How Ukraine’s Deep Strikes Are Reshaping Russia’s Strategic Choices - Lesia Bidochko, and Andreas Umland (The National Interest)

How Ukraine’s Deep Strikes Are Reshaping Russia’s Strategic Choices

The National Interest, July 21, 2026

By:  Lesia Bidochko, and Andreas Umland Umlan

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Russia has three possible options to respond to Ukraine’s strategically successful mid- and long-range strikes into its territory.

Since the beginning of 2026, Ukraine has rapidly expanded a long-range strike campaign, with droneshitting targets ever deeper within Russia’s hinterland and with more impact on the Russian industry as well as the military. Kyiv’s new strategy is changing the character of the Ukraine War: Rather than seeking stabilization or breakthrough at the front, Kyiv aims to degrade the economic, logistical, and social systems that sustain the Russian troops deployed against Ukraine.

Ukrainian deep strikes with drones and cruise missiles into Russia’s rear are disrupting, damaging, or destroying more and more military-industrial, transportation, and energy infrastructure. According to Robert “Magyar” Brovdi, commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, the number of strikes inflicted on Russia’s operational and strategic depth has grown by 1,150 percent since the beginning of 2026. Ukraine’s front strikes now reach up to 150 kilometers (93 miles), middle strikes approximately to 300 kilometers (186 miles), and deep strikes up to 2,000 kilometers (1243 miles).

This is driving Russia into a broader socio-economic crisis. Moscow has had to restrict access to gasoline and diesel in 60 of 83 Russian regions amid rising fuel prices. Especially in annexed Crimea, the supply of fuel, water, electricity, and food has become a major problem, and economic life has largely halted. In several Russian regions, the state-backed messenger “Maks” is blocking public chats where drivers exchange information about the gasoline supply and queues at gas stations.

Ukraine’s Mid-Strike Attacks on Russia’s Frontline Troops

Yet, the increasing deep strikes into Russia’s far-away hinterland are not Moscow’s only problem. More and more so-called “mid-strikes” on areas behind frontline troops complicate the Russian army’s supply even when sufficient fuel and other supplies are available. Ukraine is attempting to disrupt the functioning of Russia’s logistics networks by connecting still-operational fuel plants and storage facilities to Russian fighting troops with its growing mid-range UAV fleet. To do that, Ukraine has developed and is now deploying a new generation of FPV drones optimized for near- and mid-range logistics strikes.

In June 2026, Russia’s Ministry of Defense proudly reported that it had intercepted 8,849 Ukrainian drones in May 2026. That would seem to indicate a large success when compared to 3,676 interceptions in January 2026 and 2,504 in May of the previous year. There are reasons to doubt the accuracy of the Russian government’s data, which may overstate interception rates. Whether that is the case or not, the growing Russian figures also indicate that the pace of Ukrainian attacks has been rising. The drones deployed by Ukraine are more and more saturating the Russian air defense and obviously grow faster than the capabilities of Russia’s air defense.

Russia’s Insufficient Drone Interception

That is even more so the case as an entirely new type of weapon, anti-drone drones, at the front are highlighting the continued fundamental Russian equipment inadequacies. For instance, the most widely used Russian anti-aircraft system, the Pantsir-S1, is designed to engage large, radar-reflective targets such as cruise missiles. Yet, it largely fails against low-signature drones made of plastic and plywood.

Unlike Ukraine, Russian industry has only recently begun developing the capability to mass-produce interceptor drones. Its new Yolka and Lys-2 anti-drone UAVs exist only as prototypes so far. Russia lacks the integrated radar-and-software ecosystem that lets Ukrainian interceptor operators act on real-time targeting data across an assigned sector.

Defending thousands of kilometers of critical infrastructure requires vastly more resources than attacking selected high-value targets. Every improvement in Ukrainian strike capability therefore expands Russia’s defensive burden disproportionately. As a result, Russia reaching Ukraine’s current level of air-defense effectiveness is assessed by military-industrial experts as currently unachievable. Contrary to Russian propaganda narratives, the interception rates against Ukrainian deep- and mid-strike drones will remain low—at least, for the foreseeable future.

None of these pressures mechanically determines Russian behavior. Authoritarian regimes can, in general, absorb economic losses that would be politically unacceptable in democracies. The question is less about whether pressure exists than about how the Kremlin chooses to respond. Three obvious strategic pathways can be distinguished, yet they do not exclude one another; rather, they appear in combination.

Scenario One: Russia Adapts to Ukrainian Attacks

Either implicitly or explicitly, many commentators on Russia’s currently growing economic, social and logistical problems assume that they are temporary, moderate and/or secondary. From such a viewpoint, even if these issues may, at the moment, look grave, the Russian state will be able to adapt and preserve its political stability, integrity and course. The Kremlin will successfully neutralize social discontent through repression, compensation, or—most likely—a combination of both.

Temporary rationing of fuel, electricity, food, and water—as is already partly happening on Russia’s occupied Ukrainian territories—can be introduced temporarily and framed as patriotic sacrifice. Moscow will, according to this scenario, eventually find ways to largely restore the supply, transportation, and distribution lines via importing, for instance, gasoline from Central Asia. 

In such a scenario, the Russian state would view the current crisis as partial and transitory or bearable from the standpoint of Russian society. The reduction in quality of life will be insufficient to prompt major protests, constraints on foreign adventurism, or political change. Even if ordinary Russians’ standard of living sinks, a new equilibrium can be reached and sustained.

Scenario Two: Russia Moderates Its Objectives in Ukraine

The moderation scenario assumes that Moscow’s current social challenges, resulting from ongoing deep Ukrainian strikes on Russian infrastructure and parallel economic challenges such as low oil prices, are steep and will continue to worsen. A cascade of effects from further air-defense fragmentation, refinery damage, supply deficits, logistical bottlenecks, and related disruptions leads to a fundamental structural shift in Russia’s societal mood and political outlook. Recognizing this, the Russian leadership—either with or without President Vladimir Putin—temporarily moderates its maximalist war aims and negotiating position.

At the very least, the diplomatic theater around peace talks may give way to a more serious process of consultations driven by Moscow’s genuine interest in pausing the fighting. To be sure, social hardship alone will not compel an accommodative course of action, as long as the leadership can absorb political costs and deprioritize civilian welfare.

Yet, under increasing societal pressure, the Kremlin will, in this scenario, seek an at least temporary de-escalation of the conflict and a shift to low-intensity fighting. Moderation would mean, in such a turn of events, not a Russian ideological reorientation but a mere military and economic re-calculation. Serious search for compromise and interest in a ceasefire will occur only when Moscow concludes that the war is, at the moment, unwinnable—a threshold not yet visibly reached.

Scenario Three: Russia Escalates Attacks on Ukraine and the West

As in the second scenario, the third ideal-typical script considered here also assumes that mounting military and economic pressure will prompt the Kremlin to change course radically; Moscow may escalate rather than moderate. Russian escalation can have both political-psychological and military-material purposes, and be designed to scare or/and bomb Ukraine and its Western partners into capitulation or, at least, an acceptance of Russian terms for a ceasefire—a strategic approach sometimes labeled “escalate to deescalate. 

Among others, escalation could aim to restore Russia’s initiative on the battlefield, decapitate the leadership of the Ukrainian state, disrupt Ukraine’s long-range drone development and production, or dismantle supply logistics of Ukrainian frontline troops. Arguably, this scenario has already started to materialize with the heavy drone attacks and missile bombardment of Kyiv on the nights of July 1–2 as well as 5–6.

While being the obviously preferred course of action by the Kremlin in response to Ukraine’s successful attacks on Russian infrastructure, Moscow’s options for and benefits from escalation are today more constrained than they were when the full-scale invasion started in 2022. Ukraine’s capacity to defend itself and its support from abroad have significantly increased compared to four years ago. The strategic rationale for escalation is becoming weaker with every additional successful Ukrainian hit of Russia’s infrastructure.

Moscow would benefit from an interruption of the war and a halt of Ukrainian deep strikes. In addition, it would benefit greatly from sanctions relief. A continuing tit for tat will only deepen Russia’s already significant economic dislocations. Intensified strikes on Ukrainian rear areas, including Kyiv, will hardly resolve Russia’s core problems. Moscow cannot easily break the Ukrainian innovation cycle, which continues to outpace the Russian one, which is mostly adaptive and belated.

Still, as long as Moscow is not driven solely by rational motives, it has several escalation options. Internally, this can mean the start of large-scale conscription and broadening of repression against dissent in Russia. Apart from already increasing terror against Ukrainian civilians, the Kremlin may try to force Belarus’ involvement in the war as an active co-belligerent. Even a credible threat from the north may force Ukraine to divert air defenses and ground forces from the front line. Moscow may also try to further expand its hybrid measures, such as cyberattacks, sabotage activity in Europe, and nuclear signaling to the West to deter it from supporting Ukraine.

Russia and the War of Attrition

Instead of focusing on immediate territorial defense and gains, Kyiv is increasingly targeting the material and social structures in Russia’s rear that enable its warfare in Ukraine and hybrid actions elsewhere. This shift has created a strategic environment in which defense rather than offense dominates. To be sure, Russia can still gather troops at the front and mobilize industrial resources.

Yet every additional layer of protection it has to establish in reaction to Ukraine’s rapidly growing deep and mid-strike capabilities requires spreading limited air-defense assets further across its vast territory. Defending critical infrastructure along thousands of kilometers is harder than attacking select weak points of Ukraine. The cost of Russian defense is increasing more rapidly than the cost of offense.

The Ukrainian successes in striking Russia’s energy infrastructure and military-industrial complex will not produce a Russian military collapse. In principle, authoritarian regimes such as Russia can withstand, ignore, or neutralize discontent emerging from civilian hardship while preserving military capacity. The decisive variable is thus not the economic pain inflicted itself. The key question is whether Ukrainian strikes with new long-range weapons can progressively reduce Russia’s ability to sustain and generate combat power faster than Moscow can adapt to the innovation cycle.

For Europe, the challenge is greater than simply helping Ukraine somehow prevail. It is to recognize that the future character of warfare and structure of European security are being written in Ukraine today. Against this background, the European Union has to ensure that the institutions and policies tasked to preserve the sovereignty of its member states and of the European project as a whole evolve as rapidly as the changes on the Ukrainian battlefield demand.

About the Authors: Andreas Umland and Lesia Bidochko

Dr. Andreas Umland is a policy fellow at the European Policy Institute in Kyiv (EPIK), an analyst at the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies in the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI), and an associate professor of Political Science at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. He has previously worked at Stanford’s Hoover Institution, Harvard’s Weatherhead Center, St. Antony’s College Oxford, Urals State University in Yekaterinburg, National Taras Shevchenko University of Kyiv, Catholic University of Eichstaett-Ingolstadt, Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation (ІЄАС) and Ukrainian Institute for the Future (UIM) in Kyiv, Friedrich Schiller University of Jena, and Institute of International Relations (UMV) in Prague.

Dr. Lesia Bidochko is a policy fellow at EPIK, an assistant professor of Political Science at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, and a non-resident fellow at the European University Viadrina in Frankfurt (Oder). Her professional experience includes serving as deputy head of the Detector Media Research Center, where she specialized in Russian foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), information campaigns, social media monitoring, and strategic communications to disrupt propaganda networks.

EPIK is co-funded by the European Union and theSwedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida).

How Ukraine’s Fight Solves Global Problems - Andreas Umland (The National Interest)

How Ukraine’s Fight Solves Global Problems

Kyiv’s struggle, if successful, could reignite worldwide democratization and help speed along political transitions in other nations.

by Andreas Umland

The National Interest, August 12, 2024 

While the Russian-Ukrainian War is only one symptom of broader destructive international trends, its outcome will co-determine the direction of the world’s development. 

Popular yet imprecise expressions like the “Ukraine Crisis” or the “Ukraine War” have been misleading many to believe that the Russian-Ukrainian War is a solely Eastern European issue. According to this misperception, a Ukrainian leadership that was more submissive to Russia could have avoided the unfortunate war. Supposedly, Kyiv can still stem the risks spilling over from the “war in Ukraine” to other realms and regions if it accommodates Russian aggression.

If seen from a historical and comparative perspective, the Russian-Ukrainian War looks different. It is only one of several permutations of Moscow’s post-Soviet imperialism and merely one facet of larger regressive developments since the end of the twentieth century. Russia’s assault on Ukraine is a replay or preview of pathologies familiar to Eastern Europe and other parts of the world. The alleged “Ukrainian Crisis” is neither a singular nor a local issue. It is less the trigger than a manifestation of larger destructive trends.

At the same time, the Russian-Ukrainian War is a grand battle about the future of Europe and the principle of inviolability of borders. Moreover, the war is about Ukraine’s right to exist as a regular UN member state. The conflict has genuinely global significance.

Yet, the war’s course and outcome can either accelerate, contain, or reverse broader political, social, and legal decay across the globe. Moscow’s partial victory in Ukraine would permanently unsettle international law, order, and organization and may spark armed conflicts and arms races elsewhere. A successful Ukrainian defense against Russia’s military expansion, in contrast, will generate far-reaching beneficial effects on worldwide security, democracy, and prosperity in three ways.

A Ukrainian victory would, first, lead to a stabilization of the rules-based UN order that emerged after 1945 and consolidated with the self-destruction of the Soviet Bloc and Union after 1989. It would, second, trigger a revival of international democratization, which has halted since the early twenty-first century and needs a boost to start anew. Third, the ongoing Ukrainian national defense and state-building contribute to global innovation and revitalization in various fields, from dual-use technology to public administration, fields in which Ukraine has become a forerunner.

Stabilizing International Order

The Russo-Ukrainian War is only one of several attempts by powerful states to expand their territories since the end of the Cold War. Several revisionist governments have tried or are planning to install their uninvited presence in neighboring countries. The resulting military operations have been or will be offensive, repressive, and unprovoked rather than defensive, humanitarian, and preventive. Several revisionist autocracies have engaged in, or are tempted to try, replacing international law with the principle of “might is right.”

An early post-Cold War example is Iraq’s 1990 annexation of Kuwait, which was instantaneously reversed by an international coalition in 1991. Another example is Serbia’s revanchist assaults on other former Yugoslav republics once ruled from Belgrade. During this period, Russia began creating so-called “republics” in Moldova (i.e., Transnistria) and Georgia (i.e., Abkhazia and “South Ossetia”). At the same time, Moscow ruthlessly suppressed the emergence of an independent Chechen republic on its own territory.

Only recently has the Kremlin turned its attention to Ukraine. In 2014, Moscow created the “people’s republics” of Donetsk and Luhansk and illegally annexed Crimea to the Russian Federation. Eight years later, Russia also illegally incorporated Ukraine’s Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions into its official territory.

The international community’s reaction to Russia’s border revisions has remained half-hearted, unlike its responses to the Iraqi and Serbian attempts of the 1990s. The West’s timidity only provoked further Russian adventurism. Moscow now demands Kyiv’s voluntary cessation of all parts of the four Ukrainian mainland regions that Russia annexed in 2022. This includes, oddly, even some parts of Ukraine’s territory that Russian troops never managed to capture. The Kremlin’s final aim is still the eradication of Ukraine as a sovereign state.

At the same time, Beijing is bending established rules of conduct in the South and East China Seas and stepping up its preparations to incorporate the Republic of China in Taiwan into the People’s Republic of China by force. Venezuela has announced territorial claims on neighboring Guyana. Other revisionist politicians across the globe may be harboring similar plans.

Moscow’s official incorporation of Ukrainian lands is unique since Russia is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, which was created to prevent such conquests. Russia’s behavior is also peculiar in view of its status as an official nuclear-weapon state and depositary government under the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Nevertheless, Moscow is trying to reduce or even destroy an official UN member and non-nuclear weapon state, thereby undermining the entire logic of the non-proliferation regime and its special prerogatives for the five permanent UN Security Council members whom the NPT allows to have nuclear weapons.

At the same time, the Russian assault on Ukraine is not entirely exceptional, neither geographically nor temporally. It is only one of several recent symptoms of more generic Russian neo-imperialism. It is also just one aspect of larger expansionist and revanchist tendencies across the globe.

A Ukrainian victory against Russia would not be a merely local incident but an event of far broader significance, notwithstanding. It can become an important factor in preventing or reversing international border revisionism and territorial irredentism. Conversely, Ukraine’s defeat or an unjust Russo-Ukrainian peace would strengthen colonialist adventurism across the globe. Ukraine’s fight for independence is, for world affairs, both a manifestation of broader problems and an instrument of their solution.   

A Revival of International Democratization

Russia’s assault on Ukraine challenges principles such as peaceful conflict resolution, national sovereignty, and the inviolability of borders. It also represents another negative global political trend of the early twenty-first century, namely the decline of democracy and the resurgence of autocracy. This regressive trend manifests itself through the confrontation between Russia and Ukraine.

A major internal determinant of the Russian assault on Ukraine is that Putin’s various wars have, since 1999, been sources of his undemocratic rule’s popularity, integrity, and legitimacy. Sometimes overlooked in analyses of Russian public support for authoritarianism, the occupation, subjugation, and repression of peoples like the Chechens, Georgians, and Ukrainians finds broad support among ordinary Russians. Their backing of victorious military interventions—especially on the territory of the former Tsarist and Soviet empires—is a major political resource and social basis of Putin’s increasingly autocratic regime.

Regressive tendencies, to be sure, were already observable in Yeltsin’s semi-democratic Russia of the 1990s—for instance, in Moldova and Chechnya. Yet, under Putin as prime minister (1999–2000, 2008–12) and president (2000–2008, 2012– ), the viciousness of Russian revanchist military operations in and outside Russia has rapidly grown. This radicalization is a function not only of escalating Russian irredentism per se but also an effect of fundamental changes in Russia’s political regime. Moscow’s increasing foreign aggressiveness parallels the growth of domestic repression after Putin’s take-over of Russia’s government in August 1999.

The two major early spikes of Kremlin aggressiveness towards the West and Ukraine followed, not by accident, Ukrainian events in 2004 and 2014. They had much to do with the victories of those years’ liberal-democratic Orange Revolution and Euromaidan Revolution. Ukraine’s domestic development questions Russia’s imperial pretensions, as it leads the largest former colony out of Moscow’s orbit. The democratizing Ukrainian polity is also a conceptual countermodel to authoritarianism in the post-communist world. Its very existence challenges the legitimacy of the post-Soviet autocracies in Russia, Belarus, Azerbaijan, and Central Asia.  

Ukraine’s fight for independence is thus not only a defense of international law and order but also a battle for the cause of worldwide democracy. The contest between pro- and anti-democratic forces is global and has been sharpening already before, in parallel to, and independently from, the Russo-Ukrainian War. At the same time, the confrontation between Russian autocracy and Ukrainian democracy is a particularly epic one.

If Ukraine is victorious, the international alliance of democracies will win, and the axis of autocracies around Russia will lose. In this scenario, not only will other democracies become more secure, self-confident, and energized, but also it is likely that more democracies will appear—above all, in the post-communist world from Eastern Europe to Central Asia. Diffusion, spillover, or domino effects could also trigger new or re-democratizations elsewhere.

Conversely, a Russian victory will embolden autocratic regimes and anti-democratic groups throughout the world. In such a scenario, democratic rule and open societies would become stigmatized as feeble, ineffective, or even doomed. The recent worldwide decline of democracy will be less likely to reverse and may continue further or accelerate. While the “Ukraine Crisis” is not the cause of democracy’s current problems, its successful resolution would revitalize worldwide democratization.

Transferable Innovations

A third, so far, underappreciated aspect of Kyiv’s contribution to global progress is the growing number of new and partly revolutionary Ukrainian cognitive, institutional, and technological advances that can be applied elsewhere. Already before the escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian War in 2022, Kyiv initiated some domestic reforms that could also be relevant for the modernization of other transition countries. After the victory of the Euromaidan uprising or Revolution of Dignity in February 2014, Ukraine started to restructure its state-society relations fundamentally.

This included the creation of several new anti-corruption institutions, namely a specialized court and procuracy, as well as a corruption prevention agency and investigation bureau. The novelty of these institutions is that they are all exclusively devoted to the preclusion, disclosure, and prosecution of bribery. In April 2014, Ukraine started a far-reaching decentralization of its public administration system that led to the country’s thorough municipalization. The reform transferred significant powers, rights, finances, and responsibilities from the regional and national levels to local self-governmental organs of amalgamated communities that have now become major loci of power in Ukraine.

The Euromaidan Revolution also led to a restructuring of relations between governmental and non-governmental organizations. Early independent Ukraine, like other post-Soviet countries, suffered from alienation between civil servants and civic activists. After the Revolution of Dignity, this gap began to close. For instance, Kyiv’s famous “Reanimation Package of Reforms” is a coalition of independent think tanks, research institutes, and non-governmental organizations that has been preparing critical new reform legislation for the Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council), Ukraine’s unicameral national parliament.

Also, in 2014, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia signed EU Association Agreements of a new and, so far, unique type. The three bilateral mammoth pacts go far beyond older foreign cooperation treaties of the Union and include so-called Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas between the EU and the three countries. Since 2014, the Association Agreements have been gradually integrating the Ukrainian, Moldovan, and Georgian economies into the European economy.

These and other regulatory innovations have wider normative meaning and larger political potential. They provide reform templates, institutional models, and historical lessons for other current and future countries undergoing democratic transitions. Ukraine’s experiences can be useful for various nations shifting from a traditional to a liberal order, from patronal to plural politics, from a closed to an open society, from oligarchy to polyarchy, from centralized to decentralized rule, and from mere cooperation to deeper association with the EU.

While Ukraine’s post-revolutionary developments are, above all, relevant for transition countries, its war-related experiences and innovations are also of interest to other states—not least the members and allies of NATO. Such diffusion concerns both Ukrainian accumulated knowledge of hybrid threats and how to meet them, as well as Ukraine’s rapid technological and tactical modernization of its military and security forces fighting Russian forces on the battlefield and in the rear. Since 2014, Ukraine has become—far more so than any other country on earth—a target of Moscow’s multivariate attacks with irregular and regular forces in the media and cyber spaces, within domestic and international politics, as well as on its infrastructure, economy, and cultural, religious, educational, and academic institutions.

Since February 24, 2022, Ukraine has engaged in a dramatic fight for survival against a nominally far superior aggressor country. Ukraine’s government, army, and society had to adapt quickly, flexibly, and thoroughly to this existential challenge. This included the swift introduction of new types and applications of weaponry, such as a variety of unmanned flying, swimming, and driving vehicles, as well as their operation with the help of artificial intelligence. In a wide variety of military and dual-use technology, Ukraine had to innovate rapidly and effectively so as to withstand the lethal Russian assault.

In numerous further fields such as electricity generation and preservation, electronic communication, war-time transportation, information verification, emergency medicine, large-scale demining, post-traumatic psychotherapy, and veteran reintegration, to name but a few areas, the Ukrainian government and society have, and will have to react speedily and resolutely. While Ukraine often relies on foreign experience, equipment, and training, it is constantly developing its own novel kit, approaches, and mechanisms that could potentially be useful elsewhere. This new Ukrainian knowledge and experience will come in especially handy for countries that may be confronted with similar challenges in the near or distant future.

It All Depends on Kyiv

The escalation of the so-called “Ukraine Crisis” in 2022 has been only one expression of earlier and independently accumulating international tension. At the same time, the Russian-Ukrainian War is no trivial manifestation of these larger trends and no peripheral topic in world affairs. A Russian victory over Ukraine would have grave implications for the post-Soviet region and beyond. Conversely, a Ukrainian success in its defense against Russia’s genocidal assault and the achievement of a just peace will have stabilizing and innovating effects far beyond Eastern Europe.

Apart from being a revanchist war of a former imperial center against its one-time colony, Russia’s assault on Ukrainian democracy is driven by Russian domestic politics. It is a result of Russia’s re-autocratization since 1999, which, in turn, follows more significant regressive trends in the state of global democracy. Ukraine has been less of a trigger than a major victim of recent destructive international tendencies.

At the same time, Ukraine’s fight can make crucial contributions to counteracting the global spread of revanchism. It can reignite worldwide democratization and help speed along political transitions in other nations. A Ukrainian victory and recovery may save not only Ukraine but also its neighbors from Russian imperialism. Ukraine’s fight also contributes to solving numerous larger problems of the world today.

 Dr. Andreas Umland is an Analyst with the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI). Follow him on LinkedIn and X @UmlandAndreas.

The End of Soft Power? - Joseph S. Nye Jr. (The National Interest)

Não, ainda não é o fim, mas parece... 

The End of Soft Power?

Even as the hard power of weapons and armies resurges on the global stage, the cultivation and use of soft power will still hold currency in the twenty-first century. 

by Joseph S. Nye Jr.

The National Interest, June 12. 2024

https://nationalinterest.org/feature/end-soft-power-211414

In a world marked by wars in Ukraine and Gaza, is the age of soft power over? Thirty years ago, with the end of the Soviet Union, increasing integration in Europe, and America’s “Unipolar Moment,” the prospects for inter-state war seemed low. Some observers argued that the age of hard power was diminishing, and the world was entering an era of soft power. That clearly turned out to be wrong, but that was never my view. I formulated the concept of soft power during the Cold War and argued that it was relevant to realism and conflict as well as peace.

Soft power is the ability to affect others through attraction rather than coercion or payment, and it is relevant in both war and peace. In the Seven Year’s War of the eighteenth century, Russia dropped out of the coalition massed against Prussia because Czar Peter III (newly anointed in the course of the conflict) was a fan of Frederick the Great. Usually, however, its effects are slow and indirect, and it is not the most important source of power for foreign policy in the short run. 

However, ignoring or neglecting soft power is a strategic and analytic mistake. Soft power is not new. Roman power rested partly on the attraction of its culture. Geir Lundstadt, a Norwegian scholar, described Cold War Europe as divided into two empires, Soviet and American, but the American presence in Western Europe was “an empire by invitation.” Unlike the Soviet military interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the United States supported Western European integration and tolerated Charles De Gaulle’s independence. At the end of the Cold War, the Berlin Wall collapsed under an onslaught of hammers and bulldozers wielded by people in the Soviet empire whose minds had been affected by Western soft power.

Mao may have been right that power comes out of the barrel of a gun, but power also extends from values. In the short run, swords are mightier than words, but in the long run, words guide swords. If I can get you to want to do what I want, then I do not have to force you to do what you do not want. If a country represents values that others find attractive, it has less of a need for sticks and carrots. Hard and soft power sometimes contradict each other, but when they are smartly combined, attraction is a force multiplier. President Zelensky used his talents as an actor to attract sympathy from Western parliaments, which could then be transformed into budgets for weapons that increased Ukraine’s hard power.

Soft power is an integral part of the great power conflict between the United States and China. In 2007, President Hu Jintao told the 17th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party that China needed to increase its soft power, and the Chinese government spent tens of billions of dollars to that end, but international polls show mixed results.

As I describe in A Life in the American Century, the Chinese foreign minister once invited me to a private dinner to ask my opinion on how China could increase its soft power. My advice was correct but probably useless to him. China faces two major obstacles that are difficult to overcome. First is its territorial disputes with a number of its Asian neighbors. Confucius Institutes that extoll traditional Chinese culture do little good if the PLA is killing Indian troops in the Himalayas or Chinese ships are harassing Philippine boats in the South China Sea. China’s second problem is its tight Communist Party control over all organizations and opinions in its civil society. This undercuts its attractiveness in democratic countries. When human rights lawyers, writers, and artists are jailed, it reduces the attraction of China in countries like Europe, Australia, Japan, and the United States.

Unlike hard-power assets like soldiers, tanks, and planes, a nation’s soft-power reserves are generated by civil society rather than governments. Much of American soft power is created by Hollywood movies that feature, for example, independent female characters, protesters demonstrating for their rights, and the workings of a diverse and free press. Others are attracted by the charitable work of U.S. foundations and the freedom of inquiry at American universities. Firms, universities, foundations, churches, and protest movements each develop soft power of their own, which can reinforce foreigners’ views of the country.

A prominent European recently told me that he used to worry about American foreign policy in terms of a decline in our hard power. Now, he said that he was more worried about America’s domestic politics corroding the soft power that underlies its foreign policy. Soft power is only one side of the coin of power, but it remains relevant to any realist analysis of world politics.

Joseph S. Nye is a former assistant secretary of defense, Distinguished Service Professor, Emeritus at Harvard University, and author of A Life in the American Century (Polity Press, 2024).