O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida.

Mostrando postagens com marcador Japão. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador Japão. Mostrar todas as postagens

quarta-feira, 19 de fevereiro de 2025

Toquio e o Japão como são, vistos por um estrangeiro - Quico Toro (Persuasion)

 

10 Observations About Tokyo

Notes on the world's most successful failing society.

(Photo by Richard A. Brooks/AFP via Getty Images.)

In fifteen years raising a family in Montreal, it had never once occurred to usto move to Japan. Yes, my wife grew up in the Kyoto ‘burbs but she left in 2004 and had zero interest in going back. But “we make plans and God laughs,” the proverb says, and so it was in our case—a too-good-to-pass-up job opportunity came her way last summer, and we soon found ourselves packing up our lives and moving to a city we’d only known as tourists.

Six months on, here are ten observations on life here.

  1. Tokyo is hyper-dense but not crowded. Even in the very center of town where we live—Nihonbashi—Manhattan-level density feels placid. The streets around our apartment are bordered by high rises and see plenty of foot traffic, but they always feel calm. The visual stereotype of white-gloved subway officials shoving commuters into hyper-crowded rail cars is two decades out of date: massive investment in new subway lines put an end to that years ago. Aside from a relatively small number of mega train stations, tourist hotspots and nightlife areas, Tokyo is calm.

  2. How a compact metro area of 37 million people manages to feel this relaxed isn’t really a mystery: the city declared war on cars, and then won that war. Citywide, there are 0.32 cars per household, half the level in New York or London. Nothing is designed with the expectation that normal people own a car, because they don’t. Every shop that sells something too big to carry in a bag offers delivery. The streets are for pedestrians: every office, school, gym, hospital and shop is built on the assumption that you’ll walk there. There’s no on-street parking. Aside from main arterial roads, streets have no sidewalks: it’s fine to just walk right down the middle. Normal people don’t drive, road traffic is dominated by delivery vans, taxis and buses. Tokyo makes it easier, more convenient and cheaper not to own a car, so people don’t. Every service you might need is packed into even higher-density pockets right next to or on top of a train station. The result is an urban marvel: amazingly convenient, easy to navigate, and pleasant. Living here radicalizes you. Transit-centered hyper-density is just a smarter, more convenient, objectively better way to build a city than the car-choked messes we insist on in North America.

  3. Of course, hyper-density requires compromises. In Tokyo’s compressed urban geometry, there’s just no room for some things I’d taken for granted. Bike parking racks. Small neighborhood parks. Ornamental flourishes. And the one that really gets me: street trees. Whole chunks of the city just don’t have any at all. This, I think, explains why Tokyo retains an oddly dystopian, Blade Runnerish vibe, despite being so calm and pleasant. You can’t go two blocks without seeing three convenience stores. But you can go days without seeing a tree.

  4. The prime directive in Japanese society is “thou shalt not discomfit thy neighbor.” Ever. Even on trivial things. Prosocial behavior is a totalizing ideology. People take it seriously. A blanket taboo bans any behavior that might create any inconvenience to people around you, let alone—heaven forbid—open conflict. Kids get this ethos drilled into them intensively in school. The result is what you’d expect. There are no surprises. Everything and everyone is on time. Everyone is polite. Everything is clean. Everyone follows all the rules all the time. Everything works.

  5. In the West, if you want to put someone at ease, you affect a plain, informal manner. Speak a little bit too politely and you come across as stiff, which turns the vibe frosty. In Japan, it works in exactly the opposite way. Polite language projects warmth and creates psychological comfort. Outside an intimate family setting, informal Japanese comes across as quite aggressive: it ends up hindering intimacy instead of enabling it. The hardest part of learning the language isn’t the language itself—though that’s quite hard, of course—but learning how to project warmth through politeness. I’m still bad at this.

  6. To people in the West, Japan’s uncompromising insistence on prosocial behavior can come across as quite oppressive. The Japanese people I talk to don’t experience it that way. Quite the opposite. They can’t imagine how people elsewhere manage to get along without it. Or why they might want to try. In Japan, social interaction is very rarely ambiguous: what is expected of you is always explicit, always clear. My kids report that fitting in at school turned out to be strangely straightforward: there’s always a script. They just have to follow it. This is the opposite of stressful. You rarely have to think. Just follow the norm and you’re safe.

  7. Democracy is a strange fit for a country this committed to prosocial behaviour. Politicians go to elaborate lengths to avoid criticizing each other too directly. The Liberal Democratic Party’s leadership race last year, which brought in the new prime minister Shigeru Ishiba, was a bizarre exercise in circumlocution—at least to me. Candidates leveled attacks at each other in ways so oblique that they would only register as an attack at all to those with encyclopedic background information about the race and each contender’s previous positions. If you have spent ten years obsessively following the comings-and-goings in Nagatachō—Tokyo’s Westminster—you could sort of squint and realize that the precise choice of words one candidate had used created a contrast with the expressed position of some rival candidate. Nobody would be so crass as to make the contrast explicit. Everybody understood it nonetheless. Japan has a democracy, but not as we know it.

  8. If Tokyo is disconcertingly functional, that’s in part because it’s a parasitic organism sucking the life out of the rest of Japan. All the good jobs are here, all the opportunities, and so all the ambitious young people are here too. This one megacity is Japan’s New York, D.C. and LA all rolled into one. Living here, it’s easy to forget the huge demographic chaos Japan faces due to its collapsed birthrate and fast-aging population: stay in Tokyo and you’d never know the country has an acute shortage of young people. But the demographic shitshow is painfully evident the second you get out into Japan’s second- and third-tier cities: boarded-up shops, ghost neighborhoods, shuttered primary schools, abandoned houses: a Children of Men dystopia. The miraculous metropolis all around me thrives because the rest of Japan doesn’t. Every politician talks about this. None has a good idea for what to do about it.

  9. Because Tokyo is so sleek and pleasant, it’s easy to forget that it sits at the center of a nation in long-term decline. Three decades of economic stagnation have seen Japan’s position on the world stage shrink dramatically from great power to afterthought. The yen is in the toilet: in dollar terms, incomes are worth a fraction of what they once were. People’s life prospects are dramatically constrained compared to where they were a generation ago. Nobody’s happy about it, but Japan has managed its decline rather elegantly: there’s little obvious poverty, no overt social conflict, very low unemployment, no such thing as a dangerous neighborhood. The hospitals work, old people are cared for, children are educated. It takes an extremely socially cohesive nation to pull it off, but living here gives you a sense that if all the cultural and political ingredients are in place, degrowth need not be a total catastrophe.

  10. Xenophobes in the West sometimes point to Japan’s relative closure to immigration to explain its virtues. This is another outdated stereotype, like the guys shoving commuters into trains. Japan threw in the towel on its near-zero-immigration policy years ago, the government’s hand forced by the same demographic trends that have doomed its smaller cities and towns. There are quite a few workers from South Asia, Southeast Asia and Latin America here now, doing jobs that would otherwise go undone. Japanese people are pretty ambivalent about it, because we foreigners undermine the predictability that’s so central to society here. When a Japanese person is talking to another Japanese person, the script is clear. When they’re talking to a foreigner, it isn’t. Ambiguity creeps in, and unpredictability. Japanese people struggle with this. Partly in response, Tokyo is now full of English signage spelling out in very explicit language what is and what is not acceptable behavior. Do not smoke on this sidewalk. Behave properly in the subway even when you are very drunk. Do not speak loudly in the bicycle parking lot. And my favorite:

Obviously you don’t need to explain to Japanese people how to use the ritual cleansing vessels at a temple, but foreigners, well, they might make a mistake, so they better be told.

Listen, Japan doesn’t have a lot of experience playing host to foreigners, and they’re sort of groping their way towards a modus vivendi that doesn’t imperil the prosocial consensus. Keeping society predictable is what Japanese people are committed to. Because everything works here. Who’d want to imperil that?

Quico Toro is a contributing editor at Persuasion and writes the Substack One Percent Brighter.


quinta-feira, 7 de março de 2024

Os dez maiores bancos do mundo, 2023

 World's largest banks, 2023.

1. 🇨🇳 ICBC

2. 🇨🇳 China Construction Bank

3. 🇨🇳 Agricultural Bank of China

R. 🇺🇸 Bank of America

6. 🇺🇸 JPMorgan Chase

7. 🇯🇵 Mitsubishi 

8. 🇬🇧 HSBC

9. 🇫🇷 BNP

10. 🇫🇷 Crédit Agricole


(S&P Global Market Intelligence)

quarta-feira, 30 de agosto de 2023

O tamanho da crise econômica da China - Paul Krugman (NYT, OESP)

O Brasil seria mais impactado por uma crise chinesa do que os EUA (pouco) ou o Japão e a Alemanha, que vendem muito para a China. Ou seja, o Brasil é um perdedor se a China entrar em recessão. 

O tamanho da crise econômica da China
Paul Krugman

O Estado de S. Paulo | Internacional
30 de agosto de 2023
Paul Krugman 
É colunista e ganhador do prêmio Nobel de Economia de 2008
The New York Times

Graças à baixa exposição da economia dos EUA, é difícil que problemas chineses se tornem globais

O efeito da crise seria maior em países que vendem mais para a China, como Alemanha e Japão

A s agruras econômicas dos anos pós-pandêmicos têm ocasionado intensos debates intelectuais e sobre políticas. Algo com que quase todos concordam, porém, é que a crise póscovid se assemelha pouco à crise financeira de 2008. Mas a China – segunda maior economia do planeta – parece balançar à beira de uma crise muito parecida.

Eu não confio no meu próprio entendimento sobre a China para julgar se o país vive seu momento Minsky, o ponto em que todos de repente se dão conta de que uma dívida insustentável é, de fato, insustentável. E, de fato, duvido que alguém ? incluindo as autoridades chinesas ? saiba responder a essa questão.

Mas acho que somos capazes de responder a uma pergunta mais condicional: se a China realmente passa por uma crise em estilo 2008, ela transbordará para o restante do mundo? E a resposta é clara: não. Por maior que seja a economia chinesa, os EUA estão pouco expostos aos problemas chineses. Antes de chegar aí, contudo, falemos sobre por que a China de 2023 se assemelha às economias americana e europeia de 2008.

BOLHA. A crise de 2008 foi ocasionada pelo estouro de uma bolha imobiliária transatlântica. Os efeitos foram amplificados por perturbações financeiras, especialmente o colapso dos ditos "shadow banks" – instituições que agiam clandestinamente como bancos, criando riscos de uma corrida bancária, mas prescindindo de regulamentações e de redes de segurança.

E agora chega a China, com um setor imobiliário ainda mais inchado que o dos países ocidentais em 2008. A China também tem um atribulado setor de "shadow banking", além de problemas peculiares, como dívidas enormes de governos locais.

A boa notícia é que a China não é a Argentina ou a Grécia, que deviam quantias imensas a credores estrangeiros. A dívida em questão aqui é de dinheiro que a China deve para si mesma. E deveria ser possível, em princípio, para o governo nacional resolver a crise por meio de alguma combinação entre resgates de devedores e abatimentos para credores.

Mas o governo da China tem competência para gerir o tipo de reestruturação financeira? As autoridades chinesas têm determinação ou clareza intelectual para fazer o que é necessário? Eu me preocupo especialmente com a segunda questão.

A China precisa substituir o investimento imobiliário insustentável por maior demanda de consumo. Mas alguns relatos sugerem que autoridades chinesas mais graduadas continuam suspeitas em relação a gastos de consumo "supérfluos" e resistem à ideia de "dar poder para os indivíduos tomarem mais decisões a respeito de como gastar seu dinheiro".

E não é nada tranquilizador o fato de as autoridades chinesas estarem respondendo à possível crise pressionando os bancos para emprestar mais, basicamente continuando a política que levou a China à situação em que ela se encontra.

EXPOSIÇÃO. Portanto, a China poderá entrar em crise. Se entrar, como isso afetará os EUA? A resposta, até onde eu consigo perceber, é que a exposição dos americanos a uma possível crise chinesa é surpreendentemente pequena.

Quanto os EUA têm investido na China? O investimento direto é de US$ 215 bilhões. Investimentos em carteira – ações e obrigações –, pouco mais de US$ 300 bilhões. Então, estamos falando de um total de US$ 515 bilhões.

Este número pode parecer grande, mas, para uma economia enorme, não é. Considerem uma comparação. Neste momento, há muitas preocupações a respeito do setor imobiliário comercial dos EUA, especialmente em relação aos prédios de escritórios ? que provavelmente encaram uma redução permanente na demanda em virtude do aumento do trabalho remoto. Os prédios de escritórios dos EUA valem hoje US$ 2,6 trilhões, aproximadamente cinco vezes mais que o nosso investimento total na China.

Por que uma economia tão grande atraiu tão pouco investimento dos EUA? Basicamente, porque, dadas as arbitrariedades das políticas chinesas, muitos possíveis investidores temem a possibilidade de a China se tornar uma armadilha: você consegue entrar, mas não consegue sair.

Mas o que dizer da China enquanto mercado? A China é uma importante jogadora no comércio mundial, mas não compra muito dos EUA – apenas US$ 150 bilhões, em 2022, menos de 1% do nosso PIB. Portanto, uma crise não surtiria muito efeito direto na demanda por produtos americanos.

O efeito seria maior em países que vendem mais para a China, como Alemanha e Japão, e algo poderia ricochetear nos EUA por meio das vendas a esses países. Mas o efeito geral ainda seria pequeno.

DIFERENÇAS
Uma crise poderia até surtir um pequeno efeito positivo nos EUA, porque reduziria a demanda por matérias-primas, especialmente petróleo, o que reduziria a inflação. Nada disso significa que devamos aplaudir a possibilidade de uma recessão chinesa ou tripudiar sobre os problemas de outro país.

Mesmo que por razões puramente egoístas, devemos nos preocupar com o que o regime chinês poderá fazer para distrair a atenção de seus cidadãos dos problemas domésticos. Mas, em termos econômicos, parece que estamos diante de uma possível crise interna na China, não de um evento global em estilo 2008. 

TRADUÇÃO DE GUILHERME RUSS


segunda-feira, 8 de maio de 2023

Participação do Presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva na Cúpula do G7: Hiroshima 2023 - Nota do MRE

Ministério das Relações Exteriores

Assessoria Especial de Comunicação Social

 

Nota nº 170

05 de maio de 2023

 Participação do Presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva na Cúpula do G7

 

 

A convite do Primeiro-Ministro do Japão, Fumio Kishida, o Presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva participará do segmento de engajamento externo da Cúpula do G7, em Hiroshima, no Japão, nos dias 20 e 21 de maio corrente.

De acordo com o governo japonês, além dos demais países do G7 e do Brasil, foram convidados para a reunião Austrália, Comores, Ilhas Cook, Índia, Indonésia, República da Coreia e Vietnã, além de representantes das Nações Unidas, do Fundo Monetário Internacional, do Banco Mundial, da Organização para Cooperação e Desenvolvimento Econômico, da Agência Internacional de Energia, da Organização Mundial de Saúde, da Organização Mundial do Comércio e da União Europeia.

O Brasil compartilha valores que congregam os países do G7 – como o fortalecimento da democracia, a modernização econômica e a proteção do meio ambiente e dos direitos humanos – e mantém com seus membros permanente coordenação sobre temas da agenda internacional, seja de forma bilateral, seja no âmbito do G20 e de organismos internacionais nos quais o Brasil e os membros do G7 interagem.

O Brasil foi convidado a participar de Cúpulas do G7 em diversas ocasiões no período entre 2003 e 2009. Esta será a sétima participação do Presidente Lula em cúpulas do grupo, marcando a retomada do engajamento do Brasil com o G7 e consolidando a percepção de equilíbrio no posicionamento do país em temas sensíveis do cenário internacional. Deverão ser discutidos no segmento de engajamento externo do G7, entre outros, os desafios enfrentados pela comunidade internacional em temas como paz e segurança, saúde, desenvolvimento, questões de gênero, clima, energia e meio ambiente.

Anexo:

Histórico de participações do Brasil em Cúpulas do G7:

• 2003: Cúpula de Évian-les-Bains, a convite da França;

• 2005: Cúpula de Gleneagles, a convite do Reino Unido;

• 2006: Cúpula de São Peterburgo, a convite da Rússia (então membro do G8);

• 2007: Cúpula de Heiligendamm, a convite da Alemanha;

• 2008: Cúpula de Hokkaido, a convite do Japão;

• 2009: Cúpula de L’Aquila, a convite da Itália.

terça-feira, 27 de dezembro de 2022

O Japão deixa oficialmente de ser uma nação pacifista - Signal GZero

 Mais de um século e meio atrás, o Japão deixou de ser uma nação reclusa para se tornar um perigoso império expansionista, militarista e fascista, que evoluiu para a agressão contra os vizinhos. O resultado foi de guerras e destruição. Recuperou-se, mas agora, devido à postura agressiva de um China recuperada e ascendente, resolveu rearmar-se. 

Para os dois países, serão gastos inuteis com armas que nunca serão usadas, mas que só servem para intimidar e dissuadir. Um pacto conjunto de não agressão e de investimentos sociais seria bem melhor. 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 


   GZero, Signal, Dec 27, 2022

After decades of pacifism, Japan recently announced that it will double its military budget over the next five years to become the world’s third-biggest defense spender behind the US and China.

How did Tokyo, whose commitment to pacifism is enshrined in the country’s post-war constitution, get here? And what are the implications – at home and abroad – of the world’s third-largest economy embarking on a major military buildup?

Japan’s move towards beefing up its military posture has been incremental. Tokyo's transition to increasing its fighting capacity has taken decades of debate by successive governments. Politically, the measures have been slow but steady, with many initiated during the long tenure of recently slain former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, including a more enhanced role of the National Security Council, which has translated into the loosening of arms controls, the constitutional re-definition of collective defense to fight alongside partners, and Tokyo’s founding membership of the Quad. More recently, Tokyo unveiled its first new national security strategy in a decade.

What is Prime Minister Fumio Kishida actually pushing for? In short, doubling the defense budget to 2% of GDP by 2027. For starters, $315 billion are earmarked for multi-dimensional defense over the next five years, including the acquisition of Tomahawk cruise missiles that could hit targets in mainland China. Critically, besides filling a major gap through a 20,000-strong cyber force, Japan would also build counter-strike capabilities to conduct retaliatory attacks on and across the Korean Peninsula, with the ability to penetrate Chinese defenses.

This isn’t just a military tech upgrade. It’s the end of the country’s pacifist foreign policy. “For years, Japan talked the talk — about increasing defense spending and acquiring counter-strike missile capabilities — without walking the walk,” says David Boling, director of Japan & Asia Trade at Eurasia Group. “Now it's walking the walk. Maybe even starting to run.”

Why is famously pacifist Japan beefing up at this rate? For more than half a century, Tokyo has refused to call its military a military – referring to it as a self-defense force – and has limited its uniformed engagements to multilateral peacekeeping missions aligned closely with the US.

“The reason for Japan’s new hawkishness can be explained in one word: China,” Boling says. 

“China’s constant intrusions into Japan’s territorial waters, its rapid military buildup, and its firing five ballistic missiles into Japan’s exclusive economic zone in August during the military exercises around Taiwan — all these combined to reach the tipping point for Japan,” adds Boling.

But China’s buildup isn’t just rapid and advanced. For a Japan haunted by memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it’s increasingly nuclear too. Considering that Japan has long supported Taiwanese democracy, the more Beijing threatens Taiwan, the more imperiled Japan feels. This is due to both the political and geographical proximity between Tokyo and Taipei. 

The problem on the peninsula. Japan is also feeling increasingly threatened by Pyongyang. Experts think a fresh nuclear test looks inevitable – which would be the seventh since Pyongyang went nuclear in 2006 (the last one was carried out in 2017). North Korea has conducted 86 missile tests this year, an all-time high, with many projectiles launched into Japanese airspace. 

Add Russia’s actions in Ukraine, as well as China’s saber-rattling with India in the Himalayas to the contemporary geopolitical mix, and the messaging for Tokyo is clear: Aggression isn’t a mere policy option. On the Eurasian landmass, when strong armies confront a weaker force, it’s an actual policy. 

The politics of it all. Kishida is already facing pushback at home. Influential members of his Liberal Democratic Party have already renounced his solution for paying for the spending hike by increasing taxes. The pushback from within the ruling party may also be connected to Kishida’s low approval ratings, which are hovering in the 30s and have been hammered by a year of controversial decisions, a weak economy, and a spiraling yen. 

Critically, more than 60% of Japanese favor the newly proposed counter-strike capability. In a new poll released after the proposed militarization, the majority of respondents favored Kishida’s plan to boost defense, with 55% endorsing the new national security plan.

Moreover, Eurasia Group’s Boling surmises that Kishida has some other factors in his corner, including a weak opposition, growing national support for sanctions against Russia, and years of experience in navigating national security as a former foreign minister. Kishida’s also wary of recent China-centric and defense-based polling: According to a recent survey, a third of the Japanese population thinks that there will be a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait. 

Indeed, according to Boling, the recent intra-party controversy over raising taxes for defense is a sign of what’s to come. 

“It augurs increased friction between Kishida and other leading LDP members in 2023,” he says.

quarta-feira, 22 de setembro de 2021

G4, mais uma tentativa inutil para reformar o Grand Machin - Nota do MRE e Paulo Roberto de Almeida

 Desde o início, ainda em 2004 ou pouco depois disso, eu considerei contraprodutiva a constituição desse grupo, que em minha opinião mais afastava do que aproximava o Brasil de seu objetivo último: reformar a Carta da ONU, ampliar o seu Conselho de Segurança e colocar o Brasil como membro permanente do CS dessa “grande geringonça”, como o general De Gaullese referia à ONU.

Eu dizia que era melhor o Brasil estar sozinho nos esforços do que unir-se a países com problemas e obstáculos muito maiores do que os nossos, como era manifestamente o caso de Japão, Índia e mesmo Alemanha.

O chanceler do lulopetismo tinha verdadeiro ódio por eu expressar tal opinião, publicamente e sem restrições.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 


Ministério das Relações Exteriores

Departamento de Comunicação Social

 

 

Nota nº 116

22 de setembro de 2021

 

Comunicado Conjunto da Reunião Ministerial do G4 – Nova York, 22 de setembro de 2021

 

1. Em 22 de setembro de 2021, os chanceleres dos países do G4, Exmo. Sr. Carlos Alberto Franco França, Ministro das Relações Exteriores do Brasil, Exmo. Sr. Heiko Maas, Ministro Federal do Exterior da Alemanha, Exmo. Sr. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, Ministro dos Negócios Exteriores da Índia, e Exmo. Sr. Motegi Toshimitsu, Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros do Japão, reuniram-se durante a 76a sessão da Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas (AGNU), em Nova York. Os Ministros sublinharam a urgência da reforma do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas, de modo a torná-lo mais legítimo, eficaz e representativo, ao refletir a realidade do mundo contemporâneo, incluindo países em desenvolvimento e os principais contribuintes.

2. Os Ministros do G4, ao passarem em revista os trabalhos da 75a Sessão da Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas, acolheram que, em sua Decisão 75/569, a Assembleia refletiu o comprometimento de todos os Chefes de Estado e Governo em “injetar vida nova nas discussões sobre a reforma do Conselho de Segurança”, conforme mencionado na Declaração de comemoração do 75o aniversário das Nações Unidas (A/RES/75/1). Nesse contexto, os Ministros celebraram, também, a prontidão do Secretário-Geral da ONU em oferecer o apoio necessário à reforma, segundo expresso em seu relatório “Nossa Agenda Comum”, de 10 de setembro de 2021. Os Ministros acolheram, ainda, o fato que o Documento de Elementos preparado pelas cofacilitadoras das Negociações Intergovernamentais (IGN) apresentou avanços, com atribuições parciais das posições e propostas dos Estados Membros.

3. Os Ministros do G4 expressaram sua forte determinação em trabalhar para o lançamento, sem delongas, de negociações baseadas em texto no âmbito das IGN, com base em um documento único, com vistas à sua adoção pela Assembleia Geral. Para este fim, os Ministros instruíram suas delegações junto às Nações Unidas a apoiarem os esforços do Presidente da 76a sessão da AGNU e das cofacilitadoras das IGN, assim como a identificarem caminhos para se elaborar documento único e consolidado, que servirá de base para projeto de resolução. Os Ministros decidiram intensificar o diálogo com todos os Estados Membros interessados, incluindo outros países e grupos alinhados à defesa da reforma do Conselho, com o objetivo de buscar conjuntamente resultados concretos em um prazo determinado. 

4. Os Ministros reafirmaram o caráter indispensável da reforma do Conselho de Segurança, por meio da expansão de ambas as categorias de assentos, permanentes e não-permanentes, de modo a habilitar o Conselho a lidar com a complexidade e os crescentes desafios à manutenção da paz e segurança internacionais, e assim, exercer seu papel de maneira mais efetiva. Nesse contexto, os Ministros expressaram seu firme apoio à Posição Comum Africana (CAP), conforme estabelecida no Consenso de Ezulwini e a Declaração de Sirte.

5. Os Ministros do G4 reiteraram seu apoio às candidaturas dos membros do grupo a novos assentos permanentes em um Conselho de Segurança reformado.

 

-

 

G4 Ministerial Joint Press Statement

1. On 22 September 2021 the Foreign Ministers of the G4 countries, H.E. Mr. Carlos Alberto Franco França, Foreign Minister of Brazil, H.E. Mr. Heiko Maas, Federal Foreign Minister of Germany, H.E. Dr. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, Minister for External Affairs of India, and H.E. Mr. Motegi Toshimitsu, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, met during the 76th session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. The Ministers underlined the urgency of reforming the Security Council in order to make it more legitimate, effective and representative by reflecting the reality of the contemporary world including developing countries and major contributors.

2. The G4 Ministers, reviewing the work of the 75th session of the United Nations General Assembly, welcomed that the Assembly reflected in its Decision 75/569 the commitment of all Heads of State and Government to “instil new life in the discussions on the reform of the Security Council”, as mentioned in the Declaration on the commemoration of the 75th anniversary of the United Nations (A/RES/75/1). In this context, the Ministers also welcomed the readiness of the UN Secretary-General to provide necessary support, as expressed in his report “Our Common Agenda” of 10th September 2021. The Ministers further welcomed that the Elements Paper prepared by the Co-Chairs of the Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) has evolved, with partial attributions of the positions and proposals of Member States.

3. The G4 Ministers expressed their strong determination to work towards launching text-based negotiations without further delay in the IGN, on the basis of a single document, with a view to its adoption in the General Assembly. The Ministers instructed, to this end, their delegations to the United Nations to support the efforts of the President of the 76th General Assembly and the Chair(s) of the IGN, and to identify ways to develop a single consolidated text as a basis for a draft resolution. The Ministers decided to intensify dialogue with all interested Member States, including other reform-minded countries and groups, in order to seek concrete outcomes in a definite time-frame.

4. The G4 Ministers reaffirmed that it is indispensable to reform the Security Council through an expansion of both categories, permanent and non-permanent seats, to enable the Security Council to better deal with the ever-complex and evolving challenges to the maintenance of international peace and security, and thereby to carry out its duties more effectively. In this context, the Ministers expressed their strong support to the Common African Position (CAP) as enshrined in the Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration.

5. The G4 Ministers reiterated their support for each other’s candidatures as aspiring new permanent members in a reformed Security Council.

[Nota publicada em: https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/comunicado-conjunto-da-reuniao-ministerial-do-g4-2013-nova-york-22-de-setembro-de-2021 ]

sábado, 21 de agosto de 2021

Por que a China nunca vai admitir o Japão no CSNU: crimes contra a humanidade, iguais ou piores que o nazismo - Lessons from History

 

Inside Unit 731 — Japan’s Disgusting Human Experiment Concentration Camp

Exposing the horrors inside the worst concentration camp of World War Two

Hdogar
May 9 · Lessons from History

Medical trials being conducted on a test subject in unit 731 (Credits: Allthatsinteresting)

Nazi Germany is often held at the top of the list for its abhorrent crimes against humanity. In truth, Hitler was not alone in the inhuman treatment of their enemies. The Japanese leadership committed similar crimes, perhaps even worse.

One such act of brutality is the biological experimentation that happened in a Japanese medical facility called Unit 731. It was set up in 1938 in Japanese-occupied China under the disguise of being a research facility, its actual aim was to develop biological weapons. Prisoners from China, Mongolia, and Russia were brought in and lethal experiments were conducted on them.

Vivisection on Conscious Human Beings

Japanese Doctors studying a prisoner they infected (Credits: LAD)

Vivisection is the act of dissecting a human being or animal unanesthetized while he or she is still alive.

The Japanese doctors opened up conscious human beings to study the effects of diseases on them. The subjects were referred to as “logs.” They were usually first injected with a disease such as cholera and then the effects of were observed by operating on the patient while they were still conscious.

In some cases, the limbs of the victims were mutilated, attached to the other side of the body or their circulation cut off to observe the effect of gangrene. When the subjects remained of no use to the doctors, they killed him by shooting or by giving him a lethal injection.

A 72-year-old farmer who used to be a medical assistant in the unit recounts: “I cut him open from the chest to the stomach, and he screamed terribly, and his face was all twisted in agony. He made this unimaginable sound, he was screaming so horribly. But then finally he stopped. This was all in a day’s work for the surgeons, but it really left an impression on me because it was my first time.” — (Nytimes)

Frostbite Experiments

Unit 731 (Credits: Atomic Heritage)

The Japanese doctors were not mad scientists that needlessly just inflicted horror on the subjects.

These experiments were strategic and designed to study the effects of various phenomena on human body. Since, the cold was something the soldiers often had to endure, brutal trials were conducted to observe the effects and treatment of frostbite.

The subjects were taken out in extremely cold weather and cold water was thrown on them until their limbs were frozen solid. Sometimes of their limbs was submerged in ice-cold water until, according to the eyewitnesses, it made the sound of a plank of wood when struck with a cane. Different methods were then used to thaw the limbs or the victims were left untreated and the time and temperature required for their limbs to reheat were noted.

The Japanese concluded that the water of temperature 100–122-degree Fahrenheit was most suitable to defrost the frozen appendages.

Target Practice On Prisoners

A staked prisoner being shot (Credits: Pinterest)

Weapons were tested on people. They were tied to stakes and blasted with various weapons from different ranges to study wound patterns and the effect of bullet penetrations. Japanese also tested effects of poisonous gasses on Chinese prisoners.

Germ testing

Although biological warfare, even during the war had been banned in the 1925 Geneva Convention, the Japanese did not honor this agreement and infected the Chinese with various diseases during the war.

Planes dropped cholera, typhoid, and plague cultures in parts of eastern China. Sometimes plague-infected animals were also released in the various villages of china that were under Japanese occupation.

To develop and study the effectiveness of these cultures, inmates in Unit 731 were infected with the most lethal pathogens known to mankind. After being infected, the victims were put under observation until they showed symptoms of the disease. They were then opened up and their blood was fed to fleas who would carry the infection to the Chinese troops and innocent civilians.

Syphilis Testing

The doctors in Unit 731 were particularly interested in studying the effects and transmission of syphilis.

They focused on devising a treatment for it. They ordered the victims invested with syphilis to rape other subjects. The newly infected patients were then not treated to observe the progression of the disease.

Forced pregnancies

The Japanese doctors raped and impregnated women of childbearing age. They then experimented on them to understand how they affected both the mother and the fetus.

They shot them, infected them with various diseases, and made them suffer other types of injuries. The female subjects were then opened up to study how the fetus had reacted to all this.

They even experimented on infants as young as three days old as a recently published book says:

“Usually a hand of a three-day-old infant is clenched into a fist,” the booklet says, “but by sticking the needle in, the middle finger could be kept straight to make the experiment easier.”

Aftermath

By the time the war ended in 1945, none of the prisoners survived and the death count is reported to as high as 3000 people. The doctors and the supervisors were never tried for their crimes mainly because the US government agreed not to prosecute them in exchange for the results and the reports of the experiments that were conducted.

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terça-feira, 13 de abril de 2021

O cinismo de Mao: sem a mortandade provocada pelos japoneses, o PCC não teria chegado ao poder - livro de Ian Buruma

 

Year Zero by Ian Buruma. China’s Communist Party prevailed against Chiang Kai-shek and China’s Nationalists in some part because of the damage inflicted upon the Nationalists by Japan in World War II:

"And in China? When the Japanese prime minister Tanaka Kakuei, in 1972, apologized to Chairman Mao for what his country had done to the Chinese during the war, Mao, who was not without a macabre sense of humor, told his foreign guest to relax: It is us who should thank you, he said; without you we would never have come to power.

"Mao was right. What happened in China was the most dramatic example of unintended consequences. The Japanese shared with Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists a horror of communism; there were even some attempts at collaboration; one faction of the Nationalists did, in fact, collaborate. But by fatally wounding the Nationalists, the Japanese helped the Communists win the civil war which was simmering in 1945 and came to a climax soon after."

Year Zero: A History of 1945
 
author: Ian Buruma 
title: Year Zero: A History of 1945 
publisher: A Penguin Random House Company 
date: Copyright 2013 by Ian Buruma 
page(s): 102


terça-feira, 17 de setembro de 2019

Quando o Japão parecia superar os EUA: anos 1980-90

A Brief History of Doom by Richard Vague.

In the 1980s and early 1990s, many Americans thought Japan was going to surpass the United States to become the world's largest economy, and some even arranged Japanese language lessons for their children to prepare them for a new world order:

"In 2016, as I was beginning to think concertedly about this book, my wife, Laura, and I found ourselves in Hawaii. I had with me The Bubble Economy, Christopher Wood's excellent book on Japan's 1990s financial crisis, and was reading it as I looked out over the ocean. I came to a passage about the Japanese luxury hotel craze of that period and realized that a neighboring hotel, the just-opened Four Seasons Resort at Ko Olina, had been part of that building frenzy. Japanese developers had built the building as a high-end luxury hotel and ambitiously created its artificial ocean peninsulas -- but the hotel had been shuttered or used for less than its original high-end purpose for almost twenty-five years. Nothing close to the demand for luxury hotels projected by the Japanese had materialized. The hotel was built because banks were making loans hand over fist and not basing their decisions on realistic projections of use.
"Vestiges of Japan's 1980s lending frenzy remain in other places: in old American magazine cover stories, such as the February 2, 1987, issue of Newsweek, which intoned, 'Your next boss may be Japanese'; or with adults who grew up in the 1980s and can still remember bits of Japanese because their ambitious parents enrolled them in Japanese-language courses as children to prepare them for the new economic world order. America seemed in the grips of a Japanese corporate takeover. As the Japanese bought more and more high-profile U.S. properties, outraged old-school columnist Paul Harvey warned that Japan's growing financial presence in the United States was 'an economic Pearl Harbor,'
Click to watch the video
"The hotel in Hawaii, like empty skyscrapers in New York and Chicago in the late 1920s, was a relic of an explosion in private lending that was all but unprecedented in the twentieth century. From 1985 to 1990, Japan's pri­vate debt-business and household loans-catapulted from 143 percent to 182 percent, an increase of ¥343 trillion, or $2.4 trillion. That percentage increase was far higher than in the years leading up to the Great Depression or Great Recession.
"Japan's runaway lending was concentrated in commercial real estate, the profligate construction of office buildings, hotels, and apartments and the de­velopment of tracts of land both in Japan and abroad. From 1985 to 1990, commercial real estate (CRE) loans more than doubled from ¥75 trillion to ¥187 trillion. Japan's loans of this era created building after building that would not be sold or filled for years and even decades. But Japan's use of real estate as collateral went far beyond CRE and conventional household mort­gages. It extended to trillions of total yen in household nonmortgage loans and small- and medium-sized business loans.' Even bank loans for finance and leasing companies were largely tied to activity in the real estate industry.
"Further, Japanese banks were eager, often naive participants in the financ­ing of U.S. leveraged buyout transactions. Japan's lending frenzy drove up real estate prices by an astonishing 300 percent in that compressed period and created a short-term economic surge that Japan and the rest of the world misconstrued as an economic miracle. Its banks, businesses, and households became overleveraged, and the country was fully overbuilt by 1990, as were other markets, such as California and Hawaii, targets of Japan'shyperactive lending.
"By the late 1980s, five of the world's ten largest commercial banks by total assets were Japanese. In the 1990s, Japan's economy reached 18 percent of world GDP, yet by 2007, it was a mere 7.9 percent. Japan followed the well-trodden boom trajectory in the 1980s but then distinguished itself by delay, denial, and delusion in the bust in the 1990s. Japan's struggles with its crisis and efforts at bank recapitalization took as long as fifteen years -- a distinct inflection from the Great Depression. Japan's financial crisis is a parable of when, and how, policy decisions matter in the postboom phases of financial crisis."
A Brief History of Doom
Author: Richard Vague
Publisher: University of Pennsylvania Press
Copyright 2019 University of Pennsylvania Press
Pages: 71-72