O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida.

Mostrando postagens com marcador Vladimir Putin. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador Vladimir Putin. Mostrar todas as postagens

sábado, 17 de agosto de 2024

How Ukraine’s Fight Solves Global Problems - Andreas Umland (The National Interest)

How Ukraine’s Fight Solves Global Problems

Kyiv’s struggle, if successful, could reignite worldwide democratization and help speed along political transitions in other nations.


The National InterestAugust 12, 2024 


While the Russian-Ukrainian War is only one symptom of broader destructive international trends, its outcome will co-determine the direction of the world’s development. 

Popular yet imprecise expressions like the “Ukraine Crisis” or the “Ukraine War” have been misleading many to believe that the Russian-Ukrainian War is a solely Eastern European issue. According to this misperception, a Ukrainian leadership that was more submissive to Russia could have avoided the unfortunate war. Supposedly, Kyiv can still stem the risks spilling over from the “war in Ukraine” to other realms and regions if it accommodates Russian aggression.

If seen from a historical and comparative perspective, the Russian-Ukrainian War looks different. It is only one of several permutations of Moscow’s post-Soviet imperialism and merely one facet of larger regressive developments since the end of the twentieth century. Russia’s assault on Ukraine is a replay or preview of pathologies familiar to Eastern Europe and other parts of the world. The alleged “Ukrainian Crisis” is neither a singular nor a local issue. It is less the trigger than a manifestation of larger destructive trends.

At the same time, the Russian-Ukrainian War is a grand battle about the future of Europe and the principle of inviolability of borders. Moreover, the war is about Ukraine’s right to exist as a regular UN member state. The conflict has genuinely global significance.

Yet, the war’s course and outcome can either accelerate, contain, or reverse broader political, social, and legal decay across the globe. Moscow’s partial victory in Ukraine would permanently unsettle international law, order, and organization and may spark armed conflicts and arms races elsewhere. A successful Ukrainian defense against Russia’s military expansion, in contrast, will generate far-reaching beneficial effects on worldwide security, democracy, and prosperity in three ways.

A Ukrainian victory would, first, lead to a stabilization of the rules-based UN order that emerged after 1945 and consolidated with the self-destruction of the Soviet Bloc and Union after 1989. It would, second, trigger a revival of international democratization, which has halted since the early twenty-first century and needs a boost to start anew. Third, the ongoing Ukrainian national defense and state-building contribute to global innovation and revitalization in various fields, from dual-use technology to public administration, fields in which Ukraine has become a forerunner.

Stabilizing International Order

The Russo-Ukrainian War is only one of several attempts by powerful states to expand their territories since the end of the Cold War. Several revisionist governments have tried or are planning to install their uninvited presence in neighboring countries. The resulting military operations have been or will be offensive, repressive, and unprovoked rather than defensive, humanitarian, and preventive. Several revisionist autocracies have engaged in, or are tempted to try, replacing international law with the principle of “might is right.”

An early post-Cold War example is Iraq’s 1990 annexation of Kuwait, which was instantaneously reversed by an international coalition in 1991. Another example is Serbia’s revanchist assaults on other former Yugoslav republics once ruled from Belgrade. During this period, Russia began creating so-called “republics” in Moldova (i.e., Transnistria) and Georgia (i.e., Abkhazia and “South Ossetia”). At the same time, Moscow ruthlessly suppressed the emergence of an independent Chechen republic on its own territory.

Only recently has the Kremlin turned its attention to Ukraine. In 2014, Moscow created the “people’s republics” of Donetsk and Luhansk and illegally annexed Crimea to the Russian Federation. Eight years later, Russia also illegally incorporated Ukraine’s Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions into its official territory.

The international community’s reaction to Russia’s border revisions has remained half-hearted, unlike its responses to the Iraqi and Serbian attempts of the 1990s. The West’s timidity only provoked further Russian adventurism. Moscow now demands Kyiv’s voluntary cessation of all parts of the four Ukrainian mainland regions that Russia annexed in 2022. This includes, oddly, even some parts of Ukraine’s territory that Russian troops never managed to capture. The Kremlin’s final aim is still the eradication of Ukraine as a sovereign state.

At the same time, Beijing is bending established rules of conduct in the South and East China Seas and stepping up its preparations to incorporate the Republic of China in Taiwan into the People’s Republic of China by force. Venezuela has announced territorial claims on neighboring Guyana. Other revisionist politicians across the globe may be harboring similar plans.

Moscow’s official incorporation of Ukrainian lands is unique since Russia is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, which was created to prevent such conquests. Russia’s behavior is also peculiar in view of its status as an official nuclear-weapon state and depositary government under the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Nevertheless, Moscow is trying to reduce or even destroy an official UN member and non-nuclear weapon state, thereby undermining the entire logic of the non-proliferation regime and its special prerogatives for the five permanent UN Security Council members whom the NPT allows to have nuclear weapons.

At the same time, the Russian assault on Ukraine is not entirely exceptional, neither geographically nor temporally. It is only one of several recent symptoms of more generic Russian neo-imperialism. It is also just one aspect of larger expansionist and revanchist tendencies across the globe.

A Ukrainian victory against Russia would not be a merely local incident but an event of far broader significance, notwithstanding. It can become an important factor in preventing or reversing international border revisionism and territorial irredentism. Conversely, Ukraine’s defeat or an unjust Russo-Ukrainian peace would strengthen colonialist adventurism across the globe. Ukraine’s fight for independence is, for world affairs, both a manifestation of broader problems and an instrument of their solution.   

A Revival of International Democratization

Russia’s assault on Ukraine challenges principles such as peaceful conflict resolution, national sovereignty, and the inviolability of borders. It also represents another negative global political trend of the early twenty-first century, namely the decline of democracy and the resurgence of autocracy. This regressive trend manifests itself through the confrontation between Russia and Ukraine.

A major internal determinant of the Russian assault on Ukraine is that Putin’s various wars have, since 1999, been sources of his undemocratic rule’s popularity, integrity, and legitimacy. Sometimes overlooked in analyses of Russian public support for authoritarianism, the occupation, subjugation, and repression of peoples like the Chechens, Georgians, and Ukrainians finds broad support among ordinary Russians. Their backing of victorious military interventions—especially on the territory of the former Tsarist and Soviet empires—is a major political resource and social basis of Putin’s increasingly autocratic regime.

Regressive tendencies, to be sure, were already observable in Yeltsin’s semi-democratic Russia of the 1990s—for instance, in Moldova and Chechnya. Yet, under Putin as prime minister (1999–2000, 2008–12) and president (2000–2008, 2012– ), the viciousness of Russian revanchist military operations in and outside Russia has rapidly grown. This radicalization is a function not only of escalating Russian irredentism per se but also an effect of fundamental changes in Russia’s political regime. Moscow’s increasing foreign aggressiveness parallels the growth of domestic repression after Putin’s take-over of Russia’s government in August 1999.

The two major early spikes of Kremlin aggressiveness towards the West and Ukraine followed, not by accident, Ukrainian events in 2004 and 2014. They had much to do with the victories of those years’ liberal-democratic Orange Revolution and Euromaidan Revolution. Ukraine’s domestic development questions Russia’s imperial pretensions, as it leads the largest former colony out of Moscow’s orbit. The democratizing Ukrainian polity is also a conceptual countermodel to authoritarianism in the post-communist world. Its very existence challenges the legitimacy of the post-Soviet autocracies in Russia, Belarus, Azerbaijan, and Central Asia.  

Ukraine’s fight for independence is thus not only a defense of international law and order but also a battle for the cause of worldwide democracy. The contest between pro- and anti-democratic forces is global and has been sharpening already before, in parallel to, and independently from, the Russo-Ukrainian War. At the same time, the confrontation between Russian autocracy and Ukrainian democracy is a particularly epic one.

If Ukraine is victorious, the international alliance of democracies will win, and the axis of autocracies around Russia will lose. In this scenario, not only will other democracies become more secure, self-confident, and energized, but also it is likely that more democracies will appear—above all, in the post-communist world from Eastern Europe to Central Asia. Diffusion, spillover, or domino effects could also trigger new or re-democratizations elsewhere.

Conversely, a Russian victory will embolden autocratic regimes and anti-democratic groups throughout the world. In such a scenario, democratic rule and open societies would become stigmatized as feeble, ineffective, or even doomed. The recent worldwide decline of democracy will be less likely to reverse and may continue further or accelerate. While the “Ukraine Crisis” is not the cause of democracy’s current problems, its successful resolution would revitalize worldwide democratization.

Transferable Innovations

A third, so far, underappreciated aspect of Kyiv’s contribution to global progress is the growing number of new and partly revolutionary Ukrainian cognitive, institutional, and technological advances that can be applied elsewhere. Already before the escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian War in 2022, Kyiv initiated some domestic reforms that could also be relevant for the modernization of other transition countries. After the victory of the Euromaidan uprising or Revolution of Dignity in February 2014, Ukraine started to restructure its state-society relations fundamentally.

This included the creation of several new anti-corruption institutions, namely a specialized court and procuracy, as well as a corruption prevention agency and investigation bureau. The novelty of these institutions is that they are all exclusively devoted to the preclusion, disclosure, and prosecution of bribery. In April 2014, Ukraine started a far-reaching decentralization of its public administration system that led to the country’s thorough municipalization. The reform transferred significant powers, rights, finances, and responsibilities from the regional and national levels to local self-governmental organs of amalgamated communities that have now become major loci of power in Ukraine.

The Euromaidan Revolution also led to a restructuring of relations between governmental and non-governmental organizations. Early independent Ukraine, like other post-Soviet countries, suffered from alienation between civil servants and civic activists. After the Revolution of Dignity, this gap began to close. For instance, Kyiv’s famous “Reanimation Package of Reforms” is a coalition of independent think tanks, research institutes, and non-governmental organizations that has been preparing critical new reform legislation for the Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council), Ukraine’s unicameral national parliament.

Also, in 2014, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia signed EU Association Agreements of a new and, so far, unique type. The three bilateral mammoth pacts go far beyond older foreign cooperation treaties of the Union and include so-called Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas between the EU and the three countries. Since 2014, the Association Agreements have been gradually integrating the Ukrainian, Moldovan, and Georgian economies into the European economy.

These and other regulatory innovations have wider normative meaning and larger political potential. They provide reform templates, institutional models, and historical lessons for other current and future countries undergoing democratic transitions. Ukraine’s experiences can be useful for various nations shifting from a traditional to a liberal order, from patronal to plural politics, from a closed to an open society, from oligarchy to polyarchy, from centralized to decentralized rule, and from mere cooperation to deeper association with the EU.

While Ukraine’s post-revolutionary developments are, above all, relevant for transition countries, its war-related experiences and innovations are also of interest to other states—not least the members and allies of NATO. Such diffusion concerns both Ukrainian accumulated knowledge of hybrid threats and how to meet them, as well as Ukraine’s rapid technological and tactical modernization of its military and security forces fighting Russian forces on the battlefield and in the rear. Since 2014, Ukraine has become—far more so than any other country on earth—a target of Moscow’s multivariate attacks with irregular and regular forces in the media and cyber spaces, within domestic and international politics, as well as on its infrastructure, economy, and cultural, religious, educational, and academic institutions.

Since February 24, 2022, Ukraine has engaged in a dramatic fight for survival against a nominally far superior aggressor country. Ukraine’s government, army, and society had to adapt quickly, flexibly, and thoroughly to this existential challenge. This included the swift introduction of new types and applications of weaponry, such as a variety of unmanned flying, swimming, and driving vehicles, as well as their operation with the help of artificial intelligence. In a wide variety of military and dual-use technology, Ukraine had to innovate rapidly and effectively so as to withstand the lethal Russian assault.

In numerous further fields such as electricity generation and preservation, electronic communication, war-time transportation, information verification, emergency medicine, large-scale demining, post-traumatic psychotherapy, and veteran reintegration, to name but a few areas, the Ukrainian government and society have, and will have to react speedily and resolutely. While Ukraine often relies on foreign experience, equipment, and training, it is constantly developing its own novel kit, approaches, and mechanisms that could potentially be useful elsewhere. This new Ukrainian knowledge and experience will come in especially handy for countries that may be confronted with similar challenges in the near or distant future.

It All Depends on Kyiv

The escalation of the so-called “Ukraine Crisis” in 2022 has been only one expression of earlier and independently accumulating international tension. At the same time, the Russian-Ukrainian War is no trivial manifestation of these larger trends and no peripheral topic in world affairs. A Russian victory over Ukraine would have grave implications for the post-Soviet region and beyond. Conversely, a Ukrainian success in its defense against Russia’s genocidal assault and the achievement of a just peace will have stabilizing and innovating effects far beyond Eastern Europe.

Apart from being a revanchist war of a former imperial center against its one-time colony, Russia’s assault on Ukrainian democracy is driven by Russian domestic politics. It is a result of Russia’s re-autocratization since 1999, which, in turn, follows more significant regressive trends in the state of global democracy. Ukraine has been less of a trigger than a major victim of recent destructive international tendencies.

At the same time, Ukraine’s fight can make crucial contributions to counteracting the global spread of revanchism. It can reignite worldwide democratization and help speed along political transitions in other nations. A Ukrainian victory and recovery may save not only Ukraine but also its neighbors from Russian imperialism. Ukraine’s fight also contributes to solving numerous larger problems of the world today.

 Dr. Andreas Umland is an Analyst with the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI). Follow him on LinkedIn and X @UmlandAndreas.


domingo, 2 de junho de 2024

Alinhamento do Brasil com China e Rússia ameaça relação com o Ocidente - Lourival Sant'Anna (OESP)

Alinhamento do Brasil com China e Rússia ameaça relação com o Ocidente 

Além de contrariar um princípio caro da política externa brasileira, o da soberania, a Rússia atraiu contra si uma união militar no Ocidente inédita desde a 2.ª Guerra Mundial

Por Lourival Sant'Anna

 Opinião - É colunista do 'Estadão' e analista de assuntos internacionais. Escreve uma vez por semana.

O Estado de S. Paulo, 25/05/2024 


A simpatia do governo Lula pelo expansionismo militar russo tornou-se ainda mais explícita na reunião do chanceler chinês, Wang Yi, e do assessor especial brasileiro, Celso Amorim, em Pequim. As conclusões do encontro colocaram na órbita da China a política do Brasil para a Ucrânia.

Em comunicado conjunto divulgado depois do encontro, Brasil e China apelam para que todas as partes envolvidas se comprometam em não expandir o campo de batalha, não escalar os combates e não provocar a outra. Não houve condenação à invasão.

Essas condições equivalem a dizer que a Ucrânia não tem o direito de se defender. Já que ela é o país invadido, os combates terrestres se concentram, por definição, na Ucrânia, com os ucranianos tentando conter os avanços russos e recuperar território.

Desde a invasão em grande escala da Rússia, em fevereiro de 2022, a Ucrânia recuperou 54% do novo território ocupado. Outros 18% continuam ocupados, incluindo os 8% invadidos em 2014. A atitude do Ocidente de normalizar essa ocupação em 2014, a mesma que Brasil e China adotam até hoje, incentivou Vladimir Putin a ampliá-la.

Amorim, que esteve na Rússia há um mês, contou com otimismo a repórteres brasileiros em Pequim ter ouvido de um de seus interlocutores russos que eles querem uma “neutralização”, e “uma zona tampão com tamanho suficiente para que não haja armas que atinjam diretamente Moscou.”

O assessor especial brasileiro demonstra crer que a Rússia invadiu a Ucrânia para se defender de uma ameaça. Não há a menor base factual para essa leitura, promovida pela propaganda de Putin.

Ao contrário, o governo de Volodmir Zelenski fez de tudo para não dar pretextos à invasão russa. Mesmo quando mais de 100 mil soldados russos se concentravam na fronteira, e a Rússia promovia um bloqueio naval contra a costa ucraniana, em dezembro de 2021, Zelenski desautorizou providências típicas para a defesa de um país sob ataque iminente, como a convocação de reservistas ou a escavação de trincheiras.

Em várias etapas da agressão russa à Ucrânia, o Kremlin enviou sinais contraditórios sobre suas intenções de tentar congelar o front ou agarrar mais território. Esses sinais dependeram, em parte, da dinâmica no terreno e da disposição de EUA e Europa de seguir ajudando a Ucrânia, e em parte das táticas russas de guerra informacional.

Putin nunca demonstrou disposição real de negociar garantias de segurança em troca da devolução de território ucraniano. Aceitar, como fazem Brasil e China, uma solução que não contemple essa devolução é renunciar ao princípio da soberania.

Para a China, esse racional é conveniente. Primeiro, porque Xi Jinping tem deixado claro que pretende anexar Taiwan. A China assedia a ilha regularmente, por mar e ar, como fez nos últimos dias com 46 aviões de guerra. 

Em segundo lugar, as sanções impostas pelo Ocidente à Rússia criaram uma dependência do país em relação à China, que aproveita para comprar seu petróleo e gás a preços abaixo do mercado, vender-lhe produtos industrializados e até instalar fábricas para substituir as mais de mil empresas ocidentais que se retiraram do país.

Por último, ao obrigar o Ocidente a ajudar a Ucrânia, a campanha russa drena recursos das democracias na América do Norte e na Europa, que rivalizam com a China na disputa por influência global.

O alinhamento do Brasil, um país grande e democrático, é valioso para a China, porque demonstra capacidade de atrair para seu campo não apenas ditaduras africanas e asiáticas dependentes de seu poder econômico, projeção política e militar e ideologia autoritária.

E o que o Brasil ganha com isso? Wang Yi declarou que China e Brasil “têm economias altamente complementares e interesses profundamente integrados, que é o ativo estratégico mais precioso”. A primeira parte é verdadeira: o Brasil é exportador de alimentos e a China, de manufaturados.

Mas a própria complementaridade torna desnecessário um alinhamento geopolítico para impulsionar o comércio: ele se movimenta por si, e não depende da proximidade entre os governos, como ficou claro quando Jair Bolsonaro, detrator da China, era presidente.

A segunda parte é problemática. Alinhar-se à China não corresponde aos interesses nacionais do Brasil.

Além de contrariar um princípio caro da política externa brasileira, o da soberania, a Rússia atraiu contra si uma união militar no Ocidente inédita desde a 2.ª Guerra Mundial. A complacência com a agressão russa aliena o Brasil do Ocidente e o coloca como um parceiro não confiável.

Opinião por Lourival Sant'Anna

É colunista do 'Estadão' e analista de assuntos internacionais


domingo, 18 de fevereiro de 2024

Diezmada, la oposición rusa tiene pocas opciones para desafiar a Vladimir Putin - Luisa Corradini (La Nación)

Diezmada, la oposición rusa tiene pocas opciones para desafiar a Vladimir Putin

Tras la muerte en prisión del principal opositor Alexei Navalny el viernes, otras figuras que le hacen frente al mandatario ruso dudan sobre los próximos pasos a seguir para enfrentar al jefe del Kremlin

LA NACION, 18/02/2024

https://www.lanacion.com.ar/el-mundo/diezmada-la-oposicion-rusa-tiene-pocas-opciones-para-desafiar-a-vladimir-putin-nid18022024/

PARÍS.– En los 24 años que ha dirigido Rusia con mano de hierro, Vladimir Putin consiguió aniquilar casi totalmente las voces disidentes. Mostrando su verdadera naturaleza de dictador sin escrúpulos, el autócrata del Kremlin fue eliminando uno a uno cada uno de aquellos que intentaron ponerse en su camino con todos los recursos a su alcance.

Hoy, los últimos opositores realmente mediáticos se encuentran casi todos en el exilio o en prisión. Mientras la oposición propiamente dicha, dividida afuera y amordazada dentro del país, espera una nueva figura providencial, capaz de remplazar al desaparecido Alexei Navalny y provocar un sobresalto democrático. 

Todos aquellos que estamos en la oposición no sabemos muy bien lo que deberíamos hacer ahora. Toda nuestra vida de oposición giró siempre en torno a Alexei Navalny”, reconoció este fin de semana Maxim Katz, 39 años, influencer en YouTube y excampeón de póker, basado actualmente en Israel.

Como él, toda una generación de jóvenes rusos debe su despertar democrático a través de las redes sociales a Navalny, fallecido el viernes en una prisión rusa del círculo polar. Según YouTube Analytics, el canal de Katz recibió cerca de 10 millones de visitas únicas en los últimos tres meses, 60% de las cuales provenían del interior de Rusia.

Pero, ¿acaso las principales figuras de la oposición podrían reemplazar a Navalny en el futuro? ¿Tal vez formando una alianza que aumente sus pesos políticos individuales?

La alternativa siempre fue desechada por Navalny y por su equipo, explicando que el tiempo y el esfuerzo gastado en administrar alianzas políticas debía ser utilizado en denunciar a Putin. “Seré directo: vete al demonio con tus coaliciones”, escribió Navalny en respuesta al llamado de Katz a formar una alianza electoral.

No es esa la posición de otra gran figura de la oposición en exilio, el múltiple campeón de ajedrez Garry Kasparov. “Siempre defendí la idea de una coalición porque, entre otras razones, sabía cuán vulnerables son los líderes opositores. Una coalición es mucho más estable como sistema, porque si una persona desaparece, quedan otras, y otras más”, afirma.

La solución a esos interrogantes no se producirá en forma inmediata. Putin sabe muy bien que, en el exterior, ninguna disidencia tiene demasiadas chances de éxito. En cuanto a aquellos opositores que aún quedan en el país, solo basta condenarlos al silencio, como lo demuestra la siguiente lista.

Vladimir Kara-Mourza, encarcelado por “alta traición”.

Reconocido culpable en 2023 de “alta traición”, difusión de “falsas informaciones” sobre el Ejército ruso y trabajo ilegal para una organización “indeseable” en Rusia, Vladimir Kara-Mourza, 42 años, purga una pena de 25 años de cárcel en una colonia penitenciaria de Siberia. Recientemente escribió haber sido colocado en aislamiento por lo menos durante cuatro meses. Padre de tres hijos, fue detenido en la primera boreal de 2022, cuando regresó a Rusia.

Experiodista galardonado en 2022 con el premio Vaclav-Havel de los derechos humanos, Kara-Mourza afirma haber sido víctima de dos intentos de envenenamiento, en 2015 y 2017, que atribuye al poder ruso. Como consecuencia, hoy padecería de polineuropatía y patología neuromuscular.

El opositor Vladimir Kara-Mourza
El opositor Vladimir Kara-Mourza

Ruso de nacimiento, Kara-Mourza también es ciudadano del Reino Unido, país donde se instaló con su madre cuando tenía 15 años. Ya adulto se acercó a la oposición rusa, en particular a Boris Nemtsov, asesinado de cuatro balazos a dos pasos del Kremlin en 2015. Antes de ser encarcelado, en 2021, estimaba no tener la intención de dejar Rusia a pesar de los riesgos: “Somos hombres políticos rusos, nuestro lugar es en este país”, afirmaba, agregando que “el mayor regalo” que los opositores podían hacerle a Putin era “abandonar y escapar”.

Kara-Mourza fue presidente de la ONG Open Russia, fundada en 2001 por Mikhail Jodorkovski, exoligarca en exilio y opositor del Kremlin, y vicepresidente del partido opositor liberal Parnas.

Illia Yashim, encarcelado después de criticar la ofensiva Rusia contra Ucrania

Por haber criticado en directo en YouTube la invasión rusa a Ucrania, Illia Yashim fue condenado a ocho años y medio de prisión en diciembre de 2022. Una pena ratificada en apelación en abril de 2023. Yashim había denunciado “el asesinato de civiles” en la ciudad ucraniana de Bucha, donde el Ejército ruso cometió terribles exacciones, negadas hasta hoy por el Kremlin.

El político de 40 años fue juzgado por violar la ley “sobre los fake news”, pasible de una pena de hasta 15 años de cárcel para todo aquel que “desacredite” o publique “falsas informaciones” sobre las fuerzas armadas rusas.

Illia Yashim
Illia Yashim

Oleg Orlov, confundador de la disuelta ONG Memorial, podría ir a la cárcel durante cinco años.

Considerado en Rusia como un “agente del extranjero”, Oleg Orlov, de 70 años, es juzgado desde el viernes pasado por haber denunciado en varias oportunidades el asalto ruso contra Ucrania. Cofundador de Memorial, Orlov se ha negado a declarar durante ese proceso que podría llevarlo hasta cinco años a la cárcel. Las próximas audiencias han sido fijadas para el 21 y el 26 de febrero.

Una ONG rusa que fuera pilar de la lucha contra las represiones en la Rusia contemporánea, guardiana de la memoria de las víctimas del Gulag y laureada con el premio Nobel de la Paz 2022, Memorial fue disuelta por la justicia rusa en 2021.

El activista de derechos humanos Oleg Orlov
El activista de derechos humanos Oleg Orlovpicture alliance - picture alliance

Mikhail Jodorkovski, el exoligarca exiliado

Exmillonario de 60 años, el que fuera alguna vez el hombre más rico de Rusia gracias a su empresa petrolera, Yukos, fue detenido en octubre de 2003 en su jet privado, inmovilizado en la pista del aeropuerto de Novossibirk, en Siberia. Fue inculpado por el régimen de estafa en gran escala, evasión fiscal y malversación. La Justicia rusa lo condenó a 14 años de prisión y redujo después su pena en apelación. Putin lo indultó diez años después, en 2013, y le permitió exiliarse. Actualmente reside en Londres.

Tras su liberación, Jodorkovski había prometido no aventurarse en política. Pero en 2013 lanzó Open Russia, destinada a reunir fuerzas proeuropeas en Rusia, con vistas a las elecciones parlamentarias de 2016. La respuesta del Kremlin no se hizo esperar. En 2015, la Justicia lanzó un mandato de arresto internacional por “organización de asesinato e intento de asesinato contra dos personas y más”, hechos que habrían sucedido en 1998.

Ya en 2001, Jodorkovski había fundado una primera versión de Open Russia, aquella vez con carácter humanitario, que financió liceos para huérfanos de guerra y ayudó a desarrollar internet en las escuelas.

Mikhail Jodorkovski, el exoligarca exiliado que está en la mira del Kremlin
Mikhail Jodorkovski, el exoligarca exiliado que está en la mira del KremlinMatt Dunham

Evgueni Roizman, el exalcalde de Ekaterimburgo que logró escapar de la cárcel de milagro.

A los 61 años, Evgueni Roizman es un hombre libre. Pero logró escapar de milagro a la prisión. En marzo de 2023, el emblemático exalcalde (2013-2018) de Ekaterimburgo, la cuarta ciudad más importante del país, situada en los Urales, fue condenado a 14 días de prisión por haber compartido en las redes sociales un video que llevaba el logo de la Fundación Anticorrupción de Alexei Navalny, organización juzgada de “extremista”.

En mayo del mismo año, fue juzgado por haber “desacreditado” al Ejército ruso en otro video difundido en YouTube, donde criticaba la ofensiva contra Ucrania. Veredicto: una multa de unos 3000 euros.

Evgueni Roizman
Evgueni Roizman

Garry Kasparov, excampeón mundial de ajedrez exiliado

No se puede negociar con un cáncer. Como un cáncer, Putin y sus elites deben ser arrancados de cuajo”, declaró en 2015 ante el Senado de Estados Unidos el opositor Garry Kasparov, cinco días después del asesinato de Nemtsov en Moscú. A los 60 años, el séxtuple campeón del mundo de ajedrez vive exiliado en Estados Unidos, donde preside la Fundación de Derechos Humanos (HRF).

El político y cofundador del Foro Rusia Libre Garry Kasparov asiste a la sesión pública del 'Foro Rusia Libre' el 1 de diciembre de 2022 en Vilna, Lituania
El político y cofundador del Foro Rusia Libre Garry Kasparov asiste a la sesión pública del 'Foro Rusia Libre' el 1 de diciembre de 2022 en Vilna, LituaniaOleg Nikishin - Getty Images Europe