American Default (1934), Sebastian Edwards - book record, Amazon

Estou lendo este livro, e gostando. Leiam este artigo que postei anteriormente: 
https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2019/02/roosevelt-e-o-abandono-da-clausula-ouro.html

American Default: The Untold Story of FDR, the Supreme Court, and the Battle over Gold

Sebastian Edwards

Amazon.com: Books

As an economic history nerd I can only applaud the work of my UCLA colleague Sebastian Edwards in his vibrant telling the story of the long forgotten Supreme Court showdown over the United States’ abrogation of contracts written with the gold clause. Remembering the inflation of the Civil War greenback era, most creditors demanded gold clauses in debt contracts in which they would be repaid in in either gold or its paper money equivalent value.

This system worked fine until the onset of the Great Depression. It is here where Edwards begins his story as President Roosevelt adopts an inflationist policy by first abandoning the gold standard by requiring all citizens to turn in their physical gold at the then $20.67/ounce price. Then in June 1933 Congress adopts a joint resolution authorizing Roosevelt to increase the price of gold which he ultimately does to $35/ounce and the legislation abrogates the gold clause in all contracts. Indeed, most economists credit the early recovery from the depression directly to the monetary easing associated with Roosevelt’s gold policies.

If Congress hadn’t abrogated the gold clause all debts would have been written up to reflect the devaluation by 69%. Thus it would require a payment of approximately $1700 to repay a nominal debt of $1,000. Needless to say a host of bankruptcies would have ensued.

Of course several creditors sued and Edwards skillfully moves the action from Roosevelt and Congress to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ruled that it was in Congress’ power to alter private contracts, but it was not in its power to alter U.S. government debt. However, the court ruled that as of the date of the Joint Resolution gold was still trading at $20.67/ounce and Americans were not allowed to possess physical gold at that time. Hence there would be no damages. A brilliant 5-4 ruling by Chief Justice Hughes.

The reason why these cases have been forgotten is that if they went the other way all hell would have broken loose. Instead of rallying as the stock market did after the ruling, stocks likely would have crashed. It would have triggered a constitutional crisis with Court versus the other two branches of government. Indeed the lead up to the ruling was a precursor to the 1937 court fight that Roosevelt would have.
As an aside Edwards notes that the United States had a treaty with Panama concerning the lease payments for the Panama Canal. That treaty had a gold clause in it. After a long negotiation in 1939 the lease payment was increased retroactive to 1934 thereby reflecting the dollar devaluation. Thus, the U.S. made good on its international treaty obligations.

“American Default” is a worthy addition to the economics literature of the Great Depression. It should be read with the works of Friedman & Schwartz, Bernanke, Irwin, Eichengreen and Sumner. And because it is more a history book than an economics book the lay reader should find it very readable. Further given the rising debt/GDP ratio in the U.S. when coupled with even larger unfunded liabilities, the idea of a 21st century American default is not totally improbable.

Reviews: 

"Sebastian Edwards' American Default is just such a superb history of the US exit from gold in 1933-34, satisfyingly detailed and highly accessible on both the relevant economics & law."---David Frum, 

"Edwards analyses the default that followed President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s 1933 decision to devalue the dollar against gold. . . . The story is fascinating and the lessons eternal."---Martin Wolf, Financial Times

"[American Default] is the history of that mighty legal, moral, political and monetary controversy, the effects of which are with us still. . . . [Sebastian Edwards] knowledgably compares the 20th-century American default to Argentina’s 2002 abrogation of its dollar denominated debt."---James Grant, Wall Street Journal

"Brilliantly told."---Steve Hanke, Forbes

"Edwards ends his admirably accessible and illuminating book with some careful thoughts on recent financial crises around the world, such as those in Argentina and Greece, and shows why US gold cases from 1933 to 1935 are a useful precedent to understand how future such crises may be successfully resolved by hewing carefully to the rule of law. He believes that the cases may even be invoked by lawyers in other national, or international, arenas. If so, those involved will, no doubt, turn to this book for inspiration and guidance."---Benn Steil, Financial World

"Excellent. . . . A fascinating narrative of FDR's decision to devalue the dollar in 1933-34."---Scott Sumner, EconLog

"[Sebastian Edwards] skillfully narrates a pivotal episode in American political and economic history he considers too little remembered. . . . Edwards writes equally knowledgeably about economics and politics: . . . At a time of economic uncertainty at home and abroad, this comprehensive study of an important event in U.S. fiscal history has significant implications for today." (Publishers Weekly)

"Edwards’ book is fascinating, well written and enjoyable."---Geoffrey Wood, Central Banking

"Great book by UCLA economist Sebastian Edwards about a key moment in American economic history. Many economists believe that the most important thing FDR did to help the economy recover from the Great Depression was to go off the gold standard. As part of that policy, he pursued laws that rewrote many bond contracts, annulling gold clauses. It was controversial then (and surely would be again if such an issue were ever to arise). Edwards does a wonderful job telling the story."---Greg Mankiw, Greg Mankiw's Blog

"Fascinating. . . . I couldn't put this book down."---Brenda Jubin, Seeking Alpha

From the Back Cover: 

"American Default provides an in-depth look at one of the most important, but often neglected, events in U.S. economic history, the abrogation of bond’s gold clauses during the New Deal. Not only does the book provide an excellent discussion of the economics of this event, but it is a really good read because it delves into the personalities and the politics behind this effective default. I highly recommend it."--Frederic S. Mishkin, Columbia University

"I thought we knew about American abandonment of gold during the Great Depression. But American Default is an eye-opener. It is astonishing how chaotic were the circumstances and how woefully inadequate was understanding. Everyone interested in the history of gold, the Great Depression, the Greek or the Argentine crises, and in the crises to come should read this book."--Anne Krueger, Johns Hopkins University

"American Default is a fascinating and well-written book about the momentous decision to leave the gold standard in 1933. Sebastian Edwards skillfully weaves together the political, economic, and legal aspects of this important episode, with lessons for today. Highly recommended!"--Douglas A. Irwin, Dartmouth College, author of Clashing over Commerce: A History of US Trade Policy

"A really excellent book. Edwards provides a dramatic and readable account of monumental decisions that changed the course of history. American Default is sure to be a hit."--Michael D. Bordo, Rutgers University

Product details Hardcover: 288 pages Publisher: Princeton University Press (May 22, 2018) Language: English ISBN-10: 9780691161884 ISBN-13: 978-0691161884 ASIN: 0691161887

Founding fathers of the Fed, by Richard A. Naclerio - Book review by Mary Tone Rodgers

Richard A. Naclerio, The Federal Reserve and its Founders: Money, Politics and Power, Newcastle upon Tyne: Agenda Publishing, 2018. vii + 226 pp. $22.50 (paperback), ISBN: 978-1-78821-078-2.

Reviewed for EH.Net by Mary Tone Rodgers, Department of Finance, State University of New York at Oswego.

Scholars have been keenly interested in the Federal Reserve system since its inception, and the subject has motivated many books. Authors’ tones, viewpoints and theses about the Fed are understandably shaded by the political discourse of the period in which they write. Richard Naclerio writes The Federal Reserve and its Founders: Money Politics and Power in 2018, a time of rising populist sentiment and, while not explicitly identifying himself as a populist, Naclerio argues the populist viewpoint. The book’s thesis is that the Federal Reserve was formed by elites to preserve their informational advantages over the “little guy,” primarily by preserving a monopolistic structure of the banking industry. He supports his argument by providing biographical evidence that six men who suggested critical features of the Federal Reserve Act disdained the common man, perceived themselves to be elite and were interested in extracting profits for the central bank from elevated interest rates charged on loans to the “little guy.”

This book is permeated with the rhetoric of economic populism providing an “us versus them” framework for the author’s writing style. The approach is not the traditional one taken by economic historians; it does not test theories of political economy, industry structure, formation of efficient financial systems, or financial panics by examining past quantitative data. Instead, it uses qualitative archival evidence from personal writings, contemporary critiques and newspaper stories for thesis support. Its primary contributions are for the reader to understand, first, how the populist viewpoint may be informed by biographical evidence, and second, what the implications of populism for the future of Federal Reserve might be. Naclerio argues that from the “American people’s” viewpoint a central bank that does not bail out banks, does not profit from high interest rates charged to the “little guy,” and that has oversight by non-elites appears to be the type of institution a populist might prefer.

Naclerio devotes one chapter to each of the six men who attended a private conference at Jekyll Island in 1910 to draft policy proposals to create an American central bank. He also writes a chapter about J. Pierpont Morgan who did not attend the conference but who Naclerio considers a central historical figure epitomizing the elite who formed the central bank. After examining the seven men’s attitudes toward the “little guy,” Naclerio then argues that those attitudes were institutionalized in the legislation that formed the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. A chapter devoted to a post-2008 interview with one journalist at Bloomberg News is used as evidence that elitist attitudes continue to drive Fed policy in the present period. The interview explores how Bloomberg News found it difficult to obtain information from the Fed about loans the Fed made during the 2008 crisis.

The seven chapters about the Jekyll Island attendees and Morgan comprise about two-thirds of the book. Each chapter presents biographical evidence that each man embodied the populist lament that the “little guy” is disadvantaged by elite who create opacity and monopoly for self-aggrandizement. Nelson Aldrich eliminated small sugar producers and refiners by changing the tariff structure for sugar imports, benefitting his family’s wholesale grocery business. Felix Warburg’s proposal to allow the central bank to discount commercial paper disadvantaged small bankers and gave preference to large banks. Benjamin Strong’s efforts to coordinate Europe’s post-World War I reconstruction created a Western monopoly of central banks in defiance of each government’s citizenry and was achieved using loopholes in the Charter of the League of Nations. Strong’s venom toward small bankers is supported by his characterization of them as an “unorganized mob.” Henry Davison persuaded Woodrow Wilson to break his promise to the average American to stay out of World War I – so that loans to France and Britain organized by Davison at J. P. Morgan & Co. could be paid off. Davison’s efforts to preserve Morgan’s profits would be at the expense of the “European working class” whose taxes would pay the interest and principal on war loans. A. Piatt Andrew’s suggestion that the central bank would support itself by charging rates to banks on loans it provided meant that small businessmen’s and farmers’ rates would be higher, benefitting the elites in money center banks. Frank Vanderlip’s assessment that borrowers must sign loan contracts but small depositors earned no such reciprocal contract from the banker was evidence that elite bankers supported the inequity and imbalance of power inherent in the banking business model. J. P. Morgan’s takeovers of weak trust companies and corporations after the Panic of 1907 is evidence of an unscrupulous act of self-dealing. (Morgan is referred to as a “pirate” in the chapter title.)

The book’s populist argument is not completely convincing because it does not explore how concern about the “little guy” was indeed part of the policy formation process; it does not adequately describe how the grassroots debate had been ongoing since at least the Baltimore plan of 1894 and the Indianapolis Monetary Convention of 1896. Rather, Naclerio seems to attribute most of the policy formation process to the seven men showcased in the book.

Nor does the book describe how the “little guy” benefitted from the formation of the Fed. The book does not explore how achieving economies of scale in information production and liquidity coordination became overwhelming tasks for a fragmented banking system during the period of industrialization and urbanization that accompanied technological advancement that opened up opportunities for the “little guy” of the early twentieth century.

Furthermore, Naclerio does not suggest how populists of the day, such as William Jennings Bryan or Theodore Roosevelt. might have managed the problems of providing a lender of last resort in periods of exogenous economic shocks any differently than the “elitist” Wall Street bankers did. The difficulty in compelling collective action in the absence of a lender of last resort was not the purview of the federal government at the time, nor was it easily managed by private actors in an increasingly complex economy.

Naclerio interprets the Great Depression as evidence that the Fed reneged on its promise to shield the “little guy” from shocks to the economy and fluctuations in the business cycle from 1921 through the late 1930’s, without describing the remedial changes to the Fed’s policy formation process made during the subsequent Franklin Roosevelt administration that improved the institution’s future capabilities to become more responsive.

Naclerio pays scant attention to how the Federal Reserve Act was influenced by politicians to include a decentralized system of twelve regional banks that served twelve distinct regions of the country, an effort to give voice to the “little guy.”

The shortcomings of the book do not mar the usefulness of the references it provides to see the Federal Reserve system through the eyes of a twenty-first century populist. Giving voice to those who have felt alienated from or disillusioned by the system can support constructive institutional change going forward.

(Naclerio has worked extensively in business operations and real estate investment in New York City and Denver. While continuing to manage his own real estate companies and stock portfolios, he is pursuing a Ph.D. in history at the CUNY Graduate Center. He worked as an adjunct instructor and academic advisor at Sacred Heart University and Monroe College.)

Mary Tone Rodgers, DPS, CFA, is the Marcia Belmar Willock Professor of Finance and Director of the Gordon Lenz Center for Finance and Risk Management at the State University of New York at Oswego. She has published several articles in financial history, including “Monetary Policy and the Copper Price Bust: A Reassessment of the Causes of the Panic of 1907” with James E. Payne” in Review of Economic History. She is currently working on a book with Jon R. Moen (University of Mississippi) on J. Pierpont Morgan’s role as lender of last resort in the pre-Federal Reserve period.

Copyright (c) 2019 by EH.Net. All rights reserved. This work may be copied for non-profit educational uses if proper credit is given to the author and the list. For other permission, please contact the EH.Net Administrator (administrator@eh.net). Published by EH.Net (February 2019). All EH.Netreviews are archived at http://www.eh.net/BookReview.

Partidos politicos e financiamento eleitoral no Brasil - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Partidos políticos e financiamento eleitoral no Brasil

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

(www.pralmeida.org; http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com)

 [Objetivo: respostas a questionário; finalidade: participação em pesquisa]

  

Recebi, de [um pesquisador], pequeno questionário destinado a subsidiar pesquisa que ele conduz sobre sistemas de financiamento político e eleitoral. Eis minhas respostas.

1 . No contexto democrático, qual é o papel dos partidos políticos? 

Representar “partes” da opinião pública, ou frações de setores sociais e grupos determinados da sociedade, até talvez o conjunto da sociedade (embora seja difícil atender a interesses contraditórios), junto às instituições políticas de natureza governamental. Partidos são intermediários entre desejos, demandas, requerimentos da sociedade – mais frequentemente partes dela, daí o nome de “partidos”, ou seja, partes de um todo – e as instituições de governança, no legislativo, em primeiro lugar, no comando do executivo naturalmente, e eventualmente também junto a órgãos do judiciário, no caso de mecanismos de solução de controvérsias.

Partidos são elementos essenciais nas democracias modernas, que são todas, ou quase todas, representativas. O jogo democrático legítimo prevê a organização de consultas eleitorais regulares, visando à alternância dos partidos no exercício do poder, segundo procedimentos acordados consensualmente pela sociedade, através de uma assembleia constituinte e seus ordenamentos constitucionais.

2. Você seria favorável a um sistema de financiamento (partidos e campanhas) totalmente privado (doações empresariais e de pessoas físicas)?

Não se trata de ser favorável: sou, em primeiro lugar, inteiramente contrário a qualquer outro sistema, e, portanto, a favor de uma proibição formal de financiamento público de campanhas e dos partidos. Partidos são entes de direito privado – pois que representando apenas partes da opinião pública –e devem, dessa forma, ser financiados exclusivamente por seus membros, militantes, simpatizantes, apoiadores. Sou, portanto, pela liberdade absoluta de financiamento privado das campanhas. Mas, como os partidos são entidades de direito privado exercendo missões públicas, de caráter cívico, sou a favor de total transparência nos mecanismos e dados reais sobre esse tipo de financiamento: tudo o que o partido receber deve estar à disposição de todas as autoridades de organização dos escrutínios eleitorais, assim como da sociedade em geral. Repito: total liberdade. Existe o risco de partidos serem capturados por grandes interesses econômicos? Claro que existe, mas isso vai se saber imediatamente, e a sociedade terá perfeita informação e consciência desse apoio. Fraudes, omissões e sub-declarações quanto ao financiamento obtido deveriam ser sancionados severamente, implicando, por exemplo, na vedação da participação dos candidatos do partido fraudador em um ou dois escrutínios eleitorais seguidos.

3. Como a prestação de contas do dinheiro público transferido para os partidos políticos pode ser aperfeiçoada?

Sou absolutamente contrário a qualquer forma de financiamento público. O financiamento privado deve ser registrado na página de cada partido, sem sequer a obrigação de remeter à autoridade eleitoral, que procederá eventualmente a conferência por amostragem das contas dos partidos, podendo inquirir por dados mais completos.

4. Você seria favorável a um sistema de financiamento 100% público de campanhas e partidos políticos?

De nenhuma forma, e não aceito o argumento de que esse financiamento público é o preço da democracia. Partidos investem os recursos de seus apoiadores em campanhas políticas, para eleger representantes que, eles sim, receberão um salário condigno para tal tarefa de representação, mas se qualquer tipo de mordomia.

5. Você é favorável ao teto de gastos de campanha? 

Não; como liberal, acredito que cada partido deve investir o que seus apoiadores desejarem na eleição de seus candidatos. Alguns serão eleitos com muito dinheiro, outros com um mínimo. E serão ambos exatamente iguais na representação congressual ou nos cargos executivos, devendo desempenhar seus mandatos de acordo a dispositivos constitucionais.

6. Qual é sua perspectiva acerca do atual paradigma de financiamento dos partidos políticos brasileiros?  

Sistema totalmente irresponsável, perdulário, inaceitável, escandaloso e vergonhoso, do ponto de vista dos eleitores (que não deveriam ser compulsórios, e sim voluntários) e dos contribuintes (também compulsórios) que já pagam os salários de seus representantes e dirigentes. Os fundos eleitoral – uma excrescência inaceitável – e partidário devem ser extintos completamente, imediatamente, por antidemocráticos. A questão é muito simples: como um eleitor liberal, ou conservador pode apoiar, sem o seu consentimento, um partido que prega o fim da propriedade privada? E como um eleitor esquerdista, igualitarista radical, pode sustentar candidatos conservadores e partidários de uma economia de mercado totalmente livre? Injusto para ambos.

7. Qual é o modelo mais adequado de financiamento dos partidos políticos brasileiros?

 Já explicitado acima: totalmente a cargo, exclusivamente sob responsabilidade de seus membros e simpatizantes. Qualquer outra forma é antidemocrática e autoritária.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 25 de fevereiro de 2019

Roosevelt e o abandono da clausula ouro nos EUA - Mark Pulliam (Law and Liberty)

Estou lendo o livro citado de Sebastian Edwards: American Default (2018), uma história da maior decisão econômica da administração Roosevelt. (PRA)

Abandoning Gold and the Constitution?

by Mark Pulliam

Law and Liberty, February 25, 2019

https://www.lawliberty.org/2019/02/25/abandoning-gold-and-the-constitution/

Constitutional law scholars tend to focus on decisions involving abortion, same-sex marriage, desegregation, and administrative law, ignoring one of the 20th century’s most contentious legal battles: creditors’ challenge to President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s abrogation of the gold standard, and contemporaneous invalidation of “gold clauses” in contractual debt obligations, in 1933.  The New Deal spawned many events of interest to constitutional historians—such as FDR’s court-packing scheme, the abandonment of the Lochner line of cases, and the Carolene Products decision—but until the publication of Sebastian Edwards’s American Default in 2018, the great debt default of 1933-1935 had unaccountably been largely overlooked. [1] In the pre-“woke” era, constitutional battles were over economics, not culture, and no aspect of the economy is more fundamental than money.  

In response to the Great Depression, one of Roosevelt’s first acts as President, after taking office in March 1933, [2] was to ban the private ownership of gold—in the form of coins, bullion, or gold certificates—and to require all private gold holdings to be sold to the federal government at a set price. This unprecedented edict was quickly followed by taking the nation off the gold standard. Then, on June 5, 1933, at FDR’s behest Congress passed Joint Resolution No. 10, unilaterally annulling all “gold clauses”—contractual provisions requiring repayment of debts in gold, used in most bonds and mortgages since the Civil War to protect lenders against devaluation of paper money—in all past and future debt contracts, public and private. As the coup de grace, in January 1934, FDR devalued the currency by fixing a new price for gold almost 70 percent higher than its century-old price. 

Thus, to aid distressed farmers, debtors were allowed to repay their obligations with watered-down dollars, despite gold-denominated repayment obligations. Beleaguered rural voters favored inflation. (To remedy crippling deflation, FDR’s overarching goal was to increase domestic prices, especially for farm products.) Through these combined actions, the President and Congress had effectively wiped out more than 40 percent of all existing debt. Creditors were livid.  Bold holders who had purchased securities protected by gold clauses challenged the annulment as unconstitutional. This became one of the first skirmishes over the New Deal to be decided by the Supreme Court. In early 1935, following three days of argument, in a trio of related decisions [3] the Court upheld the federal government’s actions in a series of 5-4 decisions written by Chief Justice Charles Evan Hughes, with the conservative “Four Horsemen” dissenting. 

The majority blithely upheld the Joint Resolution invalidating gold clauses in private contracts, citing broad congressional power to regulate the economy and, with respect to the impairment of government obligations, denying that bond holders had been damaged by the taking. The rationale of Hughes’s opinion in the public debt cases was that annulment of the gold clause caused no economic injury to the bondholders because—even had the debt been repaid in gold coin—other features of FDR’s monetary reforms would have required that the gold be surrendered at a fixed price (less than actual market value). [4] The dissenters, who viewed FDR’s scheme as an abhorrent and dishonorable repudiation of contractual obligations, scoffed at this reasoning: “Obligations cannot be legally avoided by prohibiting the creditor from receiving the thing promised.” Justice James Clark McReynolds delivered the unitary dissent, departing from the prepared opinion to scornfully declare that the Constitution “is gone,” bitterly lamenting that “Shame and humiliation are upon us now.” 

This long-forgotten showdown occurred two years before the fateful “switch in time that saved nine,” but after the evisceration of the Contract Clause in Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell (in another 5-4  opinion, also penned by Hughes). [5] To some extent, the result in the closely-watched Gold Clause Cases was pre-ordained: many financial analysts had publicly predicted that a ruling against the FDR administration would plunge the country into a catastrophic crisis. According to Edwards, it was “plainly clear” that invalidating the Joint Resolution “would create chaos, including millions of bankruptcies across the country.” 

American Default tells a fascinating story. Edwards, who teaches international economics at UCLA, brings a sophisticated knowledge of finance to his analysis of the chaotic conditions underlying the Great Depression, the circumstances leading up to FDR’s decision to nullify the gold clauses, and the international implications of this action. (The author casually name-drops prominent economists with whom he has rubbed elbows over the years, including Milton Friedman, Anna Schwartz, and Allan Meltzer.) His account goes behind the scenes in 1933, which he suggests is “possibly the most eventful year in American history during times of peace.”  The full cast of characters who played a role in the vaunted “First 100 Days” are often over-shadowed by FDR himself. Edwards explores the personalities of Roosevelt’s New Deal advisers, especially the economists and so-called Brains Trust. 

Edwards suggests that FDR’s team was ill-equipped to manage the intricacies of monetary policy. Much of what the would-be central planners did was a haphazard experiment. Indeed, FDR did not choose his Secretary of the Treasury until shortly before he was sworn in as President. Most of FDR’s agenda during the “Hundred Days” has been panned by economists and historians. The Agricultural Adjustment Act and National Industrial Recovery Act, both struck down as unconstitutional, accomplished little. The Great Depression continued throughout the decade of the 1930s. Nevertheless, Edwards maintains that FDR’s tempestuous monetary reforms in 1933-34 arrested the nation’s economic freefall and boosted prices. Moreover, Edwards concludes—albeit with qualifying caveats—that the debt default engineered by FDR had no apparent deleterious effect on America’s economy in the long run. In both cases, Edwards offers charts and technical data (complete with “M1”) in support of his position. Friedman and Schwartz reached the opposite conclusion in their 1963 book A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960.

How well does the book, subtitled The Untold Story of FDR, the Supreme Court, and the Battle Over Gold, hold up as legal history or constitutional analysis? We have become inured to fiat currency and monetary gimmicks on the part of the Federal Reserve, but are these innovations consistent with an originalist understanding of the Constitution? What did the Framers mean when granting to Congress the power to “coin money [and] regulate the value thereof”? [6] Were FDR’s reforms within the purview of the Constitution’s “necessary and proper” clause? [7] Were the Reconstruction-era Legal Tender Cases [8] correctly decided? These questions deserve comprehensive treatment. That argument isn’t contained in Edwards’ book. In contrast to Edwards’ economic analysis, his legal narrative is somewhat superficial, derived in large part from contemporaneous accounts, some historical archives, and William Leuchtenberg’s 1995 book The FDR Years: On Roosevelt and His Legacy, which he describes as “the standard work on the Supreme Court during the time of Roosevelt.”  

Edwards acknowledges that the statutory authority for declaring a national bank holiday was “doubtful,” and notes that acting Treasury Secretary Dean Acheson resigned his post because of his concerns that the administration’s policies were illegal.  Beyond this, his largely journalistic rendition of the Supreme Court litigation is informative and may satisfy a general audience, but does not break new ground as legal scholarship. In fairness, this was not the author’s intent; yet, an account of the Gold Clause Cases is incomplete without a reckoning of the larger constitutional questions. [9] 

Although FDR’s abandonment of the gold standard is a bell that even Robert Bork conceded was impossible to un-ring, the efficacy of economic policy does not necessarily determine its constitutionality.  

[1] A prominent exception is Kenneth Dam’s article, “From the Gold Clause Cases to the Gold Commission: A Half Century of American Monetary Law,” 50 U. of Chicago Law Review 504 (1983).

[2] Presidential inaugurations were moved to January following adoption of the 20thAmendment.

[3] Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935) (consolidated with United States v. Bankers Trust Co.); Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317 (1935); and Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935). 

[4] Harvard Law School professor Henry Hart opined that “[f]ew more baffling pronouncements, it is fair to say, have ever issued from the United States Supreme Court.”

[5] 290 U.S. 398 (1934).

[6] Article I, section 8.

[7] Id.

[8] Knox v. Lee and Parker v. Davis, 79 U.S. 457 (1871) (overruling Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603 (1870)). See Robert G. Natelson, “Paper Money and the Original Understanding of the Coinage Clause,” 31 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 1017 (2008).

[9] Gerard N. Magliocca, “The Gold Clause Cases and Constitutional Necessity,” 64 Florida Law Review 1243 (2012).

O velho populismo retorna ao Brasil - Editorial Estadao

O espectro do populismo

São cada vez mais evidentes os sinais de que Bolsonaro, como governante, toma suas decisões estimulado pela perspectiva do aplauso fácil e imediato

Editorial O Estado de S. Paulo, 24/02/2019

O “bolsonarismo” é, por enquanto, apenas uma caricatura mal-ajambrada de movimento populista, desses que de tempos em tempos assombram o Brasil, mas isso não significa que o País possa tranquilizar-se. Ao contrário: a esclerose precoce do governo de Jair Bolsonaro parece ter despertado no presidente o demagogo que ele sempre foi e que se encontrava apenas anestesiado em razão de conveniências políticas. Caso isso se confirme, a recuperação do País, repleta de obstáculos, será seriamente prejudicada, com consequências graves para a solvência do Estado e para a retomada do desenvolvimento. Nem é preciso enfatizar o perigo que um cenário desses representa para a estabilidade do País e mesmo para a ordem social. 

São cada vez mais evidentes os sinais de que Bolsonaro, como governante, toma suas decisões não por razões de Estado ou como parte de alguma estratégia política de longo prazo, e sim estimulado pela perspectiva do aplauso fácil e imediato, este que brota de suas fanáticas hostes nas redes sociais – meio de comunicação caótico e irresponsável que Bolsonaro escolheu para se dirigir à sociedade, a título de estabelecer uma “relação direta entre o eleitor e seus representantes”, como disse em seu discurso ao ser diplomado como presidente. Desse modo, Bolsonaro equipara os atos de governo a tuítes tolos e a “memes” engraçadinhos. Nem é preciso mencionar os riscos institucionais que essa prática acarreta – basta lembrar a recente confusão criada pelo presidente e por um de seus filhos no Twitter a respeito de um dos ministros de Bolsonaro, demitido como consequência do imbróglio.

Para os propósitos de Bolsonaro, no entanto, as redes sociais são o meio ideal para confundir a opinião pública, criando uma realidade paralela na qual a gritante falta de traquejo do presidente para o exercício de tão importante cargo seja convertida em qualidade de “homem simples”. Nesse mundo bolsonarista, a falta de um programa claro de governo, em que haja firme compromisso com o progresso consistente e sadio do País, é compensada pela espetacularização das decisões do presidente e de seus ministros. Foi com esse espírito demagógico, por exemplo, que Bolsonaro anunciou recentemente nas redes sociais uma devassa no Ministério da Educação. “Daremos início à Lava Jato da Educação!”, exclamou o presidente no Twitter, para compreensível delírio dos bolsonaristas mais animados, que acham que todos os problemas do País se resumem à corrupção.

A ninguém, contudo, é dado o direito de surpreender-se. Em 1999, este jornal publicou uma entrevista com Bolsonaro na qual o então deputado federal declarou sua admiração por Hugo Chávez, então recém-eleito presidente da Venezuela, dizendo que “gostaria muito que sua filosofia chegasse ao Brasil”. Chávez conquistara o poder denunciando a hegemonia das oligarquias políticas, a degradação dos partidos, a corrupção desenfreada e a falência das instituições – e sobre essas bases ideológicas construiu uma ditadura populista tão sólida que sobreviveu a ele.

Não se pretende, com esse paralelo, sugerir que Bolsonaro possa reencarnar Chávez, mas é importante observar que o presidente brasileiro se elegeu com um discurso semelhante ao do falecido caudilho venezuelano e apresenta a mesma preocupante falta de compromisso com as liberdades democráticas. Seu histórico de defesa da ditadura militar e de supressão de direitos em nome de uma certa “ordem” fala por si, mas é preciso acrescentar ainda o fato de que Bolsonaro pretende resumir seu governo a uma luta do “bem” contra o “mal” – situação que inviabiliza a democracia. Foi assim que, recentemente – pelo Twitter, é claro –, Bolsonaro avisou que haverá “dificuldade” para “tentar consertar tudo isso”, pois “o sistema não desistirá”. Esse “sistema”, presume-se, engloba todos aqueles que discordam de Bolsonaro.

Assim, contando ainda com formidável concentração de poder político, econômico e cultural, resultado de uma vitória eleitoral acachapante e da ausência de uma oposição digna do nome, Bolsonaro e seu entorno parecem ter decidido acelerar sua marcha populista – receita certa para o desastre.