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Mostrando postagens com marcador War in Ukraine. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador War in Ukraine. Mostrar todas as postagens

domingo, 9 de outubro de 2022

The War in Ukraine Launches a New Battle for the Russian Soul - Masha Gessen (New Yorker)

 

The War in Ukraine Launches a New Battle for the Russian Soul

The last time people were writing in Russian so urgently was in the late nineteen-eighties, when Soviet citizens were confronted with the terror of the Stalinist past.

By Masha Gessen

The New Yorker, October 17, 2022 Issue

 

Russia says that it has expanded. On September 30th, President Vladimir Putin signed a document that ostensibly accepted four Ukrainian regions as members of the Russian Federation. The residents of those regions, Putin said in a speech, “have become our citizens forever.” He made this assertion as the Ukrainian Army was liberating territory to which Russia was laying claim. He was not just trying to snatch propaganda victory from the jaws of evident military defeat; he was laying the groundwork for fighting for those lands ever more aggressively. A week and a half earlier, he had ordered the military to draft hundreds of thousands of new soldiers, and had threatened to use nuclear weapons.

A Russia that includes parts, or all, of Ukraine and untold other lands is the Russian World, a vague and expansive idea pioneered by the self-styled philosopher Aleksandr Dugin, some of whose ideas have been adopted by the Kremlin. In August, his thirty-two-year-old daughter, Darya, also an imperialist pundit, was killed by a car bomb that may have been intended for him. Last week, the Times reported that U.S. intelligence believes a part of the Ukrainian government may have been behind the attack. If true, this suggests that the government puts strong, probably unfounded, faith in the power of the concept of the Russian World.

Putin, in his speech, described both the Russian World and the larger world as he sees it. According to him, the West destroyed the Soviet Union in 1991, but Russia came back, defiant and strong. Now the West wants to destroy Russia. “They see our thought and our philosophy as a direct threat,” he said. “That is why they target our philosophers for murder.” The ultimate goal of the West—specifically, the United States and Great Britain—is to subjugate people around the world and force them to give up traditional values, to have “ ‘parent No. 1,’ ‘parent No. 2,’ and ‘parent No. 3’ instead of mother and father (they have completely lost it!),” and to teach schoolchildren that “there are some other genders besides men and women and offer them sex-change operations.” Putin has said, repeatedly, that only Russia can save the world from this menace. This is the story of a world in which his war in Ukraine—and the draft, and even, perhaps, a nuclear strike—makes sense.

But when the world shaped by the feedback loop of propaganda collides with the world of facts on the ground, things begin to crack. On October 5th, two videos circulated widely on Russian-language social media, including in normally pro-war quarters. The videos show a crowd of men in uniform. They say that there are five hundred of them and that they were recently drafted. They complain of “animal-like” conditions, of having to buy their own food and bulletproof vests, and of a lack of organization. “We are not registered as part of any detachment,” one man says. “We have weapons, but these are not officially issued to us.” Meanwhile, some Russian television propagandists have been acknowledging Ukrainian victories, and urging Russians to prepare for a long wait before their country can attack again.

It’s too early to make assumptions about where these tiny cracks may lead. It is not too early, however, to think about what a future, militarily defeated Russia might look like. This is what Alexey Navalny, the opposition politician who has been in prison since January, 2021, has been doing. The Washington Post recently published an op-ed, smuggled out by Navalny’s legal team, in which he writes that Russia deserves to lose the war and that, once it does, it must be reconstituted as a parliamentary, rather than a Presidential, republic. This, he argues, will insure that no one person can usurp power in Russia as Putin has.

Navalny’s op-ed serves to illustrate Putin’s wisdom, of sorts—the wisdom of keeping his most important political opponent behind bars. Navalny seems to have missed a cultural turning point. In the seven and a half months since Russia launched its full-scale invasion, hundreds of thousands of Russians have left their country. Many of them are journalists, writers, poets, or artists, and they, along with some who are still in Russia, have been producing essays, poems, Facebook posts, and podcasts trying to grapple with the condition of being citizens of a country waging a genocidal colonial war. Some of their Ukrainian counterparts have scoffed at their soul-searching. Ukrainians, indeed, have bigger and more immediate problems. But they also have certainty—they know who they are in the world, while for Russians nothing is as it once seemed to be.

One of the earliest examples of this outpouring was a poem, by the children’s-book author Alexey Oleynikov, about the incongruity of trying to flee Russia with a pet hedgehog in tow. One stanza reads, “We will not wash the shame off until our old age, until we die / There have been worse times, but there has never been a more ridiculous time.” Posted on Facebook, the poem went viral in March. May’s viral poem, by the actress and poet Zhenya Berkovich, tells of a young Russian man visited by the ghost of his grandfather, who fought in the Second World War; the ghost asks his grandson to forget him, lest the memory of his valor be used to justify the current war. This month’s viral poem, by Eli Bar-Yahalom, an Israeli Russian, is a dialogue between God and a Muscovite who hopes to return home someday. “There is no resurrecting Bucha, no raising up Irpin,” God says, referring to suburbs of Kyiv where Russians appear to have committed war crimes. There are also at least two Russian-language podcasts devoted to the issues of individual and collective responsibility for the war. And Linor Goralik, an acclaimed Russian writer born in Ukraine and living in Israel, has founded an online journal called roar (Russian Oppositional Arts Review), which has published three packed issues.

The last time people were writing in Russian so urgently was in the late nineteen-eighties. Soviet citizens back then had been confronted with their past—the Stalinist terror. That moment gave Russia, among other things, Memorial, the human-rights organization that, along with Ukrainian and Belarusian activists, won the Nobel Peace Prize last week. Now Russian citizens are being confronted with their present. The writers in exile have physically fled their country (as has much of Memorial’s leadership) and are trying to write their way to a new Russia. Their imagination extends far beyond the Russian constitution to a world that’s radically different, and better than not only Putin’s revanchist Russian World but the world we currently inhabit. ♦


Published in the print edition of the October 17, 2022, issue, with the headline “Different Worlds.”

 

 

domingo, 24 de julho de 2022

War in Ukraine: the big difference brought by HIMARS - Max Khusid (Medium)

 War in Ukraine, July 19 Update

Max Khusid

Medium, July 20, 2022

https://medium.com/@maxkhusid/war-in-ukraine-july-19-update-450de511f52b

Meanwhile on the Battlefield

HIMARS

You probably heard that new word by now, HIMARS. Here’s the best chart I found that summarizes what it is.

The United States supplied 12 of these systems to the Ukrainian Armed Forces as of today. Each one costs about $5.6 million (i.e. ~$70 million in total) and according to Wikipedia, a total of 540 were built. So the US sent 12/540 = 2% of the world’s capacity of HIMARS to Ukraine. A drop in the bucket.

But.. just like with the first delivery of Javelins. Once the Ukrainians proved the effectiveness of Javelins to the US (and made one of the best commercials for it), the US was willing to supply more of them, a lot more.

So, hopefully, the same happens with HIMARS. One thing fis or sure, the manufacturer of HIMARS signed a lot of contracts for these systems, **after** the Ukranians proved to the world how effective the systems were. So, if I’d be the US, I’d keep supplying them to Ukraine, marketing money well spent.

Why are they needed, and are they effective? Let’s look at the map from the DeepState website:

These maps show the range of HIMARS supplied to Ukraine with pretty basic M31A1 ammunition (HIMARS has a great range of ammunition it can take). The map shows that Ukraine can reach almost the entire territory of the Russian-occupied Donbas with the HIMARS artillery. Russians have no escape!

or this one. Dear Russians, would you like to hide from HIMARS in Mariupol, by the Black Sea?

maybe not. What about Melitopol? Would you like to store your ammunition there? Melitopol which happens to be the key railway and road junction in that part of Ukraine. Great place for a large Russian military base and munitions depot, right?

Oops, maybe not! HIMARS can get you there as well. Oh, well, maybe Kherson? There must be a place where the Russians can hide, right?

Nope, not in Kherson either. HIMARS will make you explode here too. Better go back to Russia, HIMARS won’t get you there.

And that’s why HIMARS became so critical in this war, and that’s why Russians have no answer to it.

The Ukrainians have been attacking Russian command centers, supply depots, and high-value military targets (like Russian air bases or anti-aircraft batteries) relentlessly!

Plus, they’ve been trained to use HIMARS in very innovative and effective ways:

  • use them at night so that Russians can’t detect them easily (poor Russians don’t have enough drones esp. with night vision capabilities)
  • fire a few HIMARS rockets at the Russian anti-missile S-300 installations to distract them
  • When the S-300 hits the limit in the number of HIMARS rockets it can track, hit them with a few more and knock the S-300 out (e.g. if S-300 can track 6 rockets at a time, hit them with 7)
  • Once the S-300 is knocked out, attack the ammunition depot or a Russian army command post where the generals meet every day at 6 pm.

I don’t want to say Russians are f*cked, but they are. As long as we, the US, can supply the Ukrainians with enough ammunition for HIMARS and send maybe another 50 units (out of 540, I think we can handle it).

Look at this July 4th map. All of these red and yellow dots show recent explosions on the battlefield. There are more of these explosions on the Russian-occupied side of the map than on the Ukrainian.

or another one in the Donbas area. HIMARS reach far into the Russian-occupied territory so that the Russians don’t feel safe there. Ukraine drones harass them at the front line, while HIMARS harass them deep in their rear.

Have a good night, dear Russian occupiers! Sleep tight!

NATO Training Ukrainians Troops

Another development away from the battlefield, but I think it will seriously impact the battlefield.

Some of us remember how the Russians attacked several military bases in Western Ukraine near Lviv at the beginning of the war. These missile strikes attacked Ukrainian training centers where NATO instructors were training the Ukrainians. A big problem, of course. Solution? Train the Ukrainian forces on the territories Russian can’t attack.

Like the UK, for example, in Wales somewhere. According to this video, the UK has committed to training 10,000 Ukrainian troops every 6 months and can do more if required. 10,000 troops is significant.

I believe I saw somewhere that the Dutch are taking on another 10,000, but can’t find the source right now.

And is it working? The DOD says it does. The DOD poured billions to rearm the Afghan army and, in the end, concluded that the Afghan army had “no will to fight” and use the US-supplied weapons effectively. The Ukrainians are different. They have not only the “will” to fight but *the hunger* to fight. This training is put to good use.

Plenty of similar stories all point to NATO’s commitment to build and rebuild the Ukrainian army in places the Russians can’t get in the way.

From the large-scale war point of view, this is an unwinnable situation for Russia. NATO is training tens of thousands of Ukrainian troops, and the Russians can’t do anything about it. NATO can supply the Ukrainian army unimpeded, and the Russians can do nothing about it.

Meanwhile, Slovakia, Poland, Lithuania, and many others take the damaged Ukrainian military equipment, fix it up on their territory, in their workshops, and send it back to the front. Poland and the Czech Republic (I believe) combined their efforts, took a bunch of the old Soviet tanks, refitted them with modern armor, weapons, and communications, and sent them to Donbas to fight the Russians. Who made that possible? The US promised (and already delivered!!) our M1 Abrams tanks to Poland to replace the T-72s they sent to Ukraine. Keep them coming.

FINAL THOUGHTS, WHERE IS THIS GOING?

I can talk about the latest at Severodonets and Lisichyansk. And maybe I will in the next report. I think both for the Ukrainians are tactical losses but strategic wins.

Why do I say that? Because, yes, clearly, Ukraine lost some of its territories in the battle of Severodonetsk, so it’s a tactical loss considering how small the area of battle is (thus, “tactical”). However, it’s a strategic win because it took the Russians **months** to occupy 40 by 40 km territory and lose thousands of its best troops in the process. Ukrainians proved that they can maul Russians like no tomorrow, at a rate that Russians can’t replace their losses. Despite Russian complete dominance in artillery, air force, and armor. This battle proves that this war is unwinnable for the Russians.

Now, where is this all going?

Let’s think of a couple of historical examples. The Russian Empire lost to Imperial Japan in 1905. That loss led to 1905 uprisings all over Russia, the rise of the Socialist and Communist popularity and the eventual demise of the Russian Empire in 1917.

The Winter War against Finland in 1940 turned out to be a Soviet pyrrhic “victory” that eventually led to the Russians leaving Finland alone for over 70 years. Yes, Finland lost some territory to the Russians, but the Russians didn’t forget the HIGH price they had to pay for that territory and haven’t been threatening Finland (or meddling in its internal affairs) from 1945 until 2022.

So these are some of the possible scenarios. Both of them are probably acceptable to Ukraine, at least in the short term.

Finally, two more, more recent examples. Russian attack to take Kyiv and Snake Island. What was interesting in both is that the Ukrainians didn’t actually win both battles clearly. The Ukrainian army just made the cost of occupation unbearable to the Russians.

In Kyiv, the Ukrainian army continuously harassed Russian supply columns and constantly attacked them with drones and artillery. Russians were losing troops and not gaining much for their losses. So Russians simply gave up and withdrew.

What about Snake Island? Russians put up a good effort to take the island (extremely important from the strategic point of view as it effectively land-locks Ukraine). Yet, when the Ukrainian army made it super difficult for them to be there (again, constant bombardments, harassments, losses in men and vehicles), the Russians finally said “please, no more” and unexpectedly left.

To me, these two examples point to what will happen. At least I hope so. Ukrainian Army doesn't have to win this war on the battlefield. It doesn’t have to win in the open field. Let’s be honest, it probably can’t. The Ukrainian Army can simply make the Russian occupying forces’ lives a complete Hell. Just like in Kyiv, just like on Snake Island.

And that means that this war still has a good chance of ending soon. Some say it will take years. I don’t think so. Russians have no will to fight. They have no business in Ukraine. No ideology to continue fighting this war. The “mighty” Russian army might collapse sooner than we think.