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Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida.

Mostrando postagens com marcador Asia. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador Asia. Mostrar todas as postagens

sexta-feira, 7 de abril de 2023

The Empire Strikes Back: Putin’s Drive To Revive Soviet Borders Is Doomed - Barry Gander (Medium)

The Empire Strikes Back: Putin’s Drive To Revive Soviet Borders Is Doomed

 

https://barry-gander.medium.com/the-empire-strikes-back-putins-drive-to-revive-soviet-borders-is-doomed-faf588929d03

 

Barry Gander

Medium, March 26, 2023

 

Thousands flee Putin’s Russia into Georgia as part of a million-person refugee tide.

We have been here before.

History gives us a way to forecast Russia’s future, as the reign of state control again erodes the country’s ability to move forward.

These events have happened back in 1991, when Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev was faced with a coup by Soviet security forces. But the coup’s leaders had no popular support, and the ruling bureaucracy was also split. Boris Yeltsin climbed aboard a tank, the people of Moscow rallied for freedom and democracy, and the coup leaders surrendered within days.

The coup by the security forces actually accelerated the demise of the Soviet Union. It gave the people of the USSR a stark choice. Yes, independence was frightening, but it could not be worse than the totalitarian alternative. In turn, republic after Soviet republic tumbled towards independence. In Moscow a jubilant crowd tore down the statue of “Iron” Felix Dzerzhinsky, the founder of the secret police, right in front of the KGB headquarters.

That revolution for freedom was extinguished in the heartland, a bit at a time, by Putin, through assassination, mass bombings and military occupation.

Now however Putin’s overlay of dictatorship is also fraying, and the pattern of freedom is reasserting itself again. This is “Overthrow 2.0”.

Putin has just been betrayed by China, which is about to tear out Russia’s Asian heartland.

Russia’s other dependencies are attracted to Western values, and are seeking independence — just like 1991.

Once an area has tasted independence from a dominating power, it will not go back into its box.

This is the problem facing Putin as he fumbles to put back the pieces of the old Soviet empire.

He has denied that he has a goal of re-establishing the Soviet Empire. His denials lost credibility after he ordered Russian troops to be sent to eastern Ukraine. We have been here before with this man.

He has continually questioned Ukraine’s sovereignty. In 2008, Russia supported two Georgian separatist regions and has backed a breakaway region of Moldova, Transnistria, since the 1990s. He annexed Ukraine’s Crimea peninsula in 2014. He became the first person to annex sovereign foreign territory by force since Saddam Hussein in Kuwait. He cut off Europe’s energy supplies, threatened the use of nukes, and ran a fascist propaganda campaign around the world.

Last year his militia took over eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk and Lugansk rebel republics and he recognized them as “independent-with-Russian-troops”.

Weeks before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine he was insisting that he had no intention of attacking Ukraine and accused the U.S. and NATO of stoking the tension by refusing to accept Moscow’s demands for “security guarantees” from the Western alliance.

Ukraine wants to be part of Europe. There is no guarantee Putin could get that would change that perspective. It also wants to be part of NATO. Both organizations are voluntary bodies — no one is forced to belong and no “security guarantees” can be part of an equation where the people have picked the path to democracy.

Putin actually wants guarantees against freedom, not NATO.

The desire for freedom is hard to detect in Russia itself, because the people are so muffled.

But it can be seen more clearly in Russia’s fringe of reluctant puppet states, where the control is less. They are able to make the choice that faced the Russians themselves in 1991: do you want freedom or do you want to be ruled by a gong show run by a poisoning dictator and his five gangs of thieves.

It is not really surprising that the West “let” Putin turn Russia into a concentration camp. At any step where a change could be made, it would mean fighting a world war. That is what kept the allies from stopping Hitler when he occupied the Rhineland. In a democracy, could the French President have gone to his people with a motivating rationale for war against Hitler?

Dictatorships have it easy; democratic countermeasures are hard. We need to have some sympathy and understanding for the bewildered democracies in Europe in the 1930s.

But we have learned from that era.

In the build-up to Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, to paraphrase Winston Churchill’s definition of appeasement, we are feeding the crocodiles, hoping they will eat us last.

(And I will keep calling this “Putin’s War”, not “Russia’s War”. The Russians were never asked for their approval. That would have meant the need for a reason for the war…beyond ego-driven empire-building)

Instead of standing on our principles about the universal values of human rights and human life, we quibbled with Russia’s propagandists about whether Russia’s feelings were being hurt. Is it uncomfortable for you to have NATO so close? OOPS — our fault!

But it has never been about NATO. Russia has in the past acknowledged Ukraine’s right to join NATO. Taking NATO off the table will not quell his insecurity; what he fears is democracy. In fact, up until Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, NATO had been drawing down resources in Europe, not increasing them.

Our focus therefore has to be the final triumph of Western-style democracy over bygone dictatorships. NO appeasement or apologies will be possible, because this is a binary game: democracy or dictatorship.

And in the process, we cannot promote democracy while treating the leaders of the world’s most repressive regimes as equals, advises Garry Kasparov, former chess champion turned activist. His mother had hung a sign above his bed — a saying of the Soviet dissidents — “If not you, who else?” We are all responsible for seeing that justice is done.

We have a lot on our side.

Almost every nation in the world that matters today is democratic. There was a time in the 1940s when dictators ruled from the English Channel to the Bering Sea. Now there are only TWO meaningful hold-outs: Russia and China.

I may be wrong, but I sense that China can evolve; we don’t need to shake a spear at them. Their biggest existential threat anyway is India, not America: India is poised to take their jobs and industry.

Our goal in Russia would ideally be to provide the citizens with hope and possibilities for a brighter future.

They exist right now in an increasingly fraught environment. The war is going badly. Russia currently controls only 17 percent of Ukrainian territory, which is the least amount of area that its forces have occupied since April. Russian leaders can see that the walls of their tents are coming down, and the light is getting in.

And sadly, Russia will not become a democracy until it falls apart. Russia is not really a nation-state but a premodern multiethnic empire living for 300 years on geographic expansion and resource looting.

Russia’s influence in the region has waned and citizens have repeatedly signaled their desire to escape Moscow’s grasp. Subservience to Putin is now required. If the regions could be free, why could not the Russians themselves?

This almost happened, in the elections in 2011. They were the largest protests in Russia since the Soviet collapse. Ordinary Russians showed themselves to have both the will and the capability to threaten his grip on power.

With this fear of democracy as his overriding motive, Putin will remain committed to undermining Georgian, Moldovan, Armenian, etc. democracy and sovereignty.

Russia has gotten so good at quelling regional aspirations that the government of Iran asked Russia for help in suppressing a popular uprising.

Mapa

Descrição gerada automaticamente

The former USSR. All the states not marked “Russia” will become independent as soon as they can. The central Asia group is now being courted by China, in a display of breathtaking hypocrisy by President Xi.

In Kazakhstan, for example, there were nationwide protests against fuel prices last year. The protests morphed into a working-class grievance campaign. The President could not get a response from his own security forces and called on the Russians. The crowds were brutally crushed and 238 people died. The former defence minister has just been jailed for not doing enough to protect the government.

Dagestan is a mountainous republic within the Russian Federation. There have been confrontations between police and crowds of mothers who were infuriated that their sons were being drafted for the war in Ukraine.

Some other ethnic minority parts of the Russian Federation, including its 22 ethnic republics, as well as other far-flung territories, or krais, even majority ethnic Russian ones, have seen anti-mobilization protests in recent weeks — as far afield as the Siberian city of Yakutsk, the capital of the Sakha Republic and Vladivostok in Russia’s far east.

While they have died down for now they have left sullen anger and resentment, which is compounding long-standing economic and local political grievances in the Russian Federation’s periphery.

Russia’s ethnic republics and far-flung territories will not remain quiet and subdued for much longer, suspects Russian-born political scientist Sergej Sumlenny, a former chief editor at Russian business broadcaster RBC-TV.

“The republics have long chafed under Moscow’s imperial rule — so too territories in the far east and parts of remote northern Russia.” The seeds of potential rebellion, especially in the North Caucasus, the Sakha Republic and the Middle Volga, are being sown, he thinks. Increasing economic distress and impoverishment, the exploitation of natural resources only for the benefit of Moscow, the failure to drive development and investment, a reckless attitude to pollution and environmental degradation, and governance swinging from repression to negligence are all stoking simmering grievance.”

What could trigger real revolt? “It could be a small spark,” he says. “Look at what triggered the Arab spring — a Tunisian fruit vendor setting himself on fire over injustice. Or look at Iran now: it can be something [like] … the death of a 22-year-old Kurdish woman because she wasn’t wearing a hijab. Revolt is often be sparked by perceived insult.

Russia’s Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu made a comparison to Yugoslavia, warning external pressures combined with internal threats risk breaking up the Russian Federation along ethnic and religious lines. At the Beijing Xiangshan Forum in 2019, Shoigu said: “Chaos and the collapse of statehood are becoming the norm.”

When the Soviet Union dissolved it wasn’t only the big constituent republics of the Soviet Union — like Ukraine, the Baltic states and Kazakhstan — that sought independence. Many of Russia’s smaller republics and even some far-flung predominantly Russian territories, cities and regions used the political turmoil to claim or to try to grab autonomy.

In 1990, fourteen of the 22 republics of the Russian Federation declared themselves sovereign and when a Federation Treaty was being negotiated the heads of several republics, including Tatarstan, demanded the new post-Communist Russian constitution recognize their “state sovereignty” as well as a right to secede from the Russian Federation. Chechnya refused to sign the Federation Treaty and declared independence, triggering an 18-month war of liberation.

Putin decided that the sovereignty of the Russian Federation would override any declaration of sovereignty by the republics or other federal subjects. Provincial authorities have been weakened.

Any candidate in a regional election who wants to register must have Kremlin backing and Putin can sack and appoint regional heads at will.

In 2021 the Russian justice ministry suspended the activities of Tatarstan’s All-Tatar Public Center “due to its extremist activities.”

Last month, retired U.S. General Ben Hodges, a former commander of the U.S. Army in Europe and a veteran of Iraq and Afghanistan, said the West should prepare for the Russian Federation breaking up within the next four or five years. “We were not prepared for the collapse of the Soviet Union. We need to be prepared for this possibility,” he told Times Radio.

Regional elites may start calculating that Moscow isn’t able to stop them breaking away, he says. “Once it starts, it could unravel fast.”

Western policymakers seem unnerved by the possibility of a break-up of nuclear-armed Russia,

That was also the case with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Western leaders preferred the status quo and frowned on Ukraine and others breaking away. “Americans will not support those who seek independence in order to replace a far-off tyranny with a local despotism. They will not aid those who promote a suicidal nationalism based upon ethnic hatred,” President George Bush said in an infamous 1991 speech in Ukraine nicknamed the Chicken Kyiv speech.

Bureaucrats will always prefer the status quo to a social revolution — no matter that it is justified.

Oleksiy Danilov, Secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, said in September that the process of Russian dissolution “has already begun and will accelerate.” He said he obtained and analyzed the results of a social survey conducted in Russia. Danilov said the focus was on separatism in the central Russian Republic of Tatarstan and the southern Chechen Republic.

Tatarstan and Chechnya have large Muslim populations, and had declared their independence at the end of the Soviet Union. Chechnya fought two wars with Russia. Failure in a war of aggression without cause could spur the fires of separatism throughout the Russian Federation.

Moldova is a tiny nation of just 2.6 million people that borders Ukraine to the southwest. Russia has 1,500 troops there supporting separatists, just as it did in Ukraine. Moldova’s government has opposed the Russian presence since it gained independence in the Soviet breakup in 1991, but has no way of forcing the Russians to leave.

Georgia, on Russia’s southwestern frontier, remains in a state of dispute. If Russian occupation forces left, there is no doubt it would swing West.

At the United Nations in March of 2022, six former republics voted in favor of a resolution condemning Russia and calling for its immediate withdrawal from Ukraine. Seven more abstained or were conveniently absent. The only country to take Russia’s side, aside from Russia itself, was Belarus. Which has Russian troops on the ground.

It is not only a geographic fragmentation that Russia is facing, but a horizontal war-of-the-dukedoms. Different factions within the government have their own armies. They could fight for power because they have their own supplies of weapons. Even criminals have weapons. Chechens have weapons. The Internal Ministry has weapons. The Defence Ministry has weapons. The security forces — KGB/FSB — have weapons. Everybody has weapons. It could be chaos in the streets. It will be the same situation as 1917–18.

Political scientist Ekaterina Schulmann told The Economist that “the Russian Federation as we know it is self-liquidating and passing into a failed-state phase.” Its administration, she continued, is unable to carry out its basic functions:

“This includes the most basic mandate of any government, which is the protection of its citizenry. But Putin’s regime now presents the greatest threat to that citizenry by threatening to forcibly conscript them in the hundreds of thousands and send them into battle with almost no proper equipment and even less training.”

The Kremlin’s decision to build its army by having each region of Russia create battalions of soldiers is unbelievably stupid. At least eight regions have created such units. Leaders of these regions have ready-made battalions under their command to enforce a separation.

Western governments should prepare a response to this rule of disorder.

It was to Russia’s extreme misfortune that Yeltsin handed over power to Putin.

It was Russia’s misfortune before that, to have Stalin take power from Lenin.

And before that, to have Lenin take power from the Tsar.

If Russia were a car on a highway, it would be veering off-course every few hours, pulled to the right or left. Anywhere there is a sign that says “Higher Power Here”.

I would feel sorry for them, but I’m impatient to see what a democratic Russia — stripped of the trappings of empire — could do for the world.

They deserve better than they’ve got, for sure.


Barry Gander

A Canadian from Connecticut: 2 strikes against me! I'm a top writer, looking for the Meaning under the headlines. Follow me on Mastodon @Barry

 

 


sábado, 1 de abril de 2023

Russia: não mais um império, nem um Estado nacional - Barry Gander (Medium)

 The Empire Strikes Back: Putin’s Drive To Revive Soviet Borders Is Doomed

Barry Gander

Medium, March 31. 2023


Thousands flee Putin’s Russia into Georgia as part of a million-person refugee tide.

We have been here before.

History gives us a way to forecast Russia’s future, as the reign of state control again erodes the country’s ability to move forward.

These events have happened back in 1991, when Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev was faced with a coup by Soviet security forces. But the coup’s leaders had no popular support, and the ruling bureaucracy was also split. Boris Yeltsin climbed aboard a tank, the people of Moscow rallied for freedom and democracy, and the coup leaders surrendered within days.

The coup by the security forces actually accelerated the demise of the Soviet Union. It gave the people of the USSR a stark choice. Yes, independence was frightening, but it could not be worse than the totalitarian alternative. In turn, republic after Soviet republic tumbled towards independence. In Moscow a jubilant crowd tore down the statue of “Iron” Felix Dzerzhinsky, the founder of the secret police, right in front of the KGB headquarters.

That revolution for freedom was extinguished in the heartland, a bit at a time, by Putin, through assassination, mass bombings and military occupation.

Now however Putin’s overlay of dictatorship is also fraying, and the pattern of freedom is reasserting itself again. This is “Overthrow 2.0”.

Putin has just been betrayed by China, which is about to tear out Russia’s Asian heartland.

Russia’s other dependencies are attracted to Western values, and are seeking independence — just like 1991.

Once an area has tasted independence from a dominating power, it will not go back into its box.

This is the problem facing Putin as he fumbles to put back the pieces of the old Soviet empire.

He has denied that he has a goal of re-establishing the Soviet Empire. His denials lost credibility after he ordered Russian troops to be sent to eastern Ukraine. We have been here before with this man.

He has continually questioned Ukraine’s sovereignty. In 2008, Russia supported two Georgian separatist regions and has backed a breakaway region of Moldova, Transnistria, since the 1990s. He annexed Ukraine’s Crimea peninsula in 2014. He became the first person to annex sovereign foreign territory by force since Saddam Hussein in Kuwait. He cut off Europe’s energy supplies, threatened the use of nukes, and ran a fascist propaganda campaign around the world.

Last year his militia took over eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk and Lugansk rebel republics and he recognized them as “independent-with-Russian-troops”.

Weeks before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine he was insisting that he had no intention of attacking Ukraine and accused the U.S. and NATO of stoking the tension by refusing to accept Moscow’s demands for “security guarantees” from the Western alliance.

Ukraine wants to be part of Europe. There is no guarantee Putin could get that would change that perspective. It also wants to be part of NATO. Both organizations are voluntary bodies — no one is forced to belong and no “security guarantees” can be part of an equation where the people have picked the path to democracy.

Putin actually wants guarantees against freedom, not NATO.

The desire for freedom is hard to detect in Russia itself, because the people are so muffled.

But it can be seen more clearly in Russia’s fringe of reluctant puppet states, where the control is less. They are able to make the choice that faced the Russians themselves in 1991: do you want freedom or do you want to be ruled by a gong show run by a poisoning dictator and his five gangs of thieves.

It is not really surprising that the West “let” Putin turn Russia into a concentration camp. At any step where a change could be made, it would mean fighting a world war. That is what kept the allies from stopping Hitler when he occupied the Rhineland. In a democracy, could the French President have gone to his people with a motivating rationale for war against Hitler?

Dictatorships have it easy; democratic countermeasures are hard. We need to have some sympathy and understanding for the bewildered democracies in Europe in the 1930s.

But we have learned from that era.

In the build-up to Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, to paraphrase Winston Churchill’s definition of appeasement, we are feeding the crocodiles, hoping they will eat us last.

(And I will keep calling this “Putin’s War”, not “Russia’s War”. The Russians were never asked for their approval. That would have meant the need for a reason for the war…beyond ego-driven empire-building)

Instead of standing on our principles about the universal values of human rights and human life, we quibbled with Russia’s propagandists about whether Russia’s feelings were being hurt. Is it uncomfortable for you to have NATO so close? OOPS — our fault!

But it has never been about NATO. Russia has in the past acknowledged Ukraine’s right to join NATO. Taking NATO off the table will not quell his insecurity; what he fears is democracy. In fact, up until Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, NATO had been drawing down resources in Europe, not increasing them.

Our focus therefore has to be the final triumph of Western-style democracy over bygone dictatorships. NO appeasement or apologies will be possible, because this is a binary game: democracy or dictatorship.

And in the process, we cannot promote democracy while treating the leaders of the world’s most repressive regimes as equals, advises Garry Kasparov, former chess champion turned activist. His mother had hung a sign above his bed — a saying of the Soviet dissidents — “If not you, who else?” We are all responsible for seeing that justice is done.

We have a lot on our side.

Almost every nation in the world that matters today is democratic. There was a time in the 1940s when dictators ruled from the English Channel to the Bering Sea. Now there are only TWO meaningful hold-outs: Russia and China.

I may be wrong, but I sense that China can evolve; we don’t need to shake a spear at them. Their biggest existential threat anyway is India, not America: India is poised to take their jobs and industry.

Our goal in Russia would ideally be to provide the citizens with hope and possibilities for a brighter future.

They exist right now in an increasingly fraught environment. The war is going badly. Russia currently controls only 17 percent of Ukrainian territory, which is the least amount of area that its forces have occupied since April. Russian leaders can see that the walls of their tents are coming down, and the light is getting in.

And sadly, Russia will not become a democracy until it falls apart. Russia is not really a nation-state but a premodern multiethnic empire living for 300 years on geographic expansion and resource looting.

Russia’s influence in the region has waned and citizens have repeatedly signaled their desire to escape Moscow’s grasp. Subservience to Putin is now required. If the regions could be free, why could not the Russians themselves?

This almost happened, in the elections in 2011. They were the largest protests in Russia since the Soviet collapse. Ordinary Russians showed themselves to have both the will and the capability to threaten his grip on power.

With this fear of democracy as his overriding motive, Putin will remain committed to undermining Georgian, Moldovan, Armenian, etc. democracy and sovereignty.

Russia has gotten so good at quelling regional aspirations that the government of Iran asked Russia for help in suppressing a popular uprising.


The former USSR. All the states not marked “Russia” will become independent as soon as they can. The central Asia group is now being courted by China, in a display of breathtaking hypocrisy by President Xi.

In Kazakhstan, for example, there were nationwide protests against fuel prices last year. The protests morphed into a working-class grievance campaign. The President could not get a response from his own security forces and called on the Russians. The crowds were brutally crushed and 238 people died. The former defence minister has just been jailed for not doing enough to protect the government.

Dagestan is a mountainous republic within the Russian Federation. There have been confrontations between police and crowds of mothers who were infuriated that their sons were being drafted for the war in Ukraine.

Some other ethnic minority parts of the Russian Federation, including its 22 ethnic republics, as well as other far-flung territories, or krais, even majority ethnic Russian ones, have seen anti-mobilization protests in recent weeks — as far afield as the Siberian city of Yakutsk, the capital of the Sakha Republic and Vladivostok in Russia’s far east.

While they have died down for now they have left sullen anger and resentment, which is compounding long-standing economic and local political grievances in the Russian Federation’s periphery.

Russia’s ethnic republics and far-flung territories will not remain quiet and subdued for much longer, suspects Russian-born political scientist Sergej Sumlenny, a former chief editor at Russian business broadcaster RBC-TV.

“The republics have long chafed under Moscow’s imperial rule — so too territories in the far east and parts of remote northern Russia.” The seeds of potential rebellion, especially in the North Caucasus, the Sakha Republic and the Middle Volga, are being sown, he thinks. Increasing economic distress and impoverishment, the exploitation of natural resources only for the benefit of Moscow, the failure to drive development and investment, a reckless attitude to pollution and environmental degradation, and governance swinging from repression to negligence are all stoking simmering grievance.”

What could trigger real revolt? “It could be a small spark,” he says. “Look at what triggered the Arab spring — a Tunisian fruit vendor setting himself on fire over injustice. Or look at Iran now: it can be something [like] … the death of a 22-year-old Kurdish woman because she wasn’t wearing a hijab. Revolt is often be sparked by perceived insult.

Russia’s Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu made a comparison to Yugoslavia, warning external pressures combined with internal threats risk breaking up the Russian Federation along ethnic and religious lines. At the Beijing Xiangshan Forum in 2019, Shoigu said: “Chaos and the collapse of statehood are becoming the norm.”

When the Soviet Union dissolved it wasn’t only the big constituent republics of the Soviet Union — like Ukraine, the Baltic states and Kazakhstan — that sought independence. Many of Russia’s smaller republics and even some far-flung predominantly Russian territories, cities and regions used the political turmoil to claim or to try to grab autonomy.

In 1990, fourteen of the 22 republics of the Russian Federation declared themselves sovereign and when a Federation Treaty was being negotiated the heads of several republics, including Tatarstan, demanded the new post-Communist Russian constitution recognize their “state sovereignty” as well as a right to secede from the Russian Federation. Chechnya refused to sign the Federation Treaty and declared independence, triggering an 18-month war of liberation.

Putin decided that the sovereignty of the Russian Federation would override any declaration of sovereignty by the republics or other federal subjects. Provincial authorities have been weakened.

Any candidate in a regional election who wants to register must have Kremlin backingand Putin can sack and appoint regional heads at will.

In 2021 the Russian justice ministry suspended the activities of Tatarstan’s All-Tatar Public Center “due to its extremist activities.”

Last month, retired U.S. General Ben Hodges, a former commander of the U.S. Army in Europe and a veteran of Iraq and Afghanistan, said the West should prepare for the Russian Federation breaking up within the next four or five years. “We were not prepared for the collapse of the Soviet Union. We need to be prepared for this possibility,” he told Times Radio.

Regional elites may start calculating that Moscow isn’t able to stop them breaking away, he says. “Once it starts, it could unravel fast.”

Western policymakers seem unnerved by the possibility of a break-up of nuclear-armed Russia,

That was also the case with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Western leaders preferred the status quo and frowned on Ukraine and others breaking away. “Americans will not support those who seek independence in order to replace a far-off tyranny with a local despotism. They will not aid those who promote a suicidal nationalism based upon ethnic hatred,” President George Bush said in an infamous 1991 speech in Ukraine nicknamed the Chicken Kyiv speech.

Bureaucrats will always prefer the status quo to a social revolution — no matter that it is justified.

Oleksiy Danilov, Secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, said in September that the process of Russian dissolution “has already begun and will accelerate.” He said he obtained and analyzed the results of a social survey conducted in Russia. Danilov said the focus was on separatism in the central Russian Republic of Tatarstan and the southern Chechen Republic.

Tatarstan and Chechnya have large Muslim populations, and had declared their independence at the end of the Soviet Union. Chechnya fought two wars with Russia. Failure in a war of aggression without cause could spur the fires of separatism throughout the Russian Federation.

Moldova is a tiny nation of just 2.6 million people that borders Ukraine to the southwest. Russia has 1,500 troops there supporting separatists, just as it did in Ukraine. Moldova’s government has opposed the Russian presence since it gained independence in the Soviet breakup in 1991, but has no way of forcing the Russians to leave.

Georgia, on Russia’s southwestern frontier, remains in a state of dispute. If Russian occupation forces left, there is no doubt it would swing West.

At the United Nations in March of 2022, six former republics voted in favor of a resolution condemning Russia and calling for its immediate withdrawal from Ukraine. Seven more abstained or were conveniently absent. The only country to take Russia’s side, aside from Russia itself, was Belarus. Which has Russian troops on the ground.

It is not only a geographic fragmentation that Russia is facing, but a horizontal war-of-the-dukedoms. Different factions within the government have their own armies. They could fight for power because they have their own supplies of weapons. Even criminals have weapons. Chechens have weapons. The Internal Ministry has weapons. The Defence Ministry has weapons. The security forces — KGB/FSB — have weapons. Everybody has weapons. It could be chaos in the streets. It will be the same situation as 1917–18.

Political scientist Ekaterina Schulmann told The Economist that “the Russian Federation as we know it is self-liquidating and passing into a failed-state phase.” Its administration, she continued, is unable to carry out its basic functions:

“This includes the most basic mandate of any government, which is the protection of its citizenry. But Putin’s regime now presents the greatest threat to that citizenry by threatening to forcibly conscript them in the hundreds of thousands and send them into battle with almost no proper equipment and even less training.”

The Kremlin’s decision to build its army by having each region of Russia create battalions of soldiers is unbelievably stupid. At least eight regions have created such units. Leaders of these regions have ready-made battalions under their command to enforce a separation.

Western governments should prepare a response to this rule of disorder.

It was to Russia’s extreme misfortune that Yeltsin handed over power to Putin.

It was Russia’s misfortune before that, to have Stalin take power from Lenin.

And before that, to have Lenin take power from the Tsar.

If Russia were a car on a highway, it would be veering off-course every few hours, pulled to the right or left. Anywhere there is a sign that says “Higher Power Here”.

I would feel sorry for them, but I’m impatient to see what a democratic Russia — stripped of the trappings of empire — could do for the world.

They deserve better than they’ve got, for sure.


quarta-feira, 8 de junho de 2022

Em que direção a Ásia se move, e qual o seu impacto global?: Parag Khanna (Cebri Online)

 Em que direção a Ásia se move, e qual o seu impacto global?

quinta-feira, 2 de junho de 2022

China Is Winning in Asia. Biden’s Plans Won’t Change That - Susannah Patton (NYT)

 Há muito tempo que os EUA – que ganharam a primeira Guerra Fria geopolítica, 1947-1991 – vêm perdendo a segunda Guerra Fria econômica, aliás, desde 2001 

The New York Times – 2.6.2022

China Is Winning in Asia. Biden’s Plans Won’t Change That.

Susannah Patton

 

President Biden has said the United States won’t stand by and let China “win the 21st century,” and his first trip to Asia was meant to match words with action.

Mr. Biden huddled last week with leaders of the four-nation “Quad” group formed to counter Beijing, vowed to defend Taiwan against China and launched a new economic pact involving a dozen nations to shore up U.S. economic influence in the region.

Yet China is already winning throughout much of Asia on both the economic and diplomatic front, and nothing the United States is doing seems likely to change that.

The Lowy Institute’s Asia Power Index, which tracks economic data to assess regional power dynamics, shows that U.S. leverage has declined precipitously since as recently as 2018, while China has surged ahead.

Twenty years ago, just 5 percent of exports from Southeast Asia went to China, and 16 percent to the United States. By 2020, they were even at around 15 percent. China’s increasing clout becomes clearer when considering total trade: it does around two and a half times more volume in the region than the United States. China is now the largest trading partner of almost every Asian country.

Investment — driven by a vibrant U.S. private sector — has long been an American advantage in Asia. But that edge is rapidly eroding, too. In 2018, 10-year cumulative flows of investment from China to other countries in the region were half those of the United States. They are now 75 percent of the U.S. total and rising.

Competing robustly in the region is essential for America. The Obama administration recognized this with its proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which would have been the largest trade bloc ever. But President Donald Trump withdrew over concerns that it would erode U.S. competitiveness and ship American jobs overseas.

That was a gift to BeijingChina is already the largest economy in a separate trade grouping called the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and last year applied to join the TPP’s successor agreement, which retains many of the original pact’s core provisions. The United States is out of both.

The Biden administration’s answer, unveiled last week in Tokyo, is its Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. It falls far short.

The plan calls for cooperation on trade, supply chains, infrastructure and fighting corruption. But it does not include better access to the huge U.S. import market, a crucial carrot that normally underpins trade agreements.

U.S. officials counter that the plan is more suited to the 21st century than “past models.” But potential Asian partners have trouble seeing what’s in it for them. A lack of buy-in could undermine the United States’ ability to set the rules on emerging issues like the digital economy, which would give American firms a leg up.

Meanwhile, China has forged ahead. State-owned companies have locked up big projects around the region, often under the umbrella of China’s sprawling Belt and Road Initiative.

China also practices persistent diplomacy. Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s travels in Southeast Asia and the Pacific has far outstripped the pace of his U.S. counterpart, Antony Blinken. Despite the fanfare of Mr. Biden’s recent trip to Asia, it was his first to the region since taking office 16 months ago and only included visits to close allies South Korea and Japan.

China also cultivates powerful elites. In the Philippines, its newly elected president and vice president have both politically benefited from China’s investments in their home constituencies. In Cambodia and the Solomon Islands, China has opened pathways for expanding its military presence far from home. In Indonesia, a strong relationship with the coordinating minister for maritime affairs and investment gives Beijing the access needed to pursue objectives such as deals for Huawei in the country’s 5G network.

The United States does have something China lacks: time-tested alliances with what the Biden administration calls “like-minded” democracies such as its fellow members of the “Quad” grouping — Japan, Australia and India — as well as South Korea. The Quad is meant to demonstrate that the United States and its partners can provide an alternative to China on, for example, vaccines and infrastructure.

But the Quad is yet to have much real impact. An ambitious pledge to deliver one billion vaccines to Indo-Pacific countries by the end of this year has run into manufacturing obstacles in India.

The Quad, in fact, highlights an American weakness: the United States is strong in the democracies fringing the region but weak at the center in Southeast Asia. Over time, a more dominant China could impede U.S. military access to regional bases during crises, pose challenges for American companies doing business and force U.S. diplomats to work harder to make their voices heard.

Unless Washington’s economic statecraft improves, its influence in Asia will continue to ebb. Rather than its uninspiring new regional economic plan, the Biden administration should summon the political courage to join the TPP’s successor pact, making clear to U.S. domestic opponents that it would be an important tool in countering China. It also needs to more aggressively engage with smaller but still important non-aligned countries of Southeast Asia and the Pacific that China is steadily winning over.

Competing with China in Asia will not be easy. But it starts with recognizing that right now the United States is losing.

 

Susannah Patton (@SusannahCPatton) researches Indo-Pacific strategy at the Lowy Institute in Sydney, Australia, and is project director of the Asia Power Index.



domingo, 17 de fevereiro de 2019

As novas rotas da seda: livros sobre a Asia - The Economist

Como a nova Rota da Seda torna a Eurásia o novo centro do mundo

Três livros argumentam que o equilíbrio da geopolítica muda com os investimentos da China para integrar o continente.


Redação, The Economist
16 Fevereiro 2019 

Indagado como decidiu escrever O Senhor dos Anéis, J.R.R. Tolkien respondeu: “Eu sabiamente comecei com um mapa e inseri nele a história”. Portanto, diz Bruno Maçães, quando se imagina novas realidades é natural começar desta maneira. Hoje um mapa revisado do mundo deve ter um foco radicalmente diferente dos anteriores – porque um vasto e integrado subcontinente eurasiano vem provando ser a característica marcante de uma ordem global emergente.

Rota da Seda
O presidente da China Xi Jinping Foto: Feng Li/Reuters
Antes, quando Oriente era Oriente e Ocidente era Ocidente, o fosso entre os dois não era somente geográfico, mas também moral e histórico. “Ásia” foi um termo inventado pelos europeus para enfatizar sua própria especificidade; para os imperialistas da era Kipling, as sociedades asiáticas eram atrasadas, despóticas e imutáveis. A Europa, pelo contrário, havia registrado avanços decisivos ao adotar um enfoque científico para as questões humanas – o que justificou seu domínio sobre outros continentes. À condescendência a resposta foi a concorrência. Desde a Restauração Meiji do Japão, em 1868, a modernização da Ásia por muito tempo se tornou uma cópia do Ocidente, ou por admiração pelos europeus ou por repulsa a eles, ou ambas as coisas. As transformações econômicas desde a 2.ª Guerra Mundial foram moldadas em parte pelas necessidades dos mercados ocidentais. 
Mas hoje a modernização que a Europa levou no início para a Ásia vem seguindo o caminho contrário. O continente eurasiano hoje está em ebulição com novas conexões, graças aos cabos de fibra ótica, gasodutos, estradas, pontes e zonas de manufatura ligando Oriente e Ocidente. Há dois anos, um trem de carga iniciava viagem em Yiwu, no leste da China, e chegava a um terminal ferroviário a leste de Londres. A façanha foi amplamente simbólica. Ninguém mais duvida que Ásia e Europa estão no mesmo voo.
Esse processo é o pontapé inicial de três novos livros muito estimulantes, que deixam claro que o mapa da política mundial como foi traçado há sete décadas não é mais adequado. Do centro do antigo mapa, como descreve Maçães, o poder dos Estados Unidos irradiava para a Europa e os extremos orientais da Eurásia, agindo como “uma espécie de desenvolvimento futuro contra os perigos emanando do seu núcleo mais profundo”, ou seja, os desafios comunistas representados por Moscou e Pequim. 
Hoje a integração cada vez mais profunda do supercontinente eurasiano que emergiu da Guerra Fria, com todas as deslumbrantes cidades que brotaram nos desertos, os portos que vêm sendo construídos ao longo das costas indo-pacíficas, não deveria surpreender os estudantes do capitalismo e do desenvolvimento. Mas muitos especialistas ocidentais em previsões erraram ao imaginarem que esse mundo seria feito à imagem do Ocidente; que ele adotaria não só as teses econômicas ocidentais, mas também os valores políticos liberais, com seu suposto apelo e legitimidade universal. Basta olhar para a extensão de terra da China e da Rússia para ver a insanidade dessa suposição. Outras potências iliberais, particularmente a Turquia e o Irã, vêm usando as glórias históricas do passado para evocar um futuro renovado, projetando poder ao longo de novas rotas da seda.
A integração econômica não está dissolvendo tais diferenças em termos de valores, mas reforçando. E não está claro que América e Europa conseguirão fazer muita coisa a respeito. Difundir os ideais democráticos não é uma prioridade fundamental para os Estados Unidos; o país deseja cada vez mais exercer poder à distância. A Europa Ocidental está se voltando para si mesma – profunda ironia – em resposta às crises que eclodem na Eurásia e chegam até ela, como as ondas de imigrantes e a intromissão da Rússia nas regiões de fronteira da Europa e sua política interna.
Maçães, cientista político português e antigo ministro do Exterior, esboçou alguns dos seus argumentos no livro The Dawn of Eurasia (O Despertar da Eurásia), publicado no ano passado. Em Belt and Road (Cinturão e Rota) ele examina principalmente o papel da China na remodelação do mundo. Até agora o projeto que é a marca do país no campo da política externa, é a iniciativa conhecida como “Um Cinturão, Uma Rota”. Abrangendo diversos países e US$ 1 trilhão em investimentos prometidos em infraestrutura, o objetivo é criar uma nova economia global com a China no centro. Apesar das negativas, esse projeto é também uma peça importante de engenharia geopolítica. Reflete o desejo da China de moldar seu ambiente externo em vez de simplesmente se adaptar a ele. Algumas pessoas se antecipam que esta será a maneira de a China substituir uma ordem internacional liderada pelos Estados Unidos pela sua própria. 
Comece com o mapa e a história o acompanha, como fazia Tolkien. Mas não há nenhum plano ou trama, diz Maçães. O presidente Xi Jinping e seus acólitos não são adeptos do determinismo marxista. Lenin é o melhor modelo quando aproveitam a chance fugaz de mudar o curso da história.
Com diz Peter Frankopan, historiador de Oxford, em The New Silk Roads (As Novas Rotas da Seda), quando Mike Pompeo, secretário americano de Estado, anunciou em julho um projeto dos EUA em oposição à Iniciativa “Um Cinturão, Uma Rota”, a soma prometida foi de US$ 113 milhões em novos programas – pouco mais do que a renda combinada de Ivanka Trump e Jared Kuchner. Do mesmo modo que Belt and Road acrescenta ao trabalho anterior de Maçães, The New Silk Roads também atualiza o magnífico livro de Frankopan, The Silk Roads (As Rotas da Seda), de 2015, que mudou a opinião de muitos leitores quanto a onde se situa o centro de gravidade histórico do mundo.
A China vem reprocessando uma velha doutrina. Segundo o antigo conceito do tianxia, ou “tudo sob o céu”, a China estava no centro do poder e da civilização. Preceitos morais governavam as relações entre Estados. Observamos ecos disto nas ideias de Xi Jinping de uma “comunidade de um futuro compartilhado para a humanidade” e na constante ênfase nos resultados em que todos ganham, na dependência e no respeito mútuos. As obrigações dos países dependem do seu lugar numa rede cujo centro é a China.
A gratidão e a dependência dos outros são convenientes para a China à medida que ela busca reciclar seu superávit de divisas externas, empregar seus trabalhadores em canteiros de construção no exterior, garantir matéria prima e impingir uma produção de baixa qualidade para outros de modo a manter internamente sua melhor manufatura e melhores serviços de alta tecnologia. O governo Trump qualifica essa abordagem de “diplomacia da armadilha da dívida”. Mas esta noção deixa de lado a atração que ela exerce para muitos beneficiários da generosidade chinesa. No momento ninguém se mostra tão generoso quanto ela.
Além disto, como afirma Parag Khanna em The Future is Asian (O Futuro é Asiático), em que faz uma avaliação otimista de uma Grande Ásia, outros países recebem com simpatia as incursões da China “porque elas dão cobertura para eles implementarem suas próprias agendas comerciais”. E o fato de Índia, Japão, Coreia do Sul e Turquia se lançarem numa corrida infraestrutural armamentista não implica um jogo de soma zero em que uns ganham e outros perdem. Para Khanna, geoestrategista indiano radicado em Singapura, a China está “dando o pontapé inicial num processo pelo qual os asiáticos sairão debaixo da sua sombra”.
Khanna mostra-se pouco preocupado com os inconvenientes do autoritarismo. Ele atribui muita habilidade tecnocrática às elites da região e analisa superficialmente as brutais dimensões do desenvolvimento, incluindo a repressão da China contra os uigures. Mas, num ponto importante, ele concorda com Maçães e Frankopan: o futuro da Eurásia deverá ser mais maleável e não imutável e hegemônico. Nesta nova ordem mundial, as ações ainda provocarão reações. O alinhamento crescente do Japão, Austrália e Índia, países democráticos, em resposta ao posicionamento mais assertivo da China é somente um caso em análise.
Inevitavelmente, a Eurásia será coesa, mas não com base na opressiva união baseada no conceito do tianxia. Em seus aspectos diferentes, esses livros servem como antídoto aos temores americanos de uma disputa maniqueísta com a China. E detalham as forças latentes que já são impossíveis de ignorar. 

TRADUÇÃO DE TEREZINHA MARTINO