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Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida;

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Mostrando postagens com marcador Post Western World. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador Post Western World. Mostrar todas as postagens

quarta-feira, 1 de novembro de 2017

Post Western World, de Oliver Stuenkel, em chinês

Não sabia como se escreve o nome do professor Oliver Stuenkel em chinês?
Pois agora já sabe. É só olhar a capa do livro aqui reproduzida...

1. 'Post-Western World' is now available in Chinese, published by Beijing Mediatime
'Post-Western World' in Chinese (中国之治终结西方时代) was launched on October 1st and is now available on amazon.cn, along with the recently launched Chinese version of 'BRICS and the Future of Global Order' (金砖国家与全球秩序的未来), published by Shanghai People's Press. The Chinese version of 'Post-Western World', which includes an extra chapter on China's role in global order, has been reviewed by QiuShi, the political theory magazine published by the Central Party School and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (available here) and China Xioakang (available here). Both books will be presented at universities in Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Guangzhou in December.

2. ‘Post-Western World’ reviewed in the New York Review of Books (NYRB)
Andrew J. Nathan of Columbia University reviewed 'Post-Western World' for the New York Review of Books (NYRB), available here. The book has previously been reviewed by International Affairs, Foreign Affairs and Foreign Affairs Latinoamerica. All reviews available hereREAD MORE

3. 'Brazil on the Global Stage: Power, Ideas and the Liberal International Order' reviewed in the Journal of Latin American Studies
Felipe Loureiro, professor at the University of São Paulo (USP), has written a critique in the Journal of Latin American Studies of "Brazil on the Global Stage: Power, Ideas and the Liberal International Order", a volume edited by Matthew M. Taylor and Oliver Stuenkel. READ MORE

sábado, 8 de fevereiro de 2014

Ajuda ao desenvolvimento: tem alguma importancia? - o caso do Fundo IBSA (Oliver Stuenkel)

A matéria abaixo tenta ser generosa e positiva em relação ao Fundo IBSA.
A realidade é que a ajuda ao desenvolvimento vem sendo realizada nas últimas cinco décadas, em montantes equivalentes a dezenas de bilhões de dólares anuais, sem resultados muito visíveis.
A África está melhor hoje em função dessa ajuda, ou através de comércio e investimentos?
O fato é que os países que mais crescerão no mundo nas últimas décadas, com destaque para a China e a Índia, o fizeram com base em sua integração nos circuitos produtivos da economia mundial, ou seja, graças à globalização, não por causa de qualquer ajuda ao desenvolvimento.
Seria muito difícil de compreender isso?
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

South-South cooperation: Does the IBSA Fund matter?
By Oliver Stuenkel
Post-Western World, 27 de janeiro de 2014

Ten years ago, leaders from India, Brazil and South Africa, which had just launched the trilateral IBSA grouping, decided to join forces as so-called "emerging donors" and established the IBSA Fund, which would come to symbolize their efforts to promote "South-South cooperation". For the past ten years, policy makers involved in the IBSA process frequently and proudly point to the IBSA Fund's great success. Yet what exactly is the IBSA Fund? More importantly, does it matter?

The IBSA Facility Fund for Alleviation of Poverty and Hunger was created in 2004 and became operational in 2006. Countries decided to contribute an annual amount of US $ 1 million. According to the IBSA governments, the Trust Fund operates through a demand-driven approach. Governments of developing countries requesting support by this fund initiate discussions with focal points appointed among IBSA countries’ officers around the world. These focal points then submit proposals to the IBSA board of directors for review. If a proposal receives a favorable review, UNDP’s Special Unit for South-South Cooperation, which acts as the Fund's  manager and board of directors’ secretariat, initiates contact with a potential executing agency to advance a project formulation, and to facilitate the project’s implementation.

IBSA projects are executed through partnerships with the UN’s Development Program, national institutions or local governments. Important concerns of IBSA partners in the design of their projects include capacity building among projects’ beneficiaries, build-in project sustainability and knowledge sharing among Southern experts and institutions.

Despite its small size, the IBSA Fund received the 2010 MDG (Millennium Development Goals) Award for South-South Cooperation by the NGO “Millennium Development Goals Awards Committee”. In 2012 the Fund earned the "South-South and Triangular Cooperation Champions Award", given by the United Nations for its innovative approach.

The IBSA Fund finances or has financed projects in Haiti, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, Burundi, Palestine, Cambodia, Lao PDR and Sierra Leone. Until today, a series of small projects in developing countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia have been implemented. For example, in Burundi, the IBSA Fund supported, until 2012, a project to increase the government’s capacity to combat HIV/ AIDS. In Cape Verde, a public health center was reformed and modernized in 2008. In Guinea Bissau, an agricultural project was implemented until 2007. In a second phase, operationalized by 2011, the project was expanded. In Haiti, a waste collection project was supported in Port-au-Prince, finalized in 2011. A sports complex has been completed and inaugurated in 2011 in Ramallah under the IBSA Fund. In 2012, the refurbishment of a hospital in Gaza began.

At this point, projects in Cape Verde (Desalinization to increase access to drinking water and provide water for agriculture), Cambodia (medical services for children and adolescents with special needs), Guinea Bissau (farming, solar energy), Laos (irrigation), Palestine (support for a hospital, center for people with special needs), Sierra Leone (leadership training), Vietnam (agriculture).

While such cooperation is notable, even IBSA-enthusiasts must admit that the amounts involved remain extremely small compared to existing development institutions. While policy makers officially hail the IBSA Fund as a centerpiece of the grouping, former diplomats concede that a lack of political will is the only way to explain why the fund remains so small – in particular when considering that all IBSA members spend far larger amounts on bilateral development and humanitarian aid.

Rajiv Bhatia, who served as India's High Commissioner to South Africa from 2006-09, commented that “IBSA assistance is too limited, with each member-state contributing just $1 million annually. Surely, they can afford to be more generous. If IBSA truly wants to make a difference, it should step up its assistance, expedite its decision-making and undertake more projects.”

Governments point out in response that the IBSA Fund is meant to develop “new paradigms” and can thus be successful even while maintaining its small size. Yet several development experts who are not involved in the IBSA Fund pointed out that unless the funds’ size increases, it is virtually impossible to judge its scalability – i.e., in how far others can learn from and copy the IBSA Fund’s strategy.

As a consequence, several observes have called on the fund to be expanded if it is to be taken seriously. Lyal White argues that, if countries committed more financial resources, the Fund could become IBSA’s “flagship and its interface with the developing world.” He recommends that a greater part of Brazilian, Indian and South African bilateral aid should be incorporated into an enlarged IBSA development fund.

Notably, civil society organizations have criticized the IBSA Fund for its lack of transparency. Laura Waisbich of Conectas, a Brazilian human rights NGO, argues that

apart from the annual report which retrospectively gives broad details of projects undertaken by the IBSA Fund, there is very little information on IBSA projects. The website dedicated to the Fund shields any information of relevance, with passwords. An interested citizen has no access to information on - the selection process of projects, the projected timeline, details of sub-contractors, impact assessment reports, target beneficiaries, overall project assessment, etc.

Waisbich writes about a conversation with Vrinda Choraria, from the Delhi-based Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, who had argued that

this lack of information on the Fund is frustrating as even a recent exercise of filing formal requests under the respective information laws, by organisations based in the three countries elicited no relevant information. (..) It is perplexing that a Fund that the three countries promote as a symbol of cooperation and assistance should be shrouded in such secrecy.

Finally, she reports that an information request to the UN Office for South-South Cooperation in United Nations Development Programme, which manages the IBSA fund, under its information disclosure policy, did not provide the information that was sought.

The incapacity of civil society to monitor and assess the impact of IBSA Fund projects reduces the buy-in of NGOs and public opinion makers, which directly impacts the grouping’s image in India’s, Brazil’s and South Africa’s civil society. On the IBSA Fund’s website, a project description affirms that a project in Guinea Bissau was “received positively in the local oficial press” - yet inviting independent NGOs to visit and evaluate the projects would certainly enhance trust in the IBSA Fund.

The IBSA Fund - one of the IBSA groupings few elements that produced tangible results - is a great idea that may not only alleviate poverty, but also enhance the debate about innovative ways of poverty reduction and South-South cooperation in more general. Yet in order to make a serious contribution in the global debate, IBSA governments should dramatically enhance financial support, and make the Fund's operation more transparent.

terça-feira, 31 de dezembro de 2013

Dez desafios do Brasil em 2014; Brazil's Top Ten Challenges in 2014 - Oliver Stuenkel

Brazil’s top 10 foreign policy challenges in 2014

Oliver Stuenkel
Post Western World, December 29, 2013

[Nota inicial: Não concordo com o título, e sugestão de programa, de "post western world", pelo menos até que o "non western world" seja capaz de oferecer coisas melhores do que o atual, certamente não perfeito, mundo ocidental; o que nos vem desse mundo não ocidental, no qual eu incluo países erráticos, estatizantes e tendencialmente autoritários, como vários da América Latina, entre eles o Brasil, não é certamente algo superior aos valores, contribuições e liberdades do mundo ocidental. Devemos, sim, valorizar, absolutamente o mundo ocidental, pois é dele que nos vem todos os valores e princípios que prezamos, e que estão no coração de nossa prosperidade atual e de TODAS as nossas liberdades; países insuficientemente democráticos, não capitalistas, estatizantes, com governos autoritários e alguns até totalitários, não oferecer nenhum modelo desejável.  Paulo Roberto de Almeida ]
Disclaimer: Selecting merely ten issues from the multitude of challenges Brazil faces is, of course, a rather impossible task, and bound to omit crucial topics. This list therefore does not claim to be complete (it does not contemplate key topics such as the environment, development aid, non-proliferation, peacekeeping in Haiti, the WTO and the Middle East), but seeks to stimulate the debate about an exciting year ahead. Comments (preferably of the critical sort) are, as usual, most welcome.
1. Get Brazil-US ties back on track
With a tight election race looming, Brazil's President Dilma Rousseff preferred not to risk being seen as weak and submissive in the face of an ongoing US spying scandal and rightly canceled her 2013 trip to Washington, D.C. After this historic low point in the bilateral relationship, it is time to take first steps to eventually get things back to normal. Studying Germany's reaction and negotiation tactics after the spying revelations may be instructive when thinking about how Brazil could benefit most from the episode. Important projects such as the visa-waiver agreement that have been put on hold after the NSA affair could be restarted, even if seeking closer ties to the US is currently unpopular. Then, Brazil could adopt a proactive policy vis-à-vis the United States and build on Obama's previous statement that he "appreciates" Brazil's desire for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. Despite China's rise, the United States remains a crucial actor that profoundly influences Brazil's foreign relations.
2. Convince the President and Congress that foreign policy (and the Foreign Ministry) matters
2013 was a difficult year for Itamaraty - it included the crisis in Bolivia which led to Minister Patriota's resignation, public attacks against supposed super-salaries and budget cuts. In order to reverse the situation, the Foreign Ministry needs to convince both the President and Congress that it requires more, not less resources. As Brazil seeks to project more influence, its relatively low number of diplomats may pose limitations on its capacity to operationalize new policies. Smart strategies developed at home may fail to have the desired impact because there are not enough foreign service officers to implement the new policy. Complex bilateral negotiations can be negatively affected if one side's negotiators have not been briefed properly due to a lack of diplomatic staff and on-the-ground knowledge on the domestic constraints the other side is facing. Finally, maintaining an understaffed embassy can send a negative signal to the host country, in some cases causing more damage than opening no embassy at all. Yet the President cares little about diplomacy, and some of Brazil's major international initiatives - such as the successful campaign to put a Brazilian at the helm of the World Trade Organization (WTO) - was not coordinated by Itamaraty, but by other parts of government. Foreign policy makers' thus face a double challenge: convince both Congress and the President that foreign policy matter, and that the Foreign Ministry is the best place to design and implement it.
3. Assume leadership in the global debate about internet governance
In September 2013, Rousseff took the initiative and placed Brazil in the center of the debate about the future of internet governance. This is indicative of a growing willingness to play a key role in international affairs. At the same time, Rousseff's presentation has also raised global expectations considerably. In April, the government will organize a summit that will involve national governments as well as representatives from industry, civil society, and the private sector International Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), which currently oversees aspects of Internet governance like IP addresses. In São Paulo, they will brainstorm about new global rules for privacy in the digital age. The debates may strengthen those who wish to wrest management of the Internet from the multi-stakeholder ICANN and place it in the hands of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), where it would be even more susceptible to national manipulation.
Brazil's credibility as a global actor will, to no small degree, depend on its capacity to follow-up on such promises and make a meaningful contribution to this highly complex debate. As I have argued before in the debate about RwP, Brazil's attempt to act as an agenda-setter may have been useful to provide a glimpse of what Brazil is capable of on a global scale. Between 2011 and 2012, despite Brazil's limited hard power, it temporarily exercised international leadership in the debate about humanitarian intervention. Just like back then, Brazil will have to prepare for a tough discussion, which is likely to include fierce criticism from many sides.
4. Continue to engage in the global debate about how to prevent mass atrocities
With Ambassador Patriota in New York, Brazil possesses considerable authority at the UN to play a leading role in the discussions about how to deal with humanitarian crises around the world. Having created the concept of RwP (the Responsibility while Protecting), Patriota placed Brazil in the midst of the controversy about the legality of the way the Libya intervention was conducted. In many ways, RwP symbolized the very strategy Brazil aspired to pursue: turn into a bridge builder, mediator and consensus seeker through thought leadership. RwP, despite its flaws, was an innovative and constructive proposal to bridge the gap between an overly trigger-happy NATO and excessively resistant China and Russia.With the severe humanitarian crisis in Syria ongoing, and new ones erupting in South Sudan and the Central African Republic, Brazil would do well to take a leading role in the global debate about preventing mass atrocities in the future - a debate that is far richer and more complex than the usual NATO-Russia duality.
5. Show that the BRICS grouping is worth keeping
During the first week of April, Brazil will organize the 6th BRICS Summit. Since the host has the right to set the agenda of the summit, Brazil has a unique chance to give the 6th BRICS Summit its own imprint - and thus engage the leaders of China, India, Russia and South Africa on one or several topics of its choice. This is a tremendous opportunity for Brazil. Yet the public is likely to remain skeptical of the usefulness of the BRICS concept, particularly as growth in the Global South has slowed markedly. Add to that a President who never really warmed to the idea and foreign policy makers face a tough challenge to keep the momentum going and show that Brazil benefits from being part of the BRICS grouping. In the midst of all the gloom, the BRICS grouping will hold its 6th Summit in Brazil and launch the BRICS Development Bank, marking the most important step towards institutionalization in its young history.
6. Project stability in the neighborhood
As political and economic stability has led to unknown levels of prosperity and reduced levels of inequality and poverty, Brazil’s economic ties with the region have grown considerably. Brazil’s relative economic growth vis-à-vis its neighbors created significant structural incentives for Brasília to design more assertive strategies to boost regional cooperation. This implies the necessity to offer credit to large Brazilian companies that are in search for opportunities in largely untapped markets, and as a consequence, to establish clear rules and guidelines to make these countries more predictable and navigable for Brazilian companies. While demand from China will remain important, it may weaken, increasing the significance of Brazil's neighborhood even further. Yet the region does not only present opportunities, but also risks. Rather than merely the strength of other states, the weakness of others may produce threats, as weak nations may not be able to provide basic levels of public order. For example, violence and chaos that ensues in Bolivia could spill into Brazilian territory. Brazil is strong and getting stronger – but some of its neighbors are weak and some appear to be getting weaker. It is within this context that Brazil faces its biggest security challenges. Projecting political stability and strengthening governance and the rule of law in the neighborhood thus remain high on Brazil's foreign policy agenda.
7. Engage the public - both at home and abroad 
Few Foreign Ministers spent as much time talking to students, representatives of NGOs and academics as Antonio Patriota during his time in office. Rightly so: Itamaraty must convince civil society that Brazil should turn into a global actor strongly involved in many issues around the world. Yet foreign policy still plays only a marginal role in Brazil's bustling public debate. Itamaraty's greatest projects are often greeted with a mixture of neglect and rejection by both the media and public opinion. A supportive public, however, could help the Foreign Ministry precisely with the sort of problems it faced in 2013. A youtube channel, a public diplomacy blog, a twitter presence and an accessible Foreign Minister are important first steps. Launching a complete English-language Foreign Ministry website would make a tremendous difference to those who follow Brazilian foreign policy abroad, making Brazil's international strategy more transparent and accessible.
8. Solve the trade conundrum
In the past 13 years more than 350 trade deals were registered at the WTO.  Mercosur, for its part, signed just four, with Egypt, Peru, Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Trade talks between the EU and Mercosur are also incredibly difficult, having started 14 years ago. They stalled over similar issues to those which made the WTO negotiations so complex: European unwillingness to expose its protected farmers to competition and South American desire to shelter industry from high-quality imports. Yet in Brazil, a number of stakeholders supports trade agreements not only with Europe but also with the United States, arguing that Brazil's industry could compete on equal terms if the government reduced the long-standing “Brazil cost” by facilitating tax rules and improving infrastructure. As big regional negotiations such as one between the EU and United States advance, one cannot but notice the prospect of a world divided into trade blocs. Brazil will have to make up its mind about what strategy to pursue should such a scenario come true. In the case of the negotiations with the EU, this involves making a decision about whether to take more protectionist Argentina along or whether to pursue a two-speed solution,  leaving Argentina behind.
9. Keep IBSA alive
In 2013, the IBSA grouping celebrated its tenth anniversary. Yet the way leaders in the Global South marked the special occasion was rather underwhelming: They canceled the summit that was supposed to take place in June 2013 in New Delhi. To make matters worse, the schedule in 2014 looks particularly crowded, with a BRICS Summit and a Football World Cup in Brazil, and general elections in all three member countries. While IBSA's survival does not solely depend on leaders' summits (the grouping contains 16 working groups and a trilateral commission), not organizing a leaders' meeting in 2014 would send a bad signal.
10. Keep opening up Brazil
Brazil has undergone an incredible and unprecedented process of internationalization over the past decade. Foreign investment skyrocketed. Never in history have as many Brazilians traveled or studied abroad. The number of foreign tourists, business travelers and exchange students has never been as high. And yet, Brazil remains, in many ways, more isolated than other countries. Far more tourists travel to Argentina than to Brazil. The number of foreign tourists coming to Paris alone exceeds that of visitors to all of Brazil by more than three times. The number of Brazilian students who go abroad remains low by international comparison. The government's growing financial support for exchange programs is thus to be welcomed. Universities should push governments to make recognizing diplomas abroad easier. Following the example of the Brazil-Russia visa waiver deal, visa requirements with other countries (such as the United States) should be eased. Brazil has little to lose and lots to gain from enhancing this international people-to-people diplomacy.
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Photo credit: Valter Campanato/ABr