonies of torture, is not master enough of himself to be able to declare the truth."

Catherine followed the publication of her "Instruction" by summoning a Legislative Commission, elected from all free social classes and ethnic groups, to voice complaints and propose new laws. The representatives gathered in Moscow and met for 18 months, but they failed to meet her goals. No new code of laws was produced. Worse, because of the vociferous opposition of the landowning nobility, Catherine's effort to improve and eventually end the institution of serfdom came to naught.

Still, Catherine considered her "Instruction" the greatest contribution that she made to Russia, and it is worth noting how early she was in promoting such liberal ideas. She preceded Thomas Jefferson's drafting of the Declaration of Independence by nine years, and her legislative assembly came 22 years before Louis XVI of France summoned the Estates General.

Near the end of her reign Catherine was asked how she understood the "blind obedience with which her orders were obeyed." Catherine smiled and answered, "It is not as easy as you think…. I examine the circumstances, I take advice, I consult the enlightened part of the people, and so in this way I find out what sort of effect my laws will have. And when I am already convinced in advance of good approval, then I issue my orders and have the pleasure of observing what you call blind obedience."

Catherine died in 1796, when George Washington was finishing his second term in office. Since then, the temptations of absolute power have remained great; despots have continued to appear, afflicting people everywhere. We have learned, at enormous cost, the difficulty of combining despotism with benevolence. Few rulers have even tried. Catherine tried.

—Mr. Massie's new book is "Catherine the Great: Portrait of a Woman." His previous books include "Nicholas and Alexandra" and "Peter the Great," for which he won the Pulitzer Prize.

Debate academico na UnB: Ikenberry, Bagley on US and emerging countries

Em parceira com a Embaixada dos Estados Unidos, o iRel promoveu hoje, quinta-feira, dia 5/5, às 9:30h, na sala FA A1-04, uma mesa redonda com os professores JOHN G. IKENBERRY (Princeton), que falou sobre "Os BRICS e a Nova Ordem Global: A Visão dos EUA sobre a Liderança Regional e a Ascensão Global do Brasil, Rússia, China e Índia", e BRUCE M. BAGLEY (U Miami), que tratou das "Novas Influências Econômicas e Militares na América Latina: China, Irã e Rússia".

Abaixo uma informação sobre o mais recente livro do Prof. Ikenberry:

Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order
G. John Ikenberry
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011; 392 pp.; ISBN: 978-1-4008-3819-6

In the second half of the twentieth century, the United States engaged in the most ambitious and far-reaching liberal order building the world had yet seen. This liberal international order has been one of the most successful in history in providing security and prosperity to more people. But in the last decade, the American-led order has been troubled. Some argue that the Bush administration, with its war on terror, invasion of Iraq, and unilateral orientation, undermined this liberal order. Others argue that we are witnessing the end of the American era. Liberal Leviathan engages these debates.

G. John Ikenberry argues that the crisis that besets the American-led order is a crisis of authority. A political struggle has been ignited over the distribution of roles, rights, and authority within the liberal international order. But the deeper logic of liberal order remains alive and well. The forces that have triggered this crisis--the rise of non-Western states such as China, contested norms of sovereignty, and the deepening of economic and security interdependence--have resulted from the successful functioning and expansion of the postwar liberal order, not its breakdown. The liberal international order has encountered crises in the past and evolved as a result. It will do so again.

Ikenberry provides the most systematic statement yet about the theory and practice of the liberal international order, and a forceful message for policymakers, scholars, and general readers about why America must renegotiate its relationship with the rest of the world and pursue a more enlightened strategy--that of the liberal leviathan.

G. John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. His books include After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton).

Review:
"His book lucidly explains how the end of the Cold War allowed the U.S.-dominated Western system to expand to the rest of the world. Ikenberry's account has an intuitive appeal. There's always more than enough chaos to argue that the world is in crisis . . . he writes thoughtfully about the challenge of integrating rising powers into global governance. . . . As a clear and informed synthesis of the existing scholarship on global governance, this book is a success."--David Bosco, American Prospect

Endorsements:
"John Ikenberry, America's leading scholar of international affairs, brilliantly relates theory to historical change in his timely advocacy of a new U.S. foreign policy."--Zbigniew Brzezinski, Center for Strategic and International Studies

"Nobody has thought longer or deeper about the nature of the American liberal world order than John Ikenberry. Tough-minded yet visionary and optimistic, this inspirational volume should become required reading for all those tasked with the great responsibility of steering us to safety through the very choppy international waters into which we are now heading."--Michael Cox, London School of Economics and Political Science

"Liberal Leviathan traces the intimate connections between the emergence of a largely liberal international system and the concentration of global power in the United States in the twentieth century. The marriage of power and principle in the United States has been central to the emergence of the liberal order, but Ikenberry shows that it is also corrosive of that order. As a consequence both of U.S. foreign policy activism and gradual shifts in the distribution of world power, the liberal order faces significant new challenges. This book traces alternative paths through which these challenges might be met."--Barry Posen, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Table of Contents:
Preface xi
Acknowledgments xvii
Chapter One: Crisis of the Old Order 1
Part One: Theoretical Foundations 33
Chapter Two: Power and the Varieties of Order 35
Chapter Three: Power and Strategies of Rule 79
Chapter Four: Unipolarity and Its Consequences 119
Part Two: Historical Origins and Trajectories of Change 157
Chapter Five: The Rise of the American System 159
Chapter Six: The Great Transformation and the Failure of Illiberal Hegemony 221
Chapter Seven: Dilemmas and Pathways of Liberal International Order 279
Chapter Eight: Conclusion: The Durability of Liberal International Order 333
Index 361

Other Princeton books by G. John Iikenberry:
After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars.
The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-first Century.
The Nation-State in Question.

Chapter 1 of Liberal Leviathan [PDF]