Russia de Putin - Rede francesa de institutos de estudos avancados

Lettre bimensuelle publiée par la fondation RFIEA     Fellows #27 : La Russie de Vladimir Poutine   Si l'attitude du président russe inquiète à l'international, les Russes le plébiscitent : selon les deniers sondages, sa côte de popularité ne cesse de monter, frôlant les 85%. Pourtant, les détracteurs du Président Poutine sont nombreux, en Russie comme à l'international. Tiraillée entre nécessité de se moderniser, corruption et jeux de pouvoir ancestraux, la Russie doit choisir sa voie. Petr Bizyukov, chercheur spécialiste en économie du travail et ancien résident à l'IEA de Nantes, analyse les conflits qui opposent élites russes et couches populaires ; tandis qu'Alena Ledeneva, professeur de science politique à University College de Londres et ancienne résidente de l'IEA de Paris, examine les obstacles qui se dressent devant Vladimir Poutine concernant la gouvernance de la Russie.     Lire Fellows #27   La Russie de Vladimir Poutine   La Russie sous le joug de Vladimir Poutine   La Russie actuelle est un régime autoritaire ou une dictature douce, ambivalence due à l'illusion démocratique et d'État de droit qu'elle entretient en dépit des répressions contre l'opposition...   Lire l'article de Petr Bizyukov     Three Obstacles to the Change of Putin's sistema   Putin's regime has been commonly referred to as neo-Soviet, competitive-authoritarian or post-modern dictatorial. I argue that Putin's system of governance – sistema – goes deeper and far beyond the Soviet system of governance...   Lire l'article d'Alena Ledeneva     RFIEA Réseau français des instituts d'études avancées 54 boulevard Raspail, 75006 Paris Tél. : 01 40 48 65 57 contact@rfiea.fr www.rfiea.fr http://fellows.rfiea.fr

2017, cem anos da revolucao bolchevique: seria uma volta da gloriosa URSS putinesca? - Oleg Chuvakin

Não acredito nisso, dadas as fragilidades econômicas e a instabilidade política da Rússia atual, que voltou aos tempos do czarismo, agora sob a liderança de um ex-KGB, que sempre achou que a derrocada do império soviético foi a maior tragédia geopolítica do século 20.
Também acho, mas creio que foi a MELHOR tragédia geopolítica que poderíamos ter ao final de um século extremamente destruidor por causa das ideologias totalitárias que o perpassaram, primeiro o bolchevismo, logo seguido pelo fascismo italiano, pelo stalinismo soviético, pelo nazismo hitlerista, pelo maoismo delirante e outros experimentos tirânicos de par le monde, todos eles responsáveis diretos e indiretos pela morte de dezenas de MILHÕES, talvez mais de uma centena, de pessoas, muitos militares, mas muito mais civis inocentes, gente que pereceu das mais diversas formas sob o tacão de tiranos dementes, psicopatas, megalomaníacos, simplesmente totalitários.
Para mim, os atuais dirigentes russos continuam sua política agressiva em relação ao Ocidente, que sempre lhes aportou coisas boas, ao longo da história, em termos de modernização cultural e material da velha Rússia semi-asiática (por opção imperial, não por necessidade, pois a Rússia poderia ser uma potência perfeitamente ocidental, enquadrada no mainstream da globalização). Infelizmente, os instintos autocráticos dos dirigentes russos, desde sempre (czarismo tradicional, bolchevismo soviético imperial, "renascimento" putinesco atual), os levam a continuar com essa política agressiva e prejudicial ao próprio povo russo.
Reproduzo aqui o que comentei em resposta ao envio deste artigo, em russo, ao colega que gentilmente me repassou a matéria:
"Cem anos depois da revolução bolchevique, Putin gostaria de ter um ano glorioso para o finado império soviético, reconstruído com quase todas as suas satrapias da Ásia central. Creio, porém, que ele vai perder espaço para a China nestas últimas, e ainda tem muitos problemas a resolver com os ocidentais na questão da Criméia e da Ucrânia em geral. Sinceramente, espero que, para melhorias democráticas no mundo, Putin e seus aliados involuntários no Ocidente (entre os quais Mister Trump e a "assistida" Marine Le Pen) sejam fragorosamente derrotados ou pelo menos frustrados em suas pretensões absurdas e semi-autocráticas. Não sou a favor da "decadência do Ocidente", para usar um conceito que estava em voga cem anos atrás, materializado no livro idiota do Oswald Spengler."
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

2017 will be a year of strengthening Russia 

Stratfor

06/12/2016 - 8:29

Company «Stratfor», «shadow CIA", predict the future strengthening of Russia. Russian will be strengthened in the coming year. The situation in Europe, the change in the US policy establishment will play into the hands of Russia in 2017. year. In addition, Moscow will regain position in the post-Soviet countries. And then the Kremlin will receive a hypersonic weapon.

In the latest report think tank «Stratfor» reported projections for the Russian. It turns out that three years later, "confrontation" with the West, not only Russian drowned in the depths of the crisis, but even began to hope for a strengthening of the world's influence.

"Disputes between Russia and the West", the report says, going for three years now. Why then came Russia at the turn of 2016 and 2017.? "Stratfor" writes that Brexit and discord in the European Union "Moscow gave a glimmer of hope."

EU Member States disagree with Brussels, at the next voting may violate Union consensus on sanctions against Russia, which touches the question of the extension of the restrictive measures.

In the United States, recently won the election, Donald Trump. His victory opened the way possible "to warmer relations between the United States and Russia", the analysts believe. It is possible that sanctions against Moscow would even stopped by Washington.

In short, "the political tides in Brussels and Washington," the Kremlin can give "freedom of action". If the Kremlin would use it, it can enhance its influence in the former Soviet Union.

Next, the experts "think tank" to pass some of the details.

Many of the failures of the past Russia date back to 2014, since February of that year "euromaidan" in Ukraine ended the uprising and overthrow of Viktor Yanukovych, analysts remind.

Next month Crimea declared independence from Ukraine and Moscow "annexed area and expanded support for a separatist rebellion in the eastern part of Ukraine."

In response, the European Union and the US imposed sanctions against Russia. Then, after a few months, international oil prices began to decline sharply and fell almost in half by the end of the year.

The result: a combination of low oil prices and sanctions has led Russia to the recession and the exchange rate has given rise to the confrontation with the West.

Simultaneously, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia to strengthen ties with the European Union and NATO.

Now, however, the fate of Russia can change. Of the entire territory of the former Soviet Union know what policy changes are taking place in Europe and the United States. These countries are likely to reconsider its position in relation to the West.

In Moldova, the presidential elections of November 13 victories leader of the pro-Russian party.However, the Parliament of Moldova and its prime minister still prefer integration with the West, so the elected President, Igor Dodon, will hardly be able to build a course in Moscow.

And yet he will try to develop a deeper economic and political ties with Russia.

Georgia is also beginning to soften "some aspects" position in relation to the breakaway Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the report said. In addition, as a result of the October parliamentary elections, it became clear that Georgia can expand economic ties with Moscow as early as next year.

As for Ukraine, it is now based on economic and political support from the West and is counting on a constant pressure through sanctions against Moscow. However, the government in Kiev can not be sure that Western support - something permanent.

It is unlikely that the people of Ukraine will elect a presidential "pro-Russian leader," given the ongoing conflict in the east. Nevertheless, the change in political circumstances in Europe and the United States can force the Ukrainian government to reduce the temperature at the meetings on the Minsk agreements and to take a more moderate stance in the negotiations with Russia on the eastern territories of Ukraine.

On the other hand, Kiev may try to bolster its defense integration with Poland and the Baltic countries.

Further, experts are moving to Belarus.

In other countries of the former Soviet Union, which previously had strong ties with Russia, too, understand the importance of the current changes in the West. Despite its longtime military alliance with Russia, Belarus last year drifted slowly westward. But now this process will go either to a standstill, or even "turn back the clock."

And even in those countries that have remained more or less neutral in the current confrontation between Russia and the West, politicians can "correct position".

"Brain Trust" refers to the recent negotiations, which held Russia and aimed at strengthening military cooperation with Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan - the former Soviet republics willing to expand cooperation with Russia in the areas of arms and training.

Finally, Moscow would "revive" integration initiatives of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Organization of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Against this background, the growing political divide in Europe will look particularly clearly.

As early as next year in Washington new power chair will sit, and a split in the European Union will only intensify. And Russia can seize the opportunity to return to the influence of the post-Soviet "outskirts".

The political transformations taking place in Europe and the United States, the authors conclude, may play into the hands of Moscow: give her the opportunity to restore the former reputation throughout Eurasia.

Meanwhile in the US have discovered a new vulnerability to the formidable Russian. It turns out that States allegedly behind Russia in the development of hypersonic missiles. And this creates for America "danger".

This writes the online edition «Washington Free Beacon», referring to the report of the US Air Force.

The article states that both Russia and China are experiencing high-speed maneuvering weapons is a "threat to US forward-deployed forces." And these things are too dangerous for the United States 'mainland'.

Speakers noted that the latest Russian and Chinese weapons can change the views of the US military on a "global vigilance." "The threat of a symmetric shock" Experts are considering the need of opposition to plans of the enemy.

As explained, "Reedus" expert "Independent Military Review" Oleg Vladykin that once hypersonic vehicles reach speeds of up to 4 M, they acquire the plasma membrane.

"The plasma cocoon - said the expert - is impervious to the radio, which means that the hypersonic missile, first, loses control, and secondly," going blind "itself. She does not see the operator, she did not see the goal.

The technological breakthrough of Russian engineers is precisely in the fact that they are smart enough, you can use this very plasma membrane to the radar. "

However, we add yet speak of a hypersonic weapons from Moscow early.

In 2015-2016 gg. Experts called the date: 2020, not earlier. They also note that in this particular secret is not, and the same weapon is being developed and the Americans.

PH "Kommersant" correspondent Ivan Safronov Special in July last year said that such weapons "developed in America and in Russia." In 2013, the general director of the corporation "Tactical Missiles" B. Obnosov openly declared that the relevant work is being done.

"We know that at the landfill near Astrakhan being tested, at least, our products hypersonic. It is impossible, of course, say that they are successful when compared with the Soviet Union - that this was a test launch? Nothing.

Now, of course, each test - this is another reason to think about. It took a number, here are trying to still take the quality and anticipate their failures.

Some snags that will arise in the process. I think that's up to the end of the decade, in 2020, Russia has quite a hypersonic missile will most likely air-to-air. "

But the words of the Director General of the corporation "Tactical Missiles" (Tactical Missiles Corporation) Boris Obnosova. At the end of September 2016, he told the same journalist Safronov of the "Kommersant" newspaper, "Now this area is given due consideration, that can not but rejoice.

Is underway a number of projects and the Foundation for Advanced Studies at the Military-Industrial Commission. Believe me, we already have interesting results in this direction. "

When asked about the timing of the appearance of a hypersonic weapons Obnosov said cautiously: "I think that at the beginning of the next decade."

As for the US, adding, they will forever haunt fear of the "Russian threat" and the Kremlin's desire to hit the US "mainland."

It seems that two of the state again deadlocked arms race and think a military scenario. Sure, if in 2017 Russia will even weak economic growth, the American "defense" experts yelled about the impending attack Russian America already in 2018.

Oleg Chuvakin

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Mr. Putin goes to war (and it seems serious) - Joshua Yaffa (The New Yorker)

NEWS DESK

PUTIN, SYRIA, AND WHY MOSCOW HAS GONE WAR-CRAZY

By Joshua Yaffa

 ,  

New Yorker, OCTOBER 14, 2016

 

Vladimir Putin may spend the next three months working through his geopolitical wish list, trying to set in place a number of faits accomplis that will be hard for the next U.S. President to overturn.PHOTOGRAPH BY ALEXEI NIKOLSKY TASS VIA GETTY

A viewer of Russian television this week could be forgiven for thinking that the end of the world was imminent, and that it would arrive in the form of grand superpower war with the United States, culminating in a suicidal exchange of nuclear weapons. On one day alone, three separate test firings of intercontinental ballistic missiles were broadcast on state media: two by submarine, one from a launch pad in the Far East. Last weekend, NTV, a channel under effective state control, aired a segment on emergency preparedness that included a tour of a Cold War-era bomb shelter, fortified in case of atomic war, and a mention of the municipal loudspeakers that will sound upon the arrival of “Hour X.” On Sunday, Dmitry Kiselev, the most bombastic and colorful of Kremlin propagandists, warned on his weekly newsmagazine show that “impudent behavior” toward Russia may have “nuclear” consequences.

Grievances against the West and predictions of militaristic doom are not new in Russia—they have run through all sixteen years of Vladimir Putin’s rule. But they took on a heightened intensity in early 2014, after Russia’s intervention in Ukraine and the U.S. sanctions that followed. Suddenly the question of war was in the air in Moscow. If nothing else, the spectre of a conflict with Washington served as retroactive justification for the Kremlin’s policies, and a ready-made excuse for why the Russian economy had sunk into recession. At home, Russia’s ostracization was spun as a sign of its righteousness.

The war in Syria, however, was supposed to offer Russia a chance to rehabilitate its image and re-start relations with the United States. Last year, Putin travelled to New York, where he addressed the United Nations and called for “a genuinely broad international coalition” to fight the Islamic State. According to a deeply informed new book on Putin and his court, “All the Kremlin’s Men,” by the Russian journalist Mikhail Zygar, the idea, as Putin and his speechwriters had imagined it, was to “brand isis as the new Third Reich.” Putin envisioned a grand coalition, Zygar writes—just like in the good old days of the Second World War—that would bring Russia out of its isolation; what’s more, Putin seemed to hope that, by “defeating Islamic terrorism, the Russians and Americans would finally succeed in creating a new world order.” It would be Yalta, 1945, all over again—Putin’s dream scenario of how global diplomacy is meant to work.

For a while, things appeared to be going largely Putin’s way. At last year’s U.N. general assembly, Putin also had a one-on-one meeting with Obama for the first time in two years. In the months that followed, Moscow became a hub of diplomatic activity, with everyone from Benjamin Netanyahu to the Emir of Qatar flocking to town for audiences with the Russian leader. Meanwhile, a Russian air campaign in Syria was helping Bashar al-Assad regain territory and push back rebel forces. “Russia’s battlefield successes in Syria have given Moscow . . . new leverage in decisions about the future of the Middle East,” the Times reported as recently as this August. Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov were meeting every few weeks, and regularly exchanging gifts and jokes. (In March, when Lavrov turned sixty-six, Kerry told him, “You look terrific for thirty-nine.”) In September, their talks culminated in a deal—viewed with great skepticism by the Pentagon—that laid out terms for a ceasefire in Syria, and which foresaw joint U.S.-Russian air strikes against extremist groups. Kerry hailed the agreement as “a turning point, a moment of change.”

All that has collapsed in the past month. The ceasefire agreement fell apart after U.S. forces killed dozens of Syrian troops in a bombing raid—a mistaken strike, U.S. officials said—and a U.N. humanitarian-aid convoy was hit in an air attack outside Aleppo, leaving twenty people dead. That strike was widely blamed on Syrian attack helicopters working under the cover of Russian airpower. In the aftermath of the convoy strike, Kerry declared his interest in seeing Russia and the Syrian government investigated for war crimes for its alleged bombing of civilian areas in Aleppo. The notion that Washington and Moscow could work together to resolve Syria’s horrific war now appears to have been scrapped. At a press conference on September 28th, John Kirby, a State Department spokesperson, warned that Russia’s continued military campaign in Syria could lead to terror attacks in Russian cities and “troops in body bags.” Writing in the Financial Times, Dmitri Trenin, the head of Carnegie Moscow Center, a policy think tank, imagined that Syria “could easily turn into a battlefield” between Moscow and Washington, “with the proxies first taking aim at the principals, and the principals then shooting back not at the proxies, but at each other.”

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The collapse of the Kerry-Lavrov deal appears to have convinced Putin once and for all of the pointlessness of dealing with the United States, and prompted him to indulge the more maximalist of his anti-American urges. Last Monday, he cancelled a U.S.-Russian agreement on the disposal of weapons-grade plutonium. The program had been functionally dormant for some time, but Putin got rid of it with a flourish, producing a fantasy list of demands—which included the U.S. reducing its military presence in nato member states, lifting the sanctions imposed over Ukraine, and paying compensation for lost revenue it caused—that would need to be met before the program could be renewed. The absurdity and impossibility was the very point, an unsubtle message to Obama: don’t even bother trying to mend this relationship—it’s hopeless. There was a message embedded here for Obama’s successor, too: this is the hole you’ll have to dig out of if you want anything constructive from me.

Then, last weekend, Russia delivered nuclear-capable Iskander-M missiles to Kaliningrad, a Russian enclave on the Baltic Sea. It was a purposefully provocative move. The missiles are potentially capable of reaching Berlin, and, more important, they make the defense of nato member states in the Baltics more difficult for military planners. According to the Russian defense ministry, the country’s military timed the delivery of the missiles to insure that it would be seen by U.S. spy satellites. Even so, these moves might have garnered relatively little attention if not for the fact that the Russian state also appeared to be preparing its citizens for doomsday. On Monday, it was reported that the governor of St. Petersburg signed an order that guaranteed residents of the city three hundred grams of bread per day in the case of war. Then a Russian news site published a report saying that state officials had been advised to bring their relatives—in particular, children studying abroad or parents living elsewhere—back to Russia. It was around then that a friend sent me a link to a Facebook thread in which some friends in Moscow were discussing how to respond to air-raid sirens and where the closet bomb shelters were in their neighborhoods.

Why has Moscow gone, for lack of a better term, war-crazy? Much has been written about Putin’s paranoia and conspiratorial view of the world. But there also is a certain logic in “the demonstration of your ability to carry yourself more or less like a madman,” as Alexander Golts, a columnist on the military for The New Times, a liberal magazine in Moscow, told me this week. “Russia entered into this new Cold War without the resources the Soviet Union once did,” Golts said. “But what does Russia have? It has nuclear weapons. So it must constantly convince the United States, and the West as a whole, that it is a little crazy.” In other words, a measured dose of faux insanity is being used to make up for a gaping disparity in conventional military and economic strength. (“We have no chance,” one Russian defense expert told a radio interviewer last week, when asked about the prospects of an actual clash between Russian and U.S. forces in Syria. “Our detachment would be destroyed in two days in a single air offensive.”) It is a way for a “regional power,” in Obama’s purposefully insulting formulation from 2014, to act like a global one. And it may work, at least in part.

Projecting a half-lunatic readiness to blow up the world is, in essence, a cover operation: a way to make a lot of noise while the Kremlin goes about creating a lot of new facts on the ground, whether in Syria or the Baltics. Putin likely believes—perhaps correctly—that, for reasons of both character and political reality, Obama is unlikely to risk a potentially dangerous escalation with Russia during his final months of office. For Obama, Putin was always a nuisance and a mystery, better avoided and marginalized than confronted head-on—a logic that might hold doubly true in the lame-duck period. That gives Putin three months to work through his geopolitical wish list, trying to set in place a number of faits accomplis that will be hard for the next U.S. President to overturn.

Putin must know, for example, that sooner or later diplomatic talks over the war in Syria will resume. But, when they do, he would prefer to see Aleppo in regime hands, which would strengthen Assad’s position in any negotiations. Thus, Russian warplanes and Syrian ground troops, fighting with Iranian and Hezbollah militias, will pound the city until it falls, at however ghastly a human cost. Lest the Obama Administration consider intervening with a limited air campaign, as some U.S. officials are apparently discussing, Russia recently moved its advanced S-300 anti-aircraft system to Syria. “We’ll shoot them down,” Kiselev, the television host, said of U.S. warplanes. And in the Baltic states, a zone of perennial rivalry and latent conflict with the West, Putin and his military advisers see an opportunity to undermine nato defenses. Now that the Iskander missiles are in place in Kaliningrad, they’re unlikely to be relocated, and will complicate nato defense planning for years to come.

There are also the Kremlin’s alleged efforts “to interfere with the U.S. election process,” as U.S. security officials recently put it, by stealing U.S. political figures and parties’ data and e-mails and then leaking them to the public. This summer, WikiLeaks’s release of the Democratic National Committee’s e-mails was widely blamed on hackers working for the Russian state, and more recently the F.B.I. has said that it believes Russian intelligence agencies were behind the hacking of e-mails belonging to John Podesta, Hillary Clinton’s campaign chair. This week, I spoke to Dmitri Alperovitch, the co-founder of CrowdStrike, a cybersecurity firm that investigated the D.N.C. hack and found a trail that led back to the Russian intelligence services. “It’s just like a regular criminal investigation,” he said. “If a bank gets robbed, you don’t try and solve the crime without looking at past bank robberies in the area—is this similar to things we’ve seen before?” According to Alperovitch, one of the suspects in the D.N.C. case, a hacker who goes by the name Fancy Bear, was involved in earlier cyber attacks aimed at defense targets in Georgia and Ukraine—all during times of increased tensions with Moscow. CrowdStrike believes that Fancy Bear has links to Russian military intelligence, and that the other hacker involved in the D.N.C. operation, Cozy Bear, has ties to the F.S.B., Russia’s domestic-security service. Alperovitch told me that Cozy Bear had previously targeted servers used by the White House, State Department, and Joint Chiefs of Staff.

At this point, any Russian efforts to meddle in the election are likely not about trying to throw the election to Donald Trump, whose candidacy most serious Russian officials now believe is doomed. The goal, instead, is to confuse and discredit the American election process, in an attempt to weaken the country’s institutions and the likely future Clinton Presidency. (Trump himself has urged his supporters to read the WikiLeaks disclosures. They show “how unattractive and dishonest our country has become,” he said.) In their statement accusing the Kremlin of involvement in political hacking, U.S. security officials also expressed worry about potential attacks on election systems in U.S. states. Alperovitch argued, as many have, that any confusion about voting rolls or the count itself created by cyber incursions will “help create a narrative the day after election that the vote was manipulated, that it was somehow not legitimate.”

Although the Russian self-image of a scorned and offended partner is, in part, a cynical pose, it belies a very real sense of injury and betrayal. “Everything that Russia has done is a reaction—and an answer—to the United States’ unwillingness to speak to Russia as an equal,” Konstantin Kosachev, the chair of the foreign-affairs committee in the upper house of Russia’s parliament, told me this week. During an interview in his office, Kosachev told me that Western officials and journalists “discuss Russia’s actions as if it were taking proactive steps, when in fact Russia has been provoked into carrying out retaliatory action.”

“Any scenario of Russian-American relations is possible,” he told me, but it was all up to Washington. “The United States is the source of the problems that have arisen in our relations, and it is the United States that is able to eliminate them.”

Earlier this week, to get a whiff of the new atmosphere, I went to the studios of Channel One, the country’s main state broadcaster, to appear as a guest on a daytime political talk show. Russian television stations have long devoted much of their time to dissecting the minutiae of America’s every political hiccup, a consequence of the Russian ruling class’s simultaneous fascination and revulsion with the U.S. political system. I was the only American on set, and it was clear I was meant to play the role of the pitiable imbecile and birthday-party piñata: everyone would get a chance to step up and have a whack. The host of the program, Artem Sheinin, noted that it was the thirtieth anniversary of the Reykjavik summit between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan, talks that ultimately led to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which reduced missile stockpiles in both countries. “Some people think this is when our country began its surrender; others say it marks the end of the Cold War,” Sheinin said. “But, as we see from our conversation today, the Cold War wasn’t brought to an end, and, in my view, can’t be.”

As a digital animation of a grizzly bear clawing away at a bald eagle played on a large screen behind him, Sheinin turned to me. “Does it not seem to you,” he asked, “that all these children dying in Syria, in eastern Aleppo, this fear about Iskanders—all this is a result of how you have been pushed into being the word’s gendarme, and want to remain as such?” I fumbled through an answer. Russia obviously sees itself as fighting against U.S. hegemony, I said, but what is it fighting for? What is its strategic vision for itself and the world? Another guest, a Russian parliamentary deputy, began to shout, “For Yugoslavia! For Libya! For Syria! For everything you have done these past twenty years!” He was nearly hysterical, but his answer was truthful: Putin’s foreign policy at this moment is, in large part, about avenging the wrongs inflicted on Russia over the past decades, the insults and grievances borne by a generation. It may be a tall order to achieve by January 20th of next year. But Putin may certainly try.

Joshua Yaffa is a New Yorker contributor based in Moscow. He is also a New America fellow.

Tendencias da America Latina e papel do Brasil, em revista russa

Um artigo meu, sendo publicado na revista "International Affairs", ou o nome equivalente em russo, da People’s Friendship University of Russia (PFUR), que deve ser a antiga universidade dos povos coloniais e neocoloniais do glorioso stalinismo redivivo na Rússia atua, e que me permite, pelo menos ter meu nome escrito em russo, como evidenciado a seguir. 

Latin American development trends and Brazil’s role in the region

Paulo Roberto de Almeida[1]

В статье рассматриваются основные направления развития стран Латинской Америки в эпоху глобализации, определены особенности процесса экономической стабилизации (на примере Аргентины и Бразилии),  выявлены характерные черты интеграционных процессов в регионе (на примере Меркосур, Тихоокеанского Альянса и Венесуэльского проекта Альба). Автор показывает роль торгово-экономической политики Китая в регионе,  оценивает успехи и неудачи в проведении экономических преобразований в Бразилии и обоснованно выделяет три линии развития для стран региона в зависимости от степени их включения в процесс глобализации.

Ключевые слова: Латинская Америка, Бразилия, Аргентина, глобализация, интеграция, фрагментация, Меркосур, Тихоокеанский Альянс, Альба,  Китай.

The article considers the main directions of development of Latin American countries in the era of globalization, defines the features of the process of economic stabilization (for example, Argentina and Brazil), reveals the main features of the integration processes in the region (Mercosur, the Pacific Alliance and the Venezuelan project of Alba). The author shows the role of trade and economic policy of China in the region, the successes and failures in the implementation of economic reforms in Brazil and reasonably identifies three lines of development for the region, depending on the degree of their inclusion in the process of globalization.

---

[1]Паоло Роберто де Алмейда, видный дипломат, профессор Университета UniCEUB (Centro Universitario de Brasilia), г. Бразилиа,  ведущий специалист в области международных отношений и внешней политики Бразилии, автор ряда статей и монографий по дипломатии Бразилии. http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com)

Energia: a visao americana, e a visao russa; falta a chinesa, a brasileira e a da Europa...

Por acaso, chegam dois relatórios sobre energia no mesmo dia, um informado pelo Wilson Weekly, o boletim semanal do Woodrow Wilson Center for International Studies, o outro pelo magazine Russia Direct.
Ainda não li nenhum dos relatórios, mas vou procurar obter o dos EUA, que me parece mais confiável, pelos dados, do que o de Russia Direct (a despeito dos consultores contratados para fazer o relatório), uma vez que o setor de energia é o exemplo típico da capitalismo promíscuo (ou claramente mafioso) que vigora nas terras do czar.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida


Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz
U.S. Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz on 2015 Global Policy Outlook    Gold Angle
"In doing this quadrennial energy review, what has come into much sharper focus is the question of not just the energy infrastructure----the pipes and wires that move electricity or fuels--but also what we might term the shared infrastructure that moves many, many commodities including energy," said Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz.

Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz on 2015 Global Policy Outlook

January 07, 2015 // 10:30am — 12:00pm

• Event Speakers

Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz will keynote an event at the Wilson Center entitled “2015 U.S. Energy Policy Outlook: Opportunities and Challenges”. An additional panel of experts from academia, government and the private sector will discuss current global challenges and opportunities in energy markets and politics.

Location: 

6th Floor, Woodrow Wilson Center

Event Speakers List: 

• The Hon. Ernest Moniz //
  United States Secretary of Energy
• Ana de Palacio //
  International Lawyer and founding partner, Palacio y Asociados, and former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain
• Leon Fuerth //
  Professor of International Affairs, George Washington University and former National Security Adviser to Vice President Al Gore

• David L. Goldwyn //
  President, Goldwyn Global Strategies LLC, former State Department Coordinator for International Energy Affairs, and Co-Editor, Energy & Security: Strategies for a World in Transition
• Jan H. Kalicki // Public Policy Scholar
  Lead, Regional and Global Energy Issues; former Counselor for International Strategy, Chevron, and Co-editor, Energy & Security: Strategies for a World in Transition
• Edward L. Morse //
  Head of Global Commodities Research, Citigroup, and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Energy Policy 

   

   January 9, 2015
  
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  Russian Energy Sector: Beyond Sanctions
  By Natasha Udensiva, Marat Terterov, Ben McPherson,   Ka-ho Yu
  
  The report offers a look at the current state of the Russian energy sector and includes an overview of Russia's energy ambitions in Europe and Asia. The issue also contains a commentary from the Russian Ministry of Energy explaining the government’s position on the most pressing issues and sheds some light on what to expect in 2015.
  
  The bite of sanctions, falling oil prices and Europe’s yearning for energy independence have forced Russia to look for new business models, new markets and new customers. The question is how Russia’s much-touted pivot to Asia will impact the prospects of Russia’s energy sector.