Vou ser muito claro quanto ao que pretende Ricardo Hausmann, um venezuelano que se desespera de ver o seu povo morrer de fome: a Assembleia Nacional não tem poderes para destituir Maduro, e mesmo que tivesse, não aconteceria absolutamente nada, pois as rédeas do poder continuariam com quem estão atualmente: com os chavistas no poder, apoiados em maciças forças repressivas, a começar pelo Exército (mas não só ele). E mesmo se esse milagre da destituição por acaso ocorresse, não haveria um governo com legitimidade suficiente para chamar uma "invasão" estrangeira, que seria contra quem? Contra o Exército venezuelano? Haveria sérios problemas nos planos militar, social, político, logístico, humanitário, e a situação passaria de uim para pior. Mas imaginemos que tudo isso ocorra, que viria para essa "invasão armada estrangeira"? Não vejo NENHUM vizinho em condições políticas, militares, diplomáticas de fazê-lo, e não creio que os EUA de Trump poderiam montar um exército à la Rangers de Theodore Roosevelt, ou mesmo de marines, para "libertar" a Venezuela do governo narcotraficante (essa seria a rationale, não seria?). Esqueçam a ONU, que não serve para essas coisas, não por culpa da ONU, mas dos membros do CSNU.
Infelizmente, a Venezuela e os venezuelanos estão dramaticamente sós, para enfrentar a fome, a repressão, a desesperança, a morte...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
D-Day Venezuela
Project
Syndicate, Jan 2, 2018
As conditions in Venezuela worsen, the
solutions that must now be considered include what was once inconceivable. A
negotiated political transition remains the preferred option, but military
intervention by a coalition of regional forces may be the only way to end a
man-made famine threatening millions of lives.
CAMBRIDGE –
The Venezuelan crisis is moving relentlessly from catastrophic to unimaginable.
The level of misery, human suffering, and destruction has reached a point where
the international community must rethink how it can help.
In July, I
described the unprecedented nature of Venezuela’s
economic calamity, documenting the collapse in output, incomes,
and living and health standards. Probably the single most telling statistic I
cited was that the minimum wage (the wage earned by the median worker) measured
in the cheapest available calorie, had declined from 52,854 calories per day in
May 2012 to just 7,005 by May 2017 – not enough to feed a family of five.
Since then,
conditions have deteriorated dramatically. By last month, the minimum wage had
fallen to just 2,740 calories a day. And proteins are in even shorter supply.
Meat of any kind is so scarce that the market price of a kilogram is equivalent
to more than a week of minimum-wage work.
Health conditions have worsened as well,
owing to nutritional deficiencies and the government’s decision not to supply
infant formula, standard vaccines against infectious diseases, medicines for
AIDS, transplant, cancer, and dialysis patients, and general hospital supplies.
Since August 1, the price of a US dollar has added an extra zero, and inflation
has exceeded 50% per monthsince September.
According to
OPEC, oil production has declined
by 16% since May, down more than 350,000 barrels a day. To
arrest the decline, President Nicolás Maduro’s government has had no better
idea than to arrest some 60 senior managers of the state-owned oil company
PDVSA and appoint a National Guard general with no industry experience to run
it.
Rather than
taking steps to end the humanitarian crisis, the government is using it to
entrench its political control. Rejecting offers of assistance, it is spending
its resources on Chinese-made military-grade crowd-control systems to
thwart public protests.
With all
solutions either impractical, deemed infeasible, or unacceptable, most
Venezuelans are wishing for some deus ex machinato save them from
this tragedy. The best scenario would be free and fair elections to choose a
new government. This is Plan A for the Venezuelan opposition organized around
the Mesa de la Unidad Democratica, and is being sought in talks
taking place in the Dominican Republic.
But it
defies credulity to think that a regime that is willing to starve millions to
remain in power would yield that power in free elections. In Eastern Europe in
the 1940s, Stalinist regimes consolidated power despite losing elections. The fact that the
Maduro government has stolen three elections in 2017 alone and has blocked the
electoral participation of the parties with which it is negotiating, again
despite massive international attention, suggests that success is unlikely.
A domestic
military coup to restore constitutional rule is less palatable to many
democratic politicians, because they fear that the soldiers may not return to
their barracks afterwards. More important, Maduro’s regime already is a
military dictatorship, with officers in charge of many government agencies. The
senior officers of the Armed Forces are corrupt to the core, having been
involved for years in smuggling, currency and procurement crimes,
narco-trafficking and extra-judicial killings that, in per capita terms
are three times more prevalent than in
Rodrigo Duterte’s Philippines. Decent senior officers have been quitting in large numbers.
Targeted sanctions, managed by the US Office
of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), are hurting many of the thugs ruling
Venezuela. But, measured in the tens of thousands of avoidable deaths and
millions of additional Venezuelan refugees that will occur until the sanctions
yield their intended effect, these measures are too slow at best. At worst,
they will never work. After all, such sanctions have not led to regime change
in Russia, North Korea, or Iran.
This leaves
us with an international military intervention, a solution that scares most
Latin American governments because of a history of aggressive actions against
their sovereign interests, especially in Mexico and Central America. But these
may be the wrong historical analogies. After all, Simón Bolívar gained the
title of Liberator of Venezuela thanks to an 1814 invasion organized and
financed by neighboring Nueva Granada (today’s Colombia). France, Belgium, and
the Netherlands could not free themselves of an oppressive regime between 1940
and 1944 without international military action.
The
implication is clear. As the Venezuelan situation becomes unimaginable, the
solutions to be considered move closer to the inconceivable. The duly elected
National Assembly, where the opposition holds a two-thirds majority, has
been unconstitutionally stripped of power by
an unconstitutionally appointed Supreme Court. And the military has used its
power to suppress protests and force into exile
many leaders including the Supreme Court justices elected by the National
Assembly in July.
As solutions
go, why not consider the following one: the National Assembly could impeach
Maduro and the OFAC-sanctioned, narco-trafficking vice president, Tareck El
Aissami, who has had more than $500 million in assets seized by the United States government. The
Assembly could constitutionally appoint a new government, which in turn could
request military assistance from a coalition of the willing, including Latin
American, North American, and European countries. This force would free Venezuela,
in the same way Canadians, Australians, Brits, and Americans liberated Europe
in 1944-1945. Closer to home, it would be akin to the US liberating Panama from
the oppression of Manuel Noriega, ushering in democracy and the fastest economic growth in Latin America.
According to
international law, none of this would require approval by the United Nations
Security Council (which Russia and China might veto), because the military
force would be invited by a legitimate government seeking support to uphold the
country’s constitution. The existence of such an option might even boost the
prospects of the ongoing negotiations in the Dominican Republic.
An imploding
Venezuela is not in most countries’ national interest. And conditions there
constitute a crime against humanity that must be stopped on moral grounds. The
failure of Operation Market Garden in September 1944, immortalized in the book
and film A Bridge Too Far, led to famine in the Netherlands in the
winter of 1944-1945. Today’s Venezuelan famine is already worse. How many lives
must be shattered before salvation comes?
Writing for PS
since 2001
58 Commentaries
Ricardo
Hausmann, a former minister of planning of Venezuela and former Chief Economist
of the Inter-American Development Bank, is Director of the Center for
International Development at Harvard University and a professor of economics at
the Harvard Kennedy School.