O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida.

terça-feira, 27 de junho de 2023

The West must prepare for a long overdue reckoning - Chandran Nair (The National Interest)

The West must prepare for a long overdue reckoning

The National Interest June 8, 2023

https://johnmenadue.com/the-west-must-prepare-for-a-long-overdue-reckoning/

Five major trends illustrate how the world is changing, and that the West must grapple with the reality that it can no longer impose its “leadership” on the world as it once did.

The post-Western, multipolar international order is coming to pass. As the world grapples with the implications of this shift in power, the foundations of a great reckoning are taking shape. This reckoning will challenge the long-held beliefs and structures that have sustained Western dominance of the world for the past few hundred years, exposing along the way the nature of the West’s perceived entitlement to lead the global pecking order. The end result will be a significant re-evaluation of international relations as we know it.

This great reckoning will be driven by five major trends, which are compelling Western nations to confront and adapt to a future where power must be shared with the rest in a multipolar world. A failure to recognise, or attempting to strongly resist, these trends could pose significant risks not only to the West itself but also to global stability. Yet future conflicts can be avoided if this period of change is viewed as an opportunity to build a more equitable world, rather than as a crisis that threatens preferred and entrenched privileges.

Five trends to consider

What future awaits the West—a smooth transition toward multipolarity or a period of instability and potential conflict—will largely depend on how policymakers respond to the following five trends.

First is the unravelling of the hitherto telling of history. The West, across its colonial history, has practiced and perfected the selective interpretation and telling of events, choosing to portray itself as the originator of modern civilisation and a benevolent guiding force. This is now changing; information technologies, such as the Internet and social media, have broken the monopoly over information and history once held by Western gatekeeping institutions (media companies, universities, book publishers, and more). As a consequence, people around the world are recognising that history is no longer confined to Western interpretation—including its projection of benevolence.

A significant component of this has been the West’s frequent failure to acknowledge its own imperfect past. Despite amplifying the perceived wrongdoings of others, it has been silent about its own unsavoury moments, such as early American pioneers’ destruction of First Nation cultures, European exploitation of the African continent, or Australia’s treatment of aboriginal peoples. Addressing these historical episodes matters all the more because they affect current behaviour; Western nations also have problems admitting to contemporary mistakes and intentions.

Non-Western nations can now make clear that their own countries and communities have long histories that not only exist despite Western interpretation, but these histories need to be explored, understood, and told. The West must grapple with this trend and its implications, rather than continue to obscure it in denial. Consider the ongoing diplomatic efforts of the Indian government to compel Great Britain to return the treasure stolen from India, including some of the crown jewels.

The second trend is the re-evaluation of the” rules-based” international order. Policymakers in Washington may not like hearing it, but the concept is the subject of much derision around the world and is widely regarded as a tool used by the West to control global affairs and maintain hegemony. There is ample resentment growing against Western nations given the repeated breaching of their own rules, meaning that the legitimacy of this order is being questioned despite its positive aspects.

Coinciding with this growing frustration is the reality that the distribution of power across more nations is transforming the current world order and creating new opportunities and challenges. China has assumed a more prominent position, offering global public goods such as peacemaking and addressing climate change in a manner Western nations are not willing, or able, to do. Similarly, India is beginning to assert itself, as are other smaller nations, like the UAE and Indonesia.

As more countries determine their own trajectories in the twenty-first century, the West must recognise that the international balance of power has shifted. It cannot continue to impose its will on others—the rise of China and other nations is evidence of such. The West must come to terms with this new reality and recognise that a new, more pragmatic, and multipolar approach is needed, where nations pursue foreign policies committed to co-existence, driven by their own best interests rather than aligning themselves with “one side” or the other.

Third is the unmasking of Western “peacekeeping.” Despite portraying itself as the guarantor of global security, much of the world now views the United States‚ and Europe to a lesser extent, as profiting from war rather than being interested in promoting authentic peace. The Western military-industrial complex—particularly the United States’—is so powerful that it is now well-known to drive U.S. foreign policy to the extent that it perpetuates conflicts to thus profit from war.

At present, the United States and its NATO allies are driving the rise in global military spending, with America spending more on defence than the next ten countries combined. It is similarly well known that almost half of the Pentagon’s budget goes to private contractors each year, and the military-industrial complex donates millions of dollars to U.S. Congressional races, resulting in state capture and significant increases in defence budgets.

The rest of the world has realised that the West alone cannot be trusted to lead global peace efforts, especially if a significant portion of their economies are geared to profit from conflict. In light of this, a positive change is occurring, with China brokering ground-breaking peace agreements—between Saudi Arabia and Iran, for example—while world leaders like Indonesia’s Joko Widodo, India’s Narendra Modi, and Brazil’s Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva pitch peaceful resolutions to modern conflicts.

The fourth trend underway is the dethroning of the Western financial superstructure. That the West makes ample use of its financial might for geopolitical advantage and purposes is no great secret—policymakers and experts openly talk about the “weaponisation of finance” and applying sanctions on countries that do not comply with Western intentions. Likewise, the ability of the United States and its allies to freeze and even confiscate the reserves of sovereign states—Afghanistan, Venezuela, Russia—sent shock waves across the world.

Because of this and the West’s own track record of financial greed and impropriety—which resulted in devastating crises such as the 2007–2008 financial crisis and the recent collapse of Silicon Valley Bank, which has had global reverberations—distrust in and a rejection of Western financial structures is growing.

Efforts are now underway to dismantle the exorbitant privilege bestowed on the United States via its currency. De-dollarisation is very much happening, with the currency’s share of global reserves falling to 47 percent last year, down from 73 percent in 2001. Additionally, countries are seeking alternatives to the SWIFT system, which also has been used in aid of Western-based sanctions and thus alarmed the global majority. As countries with stable currencies gain influence, a more multipolar economic order emerges, reshaping geopolitical alliances, economic diplomacy, and the balance of power within international institutions. This change may grant developing nations greater flexibility in managing their currencies and monetary policies and limit the West’s capacity to unilaterally impose sanctions. Moreover, BRICS nations have recently surpassed the G7 in terms of GDP, signalling a redistribution of economic power and hinting at a future of cooperation in trade, investment, infrastructure, and development assistance.

Fifth and finally, there is the notable collapse of the Western press’ credibility. This comes at a critical juncture, as repeated shortcomings in the last few years have heightened global awareness of Western media’s role in perpetuating the West’s preferred aspects of the current world order—often to the detriment of other countries.

For instance, persistent China-bashing in Western headlines has perpetuated an unproductive and fear-mongering narrative of Beijing as a threat to its own citizens and the world at large. The geopolitical contexts of Hong Kong and Taiwan, though complicated affairs, have been particularly and selectively drummed up to push an “us vs. them” narrative, rather than encouraging understanding between the West and China.

Similarly, overwhelmingly one-sided coverage of the Ukrainian conflict regularly overlooks national and regional geopolitical complexities in the long-standing Russian-Ukrainian relationship and the history of NATO expansion in Europe. A lack of reporting on the Nord Stream bombing, which many believe was perpetrated by a Western nation—with reporting to back this claim up—is a glaring hole that has contributed to the lack of trust in Western media from both non-Western and Western readers alike. Only months later is the Western press quietly admitting potential Western culpability, or at the very least, knowledge.

Moreover, inadequate, and biased coverage of non-Western conflicts, such as those in Yemen, Myanmar, and Palestine, has led to global accusations of neglectbias, and even racism.

The writing on the wall

Western governments operating in an echo chamber of denial need to reach out to their friends across the world and realise what is obvious to everyone except to themselves: that the world is not like what it was in the post-Cold War era. The old ways are finished, and the West simply does not have the political and financial power, not to mention the international legitimacy, it once did. Western nations must adapt to this changing international environment, rather than stubbornly insisting upon business as usual. Failure to do so will make the world a more dangerous place and erode the credibility and influence of the West even further.

Chandran Nair is the Founder and CEO of Global Institute for Tomorrow and a member of the Executive Committee of the Club of Rome. He is the author of “The Sustainable State: The Future of Government, Economy and Society”. His latest book “Dismantling Global White Privilege: Equity for a Post-Western World” will be available from December.


The Sword and the Shield: the history of the KGB - filme-documentário (YouTube)

Uma piadinha soviética da época do stalinismo: 

"A Rússia é um país com três tipos de prisioneiros: os que foram para a cadeia no passado, os que estão indo agora, e os que irão no futuro". 

Agora ela apareceu aqui neste filme

The Sword and the Shield: the history of the KGB

https://ok.ru/videoembed/3358090005017



A política externa enquanto política pública: questões conceituais e operacionais da diplomacia brasileira - Paulo Roberto de Almeida (Revista Crítica & Controle)

 Brevemente, na sua estante digital: 


A política externa enquanto política pública: 
questões conceituais e operacionais da diplomacia brasileira
External policy as a public policy: 
conceptual and operational issues of the Brazilian diplomacy

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 
Revista Crítica & Controle, 2023 
https://seer.ufrgs.br/index.php/criticaecontrole 

Resumo: Ensaio sobre as bases ideais, nos planos conceitual e operacional, de uma política externa como uma das políticas públicas, vinculando métodos, procedimentos e atuação a diferentes exercícios práticos da diplomacia brasileira, e alguns exemplos de outras diplomacias no cenário global contemporâneo. Depois de breve recapitulação histórica sobre a diplomacia brasileira, o ensaio examina primeiro os fundamentos de uma política externa focada estritamente no interesse nacional, em suas diferentes modalidades de implementação, para depois considerar os elementos práticos, teoricamente aplicáveis ao Brasil, ao seguir resumidamente o itinerário da sua política externa e as diplomacias que se sucederam nas duas últimas décadas.
Palavras-chave: Política externa; diplomacia brasileira; fundamentos conceituais; bases operacionais; rupturas e continuidades.

Abstract: Exploratory essay on the ideal basis of an external policy as one of the public policies, on conceptual and operative grounds, connecting its methods and its practical implementation to the actual Brazilian diplomacy, with some references to other foreign policies in the current global context. After a brief description of the historical itinerary of the Brazilian diplomacy, the essay deals at first with the founding elements of an external policy strictly based on the national interest, taking support on a discussion over its practical enforcement, as ideally connected with the Brazilian case, exploring the various actual examples of Brazil’s foreign policies over the last two decades. 
Keywords: Foreign policy; Brazilian diplomacy; conceptual elements; operative basis; stability and discontinuities. 

Bibliografia de história diplomática e de relações exteriores do Brasil - Compilação de Paulo Roberto de Almeida

 4425. “Bibliografia de história diplomática do Brasil”, Brasília, 27 junho 2023, 17 p. Atualização sintética de listas anteriores de referências bibliográficas sobre obras de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil, em especial a partir do trabalho n. 3097/2017. Divulgado via plataforma Academia.edu (link: https://www.academia.edu/103922289/4425_Bibliografia_de_história_diplomática_e_de_relações_exteriores_do_Brasil_2023_).

Bibliografia de história diplomática e de relações exteriores do Brasil

 

Compilação: Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 27/06/2023

 

ABDENUR, Roberto. A política externa brasileira e o ‘sentimento de exclusão’. In: FONSECA JR., Gelson; CASTRO, Sérgio Henrique Nabuco de (orgs.). Temas de Política Externa Brasileira II. 2. ed. São Paulo; Brasília: Paz e Terra; Funag/IPRI. 1997, v. 1, p. 31-46.

ABREU, Alzira Alves et al. (orgs.). Dicionário histórico-biográfico brasileiro. Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 2001, 5 v.

ABREU, Marcelo de Paiva (org.). A ordem do progresso: dois séculos de política econômica no Brasil. 2a. ed.; Rio de Janeiro: Elsevier, 2014.

__________ . O Brasil e a economia mundial, 1930-1945. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1999.


(...)


VIZENTINI, Paulo G. F. Relações internacionais no Brasil: de Vargas a Lula. São Paulo: Fundação Perseu Abramo, 2003.

__________ . A política externa do regime militar brasileiro: multilateralização, desenvolvimento e construção de uma potência média (1964-1985). Porto Alegre: UFRGS, 1998 (Coleção Relações Internacionais e Integração).

__________ . Relações internacionais e desenvolvimento: o nacionalismo e a política externa independente (1951-1964). Petrópolis: Vozes, 1995.

__________ .  Da Guerra Fria à crise (1945-1992). Porto Alegre: UFRGS, 1992. (Síntese Universitária.)

__________ (org.). A grande crise: a nova (des)ordem internacional dos anos 80 aos 90. Petrópolis: Vozes, 1992.

WEHLING, Arno; WEHLING, Maria José C. Formação do Brasil Colonial. Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1994.

WERNECK SODRÉ, Nelson. Panorama do Segundo Império. São Paulo: Nacional, 1939; 2ª ed.; Rio de Janeiro: Graphia, 1998.

__________ . Formação Histórica do Brasil. São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1962.

 

 

Compilação original: 22/03/2017; versão revista: 27/06/2023

 


Integra disponível na plataforma Academia.edu (link: https://www.academia.edu/103922289/4425_Bibliografia_de_história_diplomática_e_de_relações_exteriores_do_Brasil_2023.

segunda-feira, 26 de junho de 2023

Assembleia Geral Constituinte e Legislativa do Império do Brasil de 1823 - Fundo documental da Câmara dos Deputados

Fundo AC1823 - Assembleia Geral Constituinte e Legislativa do Império do Brasil de 1823

https://arquivohistorico.camara.leg.br/index.php/assembleia-geral-consituinte-e-legislativa-do-imperio-do-brasil-1823 

Open original Objeto digital

Área de identificação

Código de referência

BR DFCD AC1823

Título

Assembleia Geral Constituinte e Legislativa do Império do Brasil de 1823

Data(s)

  • 17-04-1823 a 12-11-1823 (Produção)

Nível de descrição

Fundo

Dimensão e suporte

3 metros lineares de documentos em suporte de papel correspondente a 3.697 peças, sendo:

12 latas de manuscritos originais
8 volumes de códices.
53 documentos em grandes formatos (tabelas, mapas, bando)
9 volumes de publicações impressas (Diários e Anais)

Área de contextualização

Entidade custodiadora

História do arquivo

A história da documentação da Assembleia Geral Constituinte e Legislativa do Império de 1823 se inicia com sua custódia pelo Arquivo da Câmara dos Deputados, órgão criado pela Constituição de 1824. Nos anos 80 do século 20, ocorreram duas importantes ... »

Procedência

Considera-se que a documentação do fundo da Assembleia Geral Constituinte e Legislativa do Império do Brasil de 1823 foi transferida à Câmara dos Deputados por meio da “herança de fundos”, que, nos termos do Dicionário Brasileiro de Terminologia ... »

Área de conteúdo e estrutura

Âmbito e conteúdo

Durante sete meses, a Assembleia discutiu inúmeros temas relativos à organização política-administrativa do país e à economia, educação, saúde, segurança nacional entre outros assuntos. O Brasil vivia seu primeiro ano como nação independente e os debates ... »

Avaliação, selecção e eliminação

Toda a documentação deste fundo foi considerada de caráter permanente pela Câmara dos Deputados, em 1986, por meio da publicação da Instrução Normativa nº 1, que considerou todos os documentos anteriores ao ano de 1946 permanentes. Atualmente a ... »

Ingressos adicionais

O fundo é fechado e não foram incorporados documentos encontrados em outras entidades custodiadoras.

Sistema de arranjo

Em sua organização foram identificados 3.697 documentos. Dentre eles, 53 documentos em grandes formatos, 8 volumes de códices e 9 volumes de publicações impressas (Diários e Anais), que, após minucioso trabalho de pesquisa, foram agrupados em dossiês, ... »

Área de condições de acesso e uso

Condições de acesso

Sem restrições de acesso ao conteúdo, documentação totalmente digitalizada.

Os documentos do fundo da Assembleia Geral Constituinte e Legislativa do Império do Brasil de 1823 são públicos e estão custodiados no arquivo permanente da Câmara dos Deputados, ... »

Condiçoes de reprodução

Documentação digitalizada e disponível para consulta e download nesse site.

Idioma do material

  • francês
  • inglês
  • português

Script do material

  • latim

Características físicas e requisitos técnicos

A maior parte da documentação é composta por manuscritos, incluindo tabelas e mapas. A versão digitalizada está em formato PDF.

Instrumentos de descrição

Inventário analítico disponível em formato digital (PDF) http://arquivohistorico.camara.leg.br/atom/AC1823/sobre/Inventario_AnaliticoAcervoConstituinte1823.pdf

Brasil. Congresso Nacional. Câmara dos Deputados. Coordenação de Arquivo. Inventário ... »

Área de documentação associada

Existência e localização de originais

Entidade custodiadora: Câmara dos Deputados (Brasil)
Localização: Brasília

Existência e localização de cópias

Cópias digitais em formato PDF disponíveis neste site.
Cópias de preservação em formato TIFF no repositório digital da Câmara dos Deputados.
Cópias de Anais e Diários em microfilmes no arquivo permanente.

Nota de publicação

Os Annaes do Parlamento Brazileiro da Assemblea Constituinte podem ser acessados em:
Tomo 1 acessível em: https://arquivohistorico.camara.leg.br/atom/AC1823/sobre/annaes/ANNAES-TOMO1.pdf
Tomo 2 acessível em: https://arquivohistorico.camara.leg.br/atom/... »

Área de notas

Nota

MINISTROS E SECRETÁRIOS DE ESTADO DO IMPÉRIO DO BRASIL - 1822-1823 (Parte 1)
In: <i>Organização e programas ministeriais, desde 1822 a 1889,/i... pelo Barão de Javary. Rio de Janeiro, Secretaria da Câmara dos Deputados, 1889 p. 3 a 10.</i>

... »

Nota

MINISTROS E SECRETÁRIOS DE ESTADO DO IMPÉRIO DO BRASIL - 1822-1823 (Parte 2)
In: <i>Organização e programas ministeriais, desde 1822 a 1889,/i... pelo Barão de Javary. Rio de Janeiro, Secretaria da Câmara dos Deputados, 1889 p. 3 a 10.</i>

2º ... »

Nota

MINISTROS E SECRETÁRIOS DE ESTADO DO IMPÉRIO DO BRASIL - 1822-1823 (Parte 3)
In: <i>Organização e programas ministeriais, desde 1822 a 1889,/i... pelo Barão de Javary. Rio de Janeiro, Secretaria da Câmara dos Deputados, 1889 p. 3 a 10.</i>

3º ... »

Regras ou convenções utilizadas

ISAD(G) ISAAR(CPF) ISDF ISDIAH

Idioma(s)

  • português


Como será o dia em que Putin desligar todos os cabos submarinos? - Moisés Naim (OESP)

Como será o dia em que Putin desligar todos os cabos submarinos?

Moisés Naim

O Estado de S. Paulo, 25/06/2023

 É fácil imaginar a internet como um fenômeno etéreo, imaterial. Nestes tempos é normal, por exemplo, conectar-se à rede sem necessidade de cabos, guardar dados na “nuvem” e supor que a informação flui sem “sujar-se” no mundo tátil.

Pena que essas suposições sejam errôneas. A rede da qual dependemos é alarmantemente física e eminentemente vulnerável. Segundo o marechal Edward Stringer, ex-diretor de operações do Ministério de Defesa britânico, 95% do tráfego internacional de dados passa por um pequeno número de cabos submarinos. Estamos falando de meros 200 cabos, cada um da grossura aproximada à de uma mangueira de jardim e capaz de transferir cerca de 200 terabytes por segundo.

Por essa rede física trafegam US$ 10 trilhões em transações financeiras a cada dia. Como explica Stringer, nos últimos 20 anos, a Rússia investiu fortemente em sistemas capazes de atacar essa rede de cabos submarinos. O Kremlin conta hoje com uma frota de sofisticados submergíveis não tripulados projetados especificamente para esses fins. E a China também.

De fato, não se trata de uma ameaça teórica. Em outubro de 2022, o cabo submarino que conecta as Ilhas Shetland com o restante do mundo foi cortado em dois pontos. Poucos dias antes, havia sido detectada presença nessa região de um barco russo de “investigação científica”.

Não é possível vincular a presença do barco com o corte do cabo. De fato, na maioria das vezes os cortes se devem a acidentes com embarcações pesqueiras ou a eventos sísmicos no leito marinho. Mesmo assim, essa coincidência preocupou muito as agências de segurança das potências ocidentais, que perceberam o incidente como uma advertência enviada pelo Kremlin.

Outro evento relevante nesse sentido foi a decisão tomada em fevereiro de 2023 pelas duas maiores empresas de telecomunicações chinesas, que decidiram se retirar do consórcio internacional encarregado de desenvolver uma rede de 19,2 mil quilômetros de cabos submarinos que conectam o sudoeste da Ásia e a Europa Ocidental.

Os impactos de um ataque coordenado contra os principais cabos submarinos em nível global seriam incalculáveis. Um ataque simultâneo paralisaria o comércio global, os mercados financeiros, o trabalho remoto e as indústrias de tecnologia e comunicação, provocando uma recessão mundial.

Mas o problema não seria meramente financeiro: as cadeias de fornecimento do século 21 dependem da transferência constante de dados para coordenar a entrega de bens e produtos. A interrupção deste fluxo poderia causar um efeito dominó de atrasos e cancelamentos que restringiria a integração econômica, política e até cultural de diferentes zonas geográficas.

Ainda mais, a crise financeira e econômica que um ataque desse tipo precipitaria nem sequer seria o maior dos problemas. “Desconectar” os cabos de potências rivais desembocaria numa crise inadministrável, especialmente se for possível atribuir a responsabilidade a algum ator estatal específico, o que poderia provocar conflitos e reconfigurar alianças. Os países que dependem em grande medida da infraestrutura digital seriam os mais afetados, e aqueles com capacidades autônomas de comunicação e tecnologia poderiam obter vantagens estratégicas.

Desafortunadamente, tais cenários não podem ser ignorados, porque no alto-mar reina a anarquia. Os tratados internacionais existentes sobre direito de navegação não cobrem satisfatoriamente o caso dos cabos submarinos. Trata-se de um exemplo emblemático de uma realidade global que, apesar de ser de grande interesse público, não está adequadamente protegida nem física nem legalmente.

Até agora, as potências marítimas se abstiveram de atacar em grande escala as infraestruturas submarinas. Obviamente, atacar os cabos e conexões submarinas do rival provocaria custosas retaliações. Mas o equilíbrio atual é instável e inerentemente suscetível a perturbações que podem desestabilizar o sistema mundial da noite para o dia.

Quando imaginamos que eventos seriam capazes de suscitar uma escalada entre o Ocidente e seus rivais, nós tendemos a nos esquecer dessa realidade. As sociedades contemporâneas não podem funcionar sem a transmissão de dados facilitada pela internet que, por sua vez, não pode funcionar sem infraestruturas muito difíceis de defender.

A sensação de invulnerabilidade do Ocidente é ilusória, e seus rivais entenderam bem que certas infraestruturas — começando pelos cabos submarinos — são seu calcanhar de Aquiles. Essa realidade sublinha a necessidade de manter relações minimamente funcionais na arena internacional.

A interdependência entre os países não é apenas um conceito usado por diplomatas. É uma realidade que define o mundo de hoje. Este é um mundo no qual os problemas, riscos e ameaças se fazem cada vez mais internacionais, enquanto as respostas dos governos seguem sendo predominantemente nacionais. Há problemas que nenhum país consegue resolver atuando sozinho. A necessidade de coordenar respostas e responder coletivamente com eficácia às ameaças é um objetivo para o qual o mundo não está preparado. / TRADUÇÃO DE AUGUSTO CALIL

https://www.estadao.com.br/internacional/como-sera-o-dia-em-que-putin-desligar-os-cabos-da-internet-mundial-leia-a-coluna-de-moises-naim/

Timothy Snyder sobre dois GANGSTERS russos: a marcha de Prigozyn contra Putin

 

Prigozhin's March on Moscow

Ten lessons from a mutiny

How to understand Yevgeny Prigozhin's march on Moscow and its sudden end?  Often there are plots without a coup; this seemed like a coup without a plot.  Yet weird as the mercenary chief’s mutiny was, we can draw some conclusions from its course and from its conclusion.

1.  Putin is not popular.  All the opinion polling we have takes place in an environment where his power is seen as more or less inevitable and where answering the question he wrong way seems risky.  But when his power was lifted, as when Rostov-on-Don was seized by Wagner, no one seemed to mind.  Reacting to Prigozhin's mutiny, some Russians were euphoric, and most seemed apathetic.  What was not to be seen was anyone in any Russian city spontaneously expressing their personal support for Putin, or let alone anyone taking any sort of personal risk on behalf of his regime.  The euphoria suggests to me that some Russians are ready to be ruled by a different exploitative regime.  The apathy indicates that most Russians at this point just take for granted that they will be ruled by the gangster with the most guns, and will just go on with their daily lives regardless of who that gangster happens to be. 

2.  Prigozhin was a threat to Putin, because he does much the same things that Putin does, and leverages Putin's own assets.  Both the Russian state itself and Prigozhin's mercenary firm Wagner are extractive regimes with large public relations and military arms.  The Putin regime exists, and the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg are relatively wealthy, thanks to the colonial exploitation of hydrocarbon resources in Siberia.  The wealth is held by a very few people, and the Russian population is treated to a regular spectacle of otherwise pointless war -- Ukraine, Syria, Ukraine again -- to distract attention from this basic state of affairs, and to convince them that there is some kind of external enemy that justifies it (hint: there really isn't).  Wagner functioned as a kind of intensification of the Russian state, doing the dirtiest work beyond Russia, not only in Syria and Ukraine but also in Africa.  It was subsidized by the Russian state, but made its real money by extracting mineral resources on its own, especially in Africa.  Unlike most of its other ventures, Wagner's war in Ukraine was a losing proposition.  Prigozhin leveraged the desperation of Russia's propaganda for a victory by taking credit for victory at Bakhmut.  That minor city was completely destroyed and abandoned by the time Wagner took it, at the cost of tens of thousands of Russian lives.  But because it was the only gain in Russia's horrifyingly costly but strategically senseless 2023 offensive, it had to be portrayed by Putin's media as some kind of Stalingrad or Berlin.  Prigozhin was able to direct the false glory to himself even as he then withdrew Wagner from Ukraine.  Meanwhile he criticized the military commanders of the Russian Federation in increasingly vulgar terms, thereby preventing the Russian state (and Putin) from gaining much from the bloody spectacle of invaded Ukraine.  In sum: Wagner was able to make the Putin regime work for it.

3.  Prigozhin told the truth about the war.  This has to be treated as a kind of self-serving accident: Prigozhin is a flamboyant and skilled liar and propagandist.  But his pose in the days before his march on Moscow made the truth helpful to him.  He wanted to occupy this position in Russian public opinion: the man who fought loyally for Russia and won Russia's only meaningful victory in 2023, in the teeth of the incompetence of the regime and the senselessness of the war itself.  I'm not sure enough attention has been paid to what Prigozhin said about Putin's motives for war: that it had nothing to do with NATO enlargement or Ukrainian aggression, and was simply a matter of wishing to dominate Ukraine, replace its regime with a Moscow-friendly politician (Viktor Medvedchuk), and then seize its resources and to satisfy the Russian elite.  Given the way the Russian political system actually works, that has the ring of plausibility.  Putin's various rationales are dramatically inconsistent with the way the Russian political system actually works.

4.  Russia is far less secure than it was before invading Ukraine.  This is a rather obvious point that many people aside from myself have been making, going all the way back the first invasion of 2014.  There was never any reason to believe, from that point at the latest, that Putin cared about Russian national interests.  If he had, he would never have begun a conflict that forced Russia to become subordinate to China, which is the only real threat on its borders.  Any realist in Moscow concerned about the Russian state would seek to balance China and the West, rather than pursue a policy which had to alienate the West.  Putin was concerned that Ukraine might serve as a model.  Unlike Russians, Ukrainians could vote and enjoyed freedom of speech and association.  That was no threat to Russia, but it was to Putin's own power.  Putin certainly saw Ukraine as an opportunity to generate a spectacle that would distract from his own regime's intense corruption, and to consolidate his own reputation as a leader who could gather in what he falsely portrayed as "Russian" lands.  But none of this has anything to do with the security of Russia as a state or the wellbeing of Russians as a people.  The Putin of 2022 (much more than the Putin of 2014) seems to have believed his own propaganda, overestimating Russian power while dismissing the reality of the Ukrainian state and Ukrainian civil society -- something no realist would do.  That meant that the second invasion failed, and that meant (as I wrote back in February 2022) that it would give an opportunity to a rival warlord.  Prigozhin was that warlord and he took that opportunity.  This might have all seemed abstract until he led his forces on a march to Moscow, downing six Russian helicopters and one plane, and stopping without ever having met meaningful resistance.  To be sure, Wagner had many advantages, such as being seen as Russian by locals and knowing how local infrastructure worked.  Nevertheless, Prigozhin's march shows that a small force would have little trouble reaching Moscow.  That was not the case before most of the Russian armed forces were committed in Ukraine, where many of the best units essentially ceased to exist.

St. Basils Cathedral

5.  When backed into a corner, Putin saves himself.  In the West, we have worry about Putin's feelings.  What might he do if he feels threatened?  Might he do something terrible to us?  Putin encourages this line of thinking with constant bluster about "escalation" and the like.  On Saturday Putin gave another speech full of threats, this time directed against Prigozhin and Wagner.  Then he got into a plane and flew away to another city.  And then he made a deal with Prigozhin.  And then all legal charges against Prigozhin were dropped.  And then Putin's propagandists explained that all of this was perfectly normal.  

So long as Putin is in power, this is what he will do.  He will threaten and hope that those threats will change the behaviour of his enemies.  When that fails, he will change the story.  His regime rests on propaganda, and in the end the spectacle generated by the military is there to serve the propaganda.  Even when that spectacle is as humiliating as can be possibly be imagined, as it was on Saturday when Russian rebels marched on Moscow and Putin fled, his response will be to try to change he subject.  

It is worth emphasizing that on Saturday the threat to him personally and to his regime was real.  Both the risk and the humiliation were incomparably greater than anything that could happen in Ukraine.  Compared to power in Russia, power in Ukraine is unimportant.  After what we have just seen, no one should be arguing that Putin might be backed into a corner in Ukraine and take some terrible decision.  He cannot be backed into a corner in Ukraine.  He can only be backed into a corner in Russia.  And now we know what he does when that happens: record a speech and run away.

(And most likely write a check.  A note of speculation.  No one yet knows what the deal between Putin and Prigozhin was.  There are rumblings in Russia that Sergei Shoigu, Prigozhin's main target, will be forced to resign after accusations of some kind of corruption or another.  There are reports that Prigozhin was given reason to be concerned about the lives of his own familymembers and those of other Wagner leaders.  I imagine, personally, that one element was money.  On 1 July, Wagner was going to cease to exist as a separate entity, at least formally speaking.  It like all private armies was required to subordinate itself to the ministry of defense, which is to say to Shoigu.  This helps to explain, I think, the timing of the mutiny.  Were Wagner to cease to function as before, Prigozhin would have lost a lot of money.  It is not unreasonable to suppose that he marched on Moscow at a moment when we still had the firepower to generate one last payout.  Mafia metaphors can help here, not least because they are barely metaphors.  You can think of the Russian state as a protection racket.  No one is really safe, but everyone has to accept "protection" in the knowledge that this is less risky than rebellion.  A protection racket is always vulnerable to another protection racket.  In marching from Rostov-on-Don to Moscow, Prigozhin was breaking one protection racket and proposing another.  On this logic, we can imagine Prigozhin's proposal to Putin as follows: I am deploying the greater force, and I am now demanding protection money from you.  If you want to continue your own protection racket, pay me off before I reach Moscow.)

6.  The top participants were fascists, and fascists can feud.  We don't use the term “fascist” much, since the Russians (especially Russian fascists) use it for their enemies, which is confusing; and since it seems somehow politically incorrect to use it.  And for another reason: unlike the Italians, the Romanians, and the Germans of the 1930s, the Putin regime has had the use of tremendous profits from hydrocarbons, which it has used to influence western public opinion.  All the same, if Russia today is not a fascist regime, it is really difficult to know what regime would be fascist.  It is more clearly fascist than Mussolini's Italy, which invented the term.  Russian fascists have been in the forefront of both invasions on Ukraine, both on the battlefield and in propaganda.  Putin himself has used fascist language at every turn, and has pursued the fascist goal of genocide in Ukraine.  

Prigozhin has been however the more effective fascist propagandist during this war, strategically using symbols of violence (a sledgehammer) and images of death (cemeteries, actual corpses) to solidify his position.  Wagner includes a very large number of openly fascist fighters.  Wagner's conflict with Shogun has racist overtones, undertones, and throughtones -- on pro-Wagner Telegram channels he is referred to as "the Tuva degenerate" and similar.  

That said, the difference between fascists can seem very meaningful when that is all that is on offer, and it is absolutely clear that many Russians were deeply affected by the clash of the two fascist camps.  That said, it is important to specify a difference between Putin and Prigozhin's fascism and that of the 1930s.  The two men are both very concerned with money, which the first generation of fascists in general were not.  They are oligarchical fascists -- a breed worth watching here in the US as well.

7.  The division in Russia was real, and will likely endure.  Some Russians celebrated when Wagner shot down Russian helicopters, and others were astonished that they could do so.  Some Russians wanted action, others could not imagine change.  Most Russians probably do not care much, but those who do are not of the same opinion.  Putin's regime will try to change the subject, as always, but now it lacks offensive power in Ukraine (without Wagner) and so the ability to create much of a spectacle. Russian propaganda has already turned against Wagner, who were of course yesterday's heroes. The leading Russian propagandist, Vladimir Solovyov, recruited for Wagner. The son of Putin's spokesman supposedly served in Wagner. Although this was almost certainly a lie, it reveals that Wagner was once the site of prestige. 

It might prove hard for Russian propagandists to find any heroes in the story, since for the most part no one resisted Wagner's march on Moscow.  If Wagner was so horrible, why did everyone just let it go forward?  If the Russian ministry of defense is so effective, why did it do so little?  If Putin is in charge, why did he run away, and leave even the negotiating to Lukashenko of Belarus?  If Lukashenko is the hero of the story, what does that say about Putin?

It is also not clear what will happen now to Wagner.  The Kremlin claims that its men will be integrated into the Russian armed forces, but it is hard to see why they would accept that.  They are used to being treated with greater respect (and getting paid better).  If Wagner remains intact in some form, it is hard to see how it could be trusted, in Ukraine or anywhere else.  More broadly, Putin now faces a bad choice between toleration and purges.  If he tolerates the rebellion, he looks weak.  If he purges his regime, he risks another rebellion.

8.  One of Putin's crimes against Russia is his treatment of the opposition.  This might seem to be a tangent: what does the imprisoned or exiled opposition have to do with Prigozhin's mutiny?  The point is that their imprisonment and exile meant that they could do little to advance their own ideas for Russia's future on what would otherwise have been an excellent occasion to do so.  The Putin regime is obviously worn out, but there is no one around to say so, and to propose something better than another aging fascist.  

I think of this by contrast to 1991.  During the coup attempt that August against Gorbachev, Russians rallied in Moscow.  They might or might not have been supporters of Gorbachev, but they could see the threat a military coup posed for their own futures.  The resistance to the coup gave Russia a chance for a new beginning, a chance that has now been wasted.  There was no resistance to this coup, in part because of the systematic political degeneration of the Putin regime, in part because the kinds of courageous Russians who went to the streets in 1991 are no behind bars or in exile.  This means that Russians in general have been denied a chance to think of political futures. 

9.  This was a preview of how the war in Ukraine ends.  When there is meaningful conflict in Russia, Russians will forget about Ukraine and pay attention to their own country.  That has no happened once, and it can happen again.  When such a conflict lasts longer than this one (just one day), Russian troops will be withdrawn from Ukraine.  In this case, Wagner withdrew itself from Ukraine, and then the troops of Ramzan Kadyrov (Akhmat) departed Ukraine to fight Wagner (which they predictably failed to do, which is another story).  In a more sustained conflict, regular soldiers would also depart.  It will be impossible to defend Moscow and its elites otherwise.  Moscow elites who think ahead should want those troops withdrawn now. On its present trajectory, Russia is likely to face an internal power struggle sooner rather than later.  That is how wars end: when the pressure is felt inside the political system.  Those who want this war to end should help Ukrainians exert that pressure.

10.  Events in Russia (like events in Ukraine) are in large measure determined by the choices of Russians (or Ukrainians).  In the US we have the imperialist habit of denying agency to both parties in this conflict.  Far too many people seem to think that Ukrainians are fighting because of the US or NATO, when in fact the situation is entirely the opposite: it was Ukrainian resistance that persuaded other nations to help.  Far too many people still think the US or NATO had something to do with Putin's personal decision to invade Ukraine, when in fact the character of the Russian system (and Putin's own words) provide us with more than enough explanation. 

Some of those people are now claiming that Prigozhin's putsch was planned by the Americans, which is silly.  The Biden administration has quite consistently worked against Wagner.  Prigozhin's main American connection was his hard work, as head of Russia's Internet Research Agency, to get Trump elected in 2016.  Others are scrambling to explain Prigozhin's march on Moscow and its end as some kind of complex political theater, in which the goal was to move Prigozhin and Wagner to Belarus to organize a strike on Ukraine from the north.  This is ludicrous.  If Prigozhin actually does go to Belarus, there is no telling what he might improvise there. But the idea of such a plan makes no sense. If Putin and Prigozhin were on cooperative terms, they could have simply agreed on such a move in a way that would not have damaged both of their reputations (and left Russia weaker).  

Putin choose to invade Ukraine for reasons that made sense to him inside the system he built.  Prigozhin resisted Putin for reasons that made sense to him as someone who had profited from that system from the inside.  The mutiny was a choice within Putin's war of choice, and it exemplifies the disaster Putin has brought to his country.