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Mostrando postagens com marcador Max Khusid. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador Max Khusid. Mostrar todas as postagens

domingo, 24 de julho de 2022

War in Ukraine: the big difference brought by HIMARS - Max Khusid (Medium)

 War in Ukraine, July 19 Update

Max Khusid

Medium, July 20, 2022

https://medium.com/@maxkhusid/war-in-ukraine-july-19-update-450de511f52b

Meanwhile on the Battlefield

HIMARS

You probably heard that new word by now, HIMARS. Here’s the best chart I found that summarizes what it is.

The United States supplied 12 of these systems to the Ukrainian Armed Forces as of today. Each one costs about $5.6 million (i.e. ~$70 million in total) and according to Wikipedia, a total of 540 were built. So the US sent 12/540 = 2% of the world’s capacity of HIMARS to Ukraine. A drop in the bucket.

But.. just like with the first delivery of Javelins. Once the Ukrainians proved the effectiveness of Javelins to the US (and made one of the best commercials for it), the US was willing to supply more of them, a lot more.

So, hopefully, the same happens with HIMARS. One thing fis or sure, the manufacturer of HIMARS signed a lot of contracts for these systems, **after** the Ukranians proved to the world how effective the systems were. So, if I’d be the US, I’d keep supplying them to Ukraine, marketing money well spent.

Why are they needed, and are they effective? Let’s look at the map from the DeepState website:

These maps show the range of HIMARS supplied to Ukraine with pretty basic M31A1 ammunition (HIMARS has a great range of ammunition it can take). The map shows that Ukraine can reach almost the entire territory of the Russian-occupied Donbas with the HIMARS artillery. Russians have no escape!

or this one. Dear Russians, would you like to hide from HIMARS in Mariupol, by the Black Sea?

maybe not. What about Melitopol? Would you like to store your ammunition there? Melitopol which happens to be the key railway and road junction in that part of Ukraine. Great place for a large Russian military base and munitions depot, right?

Oops, maybe not! HIMARS can get you there as well. Oh, well, maybe Kherson? There must be a place where the Russians can hide, right?

Nope, not in Kherson either. HIMARS will make you explode here too. Better go back to Russia, HIMARS won’t get you there.

And that’s why HIMARS became so critical in this war, and that’s why Russians have no answer to it.

The Ukrainians have been attacking Russian command centers, supply depots, and high-value military targets (like Russian air bases or anti-aircraft batteries) relentlessly!

Plus, they’ve been trained to use HIMARS in very innovative and effective ways:

  • use them at night so that Russians can’t detect them easily (poor Russians don’t have enough drones esp. with night vision capabilities)
  • fire a few HIMARS rockets at the Russian anti-missile S-300 installations to distract them
  • When the S-300 hits the limit in the number of HIMARS rockets it can track, hit them with a few more and knock the S-300 out (e.g. if S-300 can track 6 rockets at a time, hit them with 7)
  • Once the S-300 is knocked out, attack the ammunition depot or a Russian army command post where the generals meet every day at 6 pm.

I don’t want to say Russians are f*cked, but they are. As long as we, the US, can supply the Ukrainians with enough ammunition for HIMARS and send maybe another 50 units (out of 540, I think we can handle it).

Look at this July 4th map. All of these red and yellow dots show recent explosions on the battlefield. There are more of these explosions on the Russian-occupied side of the map than on the Ukrainian.

or another one in the Donbas area. HIMARS reach far into the Russian-occupied territory so that the Russians don’t feel safe there. Ukraine drones harass them at the front line, while HIMARS harass them deep in their rear.

Have a good night, dear Russian occupiers! Sleep tight!

NATO Training Ukrainians Troops

Another development away from the battlefield, but I think it will seriously impact the battlefield.

Some of us remember how the Russians attacked several military bases in Western Ukraine near Lviv at the beginning of the war. These missile strikes attacked Ukrainian training centers where NATO instructors were training the Ukrainians. A big problem, of course. Solution? Train the Ukrainian forces on the territories Russian can’t attack.

Like the UK, for example, in Wales somewhere. According to this video, the UK has committed to training 10,000 Ukrainian troops every 6 months and can do more if required. 10,000 troops is significant.

I believe I saw somewhere that the Dutch are taking on another 10,000, but can’t find the source right now.

And is it working? The DOD says it does. The DOD poured billions to rearm the Afghan army and, in the end, concluded that the Afghan army had “no will to fight” and use the US-supplied weapons effectively. The Ukrainians are different. They have not only the “will” to fight but *the hunger* to fight. This training is put to good use.

Plenty of similar stories all point to NATO’s commitment to build and rebuild the Ukrainian army in places the Russians can’t get in the way.

From the large-scale war point of view, this is an unwinnable situation for Russia. NATO is training tens of thousands of Ukrainian troops, and the Russians can’t do anything about it. NATO can supply the Ukrainian army unimpeded, and the Russians can do nothing about it.

Meanwhile, Slovakia, Poland, Lithuania, and many others take the damaged Ukrainian military equipment, fix it up on their territory, in their workshops, and send it back to the front. Poland and the Czech Republic (I believe) combined their efforts, took a bunch of the old Soviet tanks, refitted them with modern armor, weapons, and communications, and sent them to Donbas to fight the Russians. Who made that possible? The US promised (and already delivered!!) our M1 Abrams tanks to Poland to replace the T-72s they sent to Ukraine. Keep them coming.

FINAL THOUGHTS, WHERE IS THIS GOING?

I can talk about the latest at Severodonets and Lisichyansk. And maybe I will in the next report. I think both for the Ukrainians are tactical losses but strategic wins.

Why do I say that? Because, yes, clearly, Ukraine lost some of its territories in the battle of Severodonetsk, so it’s a tactical loss considering how small the area of battle is (thus, “tactical”). However, it’s a strategic win because it took the Russians **months** to occupy 40 by 40 km territory and lose thousands of its best troops in the process. Ukrainians proved that they can maul Russians like no tomorrow, at a rate that Russians can’t replace their losses. Despite Russian complete dominance in artillery, air force, and armor. This battle proves that this war is unwinnable for the Russians.

Now, where is this all going?

Let’s think of a couple of historical examples. The Russian Empire lost to Imperial Japan in 1905. That loss led to 1905 uprisings all over Russia, the rise of the Socialist and Communist popularity and the eventual demise of the Russian Empire in 1917.

The Winter War against Finland in 1940 turned out to be a Soviet pyrrhic “victory” that eventually led to the Russians leaving Finland alone for over 70 years. Yes, Finland lost some territory to the Russians, but the Russians didn’t forget the HIGH price they had to pay for that territory and haven’t been threatening Finland (or meddling in its internal affairs) from 1945 until 2022.

So these are some of the possible scenarios. Both of them are probably acceptable to Ukraine, at least in the short term.

Finally, two more, more recent examples. Russian attack to take Kyiv and Snake Island. What was interesting in both is that the Ukrainians didn’t actually win both battles clearly. The Ukrainian army just made the cost of occupation unbearable to the Russians.

In Kyiv, the Ukrainian army continuously harassed Russian supply columns and constantly attacked them with drones and artillery. Russians were losing troops and not gaining much for their losses. So Russians simply gave up and withdrew.

What about Snake Island? Russians put up a good effort to take the island (extremely important from the strategic point of view as it effectively land-locks Ukraine). Yet, when the Ukrainian army made it super difficult for them to be there (again, constant bombardments, harassments, losses in men and vehicles), the Russians finally said “please, no more” and unexpectedly left.

To me, these two examples point to what will happen. At least I hope so. Ukrainian Army doesn't have to win this war on the battlefield. It doesn’t have to win in the open field. Let’s be honest, it probably can’t. The Ukrainian Army can simply make the Russian occupying forces’ lives a complete Hell. Just like in Kyiv, just like on Snake Island.

And that means that this war still has a good chance of ending soon. Some say it will take years. I don’t think so. Russians have no will to fight. They have no business in Ukraine. No ideology to continue fighting this war. The “mighty” Russian army might collapse sooner than we think.