Ah, essa mania perversa de estudar e de prosperar - Jose Vicente Lessa

Como é duro dar duro: além disso requerer menos horas de sono, de lazer, de simples far niente, a gente ainda corre o risco de prosperar, ter sucesso, ficar rico, e... pronto: já criamos desigualdades insuperáveis em relação aos que não fizeram como nós, e quiseram apenas levar uma vida "normal", sem essas chateações de uma ambição desmedida pelo progresso individual, pela ascensão solitária em direção à riqueza, à fama, ao poder.
Sem querer estamos alimentando essas famosas assimetrias sociais que justificam todas as políticas públicas de "redução das desigualdades", que como todos sabem são criadas por esse perverso mercado e pelo ainda mais perverso capitalismo.
Ah, se não fossem os companheiros corretores das desigualdades estruturais, nos viveríamos eternamente numa sociedade injusta, cheia de pobres e desvalidos, quando não oprimidos, e teríamos de aguentar, além da miséria da massa e a possível inveja da "burguesia do capital alheio", o nosso próprio remorso, por sermos tão ricos -- eu, por exemplo, não tenho muito dinheiro no banco, mas devo ter pelo menos 5 mil livros -- e os outros tão pobres.
Ops, isso me lembra o título de dois outros livros, clássicos. O primeiro é de um tal de Adam Smith, tenho certeza de que vocês já ouviram falar dele, o tal de "pai da economia política", que proclamou (segundo alguns dos meus alunos), a tal de "teoria da mão invisível" (Senhor, perdoai aos inocentes) e afirmou que a base de toda a riqueza era a divisão do trabalho e a especialização (e eu aqui querendo saber de tudo ao mesmo tempo... que pobreza de espírito). O segundo é um tal de David Landes, que aproveitou o título do Smith, sobre A Riqueza das Nações, e aproveitou também para se questionar sobre a origem da pobreza das nações, que um tal de Jared Diamond acha que está na ecologia (ops, lá vem aqueles chatos com aquela conversa: "eu não disse?, eu não disse?").
Enfim, toda essa introdução caótica para introduzir (com perdão pela redundância e pelo conceito pornográfico), este pequeno texto sobre o mesmo assunto de meu amigo, colega, um dos meus intelectuais preferidos da diplomacia (é, parece que tem alguns, pelo menos), José Vicente Lessa.
Divirtam-se...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Nós, os injustos sociais
José Vicente Lessa
(Recebido, indiretamente, em 6/03/2013)

Confesso que o discurso sobre as “desigualdades sociais” é um dos temas que mais me aborrecem. Não porque seja ele enfadonho - longe disso -, mas em razão do envólucro politicamente “correto” e “progressista” que ele invariavelmente assume. O grande divisor de águas da discussão provém do fato de o “progressismo”, subproduto eufemístico do esquerdismo, não nos conceber como indivíduos, mas como categorias sociais. Assim, o pobre, o desvalido, a pessoa em situação (como eles gostam de dizer) de vulnerabilidade ou de precariedade socioeconômica, será sempre prisioneira de uma estrutura “perversa”, incapaz de dela se libertar por si mesma. Mas “incapaz” por quê? Ora, incapazes porque não são exatamente pessoas, mas categorias gerais!

Como se geram as desigualdades? Isto é facílimo de entender. Você, leitor, que adquiriu certa posição social, tem um bom emprego ou é um empreendedor de sucesso, é certamente, também, um injusto social. Quando você estudava, varava noites se preparando para o vestibular, trabalhava para custear seus estudos, frequentava aulas à noite, lia livros e aprendia novas habilidades, estava, sem se dar conta, cavando um fosso de desigualdades com relação a todos aqueles que preferiam ver telenovelas, conversar sobre futebol no bar da esquina, ou simplesmente coçar os “países baixos” à espera de que a sorte ou o governo viesse em seu socorro. Quanta injustiça você, leitor – e admito, eu próprio, minha culpa –, produziu nessa sua insana e estranha compulsão de melhorar de vida às próprias custas...

O problema todo está em que você e eu quisemos progredir como indivíduos. Este foi o nosso grande erro. Deveríamos todos ter ficado em casa, coçando..., como categoria social coletiva, à espera que o governo nos desse casa e comida, proclamando ser estes itens, afinal, nosso direito! Assim, se todos fôssemos “vulneráveis” e “precários”, estaríamos na mesma situação. Deixaria, enfim, de haver desigualdades.

The Economist quer reduzir as desigualdades - Editorial

Inequality and the world economy

True Progressivism

A new form of radical centrist politics is needed to tackle inequality without hurting economic growth

The Economist, Oct 13th 2012 | from the print edition

BY THE end of the 19th century, the first age of globalisation and a spate of new inventions had transformed the world economy. But the “Gilded Age” was also a famously unequal one, with America’s robber barons and Europe’s “Downton Abbey” classes amassing huge wealth: the concept of “conspicuous consumption” dates back to 1899. The rising gap between rich and poor (and the fear of socialist revolution) spawned a wave of reforms, from Theodore Roosevelt’s trust-busting to Lloyd George’s People’s Budget. Governments promoted competition, introduced progressive taxation and wove the first threads of a social safety net. The aim of this new “Progressive era”, as it was known in America, was to make society fairer without reducing its entrepreneurial vim.
Modern politics needs to undergo a similar reinvention—to come up with ways of mitigating inequality without hurting economic growth. That dilemma is already at the centre of political debate, but it mostly produces heat, not light. Thus, on America’s campaign trail, the left attacks Mitt Romney as a robber baron and the right derides Barack Obama as a class warrior. In some European countries politicians have simply given in to the mob: witness François Hollande’s proposed 75% income-tax rate. In much of the emerging world leaders would rather sweep the issue of inequality under the carpet: witness China’s nervous embarrassment about the excesses of Ferrari-driving princelings, or India’s refusal to tackle corruption.
At the core, there is a failure of ideas. The right is still not convinced that inequality matters. The left’s default position is to raise income-tax rates for the wealthy and to increase spending still further—unwise when sluggish economies need to attract entrepreneurs and when governments, already far bigger than Roosevelt or Lloyd George could have imagined, are overburdened with promises of future largesse. A far more dramatic rethink is needed: call it True Progressivism.
To have or to have not
Does inequality really need to be tackled? The twin forces of globalisation and technical innovation have actually narrowed inequality globally, as poorer countries catch up with richer ones. But within many countries income gaps have widened. More than two-thirds of the world’s people live in countries where income disparities have risen since 1980, often to a startling degree. In America the share of national income going to the top 0.01% (some 16,000 families) has risen from just over 1% in 1980 to almost 5% now—an even bigger slice than the top 0.01% got in the Gilded Age.
It is also true that some measure of inequality is good for an economy. It sharpens incentives to work hard and take risks; it rewards the talented innovators who drive economic progress. Free-traders have always accepted that the more global a market, the greater the rewards will be for the winners. But as our special report this week argues, inequality has reached a stage where it can be inefficient and bad for growth.
That is most obvious in the emerging world. In China credit is siphoned to state-owned enterprises and well-connected insiders; the elite also gain from a string of monopolies. In Russia the oligarchs’ wealth has even less to do with entrepreneurialism. In India, too often, the same is true.
In the rich world the cronyism is better-hidden. One reason why Wall Street accounts for a disproportionate share of the wealthy is the implicit subsidy given to too-big-to-fail banks. From doctors to lawyers, many high-paying professions are full of unnecessary restrictive practices. And then there is the most unfair transfer of all—misdirected welfare spending. Social spending is often less about helping the poor than giving goodies to the relatively wealthy. In America the housing subsidy to the richest fifth (through mortgage-interest relief) is four times the amount spent on public housing for the poorest fifth.
Even the sort of inequality produced by meritocracy can hurt growth. If income gaps get wide enough, they can lead to less equality of opportunity, especially in education. Social mobility in America, contrary to conventional wisdom, is lower than in most European countries. The gap in test scores between rich and poor American children is roughly 30-40% wider than it was 25 years ago. And by some measures class mobility is even stickier in China than in America.
Some of those at the top of the pile will remain sceptical that inequality is a problem in itself. But even they have an interest in mitigating it, for if it continues to rise, momentum for change will build and may lead to a political outcome that serves nobody’s interests. Communism may be past reviving, but there are plenty of other bad ideas out there.
Hence the need for a True Progressive agenda. Here is our suggestion, which steals ideas from both left and right to tackle inequality in three ways that do not harm growth.
Compete, target and reform
The priority should be a Rooseveltian attack on monopolies and vested interests, be they state-owned enterprises in China or big banks on Wall Street. The emerging world, in particular, needs to introduce greater transparency in government contracts and effective anti-trust law. It is no coincidence that the world’s richest man, Carlos Slim, made his money in Mexican telecoms, an industry where competitive pressures were low and prices were sky-high. In the rich world there is also plenty of opening up to do. Only a fraction of the European Union’s economy is a genuine single market. School reform and introducing choice is crucial: no Wall Street financier has done as much damage to American social mobility as the teachers’ unions have. Getting rid of distortions, such as labour laws in Europe or the remnants of China’s hukou system of household registration, would also make a huge difference.
Next, target government spending on the poor and the young. In the emerging world too much cash goes to universal fuel subsidies that disproportionately favour the wealthy (in Asia) and unaffordable pensions that favour the relatively affluent (in Latin America). But the biggest target for reform is the welfare states of the rich world. Given their ageing societies, governments cannot hope to spend less on the elderly, but they can reduce the pace of increase—for instance, by raising retirement ages more dramatically and means-testing the goodies on offer. Some of the cash could go into education. The first Progressive era led to the introduction of publicly financed secondary schools; this time round the target should be pre-school education, as well as more retraining for the jobless.
Last, reform taxes: not to punish the rich but to raise money more efficiently and progressively. In poorer economies, where tax avoidance is rife, the focus should be on lower rates and better enforcement. In rich ones the main gains should come from eliminating deductions that particularly benefit the wealthy (such as America’s mortgage-interest deduction); narrowing the gap between tax rates on wages and capital income; and relying more on efficient taxes that are paid disproportionately by the rich, such as some property taxes.
Different parts of this agenda are already being embraced in different countries. Latin America has invested in schools and pioneered conditional cash transfers for the very poor; it is the only region where inequality in most countries has been falling. India and Indonesia are considering scaling back fuel subsidies. More generally, as they build their welfare states, Asian countries are determined to avoid the West’s extravagance. In the rich world Scandinavia is the most inventive region. Sweden has overhauled its admittedly huge welfare state and has a universal school-voucher system. Britain too is reforming schools and simplifying welfare. In America Mr Romney says he wants to means-test Medicare and cut tax deductions, though he is short on details. Meanwhile, Mr Obama, a Democrat, has invoked Theodore Roosevelt, and Ed Miliband, leader of Britain’s Labour Party, is now trying to wrap himself in Benjamin Disraeli’s “One Nation” Tory cloak.
Such cross-dressing is a sign of change, but politicians have a long way to go. The right’s instinct is too often to make government smaller, rather than better. The supposedly egalitarian left’s failure is more fundamental. Across the rich world, welfare states are running out of money, growth is slowing and inequality is rising—and yet the left’s only answer is higher tax rates on wealth-creators. Messrs Obama, Miliband and Hollande need to come up with something that promises both fairness and progress. Otherwise, everyone will pay.

Pequena licao de Economia Politica politica: desculpem a redundancia...

... mas ela é necessaria.
A Economia Política, como sabe qualquer criancinha de kindergarten, é aquela coisa que vem de Adam Smith e pode ser traduzida como a arte de aumentar o bem estar em uma determinada sociedade pelo uso judicioso de políticas públicas tendentes a acelerar o crescimento econômico, melhorar a produtividade da economia de um país e distribuir os frutos desse processo de desenvolvimento com transformações estruturais, o que se consegue mediante a qualificação produtiva da população (ou seja, com educação).
Ufa! Desculpem a longa definição, mas era isso mesmo o que Adam Smith pretendia falar da "ciência dos estadistas" em seus dois volumes publicados pela primeira vez em 1776 (por acaso, o mesmo ano da independência americana, e Adam Smith sempre foi um opositor do colonialismo e ficou feliz com a independência dos Estados Unidos, ainda que não aprovasse métodos revolucionários).
Os companheiros não devem ter lido Adam Smith, isso eu dou por descontado. Aliás, eles devem ter lido muito pouca coisa, e por isso mesmo vivem falando bobagens econômicas e barbaridades políticas (sem falar de suas notórias más intenções de se perpetuar no poder).
Bem, tudo isso, apenas para introduzir este pequeno-grande texto que serve como uma aula de Economia Política.
Eu, que conheço a China, já li muito sobre a China e continuo me informando sobre a China, posso repetir Orson Welles: "É tudo verdade!".
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 
PS: Esta matéria de uma televisão australiana trata da gigantesca bolha imobiliária em formação na China; também vale por uma pequena grande aula de economia política, e como tal deveria ser vista e meditada pelos companheiros que detestam o modelo liberal americano e adoram o modelo estatista chinês: http://www.youtube.com/embed/2yL7t0j_4tQ
Por que o capitalismo sempre foi o verdadeiro socialismo. Agora a prova aritmética

Reinaldo Azevedo, 27/02/2012

Vocês sabem que a tirania chinesa é o grande farol do petismo. Os companheiros são fascinados por aquele misto de estatismo, ditadura, elite pistoleira e, ora veja, crescimento econômico.  Se há um lugar onde o capitalismo exibe a sua face realmente selvagem — sem, vamos dizer, os requintes civilizatórios dos direitos sociais —, esse lugar é a China. Fez-se uma sociedade de mercado para uns 400 milhões de pessoas, mantém-se uns 900 milhões debaixo de chicote, e a vida continua.

- Os petistas são obcecados pela “ditadura que funciona”.
- Alguns plutocratas nativos são obcecados pela “parceria” lá existente entre estado e iniciativa privada. Chamam  ”parceria” a mais pura pistolagem.
- Alguns que se querem “pragmáticos” são obcecados pelo, como chamarei?, “produtivismo”.

Como todo mundo sabe, a China só pode fazer o dumping clássico e exportar ao mundo a preço de banana porque faz um outro dumping, o de vidas humanas. Até alguns que se querem da minha turma, liberais, acham aquilo lindo! Lixo! Não são da minha turma. O liberalismo que não supõe o exercício das liberdades individuais e de organização é só a pistolagem dos mais fortes. Assim como o comunismo original era a pistolagem dos mais fracos. É claro que não poderia dar em nada.

Por que isso tudo? No Radar Econômico do Estadão Online, Sílvio Guedes Crespo traz uma informação espetacular, veiculada pela agência Bloomberg. Leiam trechos:

Um levantamento da agência Bloomberg a partir de dados da Hurun Report, instituição que mede riqueza na China, mostrou que a elite política do país asiático tem um patrimônio dezenas de vezes superior ao das autoridades americanas. Em reportagem intitulada “Congresso bilionário chinês faz seus pares americanos parecerem pobres”, a Bloomberg informa que os 70 delegados mais ricos do Congresso Popular da China (que tem no total 3 mil membros) possuem, juntos, uma fortuna de US$ 89,8 bilhões. Enquanto isso, nos Estados Unidos, os 535 membros do Congresso, o presidente, os secretários (equivalente a ministros) e os nove membros da Suprema Corte - 660 pessoas no total - detêm, juntos, um patrimônio de US$ 7,5 bilhões.

A Bloomberg acredita que isso seja uma amostra de como o crescimento econômico chinês tem ocorrido de forma desequilibrada. É muito provável que seja verdade, mas, para não deixar dúvida, a agência poderia ter mostrado a evolução desses números ao longo do tempo. “É extraordinário ver esse grau de casamento entre riqueza e política”, disse à Bloomberg um analista do Brookings Institution, em Washington.

Na China, vários bilionários têm cargo público. Por exemplo, Zong Qinghou, segundo homem mais rico do país de acordo com a lista mais recente da Hurun Report, é um delegado do Congresso. Zhang Yin, a mulher mais rica da China, é membro da Conferência Consultiva Política Popular da China. Segundo a Bloomberg, o ex-presidente chinês Jiang Zemin promoveu a inclusão de empresários privados no Partido Comunista.

Essa diferença entre o patrimônio das autoridades americanas e o das chinesas ocorre porque na China parte considerável da elite econômica é ligada diretamente ao governo ou ao partido. Já nos EUA, as autoridades e os legisladores não são necessariamente bilionários.
(…)

Encerro
A democracia liberal é o único regime que permitiu, até hoje, a efetiva participação do homem comum no processo político: não precisa ser um plutocrata nem um membro do “partido”. Tudo aquilo que os comunas sempre pregaram é garantido, ora vejam, pelo capitalismo — desde que exercido sob a tutela democrática. Verdade insofismável: existe capitalismo sem democracia, mas não há democracia sem capitalismo. Se livres, é claro que a tendência dos homens será em favor da redistribuição da riqueza. O verdadeiro “socialismo”, pois, é a democracia capitalista. Sob ditaduras, o que se terá sempre será a concentração da riqueza.

O PT só não consegue ser “chinês” porque é incompetente. No mais, aquele modelo os inspira. O partido também ama o estado, a ditadura e vive de braços dados com espertalhões subsidiados, convertidos em grandes esteios da economia nacional.

Não se esqueçam jamais, meus queridos: o verdadeiro confronto de posições hoje em dia se dá entre “a direita” (como eles chamam) que trabalha para arrecadar impostos e “a esquerda” que vive pendurada nas tetas do estado, com seus plutocratas agregados.

Voltando ao centro: aquela desproporção entre a concentração de riqueza dos políticos chineses e dos homens de Estado nos EUA é ainda mais eloqüente se nos lembrarmos que os EUA têm um PIB de US$ 15 trilhões para uma população de 300 milhões de habitantes, e a China, de US$ 7 trilhões para a uma população de 1,3 bilhão! Os EUA, nação mais rica do planeta, tem o 15º PIB per capita do mundo (US$ 48.147); a China, o 90º (US$ 5.184). Só para vocês terem uma idéia, o PIB per capita de Banânia (US$ 11,177) é mais do que o dobro do chinês, o que nos coloca em 71º no ranking.

De novo: o modelo chinês, tão admirado pelos “companheiros”, consegue ter o 90º PIB per capta do mundo e concentrar nas mãos de 70 políticos a estratosférica quantia de US$ 89,8 bilhões. Em 15º lugar, toda a elite política americana tem apenas o correspondente a 1/12 desse total.

Ah, sim: o comunismo, o tal “regime da igualdade” tão apreciado pela petezada, é o chinês, tá, pessoal? Do modelo americano, os companheiros não gostam. Acham que ele é muito concentrador de renda…

Inequality in America: looking for a new Tocqueville? - Charles Murray (WSJ)

Tocqueville tinha registrado, na quarta década do século XIX, a tendência igualitária nos EUA. Não parece ser mais o caso. Existem razões complexas para o crescimento das desigualdades, entre elas o fato de que a produtividade do trabalho dos que já são ricos é muito superior, por uma série de condições ambientais e estruturais, do que a dos mais pobres, não especializados.
Trata-se de um grande desafio no quadro das modernas democracias de mercado.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

The New American Divide

The ideal of an 'American way of life' is fading as the working class falls further away from institutions like marriage and religion and the upper class becomes more isolated. Charles Murray on what's cleaving America, and why.

By CHARLES MURRAY

The Wall Street Journal, Saturday Essay, January 21, 2012

America is coming apart. For most of our nation's history, whatever the inequality in wealth between the richest and poorest citizens, we maintained a cultural equality known nowhere else in the world—for whites, anyway. "The more opulent citizens take great care not to stand aloof from the people," wrote Alexis de Tocqueville, the great chronicler of American democracy, in the 1830s. "On the contrary, they constantly keep on easy terms with the lower classes: They listen to them, they speak to them every day."

Americans love to see themselves this way. But there's a problem: It's not true anymore, and it has been progressively less true since the 1960s.

People are starting to notice the great divide. The tea party sees the aloofness in a political elite that thinks it knows best and orders the rest of America to fall in line. The Occupy movement sees it in an economic elite that lives in mansions and flies on private jets. Each is right about an aspect of the problem, but that problem is more pervasive than either political or economic inequality. What we now face is a problem of cultural inequality.

When Americans used to brag about "the American way of life"—a phrase still in common use in 1960—they were talking about a civic culture that swept an extremely large proportion of Americans of all classes into its embrace. It was a culture encompassing shared experiences of daily life and shared assumptions about central American values involving marriage, honesty, hard work and religiosity.

Over the past 50 years, that common civic culture has unraveled. We have developed a new upper class with advanced educations, often obtained at elite schools, sharing tastes and preferences that set them apart from mainstream America. At the same time, we have developed a new lower class, characterized not by poverty but by withdrawal from America's core cultural institutions.

Previous Saturday Essays

Cocaine: The New Front Lines (Jan. 14)

Terror on Trial (Jan. 7)

A Year Without Fear by Scott Adams (Dec. 31)

How to Ace a Google Interview (Dec. 24)

To illustrate just how wide the gap has grown between the new upper class and the new lower class, let me start with the broader upper-middle and working classes from which they are drawn, using two fictional neighborhoods that I hereby label Belmont (after an archetypal upper-middle-class suburb near Boston) and Fishtown (after a neighborhood in Philadelphia that has been home to the white working class since the Revolution).

To be assigned to Belmont, the people in the statistical nationwide databases on which I am drawing must have at least a bachelor's degree and work as a manager, physician, attorney, engineer, architect, scientist, college professor or content producer in the media. To be assigned to Fishtown, they must have no academic degree higher than a high-school diploma. If they work, it must be in a blue-collar job, a low-skill service job such as cashier, or a low-skill white-collar job such as mail clerk or receptionist.

People who qualify for my Belmont constitute about 20% of the white population of the U.S., ages 30 to 49. People who qualify for my Fishtown constitute about 30% of the white population of the U.S., ages 30 to 49.

I specify white, meaning non-Latino white, as a way of clarifying how broad and deep the cultural divisions in the U.S. have become. Cultural inequality is not grounded in race or ethnicity. I specify ages 30 to 49—what I call prime-age adults—to make it clear that these trends are not explained by changes in the ages of marriage or retirement.

In Belmont and Fishtown, here's what happened to America's common culture between 1960 and 2010.

Marriage: In 1960, extremely high proportions of whites in both Belmont and Fishtown were married—94% in Belmont and 84% in Fishtown. In the 1970s, those percentages declined about equally in both places. Then came the great divergence. In Belmont, marriage stabilized during the mid-1980s, standing at 83% in 2010. In Fishtown, however, marriage continued to slide; as of 2010, a minority (just 48%) were married. The gap in marriage between Belmont and Fishtown grew to 35 percentage points, from just 10.

Single parenthood: Another aspect of marriage—the percentage of children born to unmarried women—showed just as great a divergence. Though politicians and media eminences are too frightened to say so, nonmarital births are problematic. On just about any measure of development you can think of, children who are born to unmarried women fare worse than the children of divorce and far worse than children raised in intact families. This unwelcome reality persists even after controlling for the income and education of the parents.

In 1960, just 2% of all white births were nonmarital. When we first started recording the education level of mothers in 1970, 6% of births to white women with no more than a high-school education—women, that is, with a Fishtown education—were out of wedlock. By 2008, 44% were nonmarital. Among the college-educated women of Belmont, less than 6% of all births were out of wedlock as of 2008, up from 1% in 1970.

Industriousness: The norms for work and women were revolutionized after 1960, but the norm for men putatively has remained the same: Healthy men are supposed to work. In practice, though, that norm has eroded everywhere. In Fishtown, the change has been drastic. (To avoid conflating this phenomenon with the latest recession, I use data collected in March 2008 as the end point for the trends.)

Ryan Collerd for The Wall Street Journal

Fishtown, a neighborhood in Philadelphia, stands in as a symbol of America's white working class in Charles Murray's new book.

The primary indicator of the erosion of industriousness in the working class is the increase of prime-age males with no more than a high school education who say they are not available for work—they are "out of the labor force." That percentage went from a low of 3% in 1968 to 12% in 2008. Twelve percent may not sound like much until you think about the men we're talking about: in the prime of their working lives, their 30s and 40s, when, according to hallowed American tradition, every American man is working or looking for work. Almost one out of eight now aren't. Meanwhile, not much has changed among males with college educations. Only 3% were out of the labor force in 2008.

There's also been a notable change in the rates of less-than-full-time work. Of the men in Fishtown who had jobs, 10% worked fewer than 40 hours a week in 1960, a figure that grew to 20% by 2008. In Belmont, the number rose from 9% in 1960 to 12% in 2008.

Crime: The surge in crime that began in the mid-1960s and continued through the 1980s left Belmont almost untouched and ravaged Fishtown. From 1960 to 1995, the violent crime rate in Fishtown more than sextupled while remaining nearly flat in Belmont. The reductions in crime since the mid-1990s that have benefited the nation as a whole have been smaller in Fishtown, leaving it today with a violent crime rate that is still 4.7 times the 1960 rate.

Religiosity: Whatever your personal religious views, you need to realize that about half of American philanthropy, volunteering and associational memberships is directly church-related, and that religious Americans also account for much more nonreligious social capital than their secular neighbors. In that context, it is worrisome for the culture that the U.S. as a whole has become markedly more secular since 1960, and especially worrisome that Fishtown has become much more secular than Belmont. It runs against the prevailing narrative of secular elites versus a working class still clinging to religion, but the evidence from the General Social Survey, the most widely used database on American attitudes and values, does not leave much room for argument.

For example, suppose we define "de facto secular" as someone who either professes no religion at all or who attends a worship service no more than once a year. For the early GSS surveys conducted from 1972 to 1976, 29% of Belmont and 38% of Fishtown fell into that category. Over the next three decades, secularization did indeed grow in Belmont, from 29% in the 1970s to 40% in the GSS surveys taken from 2006 to 2010. But it grew even more in Fishtown, from 38% to 59%.

***

It can be said without hyperbole that these divergences put Belmont and Fishtown into different cultures. But it's not just the working class that's moved; the upper middle class has pulled away in its own fashion, too.

If you were an executive living in Belmont in 1960, income inequality would have separated you from the construction worker in Fishtown, but remarkably little cultural inequality. You lived a more expensive life, but not a much different life. Your kitchen was bigger, but you didn't use it to prepare yogurt and muesli for breakfast. Your television screen was bigger, but you and the construction worker watched a lot of the same shows (you didn't have much choice). Your house might have had a den that the construction worker's lacked, but it had no StairMaster or lap pool, nor any gadget to monitor your percentage of body fat. You both drank Bud, Miller, Schlitz or Pabst, and the phrase "boutique beer" never crossed your lips. You probably both smoked. If you didn't, you did not glare contemptuously at people who did.

When you went on vacation, you both probably took the family to the seashore or on a fishing trip, and neither involved hotels with five stars. If you had ever vacationed outside the U.S. (and you probably hadn't), it was a one-time trip to Europe, where you saw eight cities in 14 days—not one of the two or three trips abroad you now take every year for business, conferences or eco-vacations in the cloud forests of Costa Rica.

You both lived in neighborhoods where the majority of people had only high-school diplomas—and that might well have included you. The people around you who did have college degrees had almost invariably gotten them at state universities or small religious colleges mostly peopled by students who were the first generation of their families to attend college. Except in academia, investment banking, a few foundations, the CIA and the State Department, you were unlikely to run into a graduate of Harvard, Princeton or Yale.

Even the income inequality that separated you from the construction worker was likely to be new to your adulthood. The odds are good that your parents had been in the working class or middle class, that their income had not been much different from the construction worker's, that they had lived in communities much like his, and that the texture of the construction worker's life was recognizable to you from your own childhood.

Taken separately, the differences in lifestyle that now separate Belmont from Fishtown are not sinister, but those quirks of the upper-middle class that I mentioned—the yogurt and muesli and the rest—are part of a mosaic of distinctive practices that have developed in Belmont. These have to do with the food Belmonters eat, their drinking habits, the ages at which they marry and have children, the books they read (and their number), the television shows and movies they watch (and the hours spent on them), the humor they enjoy, the way they take care of their bodies, the way they decorate their homes, their leisure activities, their work environments and their child-raising practices. Together, they have engendered cultural separation.

M. Scott Brauer for The Wall Street Journal

Belmont, an archetypal suburb of Boston, stands in for the white upper middle class.

It gets worse. A subset of Belmont consists of those who have risen to the top of American society. They run the country, meaning that they are responsible for the films and television shows you watch, the news you see and read, the fortunes of the nation's corporations and financial institutions, and the jurisprudence, legislation and regulations produced by government. They are the new upper class, even more detached from the lives of the great majority of Americans than the people of Belmont—not just socially but spatially as well. The members of this elite have increasingly sorted themselves into hyper-wealthy and hyper-elite ZIP Codes that I call the SuperZIPs.

In 1960, America already had the equivalent of SuperZIPs in the form of famously elite neighborhoods—places like the Upper East Side of New York, Philadelphia's Main Line, the North Shore of Chicago and Beverly Hills. But despite their prestige, the people in them weren't uniformly wealthy or even affluent. Across 14 of the most elite places to live in 1960, the median family income wasn't close to affluence. It was just $84,000 (in today's purchasing power). Only one in four adults in those elite communities had a college degree.

By 2000, that diversity had dwindled. Median family income had doubled, to $163,000 in the same elite ZIP Codes. The percentage of adults with B.A.s rose to 67% from 26%. And it's not just that elite neighborhoods became more homogeneously affluent and highly educated—they also formed larger and larger clusters.

If you are invited to a dinner party by one of Washington's power elite, the odds are high that you will be going to a home in Georgetown, the rest of Northwest D.C., Chevy Chase, Bethesda, Potomac or McLean, comprising 13 adjacent ZIP Codes in all. If you rank all the ZIP Codes in the country on an index of education and income and group them by percentiles, you will find that 11 of these 13 D.C.-area ZIP Codes are in the 99th percentile and the other two in the 98th. Ten of them are in the top half of the 99th percentile.

Similarly large clusters of SuperZIPs can be found around New York City, Los Angeles, the San Francisco-San Jose corridor, Boston and a few of the nation's other largest cities. Because running major institutions in this country usually means living near one of these cities, it works out that the nation's power elite does in fact live in a world that is far more culturally rarefied and isolated than the world of the power elite in 1960.

And the isolation is only going to get worse. Increasingly, the people who run the country were born into that world. Unlike the typical member of the elite in 1960, they have never known anything but the new upper-class culture. We are now seeing more and more third-generation members of the elite. Not even their grandparents have been able to give them a window into life in the rest of America.

***

Why have these new lower and upper classes emerged? For explaining the formation of the new lower class, the easy explanations from the left don't withstand scrutiny. It's not that white working class males can no longer make a "family wage" that enables them to marry. The average male employed in a working-class occupation earned as much in 2010 as he did in 1960. It's not that a bad job market led discouraged men to drop out of the labor force. Labor-force dropout increased just as fast during the boom years of the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s as it did during bad years.

Top 10 SuperZIPs

In 'Coming Apart,' Charles Murray identifies 882 'SuperZIPs,' ZIP Codes where residents score in the 95th through the 99th percentile on a combined measure of income and education, based on the 2000 census. Here are the top-ranked areas:

• 1. 60043: Kenilworth, Ill. (Chicago's North Shore)
• 2. 60022: Glencoe, Ill. (Chicago's North Shore)
• 3. 07078: Short Hills, N.J. (New York metro area)
• 4. 94027: Atherton, Calif. (San Francisco-San Jose corridor)
• 5. 10514: Chappaqua, N.Y. (New York metro area)
• 6. 19035: Gladwyne, Pa. (Philadelphia's Main Line)
• 7. 94028: Portola Valley, Calif. (S.F.-San Jose corridor)
• 8. 92067: Rancho Santa Fe, Calif. (San Diego suburbs)
• 9. 02493: Weston, Mass. (Boston suburbs)
• 10. 10577: Purchase, N.Y. (New York metro area)

As I've argued in much of my previous work, I think that the reforms of the 1960s jump-started the deterioration. Changes in social policy during the 1960s made it economically more feasible to have a child without having a husband if you were a woman or to get along without a job if you were a man; safer to commit crimes without suffering consequences; and easier to let the government deal with problems in your community that you and your neighbors formerly had to take care of.

But, for practical purposes, understanding why the new lower class got started isn't especially important. Once the deterioration was under way, a self-reinforcing loop took hold as traditionally powerful social norms broke down. Because the process has become self-reinforcing, repealing the reforms of the 1960s (something that's not going to happen) would change the trends slowly at best.

Meanwhile, the formation of the new upper class has been driven by forces that are nobody's fault and resist manipulation. The economic value of brains in the marketplace will continue to increase no matter what, and the most successful of each generation will tend to marry each other no matter what. As a result, the most successful Americans will continue to trend toward consolidation and isolation as a class. Changes in marginal tax rates on the wealthy won't make a difference. Increasing scholarships for working-class children won't make a difference.

The only thing that can make a difference is the recognition among Americans of all classes that a problem of cultural inequality exists and that something has to be done about it. That "something" has nothing to do with new government programs or regulations. Public policy has certainly affected the culture, unfortunately, but unintended consequences have been as grimly inevitable for conservative social engineering as for liberal social engineering.

The "something" that I have in mind has to be defined in terms of individual American families acting in their own interests and the interests of their children. Doing that in Fishtown requires support from outside. There remains a core of civic virtue and involvement in working-class America that could make headway against its problems if the people who are trying to do the right things get the reinforcement they need—not in the form of government assistance, but in validation of the values and standards they continue to uphold. The best thing that the new upper class can do to provide that reinforcement is to drop its condescending "nonjudgmentalism." Married, educated people who work hard and conscientiously raise their kids shouldn't hesitate to voice their disapproval of those who defy these norms. When it comes to marriage and the work ethic, the new upper class must start preaching what it practices.

Changing life in the SuperZIPs requires that members of the new upper class rethink their priorities. Here are some propositions that might guide them: Life sequestered from anybody not like yourself tends to be self-limiting. Places to live in which the people around you have no problems that need cooperative solutions tend to be sterile. America outside the enclaves of the new upper class is still a wonderful place, filled with smart, interesting, entertaining people. If you're not part of that America, you've stripped yourself of much of what makes being American special.

Such priorities can be expressed in any number of familiar decisions: the neighborhood where you buy your next home, the next school that you choose for your children, what you tell them about the value and virtues of physical labor and military service, whether you become an active member of a religious congregation (and what kind you choose) and whether you become involved in the life of your community at a more meaningful level than charity events.

Everyone in the new upper class has the monetary resources to make a wide variety of decisions that determine whether they engage themselves and their children in the rest of America or whether they isolate themselves from it. The only question is which they prefer to do.

That's it? But where's my five-point plan? We're supposed to trust that large numbers of parents will spontaneously, voluntarily make the right choice for the country by making the right choice for themselves and their children?

Yes, we are, but I don't think that's naive. I see too many signs that the trends I've described are already worrying a lot of people. If enough Americans look unblinkingly at the nature of the problem, they'll fix it. One family at a time. For their own sakes. That's the American way.

—Mr. Murray is the W.H. Brady Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. His new book, "Coming Apart: The State of White America, 1960–2010" (Crown Forum) will be published on Jan. 31.