O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida;

Meu Twitter: https://twitter.com/PauloAlmeida53

Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/paulobooks

Mostrando postagens com marcador recuperacao. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador recuperacao. Mostrar todas as postagens

terça-feira, 18 de junho de 2013

Alemanha, 1948: o inicio da recuperacao economica - Ludwig Erhard


How the Revival of Postwar Germany Began


DESCRIPTION
Bruce Bartlett held senior policy roles in the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations and served on the staffs of Representatives Jack Kemp and Ron Paul. He is the author of “The Benefit and the Burden: Tax Reform – Why We Need It and What It Will Take.”
Sixty-five years ago this week, in June 1948, a remarkable economic transformation took place in Germany. Almost overnight, the economy went from stagnation to revival. Most of the credit goes to the German economist Ludwig Erhard.
Ludwig Erhard in 1963.
ReutersLudwig Erhard in 1963.
TODAY’S ECONOMIST
Perspectives from expert contributors.
In 1948, the German economy was a basket case, not merely because of the damage from war but because economic policy was thoroughly confused. Some in the West, including the United States Treasury secretary, Henry Morgenthau, thought Germany’s industrial capacity should becompletely dismantled to prevent it from ever again becoming a military threat.
This was a minority point of view, however. The rising Soviet threat overwhelmed any desire for vengeance against Germany and required that it be built up as quickly as possible. The big problem was that Germany was divided into four occupation zones after the war, one each controlled by Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the United States.
Action required agreement among the four powers, which was difficult not only because of Soviet intransigence. In 1945, Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Britain’s Conservative Party had lost his position to Clement Attlee of the Labor Party, who quickly moved to nationalize industry in Britain and adopt other socialist policies. Some new British leaders wanted their socialist ideas implemented in Germany as well.
Thus there were political, ideological and diplomatic divisions among the allies that prevented action in Germany, with economic policy remaining on automatic pilot. Ironically, this led to the continuation of Nazi economic controls, because there was no agreement on what should replace them.
In 1947, the United States and Britain decided to unify the administration of their occupation zones into an area called Bizonia. Mr. Erhard, a respected German business economist from Bavaria, was named economic minister.
In 1948, Britain, France and the United States agreed to end their occupation and establish an independent German state with or without inclusion of the Soviet zone. The handover of power was set to begin on June 15, thus setting up a confrontation with the Soviets.
As soon as German economic autonomy was restored, Mr. Erhard wanted to institute sweeping economic reforms, especially currency reform. Because of inflation, the Germany currency was virtually worthless and the economy largely functioned on barter, which was extremely inefficient and severely hindered the growth of industry.
Introduction of a new German mark was set for June 20, 1948. As word of the currency reform leaked out, stores closed until the effects of the new currency could be determined. Simultaneously, the Soviets cut off supplies for Berlin, which was deep in their zone of occupation but administered jointly by the four powers. The Western powers responded by airlifting supplies to the city, the beginning of the famous Berlin Airlift, one of the most dramatic events in postwar history.
A key part of Mr. Erhard’s plan was the elimination of price controls, which was essential for the currency reform to be effective. He needed permission from the allies to change any of the price controls, but Mr. Erhard concluded that he did not need their consent to simply abolish them. As he wrote in his 1958 book “Prosperity Through Competition”:
It was strictly laid down by the British and American control authorities that permission had to be obtained before any definite price changes could be made. The Allies never seemed to have thought it possible that someone could have the idea, not to alter price controls, but simply to remove them.
Gen. Lucius D. Clay, the United States commander in Germany, was well aware of what Mr. Erhard was up to and could have stopped him. But General Clay’s personal economic adviser, the American businessman Joseph Dodge, urged him not to and the general wisely followed his advice, turning a blind eye to Mr. Erhard’s actions. (Mr. Dodge, an extraordinarily important but virtually unknown figure in postwar economic policy, also played a key role inadvising Gen. Douglas MacArthur, the United States commander in Japan, on reforming its economy as well.)
Mr. Erhard instituted many other reforms as well, including a 33 percent cut in income taxes. On June 26, the French, British and American authorities ratified Mr. Erhard’s actions. This led the Soviets to tighten the isolation of Berlin, creating a severe political and economic crisis. The allied airlift quickly ratcheted up. By July 4, 362 American and British planes brought 3,000 tons of food into the city in a single day, an amazing accomplishment given the limited landing and takeoff facilities in Berlin.
By August, the Communists were organizing demonstrations against Mr. Erhard and his reforms, but General Clay stood behind him. Fortunately, tangible signs of economic recovery were becoming evident. Rationing was ended completely in September. In October, a bumper crop of potatoes was cheered, with production up 60 percent over 1947.
By November, it was clearly apparent that the western zone of Germany was taking off, economically, leaving the eastern zone, still under Soviet control, behind. According to an article in The New York Times, industrial production was “far better than even the most optimistic economic planners envisaged when currency reform went into effect.”
The strong economic growth in the west was a major factor leading the Soviet Union to call off its blockade of Berlin on May 12, 1949, and the airlift ended.
A year after the Erhard reforms, they were generally viewed as an unqualified success. C.L. Sulzberger of The New York Times interviewed Mr. Erhard in July 1949 and he pointed with pride to the fact that the quality of German goods was rising, prices were falling and the standard of living was improving. On July 20, Mr. Sulzberger wrote, “Germany is coming back.”
The West German economy continued to expand, aided by the Marshall Plan, and Mr. Erhard remained as the nation’s economics minister until 1963, when he became West Germany’s second chancellor. He died in 1977.

quinta-feira, 14 de julho de 2011

Um importante alerta do economista Robert Lucas sobre a "retomada" americana

Os EUA estão ficando cada vez mais parecidos com a Europa, graças à Obamanomics, diz este prêmio Nobel de economia, Robert Lucas. Concordo.
Quando o Estado investe em mais welfare, em lugar de laissez-faire, a tendência é mais distributivismo e menos produtivismo. Ou seja, menor crescimento da produtividade e da inovação, e mais lazer e prazeres para todos.
Vão caminhar para menos riquezas e cada vez mais déficits públicos.
Em outros termos, para satisfazer os desejos de consumo da atual geração, vão sacrificar as perspectivas de bem-estar das gerações futuras, que deverão ser convidadas a pagar a conta.
Convidadas não é bem o termo: serão obrigadas a fazê-lo...
Bem, sempre tem chineses milionários dispostos a financiar esse desperdício.
O único problema será a obrigação de trabalhar para os chineses no futuro.
Nada que os chineses também não tenham feito em favor dos ocidentais durante dois séculos.
Assim vai o mundo...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

The Disappearing Recovery
By DANIEL HENNINGER
The Wall Street Journal, JULY 13, 2011, 7:28 P.M. ET

What if the weak recovery is all the recovery we are going to get?

Barack Obama, John Boehner and Mitch McConnell have been performing an intricate scorpion dance over spending, taxes and the debt ceiling, premised on the belief that this is the deal that would ignite the recovery.

But what if it's too late? What if that first-quarter growth rate of 1.8% is a portent of the U.S.'s long-term future? What if below-normal U.S. GDP is, as the Obama folks like to say, the new normal?

Robert Lucas, the 1995 Nobel laureate in economics, has spent his career thinking about why economies grow, and in particular about the effect of policy making on growth. From his office at the University of Chicago, Prof. Lucas has been wondering, like the rest of us, why, if the recession officially ended in the first half of 2009, there hasn't been more growth in the U.S. economy. He's also been wondering why this delayed recovery resembles the long non-recovery years of the 1930s. And he has been thinking about the U.S. and Europe.

What if the weak recovery is all the recovery we are going to get?

In May, Bob Lucas pulled his thoughts together and delivered them as the Milliman Lecture at the University of Washington, an exercise he described to me this week as "intelligent speculation."

Here is the lecture's provocative final thought: "Is it possible that by imitating European policies on labor markets, welfare and taxes, the U.S. has chosen a new, lower GDP trend? If so, it may be that the weak recovery we have had so far is all the recovery we will get."

The Obama-will-turn-us-into-Europe argument is a staple of the administration's critics. Prof. Lucas's intelligent speculation, however, carries the case beyond dinner-party carping.

The baseline reality for any discussion of where we're headed is that from 1870 to 2008, the U.S. economy has had average GDP productivity growth of about 3% and about 2% on a per-person basis. Despite displacements—wars, depressions—we've always returned to this solid upward trend. From 1870 till recently, real income per person has increased by a factor of 12—"an ongoing miracle," Prof. Lucas notes, "mainly due to free-market capitalism."

The Obama economists like to argue that this recession was the greatest meltdown since the Depression. Prof. Lucas agrees. Most recessions, he says, are not very important events. This one, though, has taken U.S. GDP almost 10% off its long-term growth trend. The only downturn comparable to this in the past century is the more than 30% decline during the Depression.

What discomfits him is the similarities in the policy choices that accompanied both delayed recoveries. By 1934, the Depression's banking crisis had been resolved, "yet full recovery was still seven years away," he said in the Milliman lecture. GDP stayed more than 10% below trend. "Why?" The answer, he says, was growth-suppressing policies, such as the Smoot-Hawley tariff, cartelization, unionization and, "most important but hardest to measure, FDR's demonization of business."

By the end of 2008, he notes, the primary storm of the financial panic was essentially over. We did get spending declines in GDP in that year's last quarter and in the first quarter of 2009. "But there is a world of difference," he says, "between two quarters of production declines and four years!" The persistence of growth 10 percentage points below its long-term trend line is troubling.

He credits the current Federal Reserve with avoiding the mistakes of the Depression, properly acting this time as the lender of last resort. With the financial side essentially in order and the recovery stalled, Prof. Lucas sees public-policy analogies to the 1930s: "The likelihood of much higher taxes, focused on 'the rich'; medical legislation that promises a large increase in the role of government; financial legislation that assigns vast, poorly defined responsibilities to the Fed and others."

The consensus assumption, however, is that the U.S. economy will return to its century-long growth trend. Prof. Lucas asks: "Is this really the case?"

Forgotten in most discussions of the U.S.-Europe comparison is that for the first 70 years of the 20th century, continental Europe's growth rose alongside that of the world-leading U.S. and U.K., especially after World War II. Through the 1960s, he says, there was every reason to expect a common, high living standard for all of us. Then, "in the 1970s, their catch-up stalled."

A 20% to 40% gap in income levels emerged between the U.S. and Europe, reflecting a lowered European work effort. In Prof. Lucas's view, that gap represents the cost (largely taxes) of financing a larger welfare state from 1970 onward. Other economists, he says, have cited a 30% loss in GDP per person in Western Europe since the 1970s.

The U.S.'s projected long-term welfare costs, including the new health-care law, are the justification the Obama economists give for pushing spending to 25% or more of GDP. The tax increase the president is fairly shrieking for this week isn't for the August debt limit. It's for the next 25 years.

"If we're going to move to a European welfare state," says Prof. Lucas, "we're going to have to pay a European price." And that price could be a permanently lower level of GDP per person. The U.S.'s amazing 100-year ride would slow.

Among the many things any such drop in GDP will siphon away is America's relentless productive vitality. "So much new happens in the United States," Prof. Lucas says. But will it still?

Write to henninger@wsj.com