Xi Jinping’s Axis of Losers - Stephen Hadley (Foreign Affairs)

Xi Jinping’s Axis of Losers

The Right Way to Thwart the New Autocratic Convergence

By Stephen Hadley | Foreign Affairs, November 1, 2024

The United States is contending with the most challenging international environment it has faced since at least the Cold War and perhaps since World War II. One of the most disconcerting features of this environment is the burgeoning cooperation among China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. Some policymakers and commentators see in this cooperation the beginnings of a twenty-first-century axis, one that, like the German-Italian-Japanese axis of the twentieth century, will plunge the world into a global war. Others foresee not World War III but a slew of separate conflicts scattered around the globe. Either way, the result is a world at war—the situation is that serious.

What should be done about this cooperation is another matter. Some strategists argue for ruthless prioritization, focusing on the members of the axis that represent the greatest threats. Others believe that only a comprehensive effort will succeed. But the best strategy would borrow elements of both approaches, acknowledging that China is the primary long-term concern for U.S. national security strategy—“the pacing threat,” in the U.S. Defense Department’s framing—but also a different kind of global actor than its rogue-state partners. Accordingly, Washington’s aim should be to make clear to Chinese President Xi Jinping how counterproductive and costly to Beijing’s interests these new relationships will turn out to be. That means effectively countering Iran, North Korea, and Russia in their own regions, thereby demonstrating to China that tethering itself to a bunch of losers is hardly a path to global influence.

BROTHERS IN ARMS

Cooperation among the members of this twenty-first-century axis has been heavily centered on military, industrial, and economic support for Russia in its war on Ukraine, which could not be sustained without such help. The resulting defense industrial cooperation and incipient integration is likely to go well beyond what existed among the twentieth-century axis partners. North Korea is providing artillery shells, other munitions, military personnel, and industrial workers to Russia and getting oil and missile and space technology in return. Iran is providing missiles and drones produced in its defense plants as well helping build such plants in Russia itself, and getting assistance with its own missile, drone, and space programs and perhaps with civil nuclear power as well. China is so far providing everything short of actual weapons: dramatically increased trade and purchases of oil, gas, and other natural resources; dual-use technology that is being integrated into Russian air-defense, electronic-warfare, drone, and other weapons and communications systems; and as of recently, actual components for Russian weapons. There is even talk of producing drone and weapons systems for Russia in Chinese factories. What China is getting in return is not fully clear at this point, aside from discounted energy—and potentially unrivaled influence over Russia. Beyond the war in Ukraine, China and Russia and their axis partners have increased joint training and operations, including with bombers, ships, and even ground forces.

The axis partners have also accelerated their diplomatic coordination, with Beijing and Moscow using their veto power in the UN Security Council to protect each other and Tehran and Pyongyang from adverse resolutions. Reciprocal high-level visits by leaders and top officials have yielded a series of agreements to cooperate in economic, technological, and other fields

This twenty-first-century axis may not be a formal alliance, but it nonetheless represents an increasingly close, highly functional, and flexible alignment of interests that does not need to become an alliance to advance its members’ aims or undermine the interests of the United States and its allies in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. Even without real ideological affinity, there is a shared anti-Westernism, opposition to democracy, and embrace of authoritarian alternatives. What truly binds the axis is not ideology but a common opposition to U.S. power and the international system it sustains—fueled by a belief that this power represents a mortal threat to their regimes’ interests, aspirations, and even survival.

The link between China and Russia is especially important. It is built on the strong personal relationship between Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin, forged in more than 60 meetings during their time in office. There are, of course, both historical and contemporary sources of tension between China and Russia: a long common border with lots of empty space on the Russian side and a large population on the Chinese side; Beijing’s suspicion of Moscow’s revived relationship with North Korea, and Moscow’s suspicion of Beijing’s growing economic influence in Central Asia; and considerable xenophobia in both countries. But these tensions, although real, are unlikely to be allowed to disrupt the relationship between the two governments as long as Putin and Xi are in charge

THE CHINA CARD

Although some commentators have recommended trying to pull the members of the axis apart, former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice leans in the opposite direction, proposing that policymakers seek to “slam them together and make them deal with the consequences of the fact they don’t actually have all that much in common.” There is much to be said for this approach. Any effort to pry Putin away from the axis will most certainly fail; he is too dependent on these partners for support in Ukraine. To try to separate North Korea or Iran from the axis would require concessions that no U.S. administration is likely to be willing to make.

But China may be a different matter. Unlike its axis partners, China is integrated into the global economy. The prospect of broad secondary sanctions—which have been limited and targeted to date—in the event that China crosses Western redlines by providing weapons to Russia could threaten to exact real economic costs. Meanwhile, the war on Israel being waged by Iran and its proxies threatens to disrupt China’s critical oil supplies and other trade with the Middle East. And North Korea’s increasingly bellicose attitude toward its neighbors has roiled China’s diplomatic and economic relations with South Korea and Japan.

More fundamentally, China has made its prestige hostage to the success of its axis partners. If they should be seen to be failing in their respective efforts to impose their will on their neighbors by force, it would become clear to the world that Beijing has cast its lot with losers. That would not only undermine China’s effort to project itself as the global leader of a new kind of international order; it would also damage Xi’s personal standing, at home and abroad.

Washington should demonstrate to China that tethering itself to a bunch of losers is hardly a path to global influence.

How might this goal be accomplished? With respect to Russia, it means preventing Putin from achieving his strategic objectives in Ukraine. This will require enough sustained Western diplomatic, economic, and military support to enable Ukrainian forces to stop the current Russian advance and, if not win back occupied territory, at least establish a stable line of contact between Ukrainian and Russian forces. Such an outcome would allow Kyiv to get on with the job of building a sovereign, prosperous, noncorrupt, and democratic state increasingly integrated with European economic and security institutions.

With respect to Iran, it means quashing Tehran’s hegemonic ambitions in the Middle East. In part, this can be done by supporting Israel in delivering strong blows against both Iran and its proxies—Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and more—to reestablish deterrence and open the way to a more stable Middle East. Stability will allow continued reconciliation between Israel and its Arab neighbors, the beginning of a more promising future for the Palestinians, and the chance for the people of Lebanon to free their country from domination by Hezbollah.

And with respect to North Korea, it means demonstrating that Pyongyang’s fixation on nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them will not bring the country security or leverage over its neighbors. That will require strengthening the diplomatic, economic, and military capabilities of Australia, Japan, South Korea, and other regional allies and partners to work with the United States to deter North Korea and defend against any military action it might undertake—all with the aim of continued progress toward a free, open, and peaceful Indo-Pacific.

EXISTENTIAL RECONSIDERATIONS

Each of these steps would advance the interests of the United States and its friends and allies, leaving aside the message they would send China. But if pursued successfully, they could cause Beijing to limit and ultimately reduce its commitment to the failing adventurism of its renegade partners.

There is good reason to think such a reconsideration is possible, since Xi has adjusted course under pressure before. Faced with street demonstrations and other clear expressions of public dissatisfaction, he abruptly abandoned his “zero COVID” policy. In response to the China strategy forged over the course of the Trump and Biden administrations, he changed his approach to the United States. Early in his tenure, Xi seemed to have concluded that the United States and the West more generally were in terminal decline, presenting an opportunity for China to assert itself on the global stage; a strong U.S. response backed by a clear bipartisan consensus, real strategic investment, and a common front with friends and allies prompted Xi to reconsider. The result was a decision to reengage with the United States, including by meeting with President Joe Biden in San Francisco last November, in an attempt to arrest the decline in U.S.-Chinese relations.

By decisively curbing the adventurism of Xi’s axis partners, Washington could cause him to change course once again. It would surely be in his interest to do so. For if the recklessness of his partners brings sustained global instability and conflict, Xi himself would bear much of the blame for preventing the Communist Party from fulfilling its pledges to make China a “moderately developed economy” by 2035 and a “strong, democratic, civilized, harmonious, and modern socialist country” by 2049. The right U.S. strategy could make Xi understand that he can best serve his own interests by breaking with the axis of losers.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

STEPHEN HADLEY is a Principal at the international consulting firm Rice, Hadley, Gates, & Manuel and served as U.S. National Security Adviser from 2005 to 2009.

Alinhamento do Brasil com China e Rússia ameaça relação com o Ocidente - Lourival Sant'Anna (OESP)

Alinhamento do Brasil com China e Rússia ameaça relação com o Ocidente 

Além de contrariar um princípio caro da política externa brasileira, o da soberania, a Rússia atraiu contra si uma união militar no Ocidente inédita desde a 2.ª Guerra Mundial

Por Lourival Sant'Anna

 Opinião - É colunista do 'Estadão' e analista de assuntos internacionais. Escreve uma vez por semana.

O Estado de S. Paulo, 25/05/2024 

A simpatia do governo Lula pelo expansionismo militar russo tornou-se ainda mais explícita na reunião do chanceler chinês, Wang Yi, e do assessor especial brasileiro, Celso Amorim, em Pequim. As conclusões do encontro colocaram na órbita da China a política do Brasil para a Ucrânia.

Em comunicado conjunto divulgado depois do encontro, Brasil e China apelam para que todas as partes envolvidas se comprometam em não expandir o campo de batalha, não escalar os combates e não provocar a outra. Não houve condenação à invasão.

Essas condições equivalem a dizer que a Ucrânia não tem o direito de se defender. Já que ela é o país invadido, os combates terrestres se concentram, por definição, na Ucrânia, com os ucranianos tentando conter os avanços russos e recuperar território.

Desde a invasão em grande escala da Rússia, em fevereiro de 2022, a Ucrânia recuperou 54% do novo território ocupado. Outros 18% continuam ocupados, incluindo os 8% invadidos em 2014. A atitude do Ocidente de normalizar essa ocupação em 2014, a mesma que Brasil e China adotam até hoje, incentivou Vladimir Putin a ampliá-la.

Amorim, que esteve na Rússia há um mês, contou com otimismo a repórteres brasileiros em Pequim ter ouvido de um de seus interlocutores russos que eles querem uma “neutralização”, e “uma zona tampão com tamanho suficiente para que não haja armas que atinjam diretamente Moscou.”

O assessor especial brasileiro demonstra crer que a Rússia invadiu a Ucrânia para se defender de uma ameaça. Não há a menor base factual para essa leitura, promovida pela propaganda de Putin.

Ao contrário, o governo de Volodmir Zelenski fez de tudo para não dar pretextos à invasão russa. Mesmo quando mais de 100 mil soldados russos se concentravam na fronteira, e a Rússia promovia um bloqueio naval contra a costa ucraniana, em dezembro de 2021, Zelenski desautorizou providências típicas para a defesa de um país sob ataque iminente, como a convocação de reservistas ou a escavação de trincheiras.

Em várias etapas da agressão russa à Ucrânia, o Kremlin enviou sinais contraditórios sobre suas intenções de tentar congelar o front ou agarrar mais território. Esses sinais dependeram, em parte, da dinâmica no terreno e da disposição de EUA e Europa de seguir ajudando a Ucrânia, e em parte das táticas russas de guerra informacional.

Putin nunca demonstrou disposição real de negociar garantias de segurança em troca da devolução de território ucraniano. Aceitar, como fazem Brasil e China, uma solução que não contemple essa devolução é renunciar ao princípio da soberania.

Para a China, esse racional é conveniente. Primeiro, porque Xi Jinping tem deixado claro que pretende anexar Taiwan. A China assedia a ilha regularmente, por mar e ar, como fez nos últimos dias com 46 aviões de guerra. 

Em segundo lugar, as sanções impostas pelo Ocidente à Rússia criaram uma dependência do país em relação à China, que aproveita para comprar seu petróleo e gás a preços abaixo do mercado, vender-lhe produtos industrializados e até instalar fábricas para substituir as mais de mil empresas ocidentais que se retiraram do país.

Por último, ao obrigar o Ocidente a ajudar a Ucrânia, a campanha russa drena recursos das democracias na América do Norte e na Europa, que rivalizam com a China na disputa por influência global.

O alinhamento do Brasil, um país grande e democrático, é valioso para a China, porque demonstra capacidade de atrair para seu campo não apenas ditaduras africanas e asiáticas dependentes de seu poder econômico, projeção política e militar e ideologia autoritária.

E o que o Brasil ganha com isso? Wang Yi declarou que China e Brasil “têm economias altamente complementares e interesses profundamente integrados, que é o ativo estratégico mais precioso”. A primeira parte é verdadeira: o Brasil é exportador de alimentos e a China, de manufaturados.

Mas a própria complementaridade torna desnecessário um alinhamento geopolítico para impulsionar o comércio: ele se movimenta por si, e não depende da proximidade entre os governos, como ficou claro quando Jair Bolsonaro, detrator da China, era presidente.

A segunda parte é problemática. Alinhar-se à China não corresponde aos interesses nacionais do Brasil.

Além de contrariar um princípio caro da política externa brasileira, o da soberania, a Rússia atraiu contra si uma união militar no Ocidente inédita desde a 2.ª Guerra Mundial. A complacência com a agressão russa aliena o Brasil do Ocidente e o coloca como um parceiro não confiável.

Opinião por Lourival Sant'Anna

É colunista do 'Estadão' e analista de assuntos internacionais

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Xi Jinping perdeu controle dos mercados? The Economist

Xi Jinping perdeu controle dos mercados?

The Economist, Feb 17, 2024

Conforme a crise imobiliária arrasta a economia para a deflação, a confiança dos investidores se esvai gradualmente

Quem investiu este ano em ações chinesas tem empreendido uma jornada arrepiante. Mesmo enquanto o índice americano S&P 500 alcançou altas-recorde, as bolsas na China e em Hong Kong perderam US$ 1,5 trilhão apenas em janeiro. Pequenos investidores ventilaram sua frustração nas redes sociais chinesas. A queda foi tão brutal que em 6 de fevereiro emergiram boatos de que o presidente da China, Xi Jinping, chegou a ser alertado; no dia seguinte, o então diretor da agência reguladora de títulos e obrigações, Yi Huiman, foi demitido. Os preços recuperaram-se um pouco, conforme o Estado começou a comprar ações. Nos próximos dias, deverão apreciar ainda mais.

A uma certa distância, contudo, o desalento no cenário maior fica nítido. O valor de mercado das empresas em bolsas da China e de Hong Kong despencou cerca de US$ 7 trilhões desde o pico, em 2021 — uma queda de aproximadamente 35%, mesmo enquanto as ações americanas subiram 14% e as indianas, 60%. O declínio sinaliza um problema fundamental. Investidores externos e domésticos consideravam no passado o governo chinês um cuidador confiável da economia. Agora essa confiança tem se esvaído, com consequências severas para o crescimento da China.

Menos de uma década atrás, o humor nos mercados chineses era fervilhante. Investidores estrangeiros estavam ávidos para acessar o potencial da estrela econômica mundial em ascensão. A China crescia a um ritmo constante e impressionante, mais que 6% ao ano. Carteiras estrangeiras de investimento entraram com tudo quando os investidores de fora obtiveram acesso direto a ações chinesas por meio de Hong Kong, em 2014.

Quatro anos depois, a MSCI, uma firma financeira, começou a incluir ações da China continental em seus índices globais. O governo chinês, de sua parte, esperava profissionalizar seus mercados para atrair capital estrangeiro e qualificação, para construir uma classe de ativos para substituir o mercado imobiliário. Uma elite de empresários e investidores abastados emergia, exortada pelo próprio Xi a viver o sonho chinês.

O entendimento implícito era que, fosse qual fosse a política da China, era possível confiar em suas autoridades para orientar sua economia no sentido da prosperidade. A China continuaria a crescer num ritmo invejável, seus cidadãos ainda colocariam riqueza e estabilidade econômica acima das liberdades políticas, e investidores estrangeiros colheriam lucros fartos. Todos poderiam enriquecer.

O que deu errado? Um problema amplamente notado é a formulação política inconstante de Xi. As ações regulatórias sobre empresas de tecnologia adotadas em 2020 derrubaram a confiança dos investidores. A política covid-zero foi um fiasco. O governo foi hesitante em uma crise no setor imobiliário que consumiu poupanças e sentimentos — e arrastou a economia para a deflação, com os preços caindo em janeiro deste ano no ritmo mais rápido desde a crise financeira de 2007-09.

Pequim pretende evitar, corretamente, voltar a inflar uma bolha. Mas também quer evitar ajudas e colocar o foco do crescimento em setores de “alta qualidade” que, acredita o governo, ajudarão a China a rivalizar com o poder tecnológico, econômico e militar dos Estados Unidos. Mas os lucros diminuíram este ano até nesses setores. E falta à China o estímulo necessário.

Um fator menos observado é quanto amor pela China os investidores estrangeiros perderam. Eles têm de enfrentar não apenas a formulação política ruim, mas também o risco de que a piora da relação de Pequim com os EUA possa colocar em perigo seus investimentos. Eles têm vendido mais ações do que compram na China continental há meses. Ainda que administradoras de ativos vibrassem no passado com a inclusão da China em índices globais, agora elas estão formatando produtos que deixam o país de fora.

Em vez disso, os investidores estão de olho na Índia, com sua grande população, e no Japão, com sua tecnologia de última geração. Hong Kong também tem sofrido. Empresas da China continental são responsáveis por três quartos de sua capitalização de mercado. Em 22 de janeiro, a Índia superou a China brevemente enquanto quarto maior mercado de ações do mundo.

O mais preocupante de tudo é que investidores na China continental também estão perdendo a confiança. Depois de três décadas de crescimento extraordinário, os chineses ricos estão experimentando uma dolorosa mudança de sorte. Seus investimentos imobiliários e financeiros estão afundando, e pesquisas indicam que muitos executivos tiveram ganhos cortados no ano passado.

Evidências sugerem que mais capital está deixando a China. Quem não consegue contornar os controles chineses sobre capital ou move seu dinheiro para fundos do mercado monetário mais seguros ou escapa para fundos listados nas bolsas da China continental que acompanham ações estrangeiras.

Tudo isso prejudicará o crescimento da China. Nossa análise de pesquisas socioeconômicas sugere que um grupo pequeno mas influente de pessoas detém a maioria dos ativos financeiros da China. Suas circunstâncias estreitadas surtirão efeitos em cadeia, reduzindo o consumo e influenciando decisões de investimento. Investidores presos na China continental poderão ter pouca opção a não ser colocar parte de seu dinheiro conquistado a duras penas em ações.

Em contraste, poderá ser difícil convencer os estrangeiros a retornar. Isso terá um custo para a China, mesmo que investidores estrangeiros ainda tenham uma pequena parte de seus ativos financeiros. Ao longo dos anos, eles forneceram um útil controle externo sobre preços de obrigações. Além disso, sua entrada no mercado, uma década atrás, foi associada com mais gastos de capital e investimentos em pesquisa e desenvolvimento das empresas chinesas. Sua partida, inversamente, poderia atrapalhar a inovação.

Xi parece saber que algo vai mal. Além de demitir Yi, o governo limitou vendas a descoberto, e administradoras de ativos pertencentes ao Estado receberam ordens de comprar ações. Isso poderá sustentar os preços das ações por algum tempo. Mas interferências desse tipo só fazem transparecer a desconfiança da China em relação aos mercados, sublinhando por que os investidores partiram.

Tudo isso prejudicará o crescimento da China. Nossa análise de pesquisas socioeconômicas sugere que um grupo pequeno mas influente de pessoas detém a maioria dos ativos financeiros da China. Suas circunstâncias estreitadas surtirão efeitos em cadeia, reduzindo o consumo e influenciando decisões de investimento. Investidores presos na China continental poderão ter pouca opção a não ser colocar parte de seu dinheiro conquistado a duras penas em ações.

Em contraste, poderá ser difícil convencer os estrangeiros a retornar. Isso terá um custo para a China, mesmo que investidores estrangeiros ainda tenham uma pequena parte de seus ativos financeiros. Ao longo dos anos, eles forneceram um útil controle externo sobre preços de obrigações. Além disso, sua entrada no mercado, uma década atrás, foi associada com mais gastos de capital e investimentos em pesquisa e desenvolvimento das empresas chinesas. Sua partida, inversamente, poderia atrapalhar a inovação.

Xi parece saber que algo vai mal. Além de demitir Yi, o governo limitou vendas a descoberto, e administradoras de ativos pertencentes ao Estado receberam ordens de comprar ações. Isso poderá sustentar os preços das ações por algum tempo. Mas interferências desse tipo só fazem transparecer a desconfiança da China em relação aos mercados, sublinhando por que os investidores partiram.

https://www.estadao.com.br/economia/the-economist-xi-jinping-controle-mercados-acoes-china/

Xi Jinping retraça a história das relações sino-americanas - discurso em San Francisco

 Galvanizing Our Peoples into a Strong Force  For the Cause of China-U.S. Friendship Speech

by H.E. Xi Jinping.

President of the People’s Republic of China

At Welcome Dinner by Friendly Organizations in the United States

San Francisco, November 15, 2023

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Friends,

It gives me great pleasure to meet with you, friends from across the American society, in San Francisco to renew our friendship and strengthen our bond. My first visit to the United States in 1985 started from San Francisco, which formed my first impression of this country. Today I still keep a photo of me in front of the Golden Gate Bridge.

Before going further, I wish to express my sincere thanks to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, the U.S.-China Business Council, the Asia Society, the Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and other friendly organizations for hosting this event. I also want to express my warm greetings to all American friends who have long committed to growing China-U.S. relations and my best wishes to the friendly American people.

San Francisco has borne witness to exchanges between the Chinese and American peoples for over a century. A hundred and fifty-eight years ago, a large number of Chinese workers came all the way to the United States to build the first transcontinental railroad, and established in San Francisco the oldest Chinatown in the Western Hemisphere. From here, China and the United States have made many achievements—USD 760 billion of annual bilateral trade and over USD 260 billion of two-way investment, 284 pairs of sister provinces/states and sister cities, and over 300 scheduled flights every week and over five million travels every year at peak time. These extraordinary accomplishments were made jointly by our peoples accounting for nearly one quarter of the global population.

San Francisco has also borne witness to the efforts by China and the United States in building a better world. Seventy-eight years ago, after jointly defeating fascism and militarism, our two countries initiated together with others the San Francisco Conference, which helped found the United Nations, and China was the first country to sign the U.N. Charter. Starting from San Francisco, the postwar international order was established. Over 100 countries have gained independence one after another. Several billion people have eventually shaken off poverty. The forces for world peace, development and progress have grown stronger. This has been the main fruit jointly achieved by people of all countries and the international community.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Friends,

The foundation of China-U.S. relations was laid by our peoples. During World War II, our two countries fought side by side for peace and justice. Headed by General Claire Lee Chennault, a group of American volunteers, known as the Flying Tigers, went to the battlefield in China. They not only engaged in direct combats fighting Japanese aggressors, but also created “The Hump” airlift to transport much-needed supplies to China. More than 1,000 Chinese and American airmen lost their lives on this air route. After Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, the United States sent 16 B-25 bombers on an air raid to Japan in 1942. Running low on fuel after completing their mission, Lieutenant Colonel James Doolittle and his fellow pilots parachuted in China. They were rescued by Chinese troops and local civilians. But some 250,000 civilian Chinese were killed by Japanese aggressors in retaliation.

The Chinese people never forget the Flying Tigers. We built a Flying Tigers museum in Chongqing, and invited over 1,000 Flying Tigers veterans and their families to visit China. I have kept in touch with some of them through letters. Most recently, 103-year-old Harry Moyer and 98-year-old Mel McMullen, both Flying Tigers veterans, went back to China. They visited the Great Wall, and were warmly received by the Chinese people.

The American people, on their part, always remember the Chinese who risked their lives to save American pilots. Offspring of those American pilots often visit the Doolittle Raid Memorial Hall in Quzhou of Zhejiang Province to pay tribute to the Chinese people for their heroic and valorous efforts. These stories fill me with firm confidence that the friendship between our two peoples, which has stood the test of blood and fire, will be passed on from generation to generation.

The door of China-U.S. relations was opened by our peoples. For 22 years, there were estrangement and antagonism between our two countries. But the trend of the times brought us together, converging interests enabled us to rise above differences, and the people’s longing broke the ice between the two countries. In 1971, the U.S. table tennis team visited Beijing—a small ball moved the globe. Not long after that, Mr. Mike Mansfield led the first U.S. Congressional delegation to China. This was followed by the first governors’ delegation including Iowa Governor Robert Ray and then many business delegations, forming waves of friendly exchanges.

This year, after the world emerged from the COVID-19 pandemic, I have respectively met in Beijing with Dr. Henry Kissinger, Mr. Bill Gates, Senator Chuck Schumer and his Senate colleagues, and Governor Gavin Newsom. I told them that the hope of the China-U.S. relationship lies in the people, its foundation is in our societies, its future depends on the youth, and its vitality comes from exchanges at subnational levels. I welcome more U.S. governors, Congressional members, and people from all walks of life to visit China.

The stories of China-U.S. relations are written by our peoples. During my first visit to the United States, I stayed at the Dvorchaks in Iowa. I still remember their address—2911 Bonnie Drive. That was my first face-to-face contact with the Americans. The days I spent with them are unforgettable. For me, they represent America. I have found that although our two countries are different in history, culture and social system and have embarked on different development paths, our two peoples are both kind, friendly, hardworking and down-to-earth. We both love our countries, our families and our lives, and we both are friendly toward each other and are interested in each other. It is the convergence of many streams of goodwill and friendship that has created a strong current surging across the vast Pacific Ocean; it is the reaching out to each other by our peoples that has time and again brought China-U.S. relations from a low ebb back onto the right track. I am convinced that once opened, the door of China-U.S. relations cannot be shut again. Once started, the cause of China-U.S. friendship cannot be derailed halfway. The tree of our peoples’ friendship has grown tall and strong; and it can surely withstand the assault of any wind or storm.

The future of China-U.S. relations will be created by our peoples. The more difficulties there are, the greater the need for us to forge a closer bond between our peoples and to open our hearts to each other, and more people need to speak up for the relationship. We should build more bridges and pave more roads for people-to-people interactions. We must not erect barriers or create a chilling effect. 

Today, President Biden and I reached important consensus. Our two countries will roll out more measures to facilitate travels and promote people-to-people exchanges, including increasing direct passenger flights, holding a high-level dialogue on tourism, and streamlining visa application procedures. We hope that our two peoples will make more visits, contacts and exchanges and write new stories of friendship in the new era. I also hope that California and San Francisco will continue to take the lead on the journey of growing China-U.S. friendship!

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Friends,

We are in an era of challenges and changes. It is also an era of hope. The world needs China and the United States to work together for a better future. We, the largest developing country and the largest developed country, must handle our relations well. In a world of changes and chaos, it is ever more important for us to have the mind, assume the vision, shoulder the responsibility, and play the role that come along with our status as major countries.

I have always had one question on my mind: How to steer the giant ship of China-U.S. relations clear of hidden rocks and shoals, navigate it through storms and waves without getting disoriented, losing speed or even having a collision?

In this respect, the number one question for us is: are we adversaries, or partners? This is the fundamental and overarching issue. The logic is quite simple. If one sees the other side as a primary competitor, the most consequential geopolitical challenge and a pacing threat, it will only lead to misinformed policy making, misguided actions, and unwanted results. China is ready to be a partner and friend of the United States. The fundamental principles that we follow in handling China-U.S. relations are mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation.

Just as mutual respect is a basic code of behavior for individuals, it is fundamental for China-U.S. relations. The United States is unique in its history, culture and geographical position, which have shaped its distinct development path and social system. We fully respect all this. The path of socialism with Chinese characteristics has been found under the guidance of the theory of scientific socialism, and is rooted in the tradition of the Chinese civilization with an uninterrupted history of more than 5,000 years. We are proud of our choice, just as you are proud of yours. Our paths are different, but both are the choice by our peoples, and both lead to the realization of the common values of humanity. They should be both respected.

Peaceful coexistence is a basic norm for international relations, and is even more of a baseline that China and the United States should hold on to as two major countries. It is wrong to view China, which is committed to peaceful development, as a threat and thus play a zero-sum game against it. China never bets against the United States, and never interferes in its internal affairs. China has no intention to challenge the United States or to unseat it. Instead, we will be glad to see a confident, open, ever-growing and prosperous United States. Likewise, the United States should not bet against China, or interfere in China’s internal affairs. It should instead welcome a peaceful, stable and prosperous China.

Win-win cooperation is the trend of the times, and it is also an inherent property of China-U.S. relations. China is pursuing high-quality development, and the United States is revitalizing its economy. There is plenty of room for our cooperation, and we are fully able to help each other succeed and achieve win-win outcomes.

The Belt and Road Initiative as well as the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the Global Security Initiative (GSI) and the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI) proposed by China are open to all countries at all times including the United States. China is also ready to participate in U.S.-proposed multilateral cooperation initiatives. This morning, President Biden and I agreed to promote dialogue and cooperation, in the spirit of mutual respect, in areas including diplomacy, economy and trade, people-to-people exchange, education, science and technology, agriculture, military, law enforcement, and artificial intelligence. We agreed to make the cooperation list longer and the pie of cooperation bigger. I would like to let you know that China sympathizes deeply with the American people, especially the young, for the sufferings that Fentanyl has inflicted upon them. President Biden and I have agreed to set up a working group on counternarcotics to further our cooperation and help the United States tackle drug abuse. I also wish to announce here that to increase exchanges between our peoples, especially between the youth, China is ready to invite 50,000 young Americans to China on exchange and study programs in the next five years.

Recently, the three pandas at Smithsonian’s National Zoo in Washington D.C. have returned to China. I was told that many American people, especially children, were really reluctant to say goodbye to the pandas, and went to the zoo to see them off. I also learned that the San Diego Zoo and the Californians very much look forward to welcoming pandas back. Pandas have long been envoys of friendship between the Chinese and American peoples. We are ready to continue our cooperation with the United States on panda conservation, and do our best to meet the wishes of the Californians so as to deepen the friendly ties between our two peoples.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Friends,

China is the largest developing country in the world. The Chinese people long for better jobs, better lives, and better education for their children. It is what the 1.4 billion Chinese hold dear to their hearts. The Communist Party of China (CPC) is committed to working for the people, and our people’s expectation for a better life is our goal. This means we must work hard to secure their support. Thanks to a century of exploration and struggle, we have found the development path that suits us. We are now advancing the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation on all fronts by pursuing Chinese modernization.

We are committed to striving in unity to achieve modernization for all Chinese. A large population is a fundamental aspect of China’s reality. Our achievements, however great, would be very small when divided by 1.4 billion. But a problem, however small, would be huge when multiplied by 1.4 billion. This is a unique challenge for a country of our size. In the meantime, big also means strength. The leadership of the CPC, the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and the endorsement and support of the people are our greatest strengths. China is both a super-large economy and a super-large market. Not long ago the sixth China International Import Expo was held, attracting over 3,400 business exhibitors from 128 countries including the United States. The exhibition area of American companies has been the largest for six consecutive years at the Expo. Modernization for 1.4 billion Chinese is a huge opportunity that China provides to the world.

We are committed to prosperity for all to deliver a better life for each and every Chinese. To eliminate poverty is the millennia-old dream of the Chinese nation, and prosperity for all is the longing of all Chinese. Before I turned 16, I was in a village in northern Shaanxi Province, where I lived and farmed with villagers, and I knew about their worries and needs. Now half a century on, I always feel confident and strong when staying with the people. Serving the people selflessly and living up to their expectations is my lifelong commitment. When I became General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee and President of the People’s Republic of China, 100 million people were still living below the poverty line set by the United Nations. Thanks to eight years of tenacious efforts, we lifted them all out of poverty. We realized the poverty reduction goal of the U.N. 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 10 years ahead of schedule. In the process, over 1,800 CPC members lost their lives in the line of duty.

Our goal is not to have just a few wealthy people, but to realize common prosperity for all. Employment, education, medical services, child care, elderly care, housing, the environment and the like are real issues important to people’s daily life and close to their heart. They are being steadily integrated into our top-level plans for national development, thus ever increasing the sense of fulfillment, happiness and security of our people. We will continue to promote high-quality development and deliver the benefits of modernization to all. This is the CPC’s founding mission and the pledge we have made to the people. It will surely be realized with the support of the people.

We are committed to well-rounded development to achieve both material and cultural-ethical advancement for the people. Our forefathers observed that “When people are well-fed and well-clad, they will have a keen sense of honor and shame.” Material shortage is not socialism, nor is cultural-ethical impoverishment. Chinese modernization is people-centered. An important goal of Chinese modernization is to continue increasing the country’s economic strength and improving the people’s living standards, and at the same time, enriching the people’s cultural lives, enhancing civility throughout society and promoting well-rounded development of the person. The purpose of the Global Civilization Initiative I proposed is to urge the international community to address the imbalance between material and cultural advancement and jointly promote continued progress of human civilization.

We are committed to sustainable development to achieve harmony between man and nature. The belief that humans are an integral part of nature and need to follow nature’s course is a distinctive feature of traditional Chinese culture. We live in the same global village, and we possibly won’t find another inhabitable planet in our lifetime. As an English saying goes, “We do not inherit the Earth from our ancestors, we borrow it from our children.” When I was Governor of Fujian Province in 2002, I called for turning Fujian into the first ecological province in China. Later when I worked in Zhejiang Province in 2005, I said that clear waters and green mountains are just as valuable as gold and silver. Today, this view has become a consensus of all the Chinese people. China now has close to half of the world’s installed photovoltaic capacity. Over half of the world’s new energy vehicles run on roads in China, and China contributes one-fourth of increased area of afforestation in the world. We will strive to peak carbon dioxide emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060. We have made the pledge, and we will honor it.

We are committed to peaceful development to build a community with a shared future for mankind. Peace, amity and harmony are values embedded in Chinese civilization. Aggression and expansion are not in our genes. The Chinese people have bitter and deep memories of the turmoils and sufferings inflicted upon them in modern times. I often say that what the Chinese people oppose is war, what they want is stability, and what they hope for is enduring world peace. The great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation cannot be achieved without a peaceful and stable international environment. In pursuing modernization, we will never revert to the beaten path of war, colonization, plundering or coercion.

Throughout the 70 years and more since the founding of the People’s Republic, China has not provoked a conflict or war, or occupied a single inch of foreign land. China is the only major country that has written peaceful development into the Constitution of the country and the Constitution of the governing party, thus making peaceful development a commitment of the nation. It benefits from and safeguards the current international order. We remain firm in safeguarding the international system with the U.N. at its core, the international order underpinned by international law, and the basic norms governing international relations based on the purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter. Whatever stage of development it may reach, China will never pursue hegemony or expansion, and will never impose its will on others. China does not seek spheres of influence, and will not fight a cold war or a hot war with anyone. China will remain committed to dialogue and oppose confrontation, and build partnerships instead of alliances. It will continue to pursue a mutually beneficial strategy of opening up. The modernization we are pursuing is not for China alone. We are ready to work with all countries to advance global modernization featuring peaceful development, mutually beneficial cooperation and common prosperity, and to build a community with a shared future for mankind.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Friends,

The passage of time is like a surging river—much is washed away, but the most valuable stays. No matter how the global landscape evolves, the historical trend of peaceful coexistence between China and the United States will not change. The ultimate wish of our two peoples for exchanges and cooperation will not change. The expectations of the whole world for a steadily growing China-U.S. relationship will not change. For any great cause to succeed, it must take root in the people, gain strength from the people, and be accomplished by the people. Growing China-U.S. friendship is such a great cause. Let us galvanize the Chinese and American peoples into a strong force to renew China-U.S. friendship, advance China-U.S. relations, and make even greater contributions to world peace and development!

FFAA da China: corruptas e sem controle do PCC? (China Talk)

O Imperador limpa o terreno... 

PLA Purges! What does it all mean for Xi and Taiwan Risk?

“Surprising and a little bit worrisome for China...” 

JORDAN SCHNEIDER AND NICHOLAS WELCH OCT 25 ∙ PREVIEW

READ IN APP

Yesterday Defense Minister Li Shangfu got officially purged. To discuss, we brought on Joel Wuthnow, a fellow at NDU. His research areas include Chinese foreign and security policy, Chinese military affairs, US-China relations, and strategic developments in East Asia. He joined ChinaTalk to discuss Xi Jinping’s recent purges of high-ranking members of the People’s Liberation Army, Xi’s larger vision for the PLA, and what all this internal turmoil might mean for China’s longer-term designs on Taiwan.

Key insights:

• Over ten years after coming to power, Xi is still purging corruption from the military, reflecting his continued lack of trust in the PLA;

• Corruption is historically endemic in the PLA in part because of its incentive structure, which makes graft a prerequisite for rising through the ranks;

• Xi’s efforts to break up the PLA’s supervisory apparatus have only been partially successful (they’re still the same people even if they’re in a different department);

• Amid the anti-corruption shakeup, China’s Rocket Force has been successfully developing hypersonic missiles, technology viewed as critical to countering US intervention in a regional conflict over Taiwan;

• Despite Xi’s apparent distrust of his inner circle of military advisors, an echo chamber–induced invasion of Taiwan is still a live possibility.

Trust Issues in the PLA

Jordan Schneider: Xi Jinping’s got some trust issues. Over the past few months he’s run through a number of PLA generals he appointed less than twelve months ago! Joel, two-sentence overview: what has happened with these purges of late? 

Joel Wuthnow: There have been many purges inside China, even beyond the PLA. Qin Gang 秦刚 disappeared, a whole bunch of people from the defense industry up and disappeared. In the PLA, a number of senior generals are missing in action; right now, frankly, we don’t know where they are. There are a lot of rumors circulating about these key figures, including the Defense Minister [Li Shangfu 李尚福] and the former commander of the Rocket Force [Li Yuchao 李玉超]. It’s not a good look for Xi Jinping.

The fact that there are so many people missing all at once means that Xi has a lack of trust and lack of confidence in some of his senior leadership right now.

Jordan Schneider: From the PLA watcher community, I had one friend reach out to me who said he was bummed about all this! He’s been following Li Shangfu for a decade, and all of a sudden he’s gone.

Are you excited or sad to see your friends leave the stage? What’s the emotional response when you see a new round of crackdowns?

Joel Wuthnow: For me, the feeling is surprise coupled with curiosity. It’s a shocking state of affairs, and the reason is this: us PLA watchers all mostly assume that Xi’s really in charge of the machine over there, that he put his people into place, and that his political rivals were gone a decade ago.

So it’s really surprising to wake up and find that the Defense Minister, someone who is probably pretty close to Xi — he’s on the Central Military Commission — is just gone. It’s surprising and a little bit worrisome, if you think about its implications for China.

Li Shangfu, China's Defense Minister, has not made a public appearance since late August. The Print/ANI.

Jordan Schneider: I think we should start by unpacking the idea that Xi has controlled or put his stamp on the PLA. To do that, we need to start with a little bit of institutional history. What was the bargain that Deng Xiaoping gave the PLA coming into the 1980s?

Joel Wuthnow: Back in the 1980s, the PLA was governing society. They were stacked in the Politburo. They were a very important part of the leadership and had a huge amount of power. Then Deng Xiaoping said, “No, we’re going to focus on reforming the economy. We want to bring in technocrats, and we want the military to be put in its place and put back in its barracks.” He said to the PLA, “We want you to modernize, but we’re not going to give you that much money to do it.”

It didn’t seem like a great bargain for the PLA. They had to give up a lot of authority and status without getting a lot of money. So, Deng said, “Okay, go back to your barracks — but you decide what you’re going to do. We’re not going to look into your affairs or get too involved in your business.”

So, Deng gave the PLA a huge amount of autonomy, and this was acceptable to them.

However, this also created a situation that allowed the PLA to become very corrupt and very inward-looking — very secretive and poorly supervised by the Politburo and the senior civilian leadership of the Party. This is really the origin of a lot of the problems that we’re seeing today.

China doesn’t have Western-style civil-military relations where there’s a lot of civilian oversight of the military — political appointees, courts, judges, media. There’s really none of that in China. So that’s the situation that the PLA found themselves in: corrupt and secretive, though not rebellious — they weren’t starting military coups against the leaders, as you saw in 1991 with the Soviet Union. But they weren’t fully professional and or fully “clean.” So the seed for what’s going on today was planted about forty years ago — in the 1980s — with Deng Xiaoping.

Jordan Schneider: The reason the PLA was so ingrained in society was because Mao decided that they were the only way to get the country out of the Cultural Revolution. So it was basically PLA power or complete chaos. This resulted in a very awkward situation where, if you’re in the PLA — if you’re not about to fight a war anytime soon and everyone else is getting rich around you — the dominant strategies if you want to rise up and be successful are to either do things like import luxury cars and run hotels; or to just graft on the procurement that’s been allocated to your budget instead of doing what the Premier wants (which is to get you in tip-top shape to potentially deter adversaries and maybe even fight an aggressive war).

So, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao: what did they want to do, and how did they struggle to execute their vision of what the PLA should be doing in the 1990s and 2000s?

Joel Wuthnow: Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao both basically wanted to make the PLA give up its business interests. The PLA was running all sorts of business empires as a way to make ends meet. Part of the way Jiang and Hu tried to undo this was by giving the PLA larger budgets; so in the 1990s and early 2000s, there were double-digit budget increases, as well as new rules and regulations.

A lot of the PLA’s operations, like the casinos and the luxury cars, were actually shut down — but this didn’t really change the basics: the PLA wasn’t well-governed or -supervised.

Rising in the ranks … a PLA promotion ceremony in July. Japan Times.

Jordan Schneider: To give folks a sense of just how broken the system was — there was not a way to rise up in the ranks without being corrupt? Because at a certain point you ended up having to buy your rank. All these positions had dollar amounts attached.

Say you want to get promoted and you don’t have a rich Chinese uncle that you can find to bankroll you. Who else might be interested in supporting folks getting promoted in the PLA system? Foreign intelligence agencies. So you end up with this very vicious cycle of the people who are getting promoted actually being the ones who are on the take from adversaries. This is the dynamic that Xi is facing as he comes to power in 2011 and 2012. Any other thoughts, Joel?

Joel Wuthnow: You’re right; it was really prolific, with schemes inside the general political department, which is like an HR system. Becoming a general had a renminbi 人民币 amount attached to it.

So when Xi comes to power in 2012, everybody who’s in the PLA is complicit in this system.

Xi’s dilemma was that he needed to fix the system, but couldn’t just get rid of everybody. So the top people on his list were those who were not only corrupt, but who were also associated with his political rivals. He focused first on Jiang Zemin’s people.

Jordan Schneider: So the hope was that you could scare people straight, while at the same time hopefully changing the institutional incentive such that everyone who may have had a dirty past ends up seeing the light, focusing on military national rejuvenation as opposed to making sure that their grandkids can have a beach house in Malibu, or what have you.

Joel Wuthnow: Exactly. But this isn’t to overstate or overplay the problem or imply that these guys are just sitting around doing corrupt schemes. Some of them are probably competent officers.

Reforming the PLA?

Jordan Schneider: So Xi starts off with a bang, throws a lot of folks out, including a lot of very senior folks, and then tries to build in some institutional reform so that this doesn’t happen again. At the same time he has a very ambitious vision for what he wants the PLA to achieve. So Joel, walk us through those two things: the reforms and his hopes for the PLA.

Joel Wuthnow: The reforms have many different pieces, some of which are about making the PLA a better warfighting organization, others of which are about making the PLA better managed. I’ll focus on the latter.

What Xi is trying to do is rearrange the system so that the people who are the supervisors — the internal control people — are a little bit disentangled from each other. Previously the General Political Department had all the power and was doing all the supervision. Corruption was investigated at that level. Xi Jinping broke up the General Political Department into a bunch of different components — financial auditors, anti-corruption people, military-court people. They’re all different from each other now; they don’t work for each other and are not part of the same bureaucracy.

These days, there are a few different control chains that come up independently to Xi Jinping’s level. He’s trying to eliminate corruption from that angle.

Ultimately, though, it’s a limited solution to the problem — because these are all still PLA officers. They all came up through the same corrupt system.

They’re all former GPD people, and they don’t work for each other anymore — but there’s no outside supervision or external control. So it is a reform that may make the system a bit better, but it doesn’t solve the fundamental problem, which is that the PLA is in its own little box.

Jordan Schneider: I assume another dynamic is that Xi has a very ambitious dream for the military power that China is able to project,which has led to 10% annual increases in the budget and, all of a sudden, a whole lot more money sloshing around than there ever has been in the history of this organization.

So the temptation is probably greater than it ever was in the Jiang and Hu eras, just because there’s so much more cash floating around.

Joel Wuthnow: There’s a lot of money sloshing around — the latest rumor is about the two guys from the Rocket Force [PLARF] who disappeared. That’s part of the PLA that’s undergoing a big expansion right now. They’re building silo fields; they’re building new ICBMs; they’re doing all sorts of construction there. The dominant rumor is that the entire leadership in the Rocket Force was in on some kind of scheme that’s not yet known, but it’s likely that there was so much money going into their strategic arsenal that the temptation was too great and the supervision was too limited and something got out of control, which led to Xi’s crackdown. But the details are totally opaque right now, and there are so many different rumors. It does seem to be about money.

Jordan Schneider: Can we get a two-second sidebar on what the Rocket Force is? It’s not something that most countries currently have.

Joel Wuthnow: It’s a little bit of a misnomer because they’re called the Rocket Force, but really this is the ICBMs, the land-based ballistic missiles. The Rocket Force runs most of the PLA’s nuclear arsenal for the PLA.

In addition to nuclear, they also manage the long-range conventional missile forces. You may have heard of the anti-ship ballistic missile or the DF26, the Guam killer. This is all part of the Rocket Force’s arsenal. It’s not so much rockets as it is ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.

Jordan Schneider: This is the really interesting internal contradiction here: on the one hand, something is wrong enough for Xi to want to fire these folks; but at least to outside observers, the Rocket Force has had some real technological successes. Can you talk a little bit about hypersonics and the broader development capabilities that the Rocket Force has presumably overseen?

Joel Wuthnow: The big thing with hypersonics is that it’s not like a ballistic missile. It’s a different trajectory. It’s not the speed — it’s that they’re very hard to track and intercept.

The reason why China is investing so much money in this is because it sees this technology as critical to countering US intervention in a regional conflict. China understands that we are reliant on large bases in the western Pacific, and they’re also aware that we’re building ballistic missile defenses.

It’s technologies like hypersonics that China thinks are an ace card, a game changer in terms of deterring, disrupting, and defeating us. Of course it’s also the case that the Chinese are just very, very good — historically and today — at missile forces and artillery and rocketry. 

It’s operationally very significant and they’re good at it; hence, there’s a whole lot of money going into hypersonics.

Jordan Schneider: To that point, we’ve seen very impressive tests, which is at least a data point that the Rocket Force isn’t wasting and stealing everything that’s going through their coffers.

Joel Wuthnow: Right, it’s not that this money is going for naught. The question for Xi Jinping is: if they haven’t been honest about the spending, are they hiding something? So this gets to trust. Showing off in parades and a successful test here and there is one thing, but if the balloon ever goes up, will this huge arsenal be reliable? It’s not just the missiles that have to work — it’s the satellites and the people that are sitting at the controls.

Jordan Schneider: How much less likely are you to start a war involving very tricky joint operations if you don’t have a ton of confidence in your generals?

Joel Wuthnow: My view is that you probably don’t want to go down that path. Xi seems to have confidence in what they’re doing right now in terms of coercion: sending planes slightly across the midline, sending a bunch of planes up into the ADIZ and so on. The PLA is able to do that, but when talking about the requirements of a war, so much more is on the line for him and the Party.

If Xi has questions about whether things are going to work and his people are competent, then the incentive to go down the warpath starts to decline very quickly. I think this internal dynamic is something we don’t pay enough attention to on our side.

What’s This Mean for the PLA’s Future?

Jordan Schneider: You wrote recently that there’s tremendous pressure on the PLA to demonstrate progress and prove that it deserves the government’s largesse. We’re at a moment where China’s macroeconomic health over the next few years is very unclear. Do you think there’s any potential that Xi becomes so frustrated and fed up with his current PLA that he decides to starve the beast a little bit, given competing priorities and the clear lack of trust that exists between him and his military?

Joel Wuthnow: I don’t expect that he’s going to cut the PLA’s budget. Xi talks about security all the time. He seems to be rather paranoid.

For example, he needed to be talked down back in 2020 when he thought the US was going to attack him. In October 2020, the PLA leadership seemed to genuinely fear that the US was going to attack them as part of a so-called “October Surprise,” and they needed to be reassured. This was the big story with General Mark Milleyhaving to reassure his PLA counterpart.

This incident speaks to the larger issue of paranoia: Xi thinks the US is out to get him, that we’re doing color revolutions — which doesn’t match with trying to starve the beast.

The PLA is also not an insignificant political actor. I think they need to have some level of autonomy and attention from the top. Xi’s going to keep giving them funds, and he’s going to hope that they’re using them in the right way, but I think he does feel the need to continue to make examples out of people and show that he’s serious about these problems.

Nicholas Welch: When Xi came to power, he fired a whole bunch of people. And then during the recent Party Congress in October 2022, he stacked the Central Committee with loyalists. But now he’s firing people again. Do you think that this move makes him more or less likely to be influenced by a so-called echo chamber and to make rational decisions?

Joel Wuthnow: If you’re China, how do you get into a war? If you look at a pure cost-benefit analysis, I think the costs are very high and the benefits are not necessarily huge. But how else can you get into a war?

One possible way would be an echo chamber. Say the PLA is making a case to you as the boss: we’re ready. So Xi Jinping gave the PLA a 2027 deadline; they need to be ready to go to war with Taiwan by 2027. When that day comes, he’ll be asking the PLA, “What’s your update? I gave you time, I gave you money, I gave you a whole lot of inspirational talk — have you done it at this point?” And who’s going to come to him and say, “No, sorry, boss, we need another five years”?

So this is a concern — that the PLA lines up and says, “We’re ready, we think America is in decline, they’re a paper tiger, and Taiwan is having a lot of their own problems.”

If Xi Jinping comes to trust that and makes a decision based on false optimism — a bit like Putin being misled by his generals and invading Ukraine — it’s something worth worrying about.

That’s a different way of plunging into a war than just saying, “I’ve counted my missiles and counted their air defenses, and mine are superior” — that’s a clinical cost-benefit. This is more based on what you believe the outcome will be, regardless of how you’re actually going to perform. That echo chamber is worth worrying about.

Jordan Schneider: Doesn’t that echo chamber scenario seem pretty unlikely right now, as Xi is firing top leadership?

Joel Wuthnow: That’s basically right. If you had asked me the question a year ago, right after the Party Congress when the entire narrative was, “Xi has installed yes-men who aren’t going to give him candid advice and are going to tell him what they think he wants them to” — I would have given you a firmer answer on the overconfidence bit.

Now, given the shock of people disappearing and what that means in terms of his confidence, I’d say the chances are less than they were a year ago, less than they were two months ago — but not zero. That’s the reason to keep worrying. Five years from now, when Xi is seventy-five and he’s surrounded by people who may be giving him simple answers, we don’t know if there’s a 1 or 2 percent chance that he’ll believe them. To me, that’s still worth worrying about. What we’re really talking about is a 1 or 2 percent chance of calamity, so that’s still a pretty huge expected problem.

China Talk