Ajuda ao desenvolvimento: tem alguma importancia? - o caso do Fundo IBSA (Oliver Stuenkel)

A matéria abaixo tenta ser generosa e positiva em relação ao Fundo IBSA.
A realidade é que a ajuda ao desenvolvimento vem sendo realizada nas últimas cinco décadas, em montantes equivalentes a dezenas de bilhões de dólares anuais, sem resultados muito visíveis.
A África está melhor hoje em função dessa ajuda, ou através de comércio e investimentos?
O fato é que os países que mais crescerão no mundo nas últimas décadas, com destaque para a China e a Índia, o fizeram com base em sua integração nos circuitos produtivos da economia mundial, ou seja, graças à globalização, não por causa de qualquer ajuda ao desenvolvimento.
Seria muito difícil de compreender isso?
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

South-South cooperation: Does the IBSA Fund matter?

By Oliver Stuenkel

Post-Western World, 27 de janeiro de 2014

Ten years ago, leaders from India, Brazil and South Africa, which had just launched the trilateral IBSA grouping, decided to join forces as so-called "emerging donors" and established the IBSA Fund, which would come to symbolize their efforts to promote "South-South cooperation". For the past ten years, policy makers involved in the IBSA process frequently and proudly point to the IBSA Fund's great success. Yet what exactly is the IBSA Fund? More importantly, does it matter?

The IBSA Facility Fund for Alleviation of Poverty and Hunger was created in 2004 and became operational in 2006. Countries decided to contribute an annual amount of US $ 1 million. According to the IBSA governments, the Trust Fund operates through a demand-driven approach. Governments of developing countries requesting support by this fund initiate discussions with focal points appointed among IBSA countries’ officers around the world. These focal points then submit proposals to the IBSA board of directors for review. If a proposal receives a favorable review, UNDP’s Special Unit for South-South Cooperation, which acts as the Fund's  manager and board of directors’ secretariat, initiates contact with a potential executing agency to advance a project formulation, and to facilitate the project’s implementation.

IBSA projects are executed through partnerships with the UN’s Development Program, national institutions or local governments. Important concerns of IBSA partners in the design of their projects include capacity building among projects’ beneficiaries, build-in project sustainability and knowledge sharing among Southern experts and institutions.

Despite its small size, the IBSA Fund received the 2010 MDG (Millennium Development Goals) Award for South-South Cooperation by the NGO “Millennium Development Goals Awards Committee”. In 2012 the Fund earned the "South-South and Triangular Cooperation Champions Award", given by the United Nations for its innovative approach.

The IBSA Fund finances or has financed projects in Haiti, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, Burundi, Palestine, Cambodia, Lao PDR and Sierra Leone. Until today, a series of small projects in developing countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia have been implemented. For example, in Burundi, the IBSA Fund supported, until 2012, a project to increase the government’s capacity to combat HIV/ AIDS. In Cape Verde, a public health center was reformed and modernized in 2008. In Guinea Bissau, an agricultural project was implemented until 2007. In a second phase, operationalized by 2011, the project was expanded. In Haiti, a waste collection project was supported in Port-au-Prince, finalized in 2011. A sports complex has been completed and inaugurated in 2011 in Ramallah under the IBSA Fund. In 2012, the refurbishment of a hospital in Gaza began.

At this point, projects in Cape Verde (Desalinization to increase access to drinking water and provide water for agriculture), Cambodia (medical services for children and adolescents with special needs), Guinea Bissau (farming, solar energy), Laos (irrigation), Palestine (support for a hospital, center for people with special needs), Sierra Leone (leadership training), Vietnam (agriculture).

While such cooperation is notable, even IBSA-enthusiasts must admit that the amounts involved remain extremely small compared to existing development institutions. While policy makers officially hail the IBSA Fund as a centerpiece of the grouping, former diplomats concede that a lack of political will is the only way to explain why the fund remains so small – in particular when considering that all IBSA members spend far larger amounts on bilateral development and humanitarian aid.

Rajiv Bhatia, who served as India's High Commissioner to South Africa from 2006-09, commented that “IBSA assistance is too limited, with each member-state contributing just $1 million annually. Surely, they can afford to be more generous. If IBSA truly wants to make a difference, it should step up its assistance, expedite its decision-making and undertake more projects.”

Governments point out in response that the IBSA Fund is meant to develop “new paradigms” and can thus be successful even while maintaining its small size. Yet several development experts who are not involved in the IBSA Fund pointed out that unless the funds’ size increases, it is virtually impossible to judge its scalability – i.e., in how far others can learn from and copy the IBSA Fund’s strategy.

As a consequence, several observes have called on the fund to be expanded if it is to be taken seriously. Lyal White argues that, if countries committed more financial resources, the Fund could become IBSA’s “flagship and its interface with the developing world.” He recommends that a greater part of Brazilian, Indian and South African bilateral aid should be incorporated into an enlarged IBSA development fund.

Notably, civil society organizations have criticized the IBSA Fund for its lack of transparency. Laura Waisbich of Conectas, a Brazilian human rights NGO, argues that

apart from the annual report which retrospectively gives broad details of projects undertaken by the IBSA Fund, there is very little information on IBSA projects. The website dedicated to the Fund shields any information of relevance, with passwords. An interested citizen has no access to information on - the selection process of projects, the projected timeline, details of sub-contractors, impact assessment reports, target beneficiaries, overall project assessment, etc.

Waisbich writes about a conversation with Vrinda Choraria, from the Delhi-based Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, who had argued that

this lack of information on the Fund is frustrating as even a recent exercise of filing formal requests under the respective information laws, by organisations based in the three countries elicited no relevant information. (..) It is perplexing that a Fund that the three countries promote as a symbol of cooperation and assistance should be shrouded in such secrecy.

Finally, she reports that an information request to the UN Office for South-South Cooperation in United Nations Development Programme, which manages the IBSA fund, under its information disclosure policy, did not provide the information that was sought.

The incapacity of civil society to monitor and assess the impact of IBSA Fund projects reduces the buy-in of NGOs and public opinion makers, which directly impacts the grouping’s image in India’s, Brazil’s and South Africa’s civil society. On the IBSA Fund’s website, a project description affirms that a project in Guinea Bissau was “received positively in the local oficial press” - yet inviting independent NGOs to visit and evaluate the projects would certainly enhance trust in the IBSA Fund.

The IBSA Fund - one of the IBSA groupings few elements that produced tangible results - is a great idea that may not only alleviate poverty, but also enhance the debate about innovative ways of poverty reduction and South-South cooperation in more general. Yet in order to make a serious contribution in the global debate, IBSA governments should dramatically enhance financial support, and make the Fund's operation more transparent.

Globonews Painel, 25/01/2014: Celso Lafer, Rubens Barbosa, Oliver Stuenkel

Para quem não assistiu ao programa de entrevistas sobre a realidade mundial, sempre dirigido pelo competente jornalista William Waack, colocações interessantes  dos três participantes, acima referidos, sobre os desafios do mundo atual:

http://g1.globo.com/globo-news/globo-news-painel/videos/t/todos-os-videos/v/convidados-debatem-relacoes-internacionais-no-mundo-hoje/3103848/

Dez desafios do Brasil em 2014; Brazil's Top Ten Challenges in 2014 - Oliver Stuenkel

Brazil’s top 10 foreign policy challenges in 2014

Oliver Stuenkel

Post Western World, December 29, 2013

[Nota inicial: Não concordo com o título, e sugestão de programa, de "post western world", pelo menos até que o "non western world" seja capaz de oferecer coisas melhores do que o atual, certamente não perfeito, mundo ocidental; o que nos vem desse mundo não ocidental, no qual eu incluo países erráticos, estatizantes e tendencialmente autoritários, como vários da América Latina, entre eles o Brasil, não é certamente algo superior aos valores, contribuições e liberdades do mundo ocidental. Devemos, sim, valorizar, absolutamente o mundo ocidental, pois é dele que nos vem todos os valores e princípios que prezamos, e que estão no coração de nossa prosperidade atual e de TODAS as nossas liberdades; países insuficientemente democráticos, não capitalistas, estatizantes, com governos autoritários e alguns até totalitários, não oferecer nenhum modelo desejável.  Paulo Roberto de Almeida ]

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Disclaimer: Selecting merely ten issues from the multitude of challenges Brazil faces is, of course, a rather impossible task, and bound to omit crucial topics. This list therefore does not claim to be complete (it does not contemplate key topics such as the environment, development aid, non-proliferation, peacekeeping in Haiti, the WTO and the Middle East), but seeks to stimulate the debate about an exciting year ahead. Comments (preferably of the critical sort) are, as usual, most welcome.

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1. Get Brazil-US ties back on track

With a tight election race looming, Brazil's President Dilma Rousseff preferred not to risk being seen as weak and submissive in the face of an ongoing US spying scandal and rightly canceled her 2013 trip to Washington, D.C. After this historic low point in the bilateral relationship, it is time to take first steps to eventually get things back to normal. Studying Germany's reaction and negotiation tactics after the spying revelations may be instructive when thinking about how Brazil could benefit most from the episode. Important projects such as the visa-waiver agreement that have been put on hold after the NSA affair could be restarted, even if seeking closer ties to the US is currently unpopular. Then, Brazil could adopt a proactive policy vis-à-vis the United States and build on Obama's previous statement that he "appreciates" Brazil's desire for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. Despite China's rise, the United States remains a crucial actor that profoundly influences Brazil's foreign relations.

2. Convince the President and Congress that foreign policy (and the Foreign Ministry) matters

2013 was a difficult year for Itamaraty - it included the crisis in Bolivia which led to Minister Patriota's resignation, public attacks against supposed super-salaries and budget cuts. In order to reverse the situation, the Foreign Ministry needs to convince both the President and Congress that it requires more, not less resources. As Brazil seeks to project more influence, its relatively low number of diplomats may pose limitations on its capacity to operationalize new policies. Smart strategies developed at home may fail to have the desired impact because there are not enough foreign service officers to implement the new policy. Complex bilateral negotiations can be negatively affected if one side's negotiators have not been briefed properly due to a lack of diplomatic staff and on-the-ground knowledge on the domestic constraints the other side is facing. Finally, maintaining an understaffed embassy can send a negative signal to the host country, in some cases causing more damage than opening no embassy at all. Yet the President cares little about diplomacy, and some of Brazil's major international initiatives - such as the successful campaign to put a Brazilian at the helm of the World Trade Organization (WTO) - was not coordinated by Itamaraty, but by other parts of government. Foreign policy makers' thus face a double challenge: convince both Congress and the President that foreign policy matter, and that the Foreign Ministry is the best place to design and implement it.

3. Assume leadership in the global debate about internet governance

In September 2013, Rousseff took the initiative and placed Brazil in the center of the debate about the future of internet governance. This is indicative of a growing willingness to play a key role in international affairs. At the same time, Rousseff's presentation has also raised global expectations considerably. In April, the government will organize a summit that will involve national governments as well as representatives from industry, civil society, and the private sector International Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), which currently oversees aspects of Internet governance like IP addresses. In São Paulo, they will brainstorm about new global rules for privacy in the digital age. The debates may strengthen those who wish to wrest management of the Internet from the multi-stakeholder ICANN and place it in the hands of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), where it would be even more susceptible to national manipulation.

Brazil's credibility as a global actor will, to no small degree, depend on its capacity to follow-up on such promises and make a meaningful contribution to this highly complex debate. As I have argued before in the debate about RwP, Brazil's attempt to act as an agenda-setter may have been useful to provide a glimpse of what Brazil is capable of on a global scale. Between 2011 and 2012, despite Brazil's limited hard power, it temporarily exercised international leadership in the debate about humanitarian intervention. Just like back then, Brazil will have to prepare for a tough discussion, which is likely to include fierce criticism from many sides.

4. Continue to engage in the global debate about how to prevent mass atrocities

With Ambassador Patriota in New York, Brazil possesses considerable authority at the UN to play a leading role in the discussions about how to deal with humanitarian crises around the world. Having created the concept of RwP (the Responsibility while Protecting), Patriota placed Brazil in the midst of the controversy about the legality of the way the Libya intervention was conducted. In many ways, RwP symbolized the very strategy Brazil aspired to pursue: turn into a bridge builder, mediator and consensus seeker through thought leadership. RwP, despite its flaws, was an innovative and constructive proposal to bridge the gap between an overly trigger-happy NATO and excessively resistant China and Russia.With the severe humanitarian crisis in Syria ongoing, and new ones erupting in South Sudan and the Central African Republic, Brazil would do well to take a leading role in the global debate about preventing mass atrocities in the future - a debate that is far richer and more complex than the usual NATO-Russia duality.

5. Show that the BRICS grouping is worth keeping

During the first week of April, Brazil will organize the 6th BRICS Summit. Since the host has the right to set the agenda of the summit, Brazil has a unique chance to give the 6th BRICS Summit its own imprint - and thus engage the leaders of China, India, Russia and South Africa on one or several topics of its choice. This is a tremendous opportunity for Brazil. Yet the public is likely to remain skeptical of the usefulness of the BRICS concept, particularly as growth in the Global South has slowed markedly. Add to that a President who never really warmed to the idea and foreign policy makers face a tough challenge to keep the momentum going and show that Brazil benefits from being part of the BRICS grouping. In the midst of all the gloom, the BRICS grouping will hold its 6th Summit in Brazil and launch the BRICS Development Bank, marking the most important step towards institutionalization in its young history.

6. Project stability in the neighborhood

As political and economic stability has led to unknown levels of prosperity and reduced levels of inequality and poverty, Brazil’s economic ties with the region have grown considerably. Brazil’s relative economic growth vis-à-vis its neighbors created significant structural incentives for Brasília to design more assertive strategies to boost regional cooperation. This implies the necessity to offer credit to large Brazilian companies that are in search for opportunities in largely untapped markets, and as a consequence, to establish clear rules and guidelines to make these countries more predictable and navigable for Brazilian companies. While demand from China will remain important, it may weaken, increasing the significance of Brazil's neighborhood even further. Yet the region does not only present opportunities, but also risks. Rather than merely the strength of other states, the weakness of others may produce threats, as weak nations may not be able to provide basic levels of public order. For example, violence and chaos that ensues in Bolivia could spill into Brazilian territory. Brazil is strong and getting stronger – but some of its neighbors are weak and some appear to be getting weaker. It is within this context that Brazil faces its biggest security challenges. Projecting political stability and strengthening governance and the rule of law in the neighborhood thus remain high on Brazil's foreign policy agenda.

7. Engage the public - both at home and abroad 

Few Foreign Ministers spent as much time talking to students, representatives of NGOs and academics as Antonio Patriota during his time in office. Rightly so: Itamaraty must convince civil society that Brazil should turn into a global actor strongly involved in many issues around the world. Yet foreign policy still plays only a marginal role in Brazil's bustling public debate. Itamaraty's greatest projects are often greeted with a mixture of neglect and rejection by both the media and public opinion. A supportive public, however, could help the Foreign Ministry precisely with the sort of problems it faced in 2013. A youtube channel, a public diplomacy blog, a twitter presence and an accessible Foreign Minister are important first steps. Launching a complete English-language Foreign Ministry website would make a tremendous difference to those who follow Brazilian foreign policy abroad, making Brazil's international strategy more transparent and accessible.

8. Solve the trade conundrum

In the past 13 years more than 350 trade deals were registered at the WTO.  Mercosur, for its part, signed just four, with Egypt, Peru, Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Trade talks between the EU and Mercosur are also incredibly difficult, having started 14 years ago. They stalled over similar issues to those which made the WTO negotiations so complex: European unwillingness to expose its protected farmers to competition and South American desire to shelter industry from high-quality imports. Yet in Brazil, a number of stakeholders supports trade agreements not only with Europe but also with the United States, arguing that Brazil's industry could compete on equal terms if the government reduced the long-standing “Brazil cost” by facilitating tax rules and improving infrastructure. As big regional negotiations such as one between the EU and United States advance, one cannot but notice the prospect of a world divided into trade blocs. Brazil will have to make up its mind about what strategy to pursue should such a scenario come true. In the case of the negotiations with the EU, this involves making a decision about whether to take more protectionist Argentina along or whether to pursue a two-speed solution,  leaving Argentina behind.

9. Keep IBSA alive

In 2013, the IBSA grouping celebrated its tenth anniversary. Yet the way leaders in the Global South marked the special occasion was rather underwhelming: They canceled the summit that was supposed to take place in June 2013 in New Delhi. To make matters worse, the schedule in 2014 looks particularly crowded, with a BRICS Summit and a Football World Cup in Brazil, and general elections in all three member countries. While IBSA's survival does not solely depend on leaders' summits (the grouping contains 16 working groups and a trilateral commission), not organizing a leaders' meeting in 2014 would send a bad signal.

10. Keep opening up Brazil

Brazil has undergone an incredible and unprecedented process of internationalization over the past decade. Foreign investment skyrocketed. Never in history have as many Brazilians traveled or studied abroad. The number of foreign tourists, business travelers and exchange students has never been as high. And yet, Brazil remains, in many ways, more isolated than other countries. Far more tourists travel to Argentina than to Brazil. The number of foreign tourists coming to Paris alone exceeds that of visitors to all of Brazil by more than three times. The number of Brazilian students who go abroad remains low by international comparison. The government's growing financial support for exchange programs is thus to be welcomed. Universities should push governments to make recognizing diplomas abroad easier. Following the example of the Brazil-Russia visa waiver deal, visa requirements with other countries (such as the United States) should be eased. Brazil has little to lose and lots to gain from enhancing this international people-to-people diplomacy.

Read also:

International Politics in 2014: Ten Predictions

The Thirteen Most-Read Post-Western World Articles of 2013

Post-Western World’s Books of the Year

2013 Review: Events at the Center for International Relations – FGV

Photo credit: Valter Campanato/ABr

Oliver Stuenkel: previsoes para o mundo em 2014

Eu ainda preciso postar aqui as minhas previsões imprevidentes para 2014, algo fantasiosas, mas já tenho aqui algumas mais sérias, do professor de RI da FGV-SP.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

International Politics in 2014: Ten Predictions

2013 DECEMBER 12

ENGLISH, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

LEAVE A COMMENT

by Oliver Stuenkel

Post-Western World, 12/12/2013

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10. The Global South goes to the polls

In 2014, four large democracies in the Global South will organize general elections: Brazil, India, Indonesia and South Africa. During election years, policy makers tend to focus more on internal challenges and less on foreign affairs. Neither outgoing leaders nor recent winners are likely to propose important international initiatives.My guess: Indonesia and India will see leadership transitions. Brazil and South Africa will reelect Dilma Rousseff and Jacob Zuma, respectively.

Read more: 
Crunch time in the Global South

9. The future of internet governance

After the spying revelations that dominated the global debate during the second half of the year, the future of internet governance will be discussed at several international fora, including the UN, during the coming year. Brazil and Germany have taken a leadership role by drafting a resolution that promotes the right of privacy in the internet, and Brazil will organize a summit in April in São Paulo. Laws that seek to keep data in-country could threaten the cloud system – where data stored by US internet firms is accessible from anywhere in the world. My guess:China and Russia will propose rules to increase government control over the internet, a move that is unlikely to find much support in the rest of the world.

Read more: 
Can Brazil assume leadership in the debate about internet governance?

8. Where are the BRICS?

In 2014 the United States will add more to global economic growth than China (at market exchange rates) and Japan will add more than India. Growth in Brazil and South Africa is poised to remain low. In the midst of all the gloom, the BRICS grouping will hold its 6th Summit in Brazil and launch the BRICS Development Bank, marking the most important step towards institutionalization in its young history. Still, most observers will remain skeptical about the grouping's future, particularly now that growth rates are unimpressive. My guess: Intra-BRICS cooperation will continue, though most of it under the radar, ranging from issues such as agriculture, education, public health to voting behavior in international institutions.

Read more:
Despite economic slowdown, BRICS grouping is here to stay
BRICS Development Bank: Patience required
The end of the emerging world?

7. Will Iran join the international community?

The historic interim agreement concluded in late November between six world powers and Iran is an important step in the right direction. The West will provide  “limited, temporary and reversible” relief from some economic sanctions, and Iran will not only stop its work on nuclear weapons, but revert some of the steps. The political leadership in Tehran accepts a more intrusive inspection regime; this makes the deal very different from the one reached with North Korea in 2005, which the Koreans broke. Reintegrating Iran into the international community would transform politics in the Middle East, making US support for an Israeli attack against Iran unlikely. A deal could possibly help obtain Iranian support to broker a peace deal in Syria. My guess: Guarded optimism is permitted and Iran may see a reduction of its painful isolation from the international community.

6. What's next for Syria?

As the civil war in Syria continues, the United States and Europe have three priorities: a negotiated peace agreement to end the violence; a reduction of Iran’s influence in the region; and the removal of Bashar Assad. My guess: Obtaining all three will be impossible. Since stopping the carnage is most important of all, a peace accord will, if reached at all, most likely involve both the Syrian President and Iran.

Read more:
The BRICS and R2P: Was Syria an exception?

5. The Global Protests

After the massive protests that shook Brazil and Turkey, where will they continue in 2014? Particularly countries with a growing yet angry middle class that do not invest enough in education and infrastructure are at risk. Protests against austerity measures (such as Spain), corruption (as in India and China), police violence (U.K.) and oppression (Egypt and Russia, among others) will become ever more frequent as technology allows protesters to organize very quickly, leaving policy makers with little time to prepare. Host countries of big political summits and sporting events face additional risk of widespread protests. My guess: Brace for protests across the world, including Brazil (though not as large as in 2013, since Brazil's World Cup triumph will limit public rage there).

Read more:
From Taksim Square to Paulista Avenue
Brazil’s Hazare moment

4. Africa's rise

Africa is the last economic frontier of the global economy. It possesses 40 percent of the world's raw materials and 60 percent of its uncultivated arable land. No other continent has developed as rapidly in the last decade as Africa, where real economic growth was between 5% and 10% per year. When the Cold War ended, just three out of 53 African nations had halfway functional democracies. Today, that figure is 25 out of 54. More than 300 million Africans are now part of the middle class, roughly the population of the United States. No important global actor can afford not to build a strong presence in Africa. My guess: As growth in South Africa falters, fast-growing economies such as Angola, Nigeria and Ethiopia will seek to play a stronger role in international affairs. Africa's role in global affairs will increase further.

Read more:
Africa’s new no. 1
As the BRICS rise in Africa, Japan seeks to hold its ground
What is Brazil doing in Africa?

3. Can Merkel fix Europe?

As the economic crisis lingers on in Europe, all eyes are on Germany. Angela Merkel is demonized across Europe for her determined enforcement of austerity. Critics say Germany is too austere, too insistent on fiscal consolidation even in recession, too prone to put the burden of adjustment on deficit countries, too dominated by lawyers, not economists. She keeps pointing out that Europe has 7% of the world’s population, 25% of its GDP and 50% of its social spending, and that it cannot continue to be so generous. My guess: Germany's chancellor remains overwhelmingly popular at home and is set to remain so next year, so very little indicates that she will change her strategy vis-à-vis the EU.

2. Will China liberalize?

After a promising start, the world will expect Xi Jinping to implement the reforms announced in 2013 and continue his battle against corruption and better public services. Furthermore, the world's largest economy in waiting has to leave Deng's model of cheap labor, capital and focus on export markets behind. Wages are increasing, capital is becoming too expense, and domestic demand will have to pick up in order to keep economic growth as high as it used to be over the past decades. For the first time since the 70s, many argue, playing it safe means undertaking some more substantial economic reforms. The Central bank is expected to formally launch financial liberalizations in the new Shanghai free-trade zone in early 2014, with the hope of soon extending the reforms to other parts of the country if the trial run proves successful. My guess: Despite continuing protests in many parts of the country (against corruption, pollution and censorship), the reforms will succeed and China will grow at 7%.

Read more:
Can Xi be the new Deng?
Book review: “What does China want?” by Matias Spektor and Dani Nedal (orgs.)
Will China promote autocracy?
 

1. The US is back on track

While long-term predictions about China's rise remain valid, the United States' economic recovery (partly driven by shale gas) is likely to provide policy makers in Washington with additional assertiveness in international affairs. My guess: If history is any guide, Obama will focus more on foreign affairs in his second term and seek to build a global legacy. That may include attempting to follow-up on the Iran deal, adopting a more reasonable Cuba policy and building a stronger presence in China's backyard. In addition, the United States may take important steps towards promoting free trade across the Atlantic and the Pacific, mediate tensions between China and Japan, end the war in Syria, and even try to bring Israel and Palestine to the table.

Bric-a-Brac, uma expressao francesa que talvez convenha aos Brics...

New book chapter: Brazil, South American Regionalism and Re-defining the ‘Atlantic Space’

BRAZIL, BRICS, ENGLISH

LEAVE A COMMENT

by Oliver Stuenkel

  2013 OCTOBER 7

Laying the BRICS of a New Global Order: From Yekaterinburg 2009 to eThekwini 2013
Editors: Francis A. Kornegay and Narnia Bohler-Muller
ISBN: 978-0-7983-0403-0
Size: 168mm x 240mm
Extent: 220 pages
Availability: September 2013

Laying the BRICS of a New Global Order: From Yekaterinburg 2009 to eThekwini 2013 was inspired by the launching of South Africa’s membership in this grouping in 2011 at the 3rd BRICS think-tank symposium, convened in Beijing. The main idea behind this work was to bring together as many scholars from the five countries as possible to provide personal perspectives and reflections not just on BRICS but on political and economic dynamics in their countries.

See here the book's contents

Chapter: Brazil, South American Regionalism and Re-defining the 'Atlantic Space' (Oliver Stuenkel)

Chapter introduction

Brazil’s economic rise over the past two decades has caused the country’s foreign policy making elite to seek a more prominent role for Brazil in the international community. On a global scale, it has sought to assume more responsibility and engage in international institutions, often criticizing established powers for not providing it with the status it deserves. Brazil’s newfound status has also caused Brazilian governments to reassess its regional role, although Brazil remains ambivalent about which strategy to adopt in South America. There is clearly a gap between Brazil’s global ambitions and its reluctance to adopt a more assertive role in its region. The country’s strategy in the region remains indecisive, combining restrained support for Mercosur, the creation of the Union of South American States (UNASUR) and the South American Defense Council (CSD) with a growing notion that a clearer vision is necessary to mitigate neighbor’s fears of a rising Brazil. Brazilian policy makers disagree on how they should characterize and understand their region – some see it as a source of problems, some as a shield against globalization, and some as a launching pad for global power. Brazil’s self-perception as a ‘BRICS country’ has fueled worries that it will pay little attention to regional matters (given that its trade interdependence with the region is far lower, percentage-wise, than that of its neighbors), causing critics of Brazil’s global focus to call it a ‘leader without followers’.

While Brazil has kept UNASUR relatively toothless, its decision to exclude Central America and Mexico from this institution is a clear sign that policy makers in Brasília have defined South America as Brazil’s immediate sphere of influence. With the majority of the continent’s landmass, population and economic output, and Venezuela’s faltering attempts to turn into a second pole, it is largely up to Brazil to define and design ‘South American Regionalism’. Brazil thus in theory holds a key coordinating role regarding important regional challenges, ranging from China’s growing economic importance, poverty, inequality, integrating the economy and security threats such as drug trafficking and smuggling.

Analogous to Brazil’s growing role on the continent, it is bound to play a larger role in the South Atlantic (at times called “Blue Amazon" in Brazil), and it has resisted attempts made by Europe and the United States to create one single Atlantic Space. Both Brazil’s and South Africa’s rise, but also West Africa’s and Angola’s increasingly prominent role as an energy provider will increase the South Atlantic’s strategic significance. Conscious of this shift, Brazil is interested in defining a separate South Atlantic Security Space, it has chosen Africa as a strategic priority, and it is developing a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines. As ever larger ships can no longer pass through the Suez Canal, one can expect to see a revival of the Cape of Good Hope route, which could be controlled by Brazil and South Africa, but they still lack the capacity to control the area. At the same time, piracy has turned into a global problem that requires a concerted effort. As a consequence, security has emerged as a topic during IBSA summits, largely in the context of large scale oil findings off the Brazilian coast, thus causing Brazil to increasingly regard control and defense of the South Atlantic Space as its national interest.

This chapter will elaborate on how Brazil thinks about South America and the South Atlantic Space, how it will seek to shape the creation of a South American and a South Atlantic identity, and how this may affect the geopolitical dynamics in the region.

Brazil, regional hegemon?

Given its dominant role, It is no exaggeration to argue that Brazil seems destined to lead South America. The truth, however, is more complex. Brazil paid little attention to its neighbors during most of the Cold War, and severe domestic problems kept the country from adopting a more assertive international role. In the 1980s, Brazilian foreign policy makers perceived the necessity to engage with its neighbors, principally its rival Argentina, a trend that continued and strengthened throughout the 1990s. At the beginning of Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s first term, the President began to articulate a vision that fundamentally diverged from Brazil’s traditional perspective – a vision that identified “South America” as a top priority. This trend has continued ever since, and was intensified under Cardoso’s successor, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Over the past years, as Brazil’s economic rise caught the world’s attention, the region has firmly stood at the center of Brazil’s foreign policy strategy. This trend continues under Brazil’s current administration: President Rousseff’s first international trip as President, in 2011, was to Argentina. The last fifteen years thus stand in stark contrast to Brazilian foreign policy tradition. Until 1981, no Brazilian President had ever visited Peru or Colombia. What further facilitated Brazil’s growing presence in the region was a power vacuum as the United States largely lost interest in South America as its strategic focus shifted to the Middle East and Central Asia in the so-called ‘War on Terror’.

Yet despite a growing capacity to engage in the global discourse, Brazil’s regional leadership remains restrained and ambivalent. As a consequence, Brazil lacks “endorsement from the region”, as Vieira and Alden put it. As Spektor points out, Brazil is reluctant to promote regional institutions that profoundly limit national sovereignty, as is the case in the European Union.

In order to better grasp Brazil’s regional strategy, it is useful to distinguish three different ways Brazil interprets the region: As an opportunity, as a source of problems, and as a launch pad for global power.
 

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Quantidade e qualidade dos diplomatas - Oliver Stuenkel

De quantos diplomatas uma potência emergente precisa?

2012 November 6

Brazil, India, Portuguese

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by Oliver Stuenkel

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Um fator importante, porém frequentemente negligenciado quando se analisa a política externa de um país, é o tamanho de seu corpo diplomático. Estratégias inteligentes planejadas no Ministério de Relações Exteriores do país de origem podem não ter o impacto esperado porque o número de oficiais em serviço no exterior é insuficiente para implementar a nova política. Negociações bilaterais complexas podem ser afetadas negativamente se os negociadores de uma das partes não tiverem o devido acesso à informação, como consequência da falta de corpo diplomático e de conhecimento sobre as pressões domésticas que o outro lado está enfrentando. Ademais, manter uma embaixada com quadros insuficientes pode mandar uma mensagem negativa ao país-sede, causando, em alguns casos, mais danos do que abdicar de abrir uma embaixada.
À medida que os países emergentes buscam projetar mais influência no cenário internacional, o número reduzido de diplomatas desses países impõe severas limitações à capacidade de operacionalizar novas políticas. Uma comparação diz tudo: há mais diplomatas americanos servindo em Nova Délhi que diplomatas indianos no mundo inteiro. Isso significa que os Estados Unidos têm mais capital humano para desenvolver sua relação bilateral com a Índia do que a Índia tem para planejar e implementar sua política externa no restante do mundo.
Em um recente artigo de opinião publicado no Times of India, Kanti Bajpai, um professor universitário especializado em política externa indiana, criticou a situação e fez piada, dizendo que, com 600 oficiais, a Índia teria tantos diplomatas “quanto os gigantes Bélgica e Holanda”. Se o Ministério de Relações Exteriores indiano continuar a crescer nesse ritmo, haverá 1.200 diplomatas indianos em 2040 – no entanto, nessa data, a China terá 10.000 diplomatas servindo no exterior. Atualmente, o número de diplomatas americanos já é muito superior a 10.000.
Essa escassez extrema deve afetar negativamente a política externa indiana em vários níveis – da diplomacia pública à dificuldade de estabelecer vínculos com os importantes stakeholders locais no país-sede. Uma das frases mais comuns que se ouve dos pesquisadores de política externa indiana que estão visitando Nova Délhi é que não foi possível “encontrar ninguém no Ministério de Relações Exteriores indiano”.
No entanto, é interessante que Bajpai não diz quantos diplomatas a Índia deveria almejar ter. Qual é o número adequado de diplomatas para uma potência emergente como a Índia, que, aos poucos, começa a atuar em regiões onde, tradicionalmente, tinha pouco interesse?

Apesar de o corpo diplomático chinês ser grande demais para servir de modelo, é interessante notar que os quadros diplomáticos brasileiros são o dobro dos indianos. A despeito disso, há representações diplomáticas brasileiras ao redor do mundo que são tão pequenas – principalmente na África – que é plausível questionar como elas funcionam adequadamente. Há menos de 10 diplomatas brasileiros em Nova Délhi, e menos de 20 em Pequim – provavelmente insuficiente, considerando que a China é o parceiro comercial mais importante do Brasil desde 2009. Entretanto, o problema no Brasil pode não ser o número total de diplomatas, mas sim, o modo como eles estão distribuídos ao redor do mundo – por exemplo, em Roma, há o dobro de diplomatas que em Pequim, o que mostra que o Itamaraty ainda não se adaptou plenamente à atual mudança de poder global, a ascensão da Ásia em detrimento da Europa.
Porém, Bajpai diz que a quantidade de diplomatas não é o único problema na Índia. A qualidade está decaindo também. Ele argumenta que o serviço diplomático deixou de ser uma opção interessante para aqueles que desejam mudar a Índia, e sugere que novos processos de seleção sejam implementados: “devemos também recrutar em outras instituições públicas, incluindo as forças armadas, o setor privado, os círculos universitários, os think tanks e a imprensa”.
Quanto a isso, o Brasil apresenta uma peculiaridade, apesar de o Ministério das Relações Exteriores, outrora isolado, ter perdido um pouco de seu glamour e misticismo, pois, cada vez mais, os diplomatas precisam trabalhar em parceria com outros ministérios. O status social de um diplomata está muito acima de outras profissões, e poucos se preocupam com a qualidade dos candidatos. Enquanto o setor privado frequentemente sonda promissores diplomatas brasileiros com experiência internacional e conhecimentos de línguas estrangeiras, o Ministério de Relações Exteriores do Brasil ainda se recusa a mudar e a adotar o conselho de Bajpai.
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• Oliver Stuenkel

  
  Oliver Stuenkel, Professor of International Relations at the Getulio Vargas Foundation
  in São Paulo, Brazil
  READ MORE
  

A ilusao do Bric - Oliver Stuenkel

OPINIÃO

A ilusão do Bric

OLIVER STUENKEL

 O Globo, 27/10/2010

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O principal legado do presidente Lula no campo da política externa é o fortalecimento das parcerias do Brasil com outras potências emergentes, sobretudo os países do Bric. O comércio com a China está em expansão. Entrou em vigor um acordo de isenção de vistos entre Brasil e Rússia. As relações com a Índia nunca estiveram melhor. O Brasil está certo de querer forjar vínculos bilaterais mais estreitos com os gigantes asiáticos emergentes.
Mas, embora o Brasil deva fortalecer os vínculos individualmente, o próximo presidente brasileiro deve tomar cuidado para não levar a aliança Bric demais a sério. A marca melhorou a imagem do Brasil, mas juntar forças e apostar na importância estratégica da aliança não pode senão resultar em decepção. A marca Bric, criada pelo banqueiro Jim O'Neill, não vai sobreviver a longo prazo.
Que o acrônimo Bric tenha deixado de ser mero termo de investimento para se tornar uma realidade política não é sinal de presciência de O'Neill. O triunfo da marca Bric e sua aceitação entusiástica até por parte de seus "membros", apesar de suas inadequações, indicam o anseio não satisfeito das potências emergentes de compreenderem um mundo cada vez mais complexo, e que lugar nele lhes cabe.
O desafio de encontrar maneiras categóricas de entender o mundo tem precedentes. Historicamente, acadêmicos buscaram estabelecer distinções entre países ao classificá-los por categorias e blocos organizados de acordo com diferentes variáveis. Em 1946, Winston Churchill estabeleceu tal conceito quando introduziu a ideia da Cortina de Ferro. Pouco depois, Alfred Sauvy cunhou o termo Terceiro Mundo, ajudando seres humanos a entenderem o sistema internacional.
Atualmente, esses modelos já não têm significado, e há muitas propostas para novas maneiras de se repensar a realidade geopolítica. Quando criou os Brics, O'Neill estava apenas considerando aspectos econômicos; sendo assim, os países que ele escolheu eram muito heterogêneos. O Brasil e a Índia são duas democracias que ainda não estão plenamente estabelecidas na atual ordem mundial, enquanto a China e a Rússia, dois regimes não democráticos, são poderes estabelecidos desde 1945. Os quatro discordam sobre quase tudo, incluindo mudança climática, direitos humanos e a reforma da governança global.
Apesar de todos estes fatores, o termo Brics virou um conceito chave entre analistas. Os líderes do Brasil, da Índia, da Rússia e da China começaram a se referir a eles mesmos como "membros do Bric". Em 2009, os presidentes Lula e Hu Jintao e os primeiros-ministros Medvedev e Singh encontraram-se em São Petersburgo para uma cúpula do Bric.
Por que os quatro líderes decidiram juntar-se e transformar a categoria de investimentos de O'Neill em realidade política? O que mais os unia parecia ser seu interesse comum em mudar a maneira como o mundo era conduzido. Após o otimismo inicial e os grandes anúncios de uma "nova ordem mundial", no entanto, os membros do Bric deram-se conta de que suas posições eram demasiadamente divergentes para concordarem sobre quaisquer medidas específicas. A categoria de O'Neill é ampla demais para ser significativa.
O que o sucesso da marca Bric realmente mostrou é que os acadêmicos e investidores não são os únicos a buscar uma categoria que possa capturar a realidade. Chefes de Estado anseiam, igualmente, por uma maneira significativa de compreender o mundo. Os quatro líderes encontraram-se em São Petersburgo essencialmente para "experimentar" a categoria que O'Neill tinha inventado para eles. Em vez de apontar para as semelhanças, seu comportamento refletia o forte desejo de entender a que categoria eles pertenciam. Em um mundo de rápidas mudanças, onde parâmetros tradicionais tais como ocidente e oriente, norte e sul e rico e pobre já não orientam as potências emergentes, colocar o "chapéu Bric" foi apenas outro episódio, embora certamente não o último, na busca complexa de sua identidade e de seu lugar em um mundo que vão, em breve, dominar.

OLIVER STUENKEL é cientista político.