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Mostrando postagens com marcador Russia. Mostrar todas as postagens
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domingo, 4 de junho de 2023

Russia, China seek world power 'rebalancing' with G7-alternative: 'indispensable mechanism' - Peter Aitken (Fox News)

Russia, China seek world power 'rebalancing' with G7-alternative: 'indispensable mechanism'

BRICS has recently positioned itself as a serious alternative to the G7's influence

By Peter Aitken | Fox News, June 2, 2023

https://www.foxnews.com/world/russia-china-seek-world-power-rebalancing-g7-alternative-indispensable-mechanism 

Foreign ministers of the nations comprising a China and Russia-led economic bloc have made clear that they intend to rebalance global power, claiming to aim for a "multipolar" dynamic even as they work to place themselves at the center. 

"At the heart of the problems we face is economic concentration that leaves too many nations at the mercy of too few," Indian Minister of External Affairs Subrahmanyam Jaishankar said following the meeting of the BRICS countries. 

Jaishankar stressed that the five nations comprising the group needed to "send out a strong message that the world is multipolar, that it is rebalancing and that old ways cannot address new situations." 

BRICS, named for its member states of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, met this week in Cape Town. The discussions focused on potential expansion of membership and potential for an alternative currency that could "ensure that we do not become victim to sanctions that have a secondary effect on countries" following sanctions on Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. 

Russia South Africa Brazil

Brazil's Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira, South Africa's Foreign Minister Naledi Pandor and Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov attend a press conference as BRICS foreign ministers meet in Cape Town, South Africa, June 1, 2023.  (Reuters/Nic Bothma)

Chinese Vice Minister Ma Zhaoxu voiced strong support for more countries joining the bloc to help expand its influence and increase its power. 

"I believe the enlargement of BRICS will be beneficial to the BRICS countries," he said, claiming the group was "inclusive … in sharp contrast to some countries’ small circle." Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that some dozen or so nations had shown interest in joining, and South Africa’s BRICS ambassador Anil Sooklal said that countries from Europe have asked about joining, according to South African outlet News 24. 

The list of potential new members allegedly includes Iran and Saudi Arabia, both of whom had representatives in Cape Town to participate in the BRICS meeting. Other hopeful candidates include Venezuela, Argentina, Algeria and the United Arab Emirates. 

Russia China economic bloc

Foreign ministers of BRICS nations pose for a family photo with representatives from Africa and the global South during a summit in Cape Town, South Africa, June 2, 2023.  (Russian Foreign Ministry/Handout via Reuters)

BRICS has recently emerged as an alternative to the G7, which met last month in Japan for its annual summit. The group started off as a loose conglomerate, but China and Russia have given it a more concrete form in the past few years as they look to re-focus world power dynamics.

Brazilian Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira called the group an "indispensable mechanism" to balance against the Western influence of the G7, which is made up of the U.S., Japan, Canada, Britain, France, Italy and Germany.    

One issue that overshadowed the meeting remained the question of whether South Africa would be obliged to arrest Russian President Vladimir Putin. The International Criminal Court issued a warrant for his arrest in relation to war crimes, specifically the abduction of children, allegedly committed in Ukraine. 

Sauid Arabia Lavrov Russia

Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Saudi Arabia's Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud meet on the sidelines of a meeting of foreign ministers from the BRICS countries, in Cape Town, South Africa June 1, 2023.  (Russian Foreign Ministry/Handout via Reuters)

South Africa, as a signatory of the 1998 Rome Statute, would likely be compelled to arrest Putin if he attended this or any future meetings within its borders, but officials have looked at obtaining diplomatic immunity for Putin in order to skirt the issue. 

"Russia attaches enormous importance to the development of this format of integration. And Russia will take part in this summit at the proper level," Russian press secretary Dmitry Peskov said during a recent press conference. "Of course, we count as a bare minimum on partner countries in such an important format not being guided by such illegal decisions."

A statement by Clayson Monyela, head of South Africa's public diplomacy, on Tuesday said it was "standard" practice for Cape Town and "all countries" to issue immunity for officials attending international conferences "irrespective of the level of participation."

Fox News Digital’s Caitlin McFall and Reuters contributed to this report.


domingo, 21 de maio de 2023

Timothy Snyder: Oligarchies in Russia and Ukraine post 1991

 Oligarchies in Ukraine and Russia

Ukraine lectures 19

May 21, 2023


https://substack.com/app-link/post?publication_id=310897&post_id=122067026&utm_source=post-email-title&isFreemail=true&token=eyJ1c2VyX2lkIjoxNDQ3NjY0NiwicG9zdF9pZCI6MTIyMDY3MDI2LCJpYXQiOjE2ODQ1ODY2OTIsImV4cCI6MTY4NzE3ODY5MiwiaXNzIjoicHViLTMxMDg5NyIsInN1YiI6InBvc3QtcmVhY3Rpb24ifQ.ykXFkUePRdX9_o3dZHhTH5G323azXQguDjwfYg2QrkQ


Apologies: I took a weekend off from posting my Making of Modern Ukraine lectures because I had a couple of other important pieces published: the one on “War and Politics” here as well as the one on nuclear propaganda in the New York Times.

The purpose of this lecture is to evaluate the Ukrainian and Russian states as they emerged after the end of the Soviet Union in 1991. I begin though with an excursus into postwar Polish history. It is very important to establish how the Polish factor changed, such that Russia became the most important “other” in Ukrainian history. The efforts of Polish thinkers and then Polish diplomats to create a new paradigm in Polish-Ukrainian relations bore fruit in the 1990s; this success was one reason why Poland was able to join NATO and the EU. Ironically, the very absence of of Polish-Ukrainian conflict made it difficult to remember just how important the Polish factor had always been. 

Russia and Ukraine both emerge from the Soviet Union, but diverge in their domestic politics. Both suffered from the problem of oligarchy: concentration of wealth and associated political power. In Ukraine this led to a certain pluralism; in Russia, one person eventually became the boss of bosses. By the 2010s, the state and societies were more different than (I think) the people in question sometimes realized; this became apparent during Ukrainian protests for democracy and for European integration, which are subjects of lectures to come.

The video is here and the podcast version is hereor here. Sorry I forgot to post the links last time! They are always the same, so if you are following these lectures, you could just bookmark them. 

man holding a book statue
Lviv, Market Square. These statues are currently stored to preserve them from Russian bomb and missile attacks, and the square is full of sandbags.

Readings:

Plokhy, Gates of Europe, chapter 26.

Serhy Yekelchyk, The Conflict in Ukraine, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, chapter 4.

Peter Pomerantsev, Nothing is True and Everything is Possible, New York: Public Affairs, 2014, Act 1: Reality Show Russia, 1-77.


quinta-feira, 18 de maio de 2023

Uma visão pessimista sobre a guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a Ucrânia - Scott C. Dunn (Medium)

 

The Historians Could Still Be Awfully Wrong About the War in Ukraine

I’ve had a few historians dog me about my articles on Ukraine. They insist that history is dispositive. They tell me that what worked for other countries will work for Russia, too. They offer the following prescription with a fair amount of uniformity and confidence: Nothing but a humiliating defeat will cure Russia of its poor behavior.

I will admit that the overwhelming and undisputable defeat of Germany and Japan did bring about some peace in the wake of the Second World War. But we still had wars after that. We had wars in Korea and Vietnam. We had Iraq, twice. Bosnia-Herzegovina, too. We took forever to get out of Afghanistan.

All of them involved the United States in some way or another. America seems to be a common element in wars around the world. That’s one reason I’m not convinced that the war in Ukraine will end if Russia were to just leave Ukraine.

Some of the historians I’ve encountered seem to think that Russia would fit the same pattern. All we have to do is deliver a humiliating defeat, followed by a big dose of disarmament, and Voila! you have peace.

But I’ve tempered my enthusiasm for war. I don’t believe in the optimists who tell me, “Look, Scott. If you could just get on board and believe what we believe, we could have unity with Ukraine. We need everyone to be on the same page so that we can help Ukraine win this war. Do you want yours with ice or room temperature?”

I’m not sure that Ukraine winning this war will bring peace.

The historians would seem to have history on their side. But those same historians seem quick to discount the uncertainty of human beings. We’re a quirky and unpredictable lot. Yes, there is a lot that can be predicted about us in peace. But in war, not so much.

When people are pressed into a mode of fight or flight, they begin to consider solutions that they would not consider in periods of peace. Historians know what I’m talking about. They know of Winston Churchill’s warning about war:

“Never, never, never believe any war will be smooth and easy, or that any one who embarks on that strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes he will encounter. The Statesman who yields to war fever must realise that once the signal is given, he is no longer the master of policy but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable events….

“I have always urged fighting wars and other contentions with might and main till overwhelming victory, and then offering the hand of friendship to the vanquished. Thus, I have always been against the Pacifists during the quarrel, and against the Jingoes at its close.” — My Early Life, 1930

Historians will mostly agree with Churchill on war. But in this war, I see absolutely zero sentiments for the part about offering the hand of friendship to Russia if and when the war should end. I have been aghast at all the ill will toward Russia. By the talk I’ve seen of the war around here, there is zero enthusiasm for friendship with Russia after the war. Zero acknowledgment of all of the forces at work against them.

Who bothers to ask the question, “Gosh, if America didn’t continually threaten Russia with nuclear weapons, would Russia even have an arsenal of nuclear weapons, too?”

Sometimes I wonder if Russia would be a different country if the United States had courted Russia the way they did China. They were both communist countries. Each got a different treatment with different outcomes.

China became a massive industrial trading partner. Russia became a fossil fuels giant. One had to build something from nothing. The other could just extract what they had to sell from the ground.

Russia isn’t operating in a vacuum. They are responding to what we do. To say that Russia is entirely at fault for the war they are in now, lets us off the hook. To say that only Putin can end the war by leaving Ukraine lets us off the hook. To say that the only solution is a complete and total humiliation of Russia is dangerous.

That might have worked in the 20th century. But technology has changed. People have changed. The world has grown older if not wiser. Russia has found access to advanced technology despite the sanctions.

Russia also has friends that can help them and support them in its war effort in ways that America or Europe can do little about. There is still a great deal of uncertainty about what Russia has and what it can deliver to the war.

I believe that there is greater certainty in negotiating for peace than in escalating the war. Every time I bring this up, I get the same refrain in reply: once we have defeated Russia, we can talk about negotiations.

If you defeat Russia and disarm it, a power vacuum will be created, and we have no way of knowing who or what will move into the vacuum to restore the power. Human power. Unpredictable human power. You know, like Afghanistan. We came, we fought, and we left Afghanistan with greater suffering than before.

Some people think it’s just Putin’s war. He wants it all back to the way it was in 1991. If only we got rid of Putin…

Eliminating Putin will very likely give rise to passionate and political insurgencies with lots and lots of guns. God knows what they will do if they get their hands on nuclear weapons in Russia.

At least if you start negotiating for peace now, you bring the temperature down. You allow cooler heads to prevail. When negotiations begin, both sides can air their complaints. Both sides can declare what it is that they really want and see if the other side can deliver. At least in negotiations, both sides are talking to each other.

You won’t have that if you escalate the war. And if you annihilate Russia’s army, as some have expressed a desire to do, you don’t really get the full picture in negotiations. If one side has an overwhelming victory, the other side will never be heard for fear of reprisal. Resentments will simmer for generations.

Starting negotiations now, before either side has declared victory, or either side has been completely destroyed, will allow enough room for both sides to air their grievances, and make their desires known. That’s information. That information can lead to greater certainty about future events.

Nothing says commitment better than making a clear statement about what one truly desires. Once we make our desires known, we commit to them. You can’t have that kind of certainty in an escalating war. You won’t get that kind of commitment in a war that could soon widen to engulf Europe.

So go on, tell me how we’re going to escalate the war. Tell me how we’re going to defeat Russia. We’re ten months into it now. All those predictions about how Russia is going to run out of weapons, run out of missiles, run out of men, seem to be off a bit. That’s uncertainty.

Start negotiations now and peace could be a thing by spring.

Write on.

sexta-feira, 7 de abril de 2023

The Empire Strikes Back: Putin’s Drive To Revive Soviet Borders Is Doomed - Barry Gander (Medium)

The Empire Strikes Back: Putin’s Drive To Revive Soviet Borders Is Doomed

 

https://barry-gander.medium.com/the-empire-strikes-back-putins-drive-to-revive-soviet-borders-is-doomed-faf588929d03

 

Barry Gander

Medium, March 26, 2023

 

Thousands flee Putin’s Russia into Georgia as part of a million-person refugee tide.

We have been here before.

History gives us a way to forecast Russia’s future, as the reign of state control again erodes the country’s ability to move forward.

These events have happened back in 1991, when Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev was faced with a coup by Soviet security forces. But the coup’s leaders had no popular support, and the ruling bureaucracy was also split. Boris Yeltsin climbed aboard a tank, the people of Moscow rallied for freedom and democracy, and the coup leaders surrendered within days.

The coup by the security forces actually accelerated the demise of the Soviet Union. It gave the people of the USSR a stark choice. Yes, independence was frightening, but it could not be worse than the totalitarian alternative. In turn, republic after Soviet republic tumbled towards independence. In Moscow a jubilant crowd tore down the statue of “Iron” Felix Dzerzhinsky, the founder of the secret police, right in front of the KGB headquarters.

That revolution for freedom was extinguished in the heartland, a bit at a time, by Putin, through assassination, mass bombings and military occupation.

Now however Putin’s overlay of dictatorship is also fraying, and the pattern of freedom is reasserting itself again. This is “Overthrow 2.0”.

Putin has just been betrayed by China, which is about to tear out Russia’s Asian heartland.

Russia’s other dependencies are attracted to Western values, and are seeking independence — just like 1991.

Once an area has tasted independence from a dominating power, it will not go back into its box.

This is the problem facing Putin as he fumbles to put back the pieces of the old Soviet empire.

He has denied that he has a goal of re-establishing the Soviet Empire. His denials lost credibility after he ordered Russian troops to be sent to eastern Ukraine. We have been here before with this man.

He has continually questioned Ukraine’s sovereignty. In 2008, Russia supported two Georgian separatist regions and has backed a breakaway region of Moldova, Transnistria, since the 1990s. He annexed Ukraine’s Crimea peninsula in 2014. He became the first person to annex sovereign foreign territory by force since Saddam Hussein in Kuwait. He cut off Europe’s energy supplies, threatened the use of nukes, and ran a fascist propaganda campaign around the world.

Last year his militia took over eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk and Lugansk rebel republics and he recognized them as “independent-with-Russian-troops”.

Weeks before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine he was insisting that he had no intention of attacking Ukraine and accused the U.S. and NATO of stoking the tension by refusing to accept Moscow’s demands for “security guarantees” from the Western alliance.

Ukraine wants to be part of Europe. There is no guarantee Putin could get that would change that perspective. It also wants to be part of NATO. Both organizations are voluntary bodies — no one is forced to belong and no “security guarantees” can be part of an equation where the people have picked the path to democracy.

Putin actually wants guarantees against freedom, not NATO.

The desire for freedom is hard to detect in Russia itself, because the people are so muffled.

But it can be seen more clearly in Russia’s fringe of reluctant puppet states, where the control is less. They are able to make the choice that faced the Russians themselves in 1991: do you want freedom or do you want to be ruled by a gong show run by a poisoning dictator and his five gangs of thieves.

It is not really surprising that the West “let” Putin turn Russia into a concentration camp. At any step where a change could be made, it would mean fighting a world war. That is what kept the allies from stopping Hitler when he occupied the Rhineland. In a democracy, could the French President have gone to his people with a motivating rationale for war against Hitler?

Dictatorships have it easy; democratic countermeasures are hard. We need to have some sympathy and understanding for the bewildered democracies in Europe in the 1930s.

But we have learned from that era.

In the build-up to Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, to paraphrase Winston Churchill’s definition of appeasement, we are feeding the crocodiles, hoping they will eat us last.

(And I will keep calling this “Putin’s War”, not “Russia’s War”. The Russians were never asked for their approval. That would have meant the need for a reason for the war…beyond ego-driven empire-building)

Instead of standing on our principles about the universal values of human rights and human life, we quibbled with Russia’s propagandists about whether Russia’s feelings were being hurt. Is it uncomfortable for you to have NATO so close? OOPS — our fault!

But it has never been about NATO. Russia has in the past acknowledged Ukraine’s right to join NATO. Taking NATO off the table will not quell his insecurity; what he fears is democracy. In fact, up until Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, NATO had been drawing down resources in Europe, not increasing them.

Our focus therefore has to be the final triumph of Western-style democracy over bygone dictatorships. NO appeasement or apologies will be possible, because this is a binary game: democracy or dictatorship.

And in the process, we cannot promote democracy while treating the leaders of the world’s most repressive regimes as equals, advises Garry Kasparov, former chess champion turned activist. His mother had hung a sign above his bed — a saying of the Soviet dissidents — “If not you, who else?” We are all responsible for seeing that justice is done.

We have a lot on our side.

Almost every nation in the world that matters today is democratic. There was a time in the 1940s when dictators ruled from the English Channel to the Bering Sea. Now there are only TWO meaningful hold-outs: Russia and China.

I may be wrong, but I sense that China can evolve; we don’t need to shake a spear at them. Their biggest existential threat anyway is India, not America: India is poised to take their jobs and industry.

Our goal in Russia would ideally be to provide the citizens with hope and possibilities for a brighter future.

They exist right now in an increasingly fraught environment. The war is going badly. Russia currently controls only 17 percent of Ukrainian territory, which is the least amount of area that its forces have occupied since April. Russian leaders can see that the walls of their tents are coming down, and the light is getting in.

And sadly, Russia will not become a democracy until it falls apart. Russia is not really a nation-state but a premodern multiethnic empire living for 300 years on geographic expansion and resource looting.

Russia’s influence in the region has waned and citizens have repeatedly signaled their desire to escape Moscow’s grasp. Subservience to Putin is now required. If the regions could be free, why could not the Russians themselves?

This almost happened, in the elections in 2011. They were the largest protests in Russia since the Soviet collapse. Ordinary Russians showed themselves to have both the will and the capability to threaten his grip on power.

With this fear of democracy as his overriding motive, Putin will remain committed to undermining Georgian, Moldovan, Armenian, etc. democracy and sovereignty.

Russia has gotten so good at quelling regional aspirations that the government of Iran asked Russia for help in suppressing a popular uprising.

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The former USSR. All the states not marked “Russia” will become independent as soon as they can. The central Asia group is now being courted by China, in a display of breathtaking hypocrisy by President Xi.

In Kazakhstan, for example, there were nationwide protests against fuel prices last year. The protests morphed into a working-class grievance campaign. The President could not get a response from his own security forces and called on the Russians. The crowds were brutally crushed and 238 people died. The former defence minister has just been jailed for not doing enough to protect the government.

Dagestan is a mountainous republic within the Russian Federation. There have been confrontations between police and crowds of mothers who were infuriated that their sons were being drafted for the war in Ukraine.

Some other ethnic minority parts of the Russian Federation, including its 22 ethnic republics, as well as other far-flung territories, or krais, even majority ethnic Russian ones, have seen anti-mobilization protests in recent weeks — as far afield as the Siberian city of Yakutsk, the capital of the Sakha Republic and Vladivostok in Russia’s far east.

While they have died down for now they have left sullen anger and resentment, which is compounding long-standing economic and local political grievances in the Russian Federation’s periphery.

Russia’s ethnic republics and far-flung territories will not remain quiet and subdued for much longer, suspects Russian-born political scientist Sergej Sumlenny, a former chief editor at Russian business broadcaster RBC-TV.

“The republics have long chafed under Moscow’s imperial rule — so too territories in the far east and parts of remote northern Russia.” The seeds of potential rebellion, especially in the North Caucasus, the Sakha Republic and the Middle Volga, are being sown, he thinks. Increasing economic distress and impoverishment, the exploitation of natural resources only for the benefit of Moscow, the failure to drive development and investment, a reckless attitude to pollution and environmental degradation, and governance swinging from repression to negligence are all stoking simmering grievance.”

What could trigger real revolt? “It could be a small spark,” he says. “Look at what triggered the Arab spring — a Tunisian fruit vendor setting himself on fire over injustice. Or look at Iran now: it can be something [like] … the death of a 22-year-old Kurdish woman because she wasn’t wearing a hijab. Revolt is often be sparked by perceived insult.

Russia’s Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu made a comparison to Yugoslavia, warning external pressures combined with internal threats risk breaking up the Russian Federation along ethnic and religious lines. At the Beijing Xiangshan Forum in 2019, Shoigu said: “Chaos and the collapse of statehood are becoming the norm.”

When the Soviet Union dissolved it wasn’t only the big constituent republics of the Soviet Union — like Ukraine, the Baltic states and Kazakhstan — that sought independence. Many of Russia’s smaller republics and even some far-flung predominantly Russian territories, cities and regions used the political turmoil to claim or to try to grab autonomy.

In 1990, fourteen of the 22 republics of the Russian Federation declared themselves sovereign and when a Federation Treaty was being negotiated the heads of several republics, including Tatarstan, demanded the new post-Communist Russian constitution recognize their “state sovereignty” as well as a right to secede from the Russian Federation. Chechnya refused to sign the Federation Treaty and declared independence, triggering an 18-month war of liberation.

Putin decided that the sovereignty of the Russian Federation would override any declaration of sovereignty by the republics or other federal subjects. Provincial authorities have been weakened.

Any candidate in a regional election who wants to register must have Kremlin backing and Putin can sack and appoint regional heads at will.

In 2021 the Russian justice ministry suspended the activities of Tatarstan’s All-Tatar Public Center “due to its extremist activities.”

Last month, retired U.S. General Ben Hodges, a former commander of the U.S. Army in Europe and a veteran of Iraq and Afghanistan, said the West should prepare for the Russian Federation breaking up within the next four or five years. “We were not prepared for the collapse of the Soviet Union. We need to be prepared for this possibility,” he told Times Radio.

Regional elites may start calculating that Moscow isn’t able to stop them breaking away, he says. “Once it starts, it could unravel fast.”

Western policymakers seem unnerved by the possibility of a break-up of nuclear-armed Russia,

That was also the case with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Western leaders preferred the status quo and frowned on Ukraine and others breaking away. “Americans will not support those who seek independence in order to replace a far-off tyranny with a local despotism. They will not aid those who promote a suicidal nationalism based upon ethnic hatred,” President George Bush said in an infamous 1991 speech in Ukraine nicknamed the Chicken Kyiv speech.

Bureaucrats will always prefer the status quo to a social revolution — no matter that it is justified.

Oleksiy Danilov, Secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, said in September that the process of Russian dissolution “has already begun and will accelerate.” He said he obtained and analyzed the results of a social survey conducted in Russia. Danilov said the focus was on separatism in the central Russian Republic of Tatarstan and the southern Chechen Republic.

Tatarstan and Chechnya have large Muslim populations, and had declared their independence at the end of the Soviet Union. Chechnya fought two wars with Russia. Failure in a war of aggression without cause could spur the fires of separatism throughout the Russian Federation.

Moldova is a tiny nation of just 2.6 million people that borders Ukraine to the southwest. Russia has 1,500 troops there supporting separatists, just as it did in Ukraine. Moldova’s government has opposed the Russian presence since it gained independence in the Soviet breakup in 1991, but has no way of forcing the Russians to leave.

Georgia, on Russia’s southwestern frontier, remains in a state of dispute. If Russian occupation forces left, there is no doubt it would swing West.

At the United Nations in March of 2022, six former republics voted in favor of a resolution condemning Russia and calling for its immediate withdrawal from Ukraine. Seven more abstained or were conveniently absent. The only country to take Russia’s side, aside from Russia itself, was Belarus. Which has Russian troops on the ground.

It is not only a geographic fragmentation that Russia is facing, but a horizontal war-of-the-dukedoms. Different factions within the government have their own armies. They could fight for power because they have their own supplies of weapons. Even criminals have weapons. Chechens have weapons. The Internal Ministry has weapons. The Defence Ministry has weapons. The security forces — KGB/FSB — have weapons. Everybody has weapons. It could be chaos in the streets. It will be the same situation as 1917–18.

Political scientist Ekaterina Schulmann told The Economist that “the Russian Federation as we know it is self-liquidating and passing into a failed-state phase.” Its administration, she continued, is unable to carry out its basic functions:

“This includes the most basic mandate of any government, which is the protection of its citizenry. But Putin’s regime now presents the greatest threat to that citizenry by threatening to forcibly conscript them in the hundreds of thousands and send them into battle with almost no proper equipment and even less training.”

The Kremlin’s decision to build its army by having each region of Russia create battalions of soldiers is unbelievably stupid. At least eight regions have created such units. Leaders of these regions have ready-made battalions under their command to enforce a separation.

Western governments should prepare a response to this rule of disorder.

It was to Russia’s extreme misfortune that Yeltsin handed over power to Putin.

It was Russia’s misfortune before that, to have Stalin take power from Lenin.

And before that, to have Lenin take power from the Tsar.

If Russia were a car on a highway, it would be veering off-course every few hours, pulled to the right or left. Anywhere there is a sign that says “Higher Power Here”.

I would feel sorry for them, but I’m impatient to see what a democratic Russia — stripped of the trappings of empire — could do for the world.

They deserve better than they’ve got, for sure.


Barry Gander

A Canadian from Connecticut: 2 strikes against me! I'm a top writer, looking for the Meaning under the headlines. Follow me on Mastodon @Barry