Carta do Atlântico, agosto de 1941: o início da trajetória para o desembarque do Dia D

 Declaração Conjunta da Carta do Atlântico

O texto completo da Carta do Atlântico e a análise de cada ponto são apresentados a seguir.

O Presidente dos Estados Unidos da América e o Primeiro-Ministro representante do Governo de Sua Majestade no Reino Unido, tendo-se reunido no Oceano, consideram oportuno dar a conhecer alguns princípios nos quais baseiam as suas esperanças num futuro melhor para o mundo e que são comuns à política nacional dos seus respectivos países:

1. Os vossos países não procuram qualquer engrandecimento territorial ou outro.

Roosevelt e Churchill não procuravam ganhos territoriais. Isto contrastava fortemente não apenas com os conflitos passados, mas também com o que os seus inimigos e o seu principal aliado procuravam. Afinal, o Terceiro Reich, o Japão Imperial, o Reino da Itália e a União das Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas (URSS) possuíam território desde o início da guerra.

2. Não desejam ver nenhuma mudança territorial que não esteja de acordo com os votos livremente expressos dos povos envolvidos.
3. Respeitam o direito de todos os povos de escolher a forma de governo sob a qual desejam viver e desejam que os direitos soberanos e o livre exercício do governo sejam restaurados àqueles de quem foram tirados à força.

Também se comprometeram a não realizar mudanças territoriais que sejam inconsistentes com os desejos livremente expressos pelos povos envolvidos e apoiaram o direito de todos os povos de escolherem a forma de governo sob a qual viverão. Isto foi um eco da promessa de autodeterminação feita por Woodrow Wilson uma geração antes.

4. Esforçar-se-ão, respeitando plenamente as suas obrigações existentes, por alargar a todos os Estados, pequenos ou grandes, vitoriosos ou derrotados, a possibilidade de acesso igualitário ao comércio mundial e às matérias-primas necessárias à sua prosperidade económica.
5. Desejam realizar a mais completa colaboração entre todas as nações, no domínio da economia, a fim de garantir a melhoria das condições de trabalho, o progresso económico e a protecção social para todos.

Recordando os fracassos de Versalhes, os líderes garantiram que a paz do pós-guerra moldada pela Carta do Atlântico quebraria as barreiras ao comércio, ao desenvolvimento e à actividade económica. Se o isolamento, o nacionalismo económico e os mercados fechados ajudassem a lançar as sementes da guerra, raciocinaram eles, então o comércio livre, o acesso às matérias-primas, os mares livres e um sistema económico mais liberal caracterizariam o mundo da cultura. Uma das pré-condições para qualquer paz duradoura terá de ser o maior comércio livre possível, disse FDR a Churchill durante a Conferência do Atlântico.

6. Após a destruição total da tirania nazi, eles esperam ver estabelecida uma paz que permitirá a todas as nações viver em segurança dentro das suas próprias fronteiras e que garantirá a todos os homens em todos os países uma existência livre, sem medo ou pobreza.

Da mesma forma, se a derrota militar da Alemanha foi incompleta em 1918, a Carta do Atlântico apelou inequivocamente à destruição final da tirania nazi e ao desarmamento das nações agressivas. Por outras palavras, os agressores seriam tratados de tal forma que os erros do pós-Primeira Guerra Mundial não se repetiriam.

7. Tal paz permitirá a todos os homens navegar sem obstáculos pelos mares e oceanos.
8. Estão convencidos de que todas as nações do mundo, tanto por razões práticas como espirituais, devem renunciar totalmente ao uso da força. Dado que nenhuma paz futura poderá ser mantida se as armas terrestres, marítimas ou aéreas continuarem a ser utilizadas pelas nações que a ameaçam, ou que são susceptíveis de a ameaçar com agressões fora das suas fronteiras, consideram que, enquanto se aguarda o estabelecimento de um sistema de segurança geral , abrangente e permanente, o desarmamento dessas nações é essencial. Da mesma forma, ajudarão e promoverão todo o tipo de medidas práticas que aliviem o pesado fardo dos armamentos que sobrecarrega os povos pacíficos.

Finalmente, a Carta previa o estabelecimento de um sistema mais amplo e permanente de segurança geral e uma redução nos gastos militares. Duas guerras globais no período de 20 anos convenceram FDR e Churchill de que tinham a obrigação de tentar controlar os impulsos destrutivos da humanidade que, no final da guerra, poderiam destruir a própria humanidade.

Franklin D. Roosevelt-Winston Churchill 14 de agosto de 1941

Fonte: https://cemeri.org/pt/enciclopedia/e-carta-del-atlantico-av

American Default (1934), Sebastian Edwards - book record, Amazon

Estou lendo este livro, e gostando. Leiam este artigo que postei anteriormente: 
https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2019/02/roosevelt-e-o-abandono-da-clausula-ouro.html

American Default: The Untold Story of FDR, the Supreme Court, and the Battle over Gold

Sebastian Edwards

Amazon.com: Books

As an economic history nerd I can only applaud the work of my UCLA colleague Sebastian Edwards in his vibrant telling the story of the long forgotten Supreme Court showdown over the United States’ abrogation of contracts written with the gold clause. Remembering the inflation of the Civil War greenback era, most creditors demanded gold clauses in debt contracts in which they would be repaid in in either gold or its paper money equivalent value.

This system worked fine until the onset of the Great Depression. It is here where Edwards begins his story as President Roosevelt adopts an inflationist policy by first abandoning the gold standard by requiring all citizens to turn in their physical gold at the then $20.67/ounce price. Then in June 1933 Congress adopts a joint resolution authorizing Roosevelt to increase the price of gold which he ultimately does to $35/ounce and the legislation abrogates the gold clause in all contracts. Indeed, most economists credit the early recovery from the depression directly to the monetary easing associated with Roosevelt’s gold policies.

If Congress hadn’t abrogated the gold clause all debts would have been written up to reflect the devaluation by 69%. Thus it would require a payment of approximately $1700 to repay a nominal debt of $1,000. Needless to say a host of bankruptcies would have ensued.

Of course several creditors sued and Edwards skillfully moves the action from Roosevelt and Congress to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ruled that it was in Congress’ power to alter private contracts, but it was not in its power to alter U.S. government debt. However, the court ruled that as of the date of the Joint Resolution gold was still trading at $20.67/ounce and Americans were not allowed to possess physical gold at that time. Hence there would be no damages. A brilliant 5-4 ruling by Chief Justice Hughes.

The reason why these cases have been forgotten is that if they went the other way all hell would have broken loose. Instead of rallying as the stock market did after the ruling, stocks likely would have crashed. It would have triggered a constitutional crisis with Court versus the other two branches of government. Indeed the lead up to the ruling was a precursor to the 1937 court fight that Roosevelt would have.
As an aside Edwards notes that the United States had a treaty with Panama concerning the lease payments for the Panama Canal. That treaty had a gold clause in it. After a long negotiation in 1939 the lease payment was increased retroactive to 1934 thereby reflecting the dollar devaluation. Thus, the U.S. made good on its international treaty obligations.

“American Default” is a worthy addition to the economics literature of the Great Depression. It should be read with the works of Friedman & Schwartz, Bernanke, Irwin, Eichengreen and Sumner. And because it is more a history book than an economics book the lay reader should find it very readable. Further given the rising debt/GDP ratio in the U.S. when coupled with even larger unfunded liabilities, the idea of a 21st century American default is not totally improbable.

Reviews: 

"Sebastian Edwards' American Default is just such a superb history of the US exit from gold in 1933-34, satisfyingly detailed and highly accessible on both the relevant economics & law."---David Frum, 

"Edwards analyses the default that followed President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s 1933 decision to devalue the dollar against gold. . . . The story is fascinating and the lessons eternal."---Martin Wolf, Financial Times

"[American Default] is the history of that mighty legal, moral, political and monetary controversy, the effects of which are with us still. . . . [Sebastian Edwards] knowledgably compares the 20th-century American default to Argentina’s 2002 abrogation of its dollar denominated debt."---James Grant, Wall Street Journal

"Brilliantly told."---Steve Hanke, Forbes

"Edwards ends his admirably accessible and illuminating book with some careful thoughts on recent financial crises around the world, such as those in Argentina and Greece, and shows why US gold cases from 1933 to 1935 are a useful precedent to understand how future such crises may be successfully resolved by hewing carefully to the rule of law. He believes that the cases may even be invoked by lawyers in other national, or international, arenas. If so, those involved will, no doubt, turn to this book for inspiration and guidance."---Benn Steil, Financial World

"Excellent. . . . A fascinating narrative of FDR's decision to devalue the dollar in 1933-34."---Scott Sumner, EconLog

"[Sebastian Edwards] skillfully narrates a pivotal episode in American political and economic history he considers too little remembered. . . . Edwards writes equally knowledgeably about economics and politics: . . . At a time of economic uncertainty at home and abroad, this comprehensive study of an important event in U.S. fiscal history has significant implications for today." (Publishers Weekly)

"Edwards’ book is fascinating, well written and enjoyable."---Geoffrey Wood, Central Banking

"Great book by UCLA economist Sebastian Edwards about a key moment in American economic history. Many economists believe that the most important thing FDR did to help the economy recover from the Great Depression was to go off the gold standard. As part of that policy, he pursued laws that rewrote many bond contracts, annulling gold clauses. It was controversial then (and surely would be again if such an issue were ever to arise). Edwards does a wonderful job telling the story."---Greg Mankiw, Greg Mankiw's Blog

"Fascinating. . . . I couldn't put this book down."---Brenda Jubin, Seeking Alpha

From the Back Cover: 

"American Default provides an in-depth look at one of the most important, but often neglected, events in U.S. economic history, the abrogation of bond’s gold clauses during the New Deal. Not only does the book provide an excellent discussion of the economics of this event, but it is a really good read because it delves into the personalities and the politics behind this effective default. I highly recommend it."--Frederic S. Mishkin, Columbia University

"I thought we knew about American abandonment of gold during the Great Depression. But American Default is an eye-opener. It is astonishing how chaotic were the circumstances and how woefully inadequate was understanding. Everyone interested in the history of gold, the Great Depression, the Greek or the Argentine crises, and in the crises to come should read this book."--Anne Krueger, Johns Hopkins University

"American Default is a fascinating and well-written book about the momentous decision to leave the gold standard in 1933. Sebastian Edwards skillfully weaves together the political, economic, and legal aspects of this important episode, with lessons for today. Highly recommended!"--Douglas A. Irwin, Dartmouth College, author of Clashing over Commerce: A History of US Trade Policy

"A really excellent book. Edwards provides a dramatic and readable account of monumental decisions that changed the course of history. American Default is sure to be a hit."--Michael D. Bordo, Rutgers University

Product details Hardcover: 288 pages Publisher: Princeton University Press (May 22, 2018) Language: English ISBN-10: 9780691161884 ISBN-13: 978-0691161884 ASIN: 0691161887

Roosevelt e o abandono da clausula ouro nos EUA - Mark Pulliam (Law and Liberty)

Estou lendo o livro citado de Sebastian Edwards: American Default (2018), uma história da maior decisão econômica da administração Roosevelt. (PRA)

Abandoning Gold and the Constitution?

by Mark Pulliam

Law and Liberty, February 25, 2019

https://www.lawliberty.org/2019/02/25/abandoning-gold-and-the-constitution/

Constitutional law scholars tend to focus on decisions involving abortion, same-sex marriage, desegregation, and administrative law, ignoring one of the 20th century’s most contentious legal battles: creditors’ challenge to President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s abrogation of the gold standard, and contemporaneous invalidation of “gold clauses” in contractual debt obligations, in 1933.  The New Deal spawned many events of interest to constitutional historians—such as FDR’s court-packing scheme, the abandonment of the Lochner line of cases, and the Carolene Products decision—but until the publication of Sebastian Edwards’s American Default in 2018, the great debt default of 1933-1935 had unaccountably been largely overlooked. [1] In the pre-“woke” era, constitutional battles were over economics, not culture, and no aspect of the economy is more fundamental than money.  

In response to the Great Depression, one of Roosevelt’s first acts as President, after taking office in March 1933, [2] was to ban the private ownership of gold—in the form of coins, bullion, or gold certificates—and to require all private gold holdings to be sold to the federal government at a set price. This unprecedented edict was quickly followed by taking the nation off the gold standard. Then, on June 5, 1933, at FDR’s behest Congress passed Joint Resolution No. 10, unilaterally annulling all “gold clauses”—contractual provisions requiring repayment of debts in gold, used in most bonds and mortgages since the Civil War to protect lenders against devaluation of paper money—in all past and future debt contracts, public and private. As the coup de grace, in January 1934, FDR devalued the currency by fixing a new price for gold almost 70 percent higher than its century-old price. 

Thus, to aid distressed farmers, debtors were allowed to repay their obligations with watered-down dollars, despite gold-denominated repayment obligations. Beleaguered rural voters favored inflation. (To remedy crippling deflation, FDR’s overarching goal was to increase domestic prices, especially for farm products.) Through these combined actions, the President and Congress had effectively wiped out more than 40 percent of all existing debt. Creditors were livid.  Bold holders who had purchased securities protected by gold clauses challenged the annulment as unconstitutional. This became one of the first skirmishes over the New Deal to be decided by the Supreme Court. In early 1935, following three days of argument, in a trio of related decisions [3] the Court upheld the federal government’s actions in a series of 5-4 decisions written by Chief Justice Charles Evan Hughes, with the conservative “Four Horsemen” dissenting. 

The majority blithely upheld the Joint Resolution invalidating gold clauses in private contracts, citing broad congressional power to regulate the economy and, with respect to the impairment of government obligations, denying that bond holders had been damaged by the taking. The rationale of Hughes’s opinion in the public debt cases was that annulment of the gold clause caused no economic injury to the bondholders because—even had the debt been repaid in gold coin—other features of FDR’s monetary reforms would have required that the gold be surrendered at a fixed price (less than actual market value). [4] The dissenters, who viewed FDR’s scheme as an abhorrent and dishonorable repudiation of contractual obligations, scoffed at this reasoning: “Obligations cannot be legally avoided by prohibiting the creditor from receiving the thing promised.” Justice James Clark McReynolds delivered the unitary dissent, departing from the prepared opinion to scornfully declare that the Constitution “is gone,” bitterly lamenting that “Shame and humiliation are upon us now.” 

This long-forgotten showdown occurred two years before the fateful “switch in time that saved nine,” but after the evisceration of the Contract Clause in Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell (in another 5-4  opinion, also penned by Hughes). [5] To some extent, the result in the closely-watched Gold Clause Cases was pre-ordained: many financial analysts had publicly predicted that a ruling against the FDR administration would plunge the country into a catastrophic crisis. According to Edwards, it was “plainly clear” that invalidating the Joint Resolution “would create chaos, including millions of bankruptcies across the country.” 

American Default tells a fascinating story. Edwards, who teaches international economics at UCLA, brings a sophisticated knowledge of finance to his analysis of the chaotic conditions underlying the Great Depression, the circumstances leading up to FDR’s decision to nullify the gold clauses, and the international implications of this action. (The author casually name-drops prominent economists with whom he has rubbed elbows over the years, including Milton Friedman, Anna Schwartz, and Allan Meltzer.) His account goes behind the scenes in 1933, which he suggests is “possibly the most eventful year in American history during times of peace.”  The full cast of characters who played a role in the vaunted “First 100 Days” are often over-shadowed by FDR himself. Edwards explores the personalities of Roosevelt’s New Deal advisers, especially the economists and so-called Brains Trust. 

Edwards suggests that FDR’s team was ill-equipped to manage the intricacies of monetary policy. Much of what the would-be central planners did was a haphazard experiment. Indeed, FDR did not choose his Secretary of the Treasury until shortly before he was sworn in as President. Most of FDR’s agenda during the “Hundred Days” has been panned by economists and historians. The Agricultural Adjustment Act and National Industrial Recovery Act, both struck down as unconstitutional, accomplished little. The Great Depression continued throughout the decade of the 1930s. Nevertheless, Edwards maintains that FDR’s tempestuous monetary reforms in 1933-34 arrested the nation’s economic freefall and boosted prices. Moreover, Edwards concludes—albeit with qualifying caveats—that the debt default engineered by FDR had no apparent deleterious effect on America’s economy in the long run. In both cases, Edwards offers charts and technical data (complete with “M1”) in support of his position. Friedman and Schwartz reached the opposite conclusion in their 1963 book A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960.

How well does the book, subtitled The Untold Story of FDR, the Supreme Court, and the Battle Over Gold, hold up as legal history or constitutional analysis? We have become inured to fiat currency and monetary gimmicks on the part of the Federal Reserve, but are these innovations consistent with an originalist understanding of the Constitution? What did the Framers mean when granting to Congress the power to “coin money [and] regulate the value thereof”? [6] Were FDR’s reforms within the purview of the Constitution’s “necessary and proper” clause? [7] Were the Reconstruction-era Legal Tender Cases [8] correctly decided? These questions deserve comprehensive treatment. That argument isn’t contained in Edwards’ book. In contrast to Edwards’ economic analysis, his legal narrative is somewhat superficial, derived in large part from contemporaneous accounts, some historical archives, and William Leuchtenberg’s 1995 book The FDR Years: On Roosevelt and His Legacy, which he describes as “the standard work on the Supreme Court during the time of Roosevelt.”  

Edwards acknowledges that the statutory authority for declaring a national bank holiday was “doubtful,” and notes that acting Treasury Secretary Dean Acheson resigned his post because of his concerns that the administration’s policies were illegal.  Beyond this, his largely journalistic rendition of the Supreme Court litigation is informative and may satisfy a general audience, but does not break new ground as legal scholarship. In fairness, this was not the author’s intent; yet, an account of the Gold Clause Cases is incomplete without a reckoning of the larger constitutional questions. [9] 

Although FDR’s abandonment of the gold standard is a bell that even Robert Bork conceded was impossible to un-ring, the efficacy of economic policy does not necessarily determine its constitutionality.  

[1] A prominent exception is Kenneth Dam’s article, “From the Gold Clause Cases to the Gold Commission: A Half Century of American Monetary Law,” 50 U. of Chicago Law Review 504 (1983).

[2] Presidential inaugurations were moved to January following adoption of the 20thAmendment.

[3] Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935) (consolidated with United States v. Bankers Trust Co.); Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317 (1935); and Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935). 

[4] Harvard Law School professor Henry Hart opined that “[f]ew more baffling pronouncements, it is fair to say, have ever issued from the United States Supreme Court.”

[5] 290 U.S. 398 (1934).

[6] Article I, section 8.

[7] Id.

[8] Knox v. Lee and Parker v. Davis, 79 U.S. 457 (1871) (overruling Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603 (1870)). See Robert G. Natelson, “Paper Money and the Original Understanding of the Coinage Clause,” 31 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 1017 (2008).

[9] Gerard N. Magliocca, “The Gold Clause Cases and Constitutional Necessity,” 64 Florida Law Review 1243 (2012).

1942: o Brasil declara guerra ao Eixo e confisca bens de seus cidadaos

A declaração de guerra era esperada e inevitável, depois do ataque alemão a navios brasileiros, na costa e longe dela. O confisco de bens dos cidadãos alemães, italianos e japoneses no Brasil já foi um ato mais controverso, uma vez que a maior parte deles eram ou imigrantes recentes, ou investidores desses países. Os negócios que poderiam servir ao esforço de guerra nazi-fascista ou que prejudicavam efetivamente o próprio esforço de guerra brasileira deveriam, sim, ser expropriados, nacionalizados, ou simplesmente colocados sob intervenção (caso de investimentos mais antigos que já estavam plenamente integrados à economia nacional), depois de investigação a respeito.
Um decreto geral e genérico, expropriando todos os ativos de todos os cidadãos ou súditos dos países declarados inimigos pode ser inconstitucional ou ilegal, pois viola direitos consagrados na Constituição: à propriedade, por exemplo.
O Brasil provavelmente tomou essa decisão a partir de medidas similares tomadas nos EUA, e que redundaram inclusive no internamento forçado de milhares de súditos japoneses, alguns até cidadãos americanos desde algum tempo, numa das grandes injustiças da Segunda Guerra. Mas, era compreensível uma medida dessas, depois do ataque traiçoeiro deslanchado pelo Japão contra os EUA (em Pearl Harbor, em 7/12/1941). Não era o caso do Brasil, a despeito dos ataques de submarinos alemães contra navios brasileiros, teoricamente neutros (mas carregando carga para o esforço de guerra americano ou britânico, alguns simplesmente de passageiros, navegando pelas costas do Brasil).
Mais relevante foi a decisão de sair da neutralidade, afirmada desde o início da guerra, e mantida durante sua fase inicial, decisão defendida por Oswaldo Aranha, que se apoiou em discurso de Rui Barbosa feito em Buenos Aires, em 14 de julho de 1916, sobre os "deveres dos neutros", no qual ele dizia que não se pode ser neutro em face da injustiça e do crime (ele se referia à invasão da Bélgica neutra pelo Reich alemão, situação que se repetiria na Segunda Guerra).
Grandes temas de relações internacionais.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Vargas decreta o confisco de bens de imigrantes alemães, italianos e japoneses

Em 11 de março de 1942, Brasil declara guerra aos países do Eixo e confisca os bens de imigrantes italianos, japoneses e alemães

Opinião e Notícia, 11 de março de 2016

Vargas e o presidente americano Franklin D. Roosevelt, em 1936 (Wikipédia)

O gaúcho Getúlio Vargas chegou à presidência da República em 1930. A chamada Era Vargas durou 15 anos e pode ser dividida em três fases: o governo provisório de 1930 a 1934, o governo constitucional de 1934 a 1937 e o Estado Novo de 1937 a 1945. A Segunda Guerra Mundial coincidiu com este último período, com a invasão da Polônia pelas tropas alemães de Hitler junto ao exército soviético de Josef Stalin em 1939.
O governo brasileiro tinha um perfil político autoritário, próximo do fascismo, mas mantinha uma aliança com os Estados Unidos, do qual tomava empréstimos generosos, de modo que o posicionamento do país na guerra se mostrava, a princípio, completamente indefinido.
O Brasil decidiu se juntar aos países democráticos — EUA, França, Inglaterra — contra os países do chamado Eixo — a aliança militar entre Alemanha, Itália e Japão — depois do afundamento de navios brasileiros nas costas marítimas do Brasil por submarinos nazistas.
A agressão dos fascistas gerou protestos de rua e convenceu o governo a declarar guerra à Alemanha. Todos os cidadãos alemães, japoneses e italianos no Brasil passaram a ser considerados inimigos de guerra e possíveis espiões. Em 11 de março de 1942, o governo brasileiro confiscou seus bens por meio de um decreto presidencial.

On this Day in History: Roosevelt, Churchill e Stalin se encontram em Teheran (NYT)

ON THIS DAY (The New York Yimes)

On Nov. 28, 1943, President Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Soviet leader Josef Stalin met in Tehran during World War II.

ROOSEVELT, STALIN, CHURCHILL AGREE ON PLANS FOR WAR ON GERMANY IN TALKS AT TEHERAN; 1,500 MORE TONS OF BOMBS DROPPED ON BERLIN

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DECISIONS VARIED

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Moscow Radio Asserts Political Problems Were Settled

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PARLEY NOW IS OVER

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Axis Reports Predict an Appeal to Germans to Quit Hitler

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By JAMES B. RESTON

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES

RELATED HEADLINES 1,000 Big Bombers, 7,789 Other Planes Built in November: Record Productions Achieved at Pace of One Every Five Minutes Around Clock: New Peaks in Navy Yards: 250,000 - Ton Output Is Largely of Combat ships, Among Them Many Aircraft Carriers Air Battles Sharp: Nazi Fighters and Guns Down 41 of RAF's Attacking Planes: South Berlin Hit: New Factory Area the Target in Fifth Heavy Blow in 15 Nights 8th Army Drives 6 MIles Up Coast Toward San Vito: Town 15 Miles From Key to Road to Rome Is Reported Taken -- Inland, Montgomery Wins Castelfrentano -- 5th Army Gains OTHER HEADLINES Soldier-Vote Bill Shifted by Senate to Let States Rule: Republicans Join With Southern Democrats in Scrapping the Plan for Federal Control: Congress Only to Advise: Opponents Will Charge Substitute Will Make Balloting Impossible for Forces Abroad Walker Opposes Postal Rate Rises: Tells Senators Department Is Studying Issue -- Swope Fights Racing Levy Olive Oil Imports Are Banned by U.S.: Importers Here Say Bumper Crop in Mediterranean Area May Go Begging Australians Peril Another Huon Base: Close in on Wareo, Japanese Stronghold in New Guinea - New Britain Is Battered Longo, Hague Foe, Is Imprisoned; Edison Joins U.S. Inquiry Plea RAF's Twin-Target Tactics Show Poser in Month's Blows at Reich

London, Saturday, Dec. 4--The Moscow radio announced early this morning that President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin had met in Teheran, Iran, "a few days ago" to discuss questions relating to the war and the post-war period.
"A few days ago," the Moscow radio said shortly after midnight, "a conference of the leaders of the three Allied nations--President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin--took place at Teheran.
"Military and diplomatic representatives also took part. The questions discussed at the conference related to the war against Germany and also to a range of political questions. Decisions were taken which will be published later."
[An Associated Press dispatch from London quoted the Soviet monitor as saying that full details of the conference might be announced between noon and 2 P.M. Eastern war time today, basing this prediction on the usual routine of the Moscow radio when announcing future broadcasts.]
The radio announcement, which came as a surprise to official quarters in London, said nothing about the present location of Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill, who held a five- day meeting with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek last week and made plans for the defeat of the Japanese and the dismemberment of their empire.
Details Are Awaited
Early this morning the Moscow radio had not indicated the nature of political and military discussions that took place in the Iranian capital, but it was generally assumed they dealt with the coordination of military plans for the final assault on Hitlerite Germany and with the unification of political plans for making peace with Germany on the basis of "unconditional surrender."
Official information that has come back to London since the Prime Minister left the capital has been extremely limited and indeed until the Moscow radio made its announcement the German radio was the main source of reports on the movements of the three leaders. It was, however, generally expected in London that the three leaders would in the course of their discussions decide to appeal to the German people over the heads of their Government to surrender or take the consequences of the air war in the west and an invasion of Russian armies from the east.
Stalin Crosses Own Border
While Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt had had seven previous conferences on the war, this was the first among the three leaders, and so far as is known it marked the first time that Mr. Stalin had left the Soviet Union since the revolution in 1917. The meeting was foreshadowed after the Quebec conference when Mr. Churchill told the House of Commons he "hoped" to meet with Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Stalin before the first of the year.
The Prime Minister had met Premier Stalin once before in the autumn of 1942, when he journeyed to Moscow to explain to him why it was impossible for the United States and Britain to invade the continent of Europe from the west that year.
Previous to that conference the United States and Britain had undertaken to concern themselves with the "urgent tasks" of creating a second front in 1942, and it is now known that the first Stalin-Churchill meeting was unsatisfactory to Mr. Stalin for military reasons. There are reasons for believing, however, that in Teheran very little if anything remained to be settled on the question of the second front except perhaps that of coordination of attacks on Germany from the east and west.
In addition to the coordination of military plans for a decisive phase of the war in Europe, it is generally believed by observers in London that the Teheran agenda covered a variety of questions that were either discussed briefly or shelved entirely by Secretary of State Cordell Hull, British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden and Foreign Commissar Vyachesalaff M. Molotoff when they met in Moscow last month.
Among the first of these questions was the status of the Polish Government, with which Premier Stalin broke diplomatic relations early this year. Since Britain went to war with Germany under the terms of the treaty alliance with Poland and since the Russian armies in their great westward sweep are now approaching the former Russo-Polish frontier, the Governments of both the United States and Britain have been hopeful that the Russo- Polish breach might be repaired.
Premier Stalin has already stated in a letter to The New York Times that he wished to see a "strong, independent Poland," and efforts have been made by London to try to get Mr. Stalin not only to renew diplomatic relations with Poland but, it is believed, to make Poland a party to the Russo-Czech twenty-year treaty alliance that will be signed within a few days.
It is assumed that this long-range question of the future Germany also was on the Teheran agenda for discussion and the question naturally arises as to whether the principle of "punishing" the aggressor would be applied to Germany as severely as it was applied to Japan in the Cairo declaration.
Whatever else the Allies may have agreed to coordinate at Teheran they did not coordinate their announcements about the fact that meetings were being held. The fact that the meetings were imminent was reported first in American newspapers. The fact that the North African conference with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had ended was reported prematurely by a Reuter correspondent in Lisbon. Senator Tom Connally, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, shared with the German radio the honor of "breaking" prematurely the fact that Mr. Stalin, Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill were in session and now this morning the Moscow radio, without pre- arrangement with London and Washington, announced that the conference had ended. Thus everybody "scooped" everybody else, which makes everybody even, although it makes nobody happy.
Axis Voices Concern
Before the Moscow broadcast today Axis sources continued to voice apprehension over the results of the parley.
Typical of their laborious attempts to anticipate the official announcements of the conference was the following comment in the Angriff:
"It seems that we are again to be asked to capitulate as a favor to the enemy. But we will again turn a deaf ear to this friendly invitation. The war criminals could have saved themselves a long trip."
The German telegraph service, picking up this same theme, which is general in the German press and radio, said "the [Allied] discussions are expected to result in a kind of ultimatum for the capitulation of the German people and its allies. The German people, however, know that their enemies try to hide their own weakness and difficulties behind every new propaganda bluff. This war of nerves is the enemy's last resort.
"The Russian drive has failed, the Allies have been unable to produce more than a slow- motion offensive in Italy, and the bombing in the west has failed to undermine either German morale or German production."
Elsewhere in the German press, however, correspondents do not support this official bravado. A remarkable article in Wednesday's Voelkisher Beobachter, for example, complains bitterly:
"Those people who spoke with deep sympathy about the people of bombed London have nothing else to say about bombed Berlin except, 'Well, you started it. Remember Warsaw, Rotterdam, London and Coventry? What you are now getting is only what you deserve.'"
Similarly Axis satellites are not either dismissing the "Big Three" conference lightly or attempting to speak like Germans of "the trumpets of Jericho which will leave the walls unmoved." They are admitting openly that the conference will have "great significance" no matter what it does.

As quatro liberdades de Franklin D. Roosevelt - Jeffrey Scott Demsky

FOUR FREEDOMS - Jeffrey Scott Demsky

http://textbookcheck.com/ency/?cat=60

In January 1941, Franklin Roosevelt outlined his “Four Freedoms” declaration before a joint session of Congress. During his remarks, the president identified four basic rights that he believed all humankind should enjoy. The first and second were those of free speech and unfettered worship. The last two were the freedoms from want and fear.[1] Once the American military entered the Second World War, mention of the “Four Freedoms” appeared in political speeches, government publications, as well as in cultural artifacts.[2]  The ideas have had great resilience. In modern times, landmarks across the U.S. and Europe memorialize the “Four Freedoms” as emblematic of the democratic nations’ triumph over fascism.[3]
There are, however, some misconceptions that skew our understanding of the speech. The “Four Freedoms” were not an ecumenical expression of goodwill. Rather, the rhetoric served a calculated political purpose. At the time of his remarks, the Second World War engulfed Europe and the Far East. Although the U.S. remained uninvolved with the struggle, President Roosevelt stated that he did not expect Americans to remain “neutral in their thoughts.”[4] Such interventionist prodding, however, concerned some onlookers. Only one generation earlier, the country’s involvement in the First World War had unloosed serious disagreements.[5] Many of these questions remained unsettled into the early 1940s. Against this backdrop, President Roosevelt’s globalist tilt irked members of such powerful isolationist organizations as the “America First Committee.”[6] His calls also met with criticism from prominent commentators such as Joseph Kennedy, Charles Lindbergh, and Henry Ford who thought it best for the U.S. to accommodate, rather than oppose, the fascist powers.[7]
President Roosevelt recognized that in order to enact his international agenda, he needed first to inspire public support. This was the parochial ambition that motivated his expansive “Four Freedoms” declaration.[8] In the months prior to his proclamation, the president had signaled his intentions in additional ways. He selected Frank Knox and Henry Stimson, both outspoken critics of isolationism, to lead the Navy and War Departments. He signed into law the Selective Training and Service Act, establishing the first peacetime draft in U.S. History. In December 1940, one month before laying out his “Four Freedoms,” Roosevelt delivered his so-called “arsenal of democracy” speech imploring Americans to embrace as their own the European fight against Nazism.[9]
In the months that followed his “Four Freedoms” remarks, the president intensified his efforts. He prodded Congress to replace its Neutrality Acts with legislation that came to be known as the Lend Lease programs. He brought Denmark, Iceland, and Greenland under the American security umbrella, and authorized the U.S. Navy to engage German vessels. That August, Roosevelt took his most significant foreign policy action by signing the Atlantic Charter with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill.[10] This eight-point document established American common cause with the British and restated verbatim language that first appeared in the “Four Freedoms.”[11]
In December 1941, after the Japanese Empire’s unexpected attack against Pearl Harbor, many Americans credited Roosevelt’s prescience. It was at this point that the “Four Freedoms” enjoyed a swift acceleration from mere political rhetoric into an exposition of grand strategy.
Franklin Roosevelt’s activist calls accomplished no less than the toppling of George Washington’s long-standing maxim to avoid diplomatic alliances.[12] Subsequent American presidents, from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush, have found in the “Four Freedoms” a sturdy foundation upon which to unwind their own interventionist doctrines. The “Four Freedoms” also influenced the narrative of twentieth-century global history. Portions of Roosevelt’s canon appear verbatim in both the preamble to the United Nation’s Charter as well as its Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[13] During the Cold War, the ideology connected member nations in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Such resilience betrays a larger and often misunderstood conclusion. Since its January 1941 appearance, the “Four Freedoms” declaration evolved from an abstract speech into a practical policy framework. During the twentieth century’s second half, it became an unquestioned set of foreign policy premises that justified wide-ranging American military actions. While most observers continue to think of the doctrine in terms of its wartime applications, the “Four Freedoms” irrevocably altered the scope and thrust of American diplomatic behaviors.[14]
JEFFREY SCOTT DEMSKY (San Bernardino Valley College)

Bibliography
Benjamin Alpers, Dictators, Democracy and American Public Culture: Envisioning the Totalitarian Enemy, 1920s-1950s. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003.
Frank Donovan. Mr. Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms: The Story Behind the United Nations Charter. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1966.
David Kennedy. Freedom From Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929–1945. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Stuart Murray and James McCabe. Norman Rockwell’s Four Freedoms: Images That Inspire A Nation. Stockbridge, MA: Berkshire House, 1993.
Marcus G. Raskin and Robert Spero. The Four Freedoms Under Siege: The Clear and Present Danger from Our National Security State. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007.
David F. Schmitz. The Triumph of Internationalism: Franklin D. Roosevelt and a World in Crisis, 1933-1941. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2007.
Sumner Welles. The World of the Four Freedoms. New York: Columbia University Press, 1943.

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[1] For the full text, see http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/fdrthefourfreedoms.htm.

[2] Stuart Murray and James McCabe, Norman Rockwell’s Four Freedoms: Images That Inspire A Nation (Stockbridge, MA: Berkshire House, 1993), 125.

[3] For example, Cape Coral, Florida’s Four Freedoms Park, New York City’s Four Freedoms Park, Washington D.C.’s F.D.R. Memorial, and Middelburg, The Netherlands’ Four Freedoms Park. One might also think of the American non-profit Fourth Freedom Forum, dedicated to freeing humanity from the fears of terrorism and war.

[4] David Kennedy, Freedom From Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 427.

[5] Matthew Coulter, The Senate Munitions Inquiry of the 1930s: Beyond the Merchants of Death (Westport, Ct.: Greenwood, 1997), 12-14.

[6] Wayne S. Cole, Charles A. Lindbergh And The Battle Against American Intervention in World War II (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974), 19, 117.

[7] Neil Baldwin, Henry Ford and the Jews: The Mass Production of Hate (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 103, 173; Susan Hertog, Anne Morrow Lindbergh (New York: Nan Talese, 1999), 321; Neal Gabler, An Empire of Their Own: How the Jews Invented Hollywood (New York: Crown Books, 1988), 344.

[8] Benjamin Alpers, Dictators, Democracy and American Public Culture: Envisioning the Totalitarian Enemy, 1920s-1950s (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 189.

[9] Julian Zelizer, Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security-From World War II to the War on Terrorism (New York: Basic Books, 2009), 49.

[10] Lloyd Gardner, “The Atlantic Charter: Idea and Reality, 1942-1945,” in Douglas Brinkley and David R. Facey-Crowther eds,, The Atlantic Charter (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 74.

[11] Thomas Fleming, The New Dealers’ War: FDR And The War Within World War II (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 88.

[12] Edward Pessen, “George Washington’s Farewell Address, the Cold War, and the Timeless National Interest,” Journal of the Early Republic 7 (1987): 2.

[13] Frank Donovan, Mr. Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms: The Story Behind the United Nations Charter (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1966), 37.

[14] David F. Schmitz. The Triumph of Internationalism: Franklin D. Roosevelt and a World in Crisis, 1933-1941 (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2007), 216.

Este dia na Historia: Acordo de ajuda EUA a URSS em 1942

De fato, a ajuda que os Estados Unidos deram à Grã-Bretanha, pelos land-lease agreements de agosto de 1941, junto com a declaração das "nações unidas", seguidas, pouco depois, pela ajuda que ambos os países começaram a dar à União Soviética, invadida pela Alemanha hitlerista em junho de 1941, foram essenciais, eu diria mesmo absolutamente indispensáveis para retornar o curso da guerra na Europa entre 1941 e 1942. Sem essa ajuda, a Grã-Bretanha talvez tivesse sucumbido ao poder nazista e a URSS também talvez tivesse deixado de existir, em face da mais formidável máquina de guerra criada pelo homem até aquele instante.
A URSS deve sua sobrevivência, ou seja, o regime comunista, unicamente à ajuda ocidental, sem a qual ela teria sucumbido e desaparecido nas dobras da história. Teria sido um mundo diferente, mas talvez um mundo dominado durante muito mais tempo pelo III Reich, que se teria tornado assim mestre absoluto da Eurásia, o continente duplo que domina o mundo. Mesmo os EUA teriam dificuldade em vencer alemães e japoneses sozinhos, ou levariam muito mais tempo, e a um custo humano inimaginável.
Falando em custos humanos, a única coisa, repito, a única coisa de que Stalin poderia dispor, à sua livre disposição, eram homens, que ele não hesitou em sacrificar terrivelmente. Basta ver, por exemplo, o diferencial de mortos DE GUERRA, entre a Alemanha e a URSS: 5,2 milhões, para a primeira, e 27 milhões para a segunda, de um total geral da guerra que chega a 62 milhões de mortos (dos quais "apenas" 273 mil para os EUA).
Em todo caso, esses acordos de ajuda, abaixo comentados, significaram a derrota do nazismo, em 3 anos, e a sobrevivência do comunismo soviético por mais 50 anos, ou duas gerações que tiveram de suportar um regime de escravidão humana quase tão desumana quanto o nazismo...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Soviet And Britain Sign War And Peace Pact; Molotoff And Roosevelt Plan For 2D Front; Army Fliers Blasted Two Fleets Off Midway

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U.S., Soviet Agree

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Russian, Here Secretly, Maps War Action in 1942 With President

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Lease Pact Signed

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Provides Reciprocal Aid and Plans for a 'Better World'

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U.S., Russia Agree On Actions In War

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By W.H. LAWRENCE

Special to The New York Times, June 12, 1942

RELATED HEADLINEA 20-Year Treaty:Mutual Aid Agreement Bars Separate Peace and Annexations: Japan Not Covered: Pact Based on Atlantic Charter Is Hailed by King and Kalinin Molotoff's London-U.S. Trip Was Best-Kept War Secret No Secret In Pact, British Are Told:Commons Cheers the News of Open Treaty--Agreement Is Hailed as Peace Safeguard Big Bombers Won:Routing Japanese Task Force June 4 Vital in Pacific Victory: Carriers Targets: Enemy's Invasion Ships Met and Pounded First Far West of IslandOTHER HEADLINESStrong Nazi Drive Fought In Ukraine:Russians Report Fierce Battle at Kharkov--Sevastopol Siege Gains Little 'Gas' Ration Unit Is Doubled To Tide Over 2 Weeks More:Emergency Period Is Extended From June 30 to July 15--OPA Says Time Is Needed to Train for Permanent Plan: Jones Beach Buses Not Curbed by ODT House Committee Raises Travel Tax:Doubles Transport Impost, Adds to Cigarette and Cigar Levies--125 Million Gained Young Deck Crew Destroys U-Boat:Freighter Gets 3d, Perhaps 5th, Raider Sunk in Caribbean--2 Allied Vessels Lost Bir Hacheim Falls to Axis in Libya; Free French Retire After 16 Days If in Doubt, Put It Out War News Summarized

Washington, Friday, June 12--The United States and Russia have reached a full understanding on the "urgent tasks of creating a second front in Europe in 1942," and have signed a master lease-lend agreement providing reciprocal defense aid and designed to create "a new and better world" after victory is won, it was announced officially yesterday.

A White House announcement at midday was the first public revelation that Vyacheslaff M. Molotoff, Soviet Foreign Commissar, had flown secretly to the United States and in several conferences with President Roosevelt and other political and military leaders of the United States Government between May 29 and June 4 had achieved unity on these three main propositions:

1. The urgent tasks of creating a second front in Europe in 1942.

2. Measures for increasing and speeding up the supplies of planes, tanks and other kinds of war materials from the United States to the Soviet Union.

3. Fundamental problems of cooperation of the Soviet Union and the United States in safeguarding peace and security to the freedom-loving peoples after the war.

"Link in Solidarity Chain"

At midnight the State Department announced that Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Maxim Litvinoff, the Soviet Ambassador, had signed a master lease-lend pact, which was described as "an additional link in the chain of solidarity being forged by the United Nations in their twofold task of prosecuting the war against aggression to a successful conclusion and of creating a new and better world."

"The agreement reaffirms this country's determination to continue to supply in ever- increasing amounts aid to the Soviet Union in the war against the common enemy," the State Department announcement said. "The agreement also provides for such reciprocal aid as the Soviet Union may be in a position to supply. But no matter how great this aid may prove to be, it will be small in comparison with the magnificent contribution of the Soviet Union's armed forces to the defeat of the common enemy."

Washington's two agreements with the Soviet Union were disclosed shortly after similar pacts between the Russians and the British had been announced to the House of Commons by Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary, with whom Mr. Molotoff had negotiated secretly before visiting the United States. The Anglo-Soviet agreements included an identical reference to the establishment of a second front and a twenty-year mutual assistance pact against "Hitlerite Germany."

Japan Not Mentioned

Neither announcement in Washington mentioned discussions of Russian cooperation in the war of the United States and Great Britain against Japan, with whom Soviet Russia remains at peace, but it was pointed out that no announcement would have been likely under the circumstances even if discussions had taken place. But the master lease-lend agreement, making no mention of the fact that Russia was warring against the Germans and not the Japanese, provided that "the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will continue to contribute to the defense of the United States of America and the strengthening thereof and will provide such articles, services, facilities or information as it may be in a position to supply."

Neither Washington nor London indicated just how soon an American-British expeditionary force could be expected to make a landing on the Nazi-held Continent of Europe to recapture lost territory from the Germans and provide a "diversion front" to which German troops, now pressing against Russia, would have to be sent.

The White House also said that the President and Mr. Molotoff had agreed on measures "for increasing and speeding up the supplies of planes, tanks and other kinds of war materials from the United States to Soviet Russia." It was learned on good authority that Mr. Molotoff carried back to Moscow a new schedule of American lease-lend shipments, replacing the Moscow protocol, which expires June 30.

It was understood that the new aid schedule placed greater emphasis on finished military mat & eacute;riel, especially tanks and bombers, than the agreement negotiated in October by the Harriman-Beaverbrook mission, which provided primarily for supplies of raw materials.

Looking toward victory over the Axis, the President and Mr. Molotoff also found unity on "the fundamental problems of cooperation of the Soviet Union and the United States in safeguarding peace and security to the freedom-loving peoples after the war."

An important feature of the master lease-lend pact was its acceptance of Secretary Hull's battle for the principle of free world trade as an important means of preventing future wars.

Article VII of the Russian-American agreement, substantially like that signed earlier by Great Britain and China, was as follows:

"In the final determination of the benefits to be provided to the United States of America by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in return for aid furnished under the Act of Congress of March 11, 1941, the terms and conditions thereof shall be such as not to burden commerce between the two countries, but to promote mutually advantageous economic relations between them and the betterment of world-wide economic relations.

"To that end they shall include provision for agreed action by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, open to participation by all other countries of like mind, directed to the expansion, by appropriate international and domestic measures of production, employment and the exchange and consumption of goods, which are the material foundations of the liberty and welfare of all peoples; to the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce and to the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers; and, in general, to the attainment of all the economic objectives set forth in the Joint Declaration made on Aug. 14, 1941, by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, the basic principles of which were adhered to by the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Sept. 24, 1941.

"At an early convenient date conversations shall be begun between the two governments with a view to determining, in the light of governing economic conditions, the best means of attaining the above-stated objectives by their own agreed action and of seeking the agreed action of other like-minded governments."

Other Provisions of Pact

Other provisions of the lease-lend pact were:

1. The United States will continue to supply the Soviet Union with war articles, war services and war information authorized by the President.

2. The Soviet Government will reciprocate with as much aid "as it may be in a position to supply."

3. The Soviet Government will not transfer lease-lend aid to another country or permit its use by non-Soviet officials or employes without the permission of the President.

4. The Soviet Government will pay American patent holders when asked to do so by the President.

5. The Soviet Government will return to the United States lease-lend military equipment desired by this government after the war.

6. The Soviet Government will receive credit for the war aid it has given this government in determining after the war the benefits it is to provide the United States for lease-lend held.

7. The agreement supersedes all previous lease-lend agreements between the two countries.

Nye Cool to Second Front

Congressional reaction to the agreement between the United States Government and Russia generally was good, although the pre-war leaders in opposition to the President's foreign policy urged caution in opening a second front in Europe, and one of them, Senator Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota, chided "others of our allies" for not opening "a second front before this time." Senator Nye added that "we've got a front or two of our own that we are needing to devote ourselves to most energetically."

Senator Burton K. Wheeler of Montana, another opponent of the President, said he hoped that "we don't attempt an invasion until we're prepared," but he was in favor of doing "everything we can to get war tools and tanks to Russia now that she's our ally in this war."

Senator Tom Connally of Texas, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who was among the few officials invited to meet with Mr. Molotoff while he was here, spoke approvingly of the agreement, declaring that the United States must give Russia "every possible aid and assistance in defeating the enemy." He said that Mr. Molotoff's visit here "was very helpful in creating unity between our countries in the prosecution of the war." He said the closest contact and understanding in regard to military operations, "including the ultimate establishment of a western front," was of vast importance to both countries.

Tydings for Project

Other comment included:

Senator Millard E. Tydings of Maryland: "If the military people deem it wise, it certainly looks sensible to me."

Senator William H. Smathers of New Jersey: "I think a second front ought to be opened immediately--the quicker the better. I don't see any sense in having our troops and the British sitting on the British Isles. I'm in favor of opening a second front as soon as the military experts think it advisable."

Representative Carl Vinson of Georgia, chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee: "This is good news; it is to be earnestly hoped that the United Nations can at the earliest possible date open a second front in Europe. I have been of the opinion for some time that the combined resources of England and the United States should be hurled against the Axis by opening up a second front. It is imperative that this be done immediately, for I am of the opinion it will insure victory to the Allied nations."

Senator Lister Hill of Alabama: "The most momentous and critical place in the whole world battle line is the war on the Russian front. The Molotoff agreement is extremely gratifying."

Senator Carl A. Hatch of New Mexico: "I am in hearty agreement with supplying all the equipment we can to our Allies. I want a second front opened just as quickly as possible, consonant with military preparedness."

Wheeler Asks About Peace

Senator Wheeler: "I feel we should do everything we can to get war tools and tanks to Russia now that she's our ally in this war. I am glad to note that the President and Mr. Molotoff have come to an understanding in helping to maintain peace after the war. What the people would be interested to know is what steps, if any, have been taken to bring about peace. I hope the President and Mr. Molotoff come to an agreement similar to the one that Russia and England entered into--that Russia was not asking territorial aggrandizement and would not in the future interfere with the internal affairs of other nations, as Eden says. I hope that the United States will not attempt an unsound invasion of Europe. I hope we don't attempt an invasion until we're fully prepared. The people of the United States want no Dunkerques."

Senator Richard B. Russell of Georgia: "A second front is going to have to come to win the war. We should open it as soon as it is possible from a military point of view--without the possibility of a second Dunkerque."