O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida

Mostrando postagens com marcador Thomas Andrew O'Keefe. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador Thomas Andrew O'Keefe. Mostrar todas as postagens

quarta-feira, 14 de agosto de 2019

Acordo Mercosul-UE: Thomas Andrew O'Keefe (Mercosur Consulting Group)

EU-MERCOSUR: Does Their New Association Agreement Mean Much?

By Thomas Andrew O’Keefe*
Mercosur Consulting Group, August 6, 2019
29/06/2019 Coletiva de Imprensa UE-Mercosul
Press conference about the trade agreement between the Mercosur and the EU / Palácio do Planalto / Creative Commons
After nearly two decades of intermittent negotiations, the European Union and the four core MERCOSUR nations (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay) have finally inked a trade agreement, but its real impact won’t be felt for years, if ever. When the negotiations began in the mid-1990s, the EU was the largest trading partner of the MERCOSUR countries, and the United States was number two. Today China is in first place, the European Union is second, and the U.S. is fourth, behind intra-Latin American trade (EU investors, however, continue to have the largest stock of foreign direct investment assets in the MERCOSUR region). When ratified, the EU-MERCOSUR Association Agreement, signed in Brussels on June 28, will exempt a little more than 90 percent of two-way trade from tariffs.
  • About 93 percent of MERCOSUR exports will eventually obtain duty-free access into the EU market, the bulk as soon as the agreement comes into effect. Agricultural commodities such as beef, chicken, corn, eggs, ethanol, honey, pork, rice, and sugar only get reduced duties, with many also subject to quotas. Another 100 MERCOSUR agricultural items are completely excluded from any type of preferential treatment.
  • Some 91 percent of European exports will get duty-free access to MERCOSUR, but gradually as tariffs are reduced over a 10-year period. The phase-out is over 15 years in the case of European automobiles, furniture, and shoes. MERCOSUR tariffs on the remaining 9 percent of primarily EU manufactured goods will remain in place permanently.
  • The agreement offers service providers from any signatory country full access to the markets of all the other signatory states.
MERCOSUR showed greater flexibility with the EU on agricultural subsidiesthan it had with the United States, a position that contributed to ultimate rejection of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Subsidies in the EU-MERCOSUR agreement are permitted if “necessary to achieve a public policy objective.” The MERCOSUR countries also capitulated on the use of anti-dumping tariffs on intra-hemisphere trade. The new accord, however, does authorize governments to impose a duty that is less than the margin of dumping if it adequately removes injury to the affected domestic industry. It also includes provisions for ensuring that sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures as well as technical norms are not abused and become disguised impediments to free trade, although it permits enforcement of the European “precautionary principle” notion to restrict the importation of genetically modified food, for example, where the risks to health are not scientifically conclusive.
The agreement – now being “legally scrubbed” and translated into the EU’s 23 official languages – faces an elaborate, multi-year ratification process in the EU, where individual countries and the European Parliament must approve it, as well as each MERCOSUR government. Agricultural forces are already lining up in many European countries in opposition. In the meantime, the accord’s greatest impact is a signal by Brazilian President Bolsonaro and Argentine President Macri that they’re making progress on their stated objective to return MERCOSUR to its original trade focus – in contrast to their predecessors – and to claim an economic “victory” when growth in both countries remains stagnant.
  • Despite the flexibility MERCOSUR showed on agricultural subsidies and anti-dumping, its main sticking points with the United States in the FTAA, a free trade agreement with the United States seems remote as the Trump administration – in contrast to the Europeans – is unlikely to offer meaningful concessions based on the lesser developed status of the MERCOSUR countries. Neither will the Association Agreement with the EU reverse or even slow the region’s shift toward trade with China and the rest of Asia. 
August 6, 2019

* Thomas Andrew O’Keefe is the President of New York City-based Mercosur Consulting Group, Ltd. and a lecturer at Stanford University. He is the author of Bush II, Obama, and the Decline of U.S. Hegemony in the Western Hemisphere.

segunda-feira, 19 de fevereiro de 2018

Thomas O'Keefe publica livro sobre as relacoes do EUA com a AL

Meu amigo Thomas O'Keefe, a quem convidei logo no início de minha gestão como Diretor do Instituto de Pesquisa de Relações Internacionais, IPRI-Funag – aqui: “O que pode o Brasil esperar de um governo Donald Trump nos EUA”, proferida pelo Professor Thomas Andrew O’Keefe, Brasília/DF, 23 de novembro de 2016 – acaba de publicar um novo livro: 


Gostaria que ele viesse novamente ao Brasil, para apresenta-lo e para que pudéssemos debater o seu conteúdo, aqui revelado parcialmente: 

Vejamos mais um pouco...

George W. Bush, Barack H. Obama, and the Decline of United States Hegemony in the Western Hemisphere
By Thomas Andrew O’Keefe

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Dedication
List of Graphs
Acknowledgments

Chapter One: What is Hegemony and When Has the United States of America Been a
 Hegemon?

I.               Introduction………………………………………………………………………………
II.             The Theoretical Underpinnings of Hegemony…………………………………………...

Text Box: Variegated Hierarchy…………………………………………………

III.           The United States of America as a “Global” Hegemon………………………………….

IV.           The United States of America as a Regional Hegemon………………………………….
Chapter Two: The Inter-American System Under the Aegis of United States Hegemony
I.               Introduction………………………………………………………………………………
II.             The Pan American Union……………………………………………………………………………………..
III.           The Organization of American States (OAS)……………….……………………………………………………………………
Text Box: Human Rights in the Inter-American System…….…….…………...
IV.           Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………….
Chapter Three: A Post Hegemonic Inter-American System
I.               Introduction…………………………………………………………………………….

II.             The Diminishing Influence of the United States of America in the OAS……………...

Text Box:  The War on Drugs…...………………………………………………..

III.           The Appearance of Potential Rival Institutions to the OAS……………………………

a.     The Union of South American Nations (UNASUR)……………………………….

b.     The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC)...……………

IV.           Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………...

Chapter Four: The Emergence and Collapse of the Free Trade Area of the Americas
I.               Introduction…………………………………………………………………………….

II.             Preparing the Stage for the Negotiations………………………………………………

III.           The Growing Rift between U.S. and Brazilian Objectives…………………………….

IV.           The Negotiations Become Hopelessly Deadlocked…………………………………....

V.             The Bolivarian Alternative for the Peoples of Our America and the Peoples’ Trade Treaty…………………………………………………………………………………..

VI.           Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………..

Chapter Five: The Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas
I.               Introduction……………………………………………………………………………

II.             Launching the Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas (ECPA)....………….

III.           ECPA Initiatives………………………………………………………………………..

IV.           A Missed Opportunity to Establish a Hemispheric Cap and Trade Program…………..

V.             The Caribbean Energy Security Initiative………………………………………………

VI.           Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………...

Chapter Six: China in Latin America and the Caribbean
I.               Introduction…………………………………………………………………………….

II.             China’s Growing Commercial Presence in Latin America and the Caribbean………...

III.           The Chinese Challenge to U.S. Hegemony in Latin America and the Caribbean……..

IV.           Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………...


Chapter Seven: The Record on Other Major U.S. Foreign Policy Initiatives for the Western
                            Hemisphere under George W. Bush and Barack H. Obama

I.               Introduction……………………………………………………………………………..

II.             Plan Colombia…………………………………………………………………………..

III.           The Merida Initiative…………………………………………………………………...

IV.           Pathways to Prosperity in the Americas………………………………………………..

V.             The Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI)………………………….

VI.           The Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI)…….…………………………………

VII.         100,000 Strong in the Americas………………………………………………………..

VIII.       Restoring Normal Diplomatic Relations with Cuba……………………………………

IX.          Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………...

Chapter Eight: The Current State of Affairs and Future Ramifications
Bibliography
Index

LIST OF GRAPHS

a.     Andean Community Exports and Imports……………………………………………...

b.     Central America Exports and Imports………………………………………………….

c.     MERCOSUR Exports and Imports……………………………………………………..

d.     Mexico Exports and Imports……………………………………………………………

e.     Lending to Latin America and the Caribbean in 2016…………………………………

Apreciações: 



A Introdução:

I.                   Introduction
The genesis for this book is the flurry of discussions in the media and academic circles on the purported decline of United States hegemony in the Western Hemisphere that coincided with the start of the twenty-first century.  These assertions blossomed following the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, as the administration of George W. Bush concentrated its attention on eliminating Al Qaeda and other extremist Islamist cells in Afghanistan, the Middle East, and Somalia.  There was a widespread sentiment that because of this new focus, the United States was “ignoring” Latin America and the Caribbean.  This period also coincided with the election of leftist governments in many Latin American countries that frequently adopted policy positions that were blatantly hostile to the agenda long promoted by Washington, DC.  Unlike what might have been the response in the past, the United States now seemed to acquiesce to the new status quo in the Americas.  This book tests the thesis of whether there has indeed been a decline in the hegemony traditionally exercised by the United States in the Western Hemisphere since at least the end of the 19th century.
At the outset, it is important to underscore that this book is about hegemony and not about power per se Although the United States emerged as the sole superpower after the end of the Cold War, with cumulative, economic, military, and other capabilities, preponderant capabilities across the board do not guarantee effective influence in any given arena.[i]  For one things, American dominance in the international security arena no longer translates into effective leverage in the international economic arena, as the United States faces rising economic challengers with their own agendas and with greater discretion in international economic policy.[ii]  Accordingly, this book focuses on those international relations theories where the concept of hegemony is a key component for explaining United States foreign policy and actions.  It also addresses the conception of hegemony as developed by the Italian sociologist and neo-Marxist Antonio Gramsci.  Furthermore, this book does not attempt to wade into the lively debate within the international relations field over which conception of hegemony is more valid or to propose yet another theory of international relations for that matter.  Instead, its goal is less ambitious.  It utilizes existing definitions and notions of hegemony to answer whether its exercise by the United States in Latin America and the Caribbean objectively declined under the administrations of George W. Bush and Barack H. Obama.
It is also important to emphasize the distinction between imperialism and hegemony.  The fact that both terms are, often, used interchangeably to describe United States behavior in the Western Hemisphere leads to much confusion, even in academic circles.  Although the precise definition of imperialism may be as contested as one for hegemony, imperialism reflects a geopolitical arrangement whereby one state extends its dominion---frequently through use of force---over populations beyond its borders that are culturally and ethnically distinct from its own.[iii]  While an imperial power attempts to control both the internal and external affairs of a client state, a hegemon respects a subaltern’s domestic sovereignty but impinges on its autonomy to conduct an independent foreign policy.[iv]  Without a doubt, the forcible annexation of the Kingdom of Hawaii in 1898 against the clear wishes of its monarch and the overwhelming majority of its indigenous population provides an egregious example of U.S. imperialism.  Similarly, a case can be made for the U.S. annexation of Puerto Rico and the Philippines where, following the defeat of Spanish forces in 1898, the U.S. refused to recognize, and in the Filipino case, ruthlessly crushed a vibrant independence movement.  On the other hand, labeling as imperialistic the U.S. invasions and subsequent occupations of Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua in the earlier part of the 20th century is debatable given that there was never an expressed intention by U.S. government officials to hold on to these countries indefinitely.  In fact, the delays in quickly restoring sovereignty was often because U.S. efforts to implement “reforms” and make a hasty exit was complicated by the fierce, armed resistance that arose to American occupation.
This work utilizes four case studies to test whether there has indeed been a decline in United States hegemony in the Western Hemisphere since the January 2001 inauguration of George W. Bush.  These include the inter-American system centered on the Organization of America States, the Free Trade Area of the Americas, the Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas, and the expanding role of China as a major trade and investment rival to the United States in Latin America and the Caribbean.  In addition, the book also examines other illustrative foreign policy initiatives under Bush and Obama to support or debunk the notion that there has been a decline in U.S. hegemony.  In particular, the book examines:  (1) Plan Colombia; (2) the Merida Initiative; (3) the Central American Regional Security Initiative (including the subsequent Alliance for Prosperity of the Northern Triangle of Central America); (4) the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative; (5) Pathways to Prosperity; (6) 100,000 Strong in the Americas; and, (7) the re-establishment of normal U.S. diplomatic relations with Cuba.



Mais um pouco: 

ACKNOWLEDMENTS

            I deeply appreciate the encouragement that my colleagues and friends Annette Hester, Robin King, Barbara Kotschwar, and Carol Wise have extended to me over the years in our mutual quest to create a more economically integrated Western Hemisphere rooted in equity, as well as the intellectual support of decades from Cathy Schneider in deepening my understanding of Latin American politics.  I am indebted to Jane Kamide as well, whose retirement offered me the opportunity to get an inside view of how U.S. foreign policy is formulated and implemented while serving as Chair of the Western Hemisphere Area Studies program at the U.S. State Department’s Foreign Service Institute between 2011 and 2016.  I am also grateful to Stanford University and the trust it has put in me since 2007 to educate its students, and the access it has provided me to its rich archival and book collections as well data banks and electronic resources that facilitated writing this book.  I especially want to thank the following Stanford University faculty and staff:  Rodolfo Dirzo, Herbert Klein, Ivan Jaksic, Adrienne Jamieson, Julie Kennedy, Lynn Orr, Ken Schultz, Stephen Stedman, Megan Gorman, and Elizabeth Sáenz-Ackermann.  Finally, I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the anonymous reviewer at the Middle Atlantic Council of Latin American Studies (MACLAS) journal, Latin American Essays, who faulted an article I had submitted for publication some years ago for not including a discussion of the different theories of hegemony.  Although this omission did not prevent the article from being published, it did serve as the catalyst for me to eventually write this book to remedy that oversight.

Vamos ver se consigo trazê-lo durante o ano...

Paulo Roberto de Almeida