Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine: NYTimes briefing, November 4, 2022

The New York Times 

By Carole Landry Editor/Writer, Briefings Team November 4, 2022

Welcome to the Russia-Ukraine War Briefing, your guide to the latest news and analysis about the conflict.

The U.S. is setting up a new command to train and equip the Ukrainian military and committing to an additional $400 million in military aid. The Group of 7 nations pledged to help “repair, restore and defend” Ukraine’s energy and water infrastructure. About 4.5 million Ukrainian households are without power, including nearly half a million in Kyiv.  China called on the world to oppose the threat or use of nuclear weaponsin Ukraine. Get the latest updates here. Track the invasion with our maps.

Russian recruits attended a ceremony in the Rostov region on Monday before leaving for Ukraine. Sergey Pivovarov/Reuters

Russian conscripts in combat

Russia is sending newly drafted troops to the front line in eastern Ukraine to try to push back Ukrainian forces, but the influx has not resulted in any Russian gains on the ground, according to military analysts.

President Vladimir Putin used a National Unity Day appearance today to announce that 318,000 soldiers had been recruited to join the Russian Army, with 49,000 of those already in combat.

The fighting in the eastern Donbas region has been particularly intense. Gen. Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, the commander of the Ukrainian military, said in a statement posted on Telegram yesterday that Russian forces were staging up to 80 assaults per day.

The scale of Russian losses in these battles is uncertain, but analysts say the number of casualties is high. The Institute for the Study of War, a research group based in Washington, said ill-prepared conscripts were being “impaled” during offensives in Donetsk. The Ukrainian military said today that more than 800 Russian soldiers had been wounded or killed over 24 hours.

In two counter-offensives in the northeast and the south, the Ukrainian military has reported step-by-step gains in cutting supply lines and damaging Russian ammunition and fuel depots.

In the south, Ukrainian troops are advancing toward Kherson, which fell to the Russians in the early weeks of the war. The Russian-appointed administration in the city has relocated to a site 50 miles away, but Russian troops have not decamped, according to residents and Ukrainian officials.

Ukrainian military intelligence says Russia has deployed about 40,000 soldiers to the area, including some elite troops such as airborne forces, to stop Ukrainian forces from reclaiming Kherson.

The remaining residents in Kherson are stocking up on food and fuel to survive.

New reparations model makes Kremlin kleptocracy pay for Ukraine’s reconstruction - Democracy Digest

New reparations model makes Kremlin kleptocracy pay for Ukraine’s reconstruction

Democracy Digest

October 31, 2022

https://www.demdigest.org/new-reparations-model-makes-kremlin-kleptocracy-pay-for-ukraines-reconstruction/

Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction should be financed by funds sanctioned from the Kremlin’s kleptocrats, argues Azeem Ibrahim, Director of Special Initiatives at the New Lines Institute of Strategy and Policy. 

In thirteen legal conclusions, new Multilateral Action Plan on Reparations spells out an international legal process to identify, collect, and distribute sanctioned Russian money, for the benefit of Ukraine, he writes for New Europe:

• Our legal analysis envisages the creation of a new fund and compensation commission, drawing on the precedent of the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) established to compensate Kuwait in the face of Iraq’s invasion in 1990.
• Signatories of this agreement would commit to seize Russian assets within their jurisdiction, in accordance with their national and constitutional requirements, and place them into the fund, for subsequent distribution by the new compensation commission.
• Ukrainians and the Ukrainian state could petition a commission for reconstruction and reparation funds. Once evidence of necessity was produced, the commission could draw on funds gathered by these methods and disburse the money.

  Karen Dawisha’s book Putin’s Kleptocracy noted that hundreds of billions of dollars are paid to regime affiliates in bribery money alone, Ibrahim adds. A creative treaty regime could render those assets available for the fund.

In combination with several U.N. resolutions and a ruling from the International Court of Justice that have found that Russia has waged a war of aggression, the International Law Commission’s Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts establish the international legal basis for transferring Russia’s reserves to Ukraine, adds Robert Zoellick, a former U.S. trade representative, deputy U.S. secretary of state and World Bank president.

In doing so, the U.S. and allied countries wouldn’t be taking Russian reserves for themselves; they would transfer them to an international fund for compensation. The U.S. should also propose to the U.N. that frozen Russian reserves could finance a U.N. claims commission to compensate low-income countries victimized by Russia’s shock to food supplies, he writes for the Wall Street Journal.

How do we build a truly comprehensive international response to stymie kleptocratic regimes like Russia? asks Ryan Arick, Assistant Program Officer at the International Forum for Democratic Studies.

“Sustaining the Momentum: Countering Kleptocracy in Russia and Beyond” was the focus of a recent event at which experts and practitioners discussed democracies’ collaborative efforts to increase transparency in the financial sector, leverage sanctions against malign actors, and connect anti-kleptocracy actors across sectors. But more needs to be done, not just related to the war in Ukraine, but also in the broader global context where kleptocratic networks can thrive, he writes:

• USAID Executive Director of the Anti-Corruption Task Force Shannon N. Green (@ShannonNGreen1) outlined USAID’s current efforts to meet this challenge, which include the launch of a “de-kleptification guide” and a global support fund for independent journalists.
• Nate Sibley (@NateSibley) advocated for a democratic, global economy founded on “friend-shoring,” or increasing coalitions among like-minded countries, to protect vital institutions and reduce vulnerabilities to malign influence.
• As for the professional enabling industries, the U.S. Helsinki Commission’s Paul Massaro (@apmassaro3) urged, if we “can clean those sectors up, we can effectively defang our adversaries.”
• Publish lists of targeted assets, or appoint commissioners to oversee anti-corruption work and serve as points of contact for civil society and others focused on the fight against kleptocracy, said Nikita Kulachenkov (@nekulachenkov).

Last year, the Biden Administration released a presidential memorandum identifying corruption as a core national security threat; the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) launched the Anti-Corruption Task Force; and several pieces of legislation have been introduced to target professions in open societies that enable kleptocrats to hide their illicit funds, Arick adds. RTWT

For the past several years, Oliver Bullough, a former Russia correspondent, has guided “kleptocracy tours” around London, explaining how dirty money from abroad has transformed the city, the New Yorker adds. His book, Butler to the World – one of the best of 2022 – argues that the UK actively solicited such corrupting influences, by letting “some of the worst people in existence” know that it was open for business.

Ukraine War, 4 November 2022: Air War Update, Part 1, Basics - Tom Cooper (Medium)

 Tom Cooper

Nov 4, 2022

Ukraine War, 4 November 2022: Air War Update, Part 1, Basics

Today, I’ll try start a ‘mini-series’ of features addressing questions like,

- What is going in the air war over Ukraine?

- What is happening with both air forces?

Explaining this — and understanding it — requires ‘going back to the point 1’.

Point 1: BASICS

The Point 1 about air power deployed in this war is the fact that both sides are operating aircraft types actually, and essentially, developed during the Soviet times. Sure, types like Sukhoi Su-30, Su-34, and Su-35 came into being after the dissolution of the USSR, and some of stuff operated by Ukrainians is ‘heavily upgraded’, too. But, keep in mind: all the Russian Su-30/32/35-Wunderwaffen are all still based on the Sukhoi Su-27, developed back in the 1970s. The same is valid for, for example, the few heavily modified Ukrainian MiG-29MUs.

As next, one needs to keep in mind that in the former USSR, and in the Russian Federation, there is just one authority responsible for conceptualising future combat aircraft, and for ordering them. That is the GenStab. GenStab is the sole military procurement authority and thus responsible for the development and acquisition of everything — every single piece of equipment, every weapons system, every bullet, every screw, every spade, every aircraft, every ship, and every intercontinental ballistic missile purchased for the Russian armed forces.

Sure, during the Soviet times, there used to be a lot of different design bureaus (OKBs) of combat aircraft: Lavochkin, MiG, Sukhoi, Yakovlev — all remain famous until this very day. There were lots of factories manufacturing their designs, too. But, none of OKBs was researching and developing any combat aircraft without an order from the GenStab, and no factory was manufacturing any. That was that way back in the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s…. 1980s, and remains that way until this very day: nothing in the Russian armed forces happens without an amen from the GenStab.

Until the mid-2010s (yes, around the times of the first invasion of Ukraine), the GenStab was preparing all of its specifications on basis of experiences from the Second World War.

When it comes to air power, one of crucial experiences from the Second World War was that an average tactical combat aircraft had a ‘service life’ — or ‘life expectancy’ — of about 120 to 160 hours. Means: statistically, one could expect the majority of combat aircraft to get shot down, or be badly damaged within 120–160 hours of combat operations; or the battle or campaign in question was over by the time the aircraft was flown for 120–160 hours. Then, the operational tempo would decrease and thus there was time to subject the surviving aircraft to complex maintenance.

The latter was of advantage also because designing and manufacturing aircraft that were ‘simple’ to maintain for these 120–160 hours, made things easier for units operating them, and for the logistics system. The units did not require having personnel qualified to run complex maintenance, did not need being equipped with expensive maintenance facilities, and the logistics system only had to care about ‘simpler’ spare parts (say: tyres, braking parachutes, cockpit canopies, etc.).

Result?

For the last 70+ years, all the Soviet/Russian combat aircraft were made to last some 150–200 hours. In this regards, it didn’t matter if this was a MiG-15, or MiG-21, or, say, MiG-25. And, sure, by the 1970s-1980s, they’ve improved their manufacturing quality to the degree where types like MiG-29s and Su-27s (and their equipment, like engines) were made to last up to 400 hours. With few ‘tricks’ — like down-tuning engines — one could stretch that up to 600 hours. Was ‘handy’ in peace-time, saving lots of money, but, be sure: at war, the engines would’ve been uprated to their max thrust as first.

Foremost, the essential idea was still the same. Even the latest types of combat aircraft could be flown intensively for these 120–160 or 400 hours, and with minimal maintenance. But, after being flown for as much, they had to be subjected to overhauls: essentially, complete re-building of every single airframe. All their major assemblies (engines, piping, radars etc.) had to be replaced.

(BTW, this is one of reasons why the Soviets really operated over 12,000 tactical combat aircraft as of the 1970s and 1980s — which is a figure plenty of youngsters have a problem with, nowadays: a third of the fleet was undergoing overhauls at any given moment; which in turn means that ‘only’ about 8,000 were actually available.)

EXCEPTION FROM THE RULE

First major improvement in this regards….or the sole exception — happened in just one case: the one case where a Soviet/Russian-designed jet was not only adapted, but actually custom-developed to customer’s specifications and requirements. That was in the mid-1990s, when India requested Sukhoi (and paid it) to convert its Su-27UB two-seat conversion trainer with combat capability into a powerful multi-role fighter-bomber, resulting in the Su-30MKI. This project forced the Russians into stretching that ‘service life’ of their combat jets (and their equipment) up to 800 and then 1000 hours; into developing ergonomic cockpits; into adapting foreign computers to improve their avionics etc., etc., etc.

Notably: this was the sole case where it was not the GenStab to place the order for development of a new combat aircraft, but a foreign customer that did so — and that in something like 100 years of Soviet/Russian aviation industry.

But, don’t worry: it was already in 2006 that Putin made an end with all such practices, when ordering — per decree, as usually — all the Russian aviation-designing- and manufacturing companies to be merged into the corporation abbreviated with OAK. After all, he ‘had to’ bring the ‘chaos under control’, i.e. make it sure he’s going to cash his cut from the income of the companies in question.

Now pay attention: essentially, within the OAK — i.e. along Putin’s decree establishing the same — foreign customers had (and still have) no say any more in the development of future combat aircraft.

With hindsight, it can be said that exactly this is what, actually, ‘killed’ the Su-57.

Reason?

Because Putin’s decree creating the OAK was prohibiting a situation where India could seriously influence the requirements, and thus the design of the new jet. Ultimately, and between others, it resulted in a situation where the Russians refused to develop what the Indians demanded them to develop, and were ready to pay for, and created a situation where Indians were not ready to pay for something they did not need.

Without Indian funding, and without Putin being ready to ‘waste’ more of ‘his’ money (stolen from Russia) — Sukhoi….erm… OAK couldn’t afford completing the development of all the necessary avionics and engines.

CONCLUSION

Conclusion from all of this is ‘on hand’: had this war lasted 3–14 days, as originally planned by Putin, ‘no problem’. The VKS would’ve been flying as much as possible and necessary: it could’ve deployed all of its might against Ukraine, and the OAK would have had no problems with keeping it operational, i.e. overhauling it once the ‘campaign’ would have been over.

However, with this war going on for more than eight months — it simply can’t.

Yes, sure, the VKS is still flying up to 200 sorties a day, but this is putting an immense strain on available airframes, requiring one third of them to undergo overhauls. And, when these overhauls are undertaken in a big rush, and under the local conditions in regards of quality management…. well, then the Sukhoi-Wunderwaffen are crashing and lots of people die — exactly like it recently happened to two of them, both during post-overhaul test-flights.

…and since in Putin’s Russia one cannot blame the ‘System Putin’ for all of this, well, it’s seagulls to blame, or whatever else…

Ukraine War, November 3, 2022: combats in land - Tom Cooper (Medium)

 Tom Cooper is a great military commentator about Russia's War of Aggression against Ukraine. This one is from Medium.

 

Tom Cooper

Medium, Nov 3, 2022

Ukraine War, 3 November 2022

Today was the 253rd day of Putin’s 3-day-invasion of Ukraine — and I’m going to take a closer look at different sections of the frontline.

STRATEGIC

Early on 29 October, Ukrainians hit the Russian Black Sea Fleet in the port of Sevastopol with semi-submerged, remotely controlled vessels. It’s not entirely sure what did they hit, but there are strong indications that two warships were targeted, including at least one Krivak-class frigate. Here I would recommend following this Twitter thread for further info.

The Keystone Cops in Moscow explained that the attack didn’t happen, then that they have repulsed it. Conclusion is obvious: they couldn’t suffer any kind of losses because they have repulsed an attack that didn’t happen — and, therefore, because nothing has happened, Moscow suspended its participation in the grain export deal. Then, less than 48 hours later, it recalled that decision: supposedly, Ukraine offered ‘written guarantees’ it wouldn’t attack any of Russian Navy warships controlling the ‘safe corridor’ for ships exporting Ukrainian grain…

What? You think the Russian foreign policy is making 0 sense? Silly you… and, therefore, Moscow is meanwhile eagerly accusing Kyiv of preparing either a dirt bomb attack, or some sort of a major incident at the Enerhodar NPP. You know, because Ukrainians are badly in need of poisoning half their country with radioactivity… not because the infrastructure of the NPP has been modified so much, the last 20+ years, the Russians can’t connect it to their own power grid any more. No, no. Therefore, the Russians have shelled the NPP’s power supply, today, cutting it off. The cooling of five reactors is now depending on diesel-powered generators: there’s enough fuel for these to work for 14 days…

Ah yes: and after failing to mobilise even 90,000 reservists — due to complete disorganisation, caused by widespread corruption (thank you, Putin) — the VSRF has launched its autumn draft: 120,000 conscripts will be drafted — and deployed to fight in Ukraine. Because, you know, Ukraine is Russia, so it’s OK if they fight there: that’s not violating any of Putin’s laws… makes as much sense as NATO supplying 14 different artillery systems, 50 different types of vehicles, and about a dozen of different air defence systems to the ZSU: nothing better but making logistics more complex in the middle of a war…

Meanwhile, Surovikin’s Missile Offensive is going on. There are days with lots of activity (like on 31 October, when Ukrainians claimed to shave shot down 44 out of 55 Russian cruise missiles and LPGMs fired at Ukraine), and then there are relatively quiet days, ‘in between’. Generally, this offensive is said to be targeting the Ukrainian power grid. However, four S-300s fired at Mykolaiv yesterday, have hit a gymnasium, a college, and a college dorm. Similarly, in Nikopol, on the western bank of the Dnipro, the Russians deployed in the Enerhodar area continued shelling schools and kindergartens. Thus, that itch in my small toe tells me, there ‘might be’ a slightly different purpose in what is done there — though still ‘perfectly’ in sense of Putin’s plot for the entire future of Ukraine.

The last few days were quite full of reports about heavy losses of VKS helicopters. For example, on 31 October, Ukrainians claimed three (yes: 3) Ka-52s as shot down in the Kherson area (including this one). Arguably, this one was actually shot down weeks ago, but this ex-Belarusian Mi-8MTKO-1 (possibly operated by the Wagner PCM), was shot down on the 31st. Moreover, a video surfaced purportedly shown somebody planting explosive charges on a Ka-52 at the Veretye AB, in the Pskov Oblast.

Regarding the Ukrainian Air Force: this is lately flying 14 to 20 air strikes a day, mostly against targets in Kherson Oblast. Apparently, it lost one Mi-8 on 31 October.

WESTERN LUHANSK

At the tactical level, for me it’s kind of hard to get used to the ‘new battlefield’ — especially so in western Luhansk: after months of reporting about fighting for Izyum, then Severodonetsk, then Lysyschansk, then along the Siversky Donets River and on approaches to Slovyansk etc., the frontline is now almost 100km further EAST. Sure, I’ve reported about Ukrainian offensives on the Oskil River and beyond it, back in September and early October, but still… Moreover, except with rain and resulting mud, Ukrainians seem to still be busy recovering all the stuff the Russians have left behind when fleeing. For example, this 2S5 Giantsint-S was captured with a full load of ammo calibre 152mm.

Furthermore, it’s hard to describe what exactly is going on along this section of the frontline. Essentially, both sides are reporting ‘local counterattacks’, lots of shelling, too, but not really a ‘lot’ in terms of big-style action. That said, east of Kupyansk, and after smashing something like a dozen of VSRF’s BTGs back in late September, Ukrainians seems to have crossed the large empty area immediately east of that town to reach Pershotravneve, Orlyanske, Kyslivka, and Kotlyarivka, but haven’t liberated any of the villages in question. Further south, there are rumours — and then rumours ‘spread’ by quite good sources — about Ukrainians being much closer to the Svatove than generally reported. However, the mass of such posts in the social media is removed shortly after, and then…. ‘nothing happened’. We’ll see what comes out there.

Further south from there, the frontline has stabilised down the western side of the T1303 highway, that is, approximately: from Kuzemivka to Kolomychykha, then down to Raihorodka and Kovalivka (all of these are still under the Russian control.

The Russians are still controlling Kremina, and from there regularly sending their reservists into attacks in direction of Torske. Surely enough, the latter was claimed as (re-)captured by all the possible Putin-fans over a month ago, but, somehow, turns out to still be under Ukrainian control. Read: could be something is exaggerating there. At least a bit, and probably because of all the losses the VSRF has suffered in that area…

DONBASS

Since about two weeks, the Russians are back to offensive in the Siversk area. The last two days, they have reached Bilohorivka (on the Siversky Donets, 10km west of Lysychansk). Haven’t taken the place, but seems to have captured few ruined homes on its eastern side.

Three months of Russian assaults on Bakhmut have resulted in profound changes of the frontline in that area. The 93rd Mech pushed the Russians back in the Soledar area, but don’t worry: they’re still assaulting the eastern side of Bakhmut, still assaulting Ivanhrad and Opytne south of Bakhmut. With other words: exactly as predicted by all the possible Putin-fans: the VSRF has ‘secured’ this ‘strategically important town and area’… or not at all. I know, it’s not fair to make jokes, then lots of people there are suffering — and terribly at that. On 3 November, they lost a Su-25 in that area(apparently, pilot ejected safely). But really, I haven’t ‘seen’ any dumber, idiotic, and more pointless ‘military operation’ of this kind since the IRGC’s idiocy best-known as Karbala-4, back in December 1986…

Further east/south-east, and like since eight months now, the Russians are assaulting Avdiivka, Opytne, Vodyane, Pervomaiske, Nevelske, Krasnohorivka, Marinka- AFAIK, Ukrainians might be withdrawing from Opytne, but Vodyane and Avdiivka are holding as well as all the months already. Certainly enough, some of Russian descriptions of their assaults on Pavlivka are reminding me of excerpts from Tolstoy’s War and Peace: the 37th explanation for their failure to capture the village was something about bad weather….and darkness of the night…

Unsurprisingly, all of this is resulting in lots of Ukrainian videos shown tanks and artillery of the VSRF getting blown up. Here the winning contender for the traditional, monthly turret-tossing contest, and here another reason for the Russian tankmen to complain about the lack of tank-vs-tank combat in this war…

Perhaps Surovikin is determined to offer us a classic example of ‘Putin’s Military Strategy’, as is going to be taught at the Academy of the GenStab for the next few hundreds of years? Read: why try something new, when one can go on squandering thousands of mobilised reservists to continue bolstering a failure?

SOUTH

The ‘biiiig’ Russian offensive on Vuhledar and Hulaypole is so successful, that….well, yes: at first, the situation was tense: 3–4 days ago, the Russians attacked Novomykhalivka, Pavlivka, even Vuhledar…. Have suffered heavy losses and meanwhile it’s Ukrainians that are attacking Marfopil.

KHERSON

There is a constant flow of reports about some sort of Russian withdrawal from Kherson. For example: they should have removed several checkpoints around the Kherson city, they should have removed their flag from the city hall of Kherson, they should be withdrawing a growing number of troops from the right bank of the Dnipro River etc. AFAIK, there’re still lots of VSRF and VDV troops there, though, and Ukrainians continue pounding targets in the area of the Antonovsky Bridge (moreover, they blew up a Russian POL depot in Chornobaivka, two days ago). Foremost, the Russian group of forces south of Davydiv Brid remains where it was, and then in force (and has recovered some terrain, the last 2–3 weeks), the entire 7th VDV Division is still in the oblast, and most of positions are holding out. Thus, sorry, not buying that (or if, then only once ZSU marches into Kherson).

…and that’s about it. At least I haven’t found much more firm data, the last few days: hope, I didn’t miss anyting important.

--

Guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a Ucrânia: Putin perde cada vez mais terreno na área declarada "russa"

 

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As President Vladimir Putin celebrates Russia’s National Unity Day holiday today, he faces a looming humiliation: the potential loss of part of Ukraine that he’s declared to be “forever” united with Russia. Ukraine’s forces are steadily closing in to reclaim Kherson, the southern city that was the first to fall to Putin’s invasion. A Russian occupation official said Moscow’s troops will “most likely” retreat from the city to the other side of the Dnipro river after Ukrainian attacks cut off bridges used for supply and reinforcement. Key reading: Iran’s Weapons Are Slowly Dragging Israel to Ukraine’s Defense US, Partners Opt to Set Fixed Crude Price For Russia Oil Cap EU Studies Use of Russian Central Bank Assets to Rebuild Ukraine Bulgaria Breaks With Pro-Russia Past, Backs Ukraine Military Aid Follow our rolling coverage of the war here. The loss of Kherson would mark another serious reverse for Putin, one that’s harder to explain away to Russians who’ve grown increasingly anxious about a war now in its ninth month. Only five weeks ago, he signed orders formally annexing Kherson and three other Ukrainian regions as part of Russia at a glittering Kremlin ceremony. It would also boost morale among millions of Ukrainians enduring widespread blackouts and power rationing as Russian missiles strike the country’s energy, water and heating networks with winter approaching. Outrage at attacks on civilian infrastructure has done nothing to deter Moscow from pursuing the strategy as its military falters on the battlefield. Alongside Ukrainian appeals to its US and European allies for more air defenses, Russia’s blitz that partly involves Iranian-made drones is starting to change Israel’s calculations on providing military aid to Kyiv after months of reticence. Increasingly viewing Iran’s support for the invasion as a threat to its own security, Israel has begun to share intelligence with Ukraine. By restricting gas supplies to Europe, threatening Ukrainian grain exports, and raising the possibility of a nuclear strike, Russia has repeatedly sought to international fracture support for Kyiv to undermine supplies of weapons. Instead, as his forces lose ground, Putin so far appears only to be strengthening unity among Ukraine’s allies to face down his invasion.

Ukrainian artillerymen on the front line near the town of Bakhmut in the eastern Donetsk region on Monday. Photographer: Dimitar Dilkoff/AFP/Getty Images Click here for this week’s most compelling political images. And if you’re enjoying this newsletter, click here to sign up for Balance of Power.

Crimes de guerra e contra a humanidade da Rússia na Ucrânia (FT)

 E pensar que a diplomacia brasileira permanece impassível em face desses crimes…

https://www.ft.com/content/99349f01-c587-4ab4-86df-85ff3c0fcd3b

War in Ukraine

 Financial Times, November 3, 2022

Kherson residents describe reign of terror under Russian rule Alleged hanging of woman in southern Ukraine signifies Moscow’s brutality in occupied territory

Russian soldiers guard the shore of the Black Sea in Skadovsk, Kherson region 

Kherson residents describe reign of terror under Russian rule on twitter (opens in a new window) Kherson residents describe reign of terror under Russian rule on facebook (opens in a new window) Kherson residents describe reign of terror under Russian rule on linkedin (opens in a new window) Kherson residents describe reign of terror under Russian rule.

Natalia Chorna had warned her more outspoken twin sister to be careful after Russian forces occupied their home town of Skadovsk near Kherson, southern Ukraine, in February. But Tetyana Mudryenko found it hard to keep her anger about the war to herself. Last month, Mudryenko paid the ultimate penalty for proclaiming Skadovsk Ukrainian territory. According to several witnesses, she was dragged into the street by the self-appointed pro-Moscow authorities and hanged in a public execution. 

“In occupied Skadovsk, you can’t have your own opinion,” said Chorna, 56. As Ukraine pursues its counteroffensive in Kherson and Russia forcibly relocates tens of thousands of people, those living in the southern region have said the occupying authorities are terrorising anyone who defies them. Residents of Skadovsk, a Black Sea port of some 15,000 inhabitants, told the Financial Times that people were being jailed and having their possessions confiscated for speaking out against their Russian occupiers. 

Russian soldiers are also seizing the homes of Ukrainians who had moved to territory controlled by Kyiv, or who have been deported to Russia or occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian military said on Tuesday that Russian forces had expanded the area from which they were forcing residents to evacuate, ostensibly to protect them from the fighting but also to make it easier to defend the region. 

Moscow has also moved its occupation administration from the city of Kherson to Skadovsk as it reinforces its positions on the east bank of the Dnipro river. Despite reports of a potential Russian withdrawal from Kherson, Ukraine’s military said in a statement on Friday that some 1,000 newly mobilised Russian troops had arrived, setting the stage for what will probably be a difficult and crucial battle in Kyiv’s bid to recapture territories from Moscow. 

The Kherson region is of strategic importance to Russia because it connects to Crimea, the peninsula annexed by Russia in 2014, with fresh water. Following sham referendums last month, Russian president Vladimir Putin claimed to “annex” Kherson along with the eastern provinces of Donetsk, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia. 

Chorna said Mudryenko, a former paediatric nurse who was as passionate about helping disabled children as she was about being Ukrainian, had had several confrontations with Russian troops during their occupation. On a walk near the seaside one spring day, the sisters ran into a group of Russian soldiers wearing balaclavas and Mudryenko confronted them. “She looked at the orc, right in his eyes and asked: ‘Why are you here? Will you shoot me?’,” said Chorna, referring to Russian troops by a derogatory term Ukrainians have used since the February invasion. 

The most recent incident prior to her death came in early October, when Mudryenko scolded Ukrainian police for collaborating with Russian forces and cried out “Skadovsk is Ukraine!” On October 7, Chorna, who had left Skadovsk in April for the twins’ hometown of Dnipro in Ukrainian-controlled territory, called Mudryenko to see how she was doing after the altercation. But the connection was bad and the call dropped out. Some time later, according to Chorna and local eyewitnesses, Mudryenko and her partner, 60-year-old Anatoliy Oryekhov, were abducted from the front yard of their home by Ukrainian police officers collaborating with Russia. Neighbours told Chorna that the home had also been ransacked by occupiers, who stole the couple’s car and bicycles. For days, no one knew of their whereabouts. Then, on October 15, Chorna got a call from a woman who said that Mudryenko was not only dead but that she had been dragged into the street by occupation authorities and killed in a public display of terror. “She told me that ‘Tanya’ was hanged,” said Chorna, using her sister’s nickname. “They poured something into her mouth and then hanged her in front of the courthouse.” The woman who called went on to say that Oryekhov had been released from captivity with a broken arm and other signs of being beaten and allowed to bury Mudryenko’s body. But he then disappeared again and has not been seen or heard from since. When Chorna called the local morgue to confirm Mudryenko’s death, an employee first declined to speak to her. But eventually the worker sent her a death certificate that stated Mudryenko’s cause of death was “mechanical asphyxiation”, meaning severe physical pressure had been applied to her neck. 

Some of the details surrounding Mudryenko’s alleged abduction and death could not be independently verified because they occurred in areas off-limits to western reporters. But the FT reviewed Mudryenko’s death certificate as well as text messages and discussions between local residents and eyewitnesses that support Chorna’s story. 

The Media Initiative for Human Rights, a Ukrainian non-governmental organisation, has documented the case. Ukraine’s state security service, the SBU, wrote on Telegram on October 14 that it “had established numerous instances of murder and torture of local residents during the temporary occupation” of the Kherson region. Chorna’s story echoes scores of accounts by Ukrainians who have lived under Russian occupation and witnessed or personally experienced violence at the hands of Putin’s invading forces, including many documented by international human rights groups and journalists. Skadovsk residents were angry and depressed in the first days and weeks of Russian occupation, said Chorna. Many people, including herself and Mudryenko, protested in the streets to show their discontent. The sisters were among many residents who live-streamed the demonstrations on social media to show that resistance remained strong. 

But after Russian troops began firing warning shots and hurling smoke grenades at the crowds the public protests stopped. Ukrainians still in occupied Kherson and some who have recently fled and asked not to be named for security reasons said Russian forces had intensified their cruelty toward locals in recent weeks. One resident who moved to Ukraine-controlled territory last month said the “occupiers are closing shops and business on a large scale [and] trying to create conditions unsuitable for people to live in”. 

Another woman lamented the “concentration camp” and “military base” that she said the once quiet town of Skadovsk — with beach resorts that people from all over Ukraine used to flock to — had become. “But everything will be Ukraine,” she said, adding that most Ukrainian residents who stayed remain defiant. “Today, I refused to pay [for my groceries] in roubles.”

Documento do Club de Madri: Leading in a World of Converging Crises - cinco grandes tarefas

Documento do Club de Madri: Leading in a World of Converging Crises

The recommendations are centred mainly around five main issues: a) ending the war in Ukraine; b) reforming the UN System; c) ensuring global food security; d) implementing debt restructuring; and,  e) accelerating the energy transition.

PRA: Permito-me observar que todas essas recomendações, por mais válidas que sejam, são extremamente complexas e basicamente dependentes de uma ampla convergência de objetivos e de uma concordância quanto aos meios entre as grandes potências, atualmente uma perspectiva praticamente impossível, dada a distância registrada entre as posições do "clube ocidental" (EUA e parceiros da OTAN) e as da "aliança sem limites" entre Rússia e China.

O Brasil, que deveria estar entre os primeiros, padece atualmente de uma enorme miopia diplomática, por força desse agrupamento bizarro chamado Brics. Parece que vai ficar pior, nesse sentido, no próximo governo, com uma liderança que ainda se recusa a denunciar as ditaduras de esquerda, e que não vai se distanciar das duas grandes ditaduras associadas ao Brics.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

De: Secretaria General <secretariageneral@clubmadrid.org>

Date: qua, 2 de nov de 2022 09:31
Subject: Advocacy Support: Concluding Document PD2022

Dear Advisors,

It is a pleasure to contact you from Club de Madrid to share the Concluding Document resulting from the discussions held in this year's Annual Policy Dialogue on Leading in a World of Converging Crises.

As always, we reach out to you to kindly ask you to read the recommendations included in this document and if you find them appropriate, elevate and disseminate them broadly with your own network, including your respective governments, international organisations, and other relevant stakeholders that you may consider fit.

As you will see in the attached document, the recommendations are centred mainly around five main issues: a) ending the war in Ukraine; b) reforming the UN System; c) ensuring global food security; d) implementing debt restructuring; and,  e) accelerating the energy transition.

This document will be key in guiding our advocacy work in the coming months and we would be most grateful to count on your support in increasing the visibility of these recommendations when possible. As you may remember from previous communications, some of our targeted landing pads for these recommendations will be the G20, the UN High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism, and international financial institutions, amongst others.

Below you will find examples of how you can share this document through your social media channels in case it is of interest to you. Please find also attached a family picture from the discussions and the image of this year´s Policy Dialogue for your reference and use.

@ClubdeMadrid Annual Policy Dialogue "Leading in a World of Converging Crises" has just ended. We will now share recommendations with #G7, #G20 and #UN – in our effort to contribute to an effective response to the megacrisis.
➡️ Know more: https://bit.ly/3gbU73x
#ClubdeMadridPD 🍎#FoodCrisis💡#EnergyCrisis 📉#DebtCrisis

We thank you in advance for your constant support of the mission and work of our organisation. We also look forward to receiving any comments or suggestions you may have about potential platforms or stakeholders you consider might be relevant for our organisation to reach out to in order to share this document.

Best regards,

Legal notice	María Elena Agüero Secretary General   Palacio de Cañete C/ Mayor 69, planta 1 28013 Madrid, Spain Office: +34 911 54 82 30 Cell: +34 678 53 07 61 clubmadrid.org
https://clubmadrid.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/031122-CONCLUDING-DOCUMENT-PD-2022.pdf