Temas de relações internacionais, de política externa e de diplomacia brasileira, com ênfase em políticas econômicas, em viagens, livros e cultura em geral. Um quilombo de resistência intelectual em defesa da racionalidade, da inteligência e das liberdades democráticas.
O que é este blog?
Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida;
Discordo de dois elementos neste artigo: (a) de que a China seja uma nação-comerciante; (b) de que os dois novos aliados, China e Rússia, tenham encontrado a fórmula do eterno crescimento, uma afirmação aliás não contida neste artigo de Marcos Troyjo.
Para que uma nação seja um comerciante bem sucedido, não pode ser apenas intermediário, ou seja, é preciso produzir bens reais. A parte de produtos "estrangeiros" produzidos na China é provavelmente gradualmente menor do que os produtos propriamente chineses. Ou seja, o made in China vai ficando menor em relação ao made BY China. Esse é um fato.
Não creio, por outro lado, que grandes acordos governamentais, por mais bilhões que possam movimentar, representem o futuro do capitalismo (e não vejo outro futuro para os dois novos aliados).
A dinâmica do crescimento é sempre a da inteligência e da criação. Isso a China está fazendo, o que é duvidoso no caso da Rússia. Mas mesmo no caso da China, não creio que seja uma boa fórmula o capitalismo dirigido pelo Estado. Vão gastar dinheiro tomando decisões erradas, isso é inevitável.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
O urso e o dragão
Marcos Troyjo
Folha de S. Paulo, Sexta, 23 de maio de 2014
Quebrar a espinha-dorsal do comunismo como força geopolítica. Topo da agenda da política externa norte-americana durante a Guerra Fria.
Encontros secretos entre Kissinger e Chou-En-Lai nos anos 70 abriram avenida entre EUA e China -- e esta desacoplou-se do bloco comunista.
Ante o potencial de relacionamento com o Ocidente, Pequim distanciou-se ainda mais de Moscou. Aprofundou-se o "Cisma Sino-Soviético".
Desde então, a China embarcou num crescimento estonteante graças a seu modelo, agora em metamorfose, de Nação-Comerciante.
A Rússia perambulou entre a memória de seu status como superpotência político-militar e a promessa -- não cumprida -- de prosperidade sustentada em formidáveis recursos humanos e energéticos.
Hoje, os dois gigantes voltam a aninhar-se. Para dissabor dos EUA, foi a Moscou que Xi Jinping fez sua primeira visita ao exterior como premiê.
Nesta semana, Putin foi recebido na China como czar. Xangai foi fechada, aulas canceladas e feriado decretado para a visita do titular do Kremlin.
Constrangido no Ocidente pela mão pesada na Ucrânia, Putin saudou o relacionamento com Pequim como "prioridade incondicional da política externa russa". Acrescentou: elos com a China encontram-se no "nível mais elevado da História".
Os chineses aproveitaram as novas limitações russas no comércio com o Ocidente para barganhar num acordo de fornecimento de gás que se arrastava há 10 anos.
O negócio alcança US$ 400 bilhões. Foi concluído às pressas para que Gazprom e CNPC, megacorporações energéticas, o assinassem perante Putin e Xi Jinping.
Pequim e Moscou realizam manobras navais conjuntas. O comércio bilateral saltará dos atuais US$ 90 bilhões para US$ 200 bilhões em 10 anos.
Nos EUA, ninguém parece entender o que está acontecendo. Think-tanks como o Council on Foreign Relations e o Chicago Council on Global Affairs colocam os EUA no divã.
Promovem "auto-análise" que opõe, de um lado, visão de política externa orientada pela opinião pública. Esta não quer encarar o preço da onipresença dos EUA.
Do outro, consolida-se a percepção nos setores mais treinados em assuntos globais de que esses movimentos da Eurásia fazem "renascer a geopolítica". Pregam reengajamento dos EUA mediante novo -- e caríssimo -- orçamento para relações exteriores e defesa.
Ganha corpo também, no mundo corporativo, a ideia de que sanções impostas a Putin criam "reserva de mercado" para potências não-ocidentais multiplicarem transações com a Rússia.
A política "principista" de Washington repetiria erros do tratamento dado a Cuba. Daí, o pior de três mundos. Afastamento no diálogo político, surgimento de projetos geoestratégicos alternativos e definhamento das relações econômicas.
Moscou reconforta-se na parceria chinesa. Pequim compraz-se ao ver os EUA rodopiarem na arena global feito barata tonta.
O Brasil, inocente, não pode vislumbrar no dueto urso-dragão idílio terceiro-mundista. São apenas dois monstros calculistas bailando à fria melodia de seus próprios interesses.
O maior objetivo do presidente da Rússia não é promover uma expansão imperialista, e sim fortalecer seu autoritarismo e esmagar a oposição interna
Nathalia Watkins, de Moscou, Veja, 16/05/2014
NACIONALISMO - Ensaio de desfile na Praça Vermelha, em Moscou: com Putin, as conquistas militares foram destacadas nos livros didáticos (Yuri Kozyrev/Noor)
Entre as muralhas vermelhas do Kremlin e lojas da Tiffany, Hermès e Louis Vuitton, milhares de russos aproveitam o calor da primavera para circular no coração da capital. Em uma das entradas da Praça Vermelha, visitantes formam fila para fazer pedidos, seguidos do lançamento de moedas sobre o marco zero de Moscou, o quadrado com um círculo no meio que fica no centro geográfico da cidade. Sem nenhuma cerimônia, um pedinte disputa os rublos no chão com uma mulher idosa. Sósias de Josef Stalin e Vladimir Lenin ficam ao redor na esperança de que os saudosistas paguem para tirar fotos com eles. Em poder de atração, nenhum deles é páreo para o sósia do presidente Vladimir Putin, o homem que desde março mantém o Ocidente em estado de tensão por ter anexado a Península da Crimeia à força e que agora empurra a Ucrânia para uma guerra civil de resultados imprevisíveis. “As pessoas se aproximam e me agradecem pela recuperação da Crimeia. Sou muito grato por ser parecido com o nosso presidente”, diz o sósia de Putin, que prefere não revelar o seu nome verdadeiro. Um clique ao seu lado custa 1 000 rublos, dinheiro suficiente para comprar onze sanduíches em uma loja do McDonald’s ali perto. “Todo mundo que me vê fica alegre e sorri. É assim comigo e com o nosso presidente. Os russos sabem que com ele tudo ficará bem, em ordem”, diz o Putin de mentira. Enquanto Lenin e Stalin labutam o dia todo, o requisitado Putin trabalha somente duas horas por dia e apenas em alguns dias da semana.
Putin, o sósia, fala em “recuperação” da Crimeia da mesma forma que Putin, o verdadeiro. A maioria dos russos pensa de maneira semelhante. Não se encontra quem aceite o termo “anexação” para explicar a tomada daquela região pela Rússia. Para eles, a península que então pertencia à Ucrânia sempre foi uma parte de seu país, salvo em um breve intervalo entre os anos de 1954 e 2014. Oito em cada dez russos estão de acordo sobre a tomada da Crimeia e aprovam a gestão do presidente. Suas palavras, seus raciocínios e seu discurso nacionalista, embora estranhos para ouvidos estrangeiros, têm soado como música clássica para os russos. Putin não tem a intenção de expandir as fronteiras da Rússia, como fizeram os czares e os comunistas soviéticos. A maior parte dos russos acha que a anexação da Crimeia foi um bem para os próprios anexados e que isso trará até prejuízos econômicos a Moscou. O presidente Putin explora muito bem o forte sentimento patriótico dos russos. O objetivo é prolongar seu poder pelo mais longo tempo possível — e apagar qualquer faísca mais forte da oposição interna.
China just signed a 30-year, $400 billion natural gas deal with Russia, handing a big win to Russian energy companies desperate to find new export markets. But the pact may have delivered Russian President Vladimir Putin an equally important win in his ongoing standoff with the Obama administration and its European allies over the ongoing crisis in Ukraine. Put simply, the deal may deal a death blow to the foundering Western efforts to punish Putin for his meddling in Ukraine and annexation of the country's Crimean peninsula.
The new pact strengthens an emerging Moscow-Beijing economic alliance that's out of the reach of Western influence -- and financial pressure. The deal, which capped years of tense negotiations, was inked in Shanghai on the sidelines of an Asian economic and security conference that included 40 countries, including Iran and Kazakhstan. Though it will be years before the gas starts flowing to China, the deal raises doubts about how effectively Western countries will be able to use sanctions as a weapon against Putin's Russia.
Former Treasury Department sanctions official Elizabeth Rosenberg, who is now a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, said the deal was Russia's "attempt to build up commercial opportunities outside of Europe where it's vulnerable and losing friends."
Sanctions -- Western leaders' weapon of choice in the battle over Ukraine - may have less bite now that Russia has proved it can find other foreign customers for its main export, natural gas. U.S. and European leaders have threatened broad sanctions against whole swaths of the Russian economy, including its finance or energy sectors, if Moscow meddles in Ukraine's presidential election this weekend. But the China deal gives those threats less teeth in the years to come because Russia would have Beijing's gas contract to fall back on, if the West decided to go after the country's crucial energy sector.
"I don't think this inhibits the ability of the U.S. and its partners to impose sanctions in the short term, but I do think it could affect the ultimate price those sanctions would exact in the medium term," said Zachary Goldman, a former Treasury Department sanctions official who now heads the Center on Law and Security at the New York University.
Though Europe still accounts for roughly 75 percent of Russia's gas export market, developing countries could make up a larger proportion over time. The gas going to China wouldn't take away from Europe's portion immediately because the gas is being extracted from different fields, but by increasing the number of buyers, Russia would be less dependent on the European market.
China is also an ideal economic ally for Putin because Beijing -- unlike Europe -- is unlikely to ever agree to sanctioning Moscow over the Ukraine crisis or to try to intentionally reduce its oil imports from Russia because of the unrest there. Chinese leaders have historically been averse to getting involved in other countries' political squabbles.
"The government in Beijing isn't interested in coming out and supporting this volatile political issue in terms of the Russia-Ukraine situation," said Nicholas Consonery, an Asia analyst with political risk consultancy Eurasia Group.
So far, Washington has frozen the assets of 45 people, including some of the Russian president's closest allies, and 19 banks and companies in an attempt to pressure Putin to reverse his annexation of Crimea and abandon his threats of invading eastern Ukraine. Tuesday, the Treasury Department added 12 more names to list in connection with unrelated alleged human rights abuses.
Some of the moves have been literally laughed off by Putin, who has given no indication whatsoever that they are making him even think of reversing his annexation of Crimea. Still, they go further than what Europe has been willing to do, highlighting the lack of unity over whether to sanction Russia and, if so, how harshly. Outside of the West, few countries have express support for the use of financial tools that could affect the global economy. The big emerging market nations -- Brazil, Russia, India, and China, collectively nicknamed the BRIC countries -- have already registered their clear dissatisfaction with the idea. Foreign ministers for Brazil, India and China joined Russia in criticizing sanctions in March after the initial rounds of tit-for-tat visa bans and asset freezes between the U.S. and Russia.
"The escalation of hostile language, sanctions and counter-sanctions, and force does not contribute to a sustainable and peaceful solution," the four foreign ministers said in a statement after a meeting at The Hague on March 24.
Some developing countries are likely to seek natural gas deals with Russia in the years ahead, and their unwillingness to go along with even modest sanctions today suggest they'd be even less likely to do so while they're in an active energy and economic partnership with Moscow. Energy experts who've followed years of fits and starts over the new natural gas deal also caution that the long-term implications of the contract will only be clear when more details are revealed -- as long as it doesn't fall through.
"Anyone who's been watching this for the last decade is ready to take this news with a heavy dose of salt," said Rosenberg.
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Whether by diplomacy, investment or in extreme cases, force, China is going to great lengths to satisfy its growing hunger for energy to fuel its expanding car fleet and electrify its swelling cities.
The Chinese government showed that desire on Wednesday when it reached a 30-yearnatural gas deal with Russia, even as China was locked in a tense standoff with Vietnam over a Chinese oil rig drilling in the contested South China Sea.
The two events involve different political dynamics. The agreement with Russia reflects closer economic ties between the two nations, while the other underscores the growing tension of two on-again, off-again Cold War allies.
But both developments demonstrate China’s expansive approach to energy, a political and economic strategy with significant implications for the rest of the world. As its economy has rapidly expanded over the last decade, China’s energy efforts have come to dominate the global markets. Its mushrooming consumption helped prompt the spike in global oil prices in the mid-2000s.
China’s demand has also provided life support to coal producers suffering from declining use in the United States and other industrialized countries. Among the fastest-growing importers of natural gas, China has had to cement its ties to Russia to diversify its supplies, as well as to invest in exploration in the United States and liquefied natural gas terminals in Australia. China now has operations, investments or projects across the globe in Africa, the Middle East, South America and North America.
“The dynamic growth of China’s economy and energy growth is reshaping global energy markets, and both the economic and strategic implications are still being developed,” said Mark J. Finley, BP’s general manager for global energy markets and United States economics.
The shift has been swift. China used only half as much energy as the United States in 2000. Nine years later, it surpassed the United States as the world’s biggest energy user and last year it leapfrogged the United States as the No. 1 oil importer.
China now burns as much coal as the rest of the world combined. The country’s emissions of greenhouse gases, linked by scientists to global warming, surged past the United States’ emissions a decade ago and have risen ever higher since then.
China has little choice but to look beyond its borders for its energy needs. While it consumed 10.1 million barrels of oil a day last year — one-ninth of the world’s total — the country produced only 4.2 million barrels a day, according to a recent OPEC report. China has had mixed results drilling offshore, and it has been slow to develop what many energy experts believe to be vast shale gas resources on land, though Chinese energy executives express optimism.
“The China market feels that the revolution in shale gas will be coming very soon,” Zhang Mi, chairman and president of Honghua Group, an exporter of drilling rigs, said in an interview while at a Houston energy technology conference this month. He added that 100 shale gas land rigs would be put in operation by the end of the year.
Most energy experts think it will take another five to 10 years, though, before substantial amounts of gas can be produced — and even then the quantities may be small compared to China’s enormous needs. The two main shale gas areas are in the west, far from major energy users in the east, and pipelines are few.
More important, shale gas in China mainly lies significantly deeper underground than in the United States and is in poorly understood, geologically complex formations. The domestic oil industry is already struggling with safety and environmental concerns, and faces a challenge in drilling extremely deep wells in western Chinese terrain with pockets of compressed natural gas and toxic gases.
China’s hunt for natural gas reserves at home has taken it into some of the poorest, most remote mountain valleys of western China, where terraced fields of mustard greens and corn cascade down hillsides from mud-brick farmhouses. While some of the country’s energy giants, like Sinopec, are using modern drilling rigs, smaller Chinese companies are also trying to jump into the industry, although many have minimal experience or technical expertise.
China’s reliance on imports poses the same kind of foreign policy challenges that the United States has faced in recent decades. That is, the country must look to unstable areas of the world to meet its needs.
China imports much of its oil from the Persian Gulf region and through the Strait of Hormuz, where security is dependent on the United States Navy. China relies on roughly a half-million barrels a day from Iran.
But American sanctions on Iran have made that country a less reliable source of oil. At the same time, China has been receiving fewer crude shipments from Libya, Sudan and South Sudan. The Energy Department recently reported that China has nimbly replaced those declining sources with imports from Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Angola, Venezuela, Russia and Iraq.
China’s relations with energy-rich countries differs widely. The situation in Vietnam seems extreme, with ships from both countries ramming each other, and the Chinese naval forces using water cannons against the Vietnamese. China’s moves to exert claims to contested Asian waters have drawn protests from its neighbors as well as from the Obama administration.
But in Iraq, where China is the biggest oil customer and Chinese oil companies are major investors in some of the biggest oil fields, the Chinese have been scrupulous about staying out of Iraq’s strained sectarian affairs. And they do not seem eager to challenge the United States’ influence in the region.
China has also become a major player in an area traditionally dominated by the United States, Latin America. But China is largely forging ties with oil-financed governments that promote a socialist ideology and seek to distance themselves from the United States, namely Ecuador and Venezuela.
In Ecuador, China has become effectively the government’s banker, providing roughly 60 percent of Ecuadorean borrowing needs in return for oil shipments. Chinese companies sell the Ecuadorean oil around the world, including to the United States. Venezuela’s state-owned oil company is repaying China for $40 billion in loans procured over the last six years with a large share of its 600,000 barrels a day in oil shipments.
Africa has proved a more difficult place to invest, showing the limits of Chinese influence. Chad last year indefinitely suspended the activities of the state-owned China National Petroleum because ofoil spills south of the capital, N’Djamena. Chadian officials claimed that the Chinese forced local workers to clean up the mess without adequate protection.
A subsidiary of another Chinese oil company, Sinopec, was forced to pay Gabon $400 million in January to settle what the government said was a breach of contract at an onshore oil field. Premier Li Keqiang this month highlighted China’s enduring interest in Africa by visiting four countries, including oil-rich Angola and Nigeria.
The new gas deal with Moscow should strengthen Russia and China, both economically and politically. It will help China ease some of its dependence on insecure transit routes and unstable countries. It will also guarantee an energy market for Russia if Europe seeks to replace Russian energy with imports from other countries.
Russia could supply 38 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually — or more than 15 percent of current demand — to China beginning in 2018. Perhaps most important, the deal should enable China to replace some of its dependence on coal for electricity generation with natural gas.
“The Chinese public will appreciate being able to industrialize without billows of toxic smog,” said Jim Krane, an energy expert at Rice University. “And the world will appreciate the reduced carbon emissions if cleaner gas can thwart some of the coal consumption in China’s power grid.”