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Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida;
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sexta-feira, 17 de janeiro de 2020
Economist: editorial sobre o acordo comercial EUA-China
Papa Francisco: uma boa alma reformista, mas economicamente equivocado - Academia Liberdade Econômica
Consumismo no capitalismo
Hoje, o consumismo determina o que é importante. Consumir relacionamentos, consumir amizades, consumir religiões, consumir, consumir… Não importam o custo ou as consequências. Um consumo que não favorece o vínculo, um consumo que tem pouco a ver com as relações humanas. Laços sociais são um mero ‘meio’ para a satisfação de ‘minhas necessidades’. O importante não é mais o nosso vizinho, com seu rosto familiar, sua história e sua personalidade.
No entanto, muitas pessoas, especialmente intelectuais, apaixonadamente detestam o capitalismo. Na visão deles, esse modo medonho de organização econômica da sociedade não trouxe nada além de danos e miséria. Os homens eram felizes e prósperos nos bons e velhos tempos que precederam a ‘Revolução Industrial’. Agora, sob o capitalismo, a imensa maioria é de um povo faminto, impiedosamente explorado por individualistas austeros. Para esses canalhas, nada conta além de seus interesses monetários. Eles não produzem coisas boas e realmente úteis, mas apenas o que trará os maiores lucros. Eles envenenam corpos com bebidas alcoólicas e tabaco, e almas e mentes com tabloides, livros lascivos e filmes idiotas.
O traço característico do capitalismo moderno é a produção em massa de bens destinados ao consumo pelas massas. (…) No mercado de uma sociedade capitalista, o homem comum é o consumidor soberano cuja compra ou abstenção de compra determina, em última análise, o que deve ser produzido e em que quantidade e qualidade.
O resultado é uma cultura que descarta tudo aquilo que já não é mais ‘útil’ ou ‘satisfatório’ para os gostos do consumidor. Transformamos nossa sociedade em uma enorme vitrine multicultural ligada apenas aos gostos de certos ‘consumidores’.
Eles falham em não reconhecer o caráter especulativo inerente a todas as empreitadas para atender futuros desejos ou satisfação; ou seja, em toda ação humana. Ingenuamente, presumem que não há qualquer dúvida sobre as medidas a serem tomadas para a melhor provisão possível dos consumidores. (…) Os defensores de uma economia planejada nunca conceberam que a tarefa é atender desejos futuros que podem ser diferentes dos desejos atuais, e empregar os vários fatores de produção disponíveis da maneira mais conveniente para a melhor satisfação possível desses incertos desejos futuros. – Human Action, Scholars Edition, pág 672 da edição em inglês
Claro, é fácil olhar para tudo isso e gritar: consumismo atroz! (…) Talvez você pense que a qualidade de vida não é grande coisa. Será que realmente importa se as pessoas têm acesso a grandes supermercados, drogarias, casas com mais de um cômodo e tecnologia? (…) Considere a expectativa de vida na era do consumismo. As mulheres em 1900 geralmente morriam aos 48 anos, e os homens aos 46. Hoje? As mulheres vivem até 80 e os homens, 77. Isso se deve à melhor alimentação, empregos menos perigosos, melhor saneamento e higiene, melhor acesso aos cuidados de saúde e a toda a gama de fatores que contribuem para o que chamamos de nosso padrão de vida. Somente desde 1950, a taxa de mortalidade infantil caiu 77%. Como resultado, a população está aumentando exponencialmente.É fácil olhar para esses números e sugerir que poderíamos ter conseguido a mesma coisa com um planejamento central para a saúde, evitando todo esse consumismo repugnante que veio junto. Mas tal planejamento central foi tentado em países socialistas, e seus resultados mostraram exatamente o contrário nas estatísticas de mortalidade. Enquanto os soviéticos lamentavam nossa persistente pobreza em meio ao consumismo desenfreado, nossa pobreza estava sendo reduzida e nossa longevidade aumentava, em grande parte por causa do consumismo pelo qual estávamos sendo criticados.
China challenge to the US: Belfer Center prized papers
EUA continuam a ver a China como adversária - Council on Foreign Relations
o Belfer organizou uma espécie de concurso para selecionar as melhores "grandes estratégias", para confrontar o "desafio da China".
Eis as respostas premiadas.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Winners Announced: Meeting the China Challenge
Read all four distinguished submissions below:
Winner | Robin Nataf
From: Robin Nataf
Date: 23 November 2019
Re: US grand strategy for meeting the China challenge
- Thanks to previous Administrations’ failed policies, China has benefited from the global economy and been able to strengthen its authoritarian capitalist model. We now need to accept the reality of China’s economic growth – the world is no longer unipolar, and the American century has ended.
- This does not mean that we will accept China’s ideology and worldview. America remains committed to democratic, liberal values, and to defending its interests vigorously in the global economic arena. We stand by our allies in East Asia, we stand by the need for trade reforms.
- That said, we need to find a way to peacefully coexist with China. History shows us that if we compete too aggressively, the risks of a violent confrontation are real. And a war with China would be dramatic – it would amount to the destruction of both of our nations as we know them, and hundreds of millions of deaths. We need to find ways to work with China to better understand each other, and avoid such a catastrophic scenario. We need to work with China to confront global challenges like climate change or terrorism.
- At the end of the day, we are confident in the attractiveness and the value of America’s liberal democracy. We have learnt that the best way to spread these values is to shine by example, and so we will invest domestically to ensure our education systems, our infrastructure and our technological capacities remain the best in the world. That way, we will show the world – and China – what America can achieve when it sets its heart to it, and other countries will be able to decide what model they want to adopt.
Honorable Mention: Kazumi Hoshino-Macdonald
- Prevent any conflict between US and China resulting in a non-limited conventional or non-conventional altercation.
- Maintain US primacy through global reserve currency, tech leadership, and international military presence.
- Ensure the security of our regional treaty allies.
- Prevent third-party states inducing a conflict (e.g. Korean peninsula, South/East China Sea, and Taiwan Strait.)
- Freedom of navigation within the Indo-Pacific.
- Promote the rule of law, free markets, and democracy in Asia.
- Prevent a strategic Russia-China axis.
- Short-term fait accompli in economic destabilization.
- Longer-term development capacity hindrance.
- A multi-country bipolarity balance may be achieved, though at a low probability.
- Cold War diagnosis inaccurate: no nuclear brinksmanship, USSR never reached 60% of US GDP, was not economically interdependent, and was ideologically rigid.
- Détente could mean sacrificing a regional sphere of influence.
- Losing cooperation on climate change, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, pandemics, and benefits from interdependent trade.
- Increased probability of miscommunication and misperception in crisis scenarios.
- Losing Chinese immigrant talent pool with a new “Red Scare.”
- Renegotiate and rejoin CPTPP, making trade benefits commensurate with higher enforceable standards that meets the administration’s needs.
- Counter A2AD, by providing regional allies and partners with long range autonomous vehicles, weaponry, and advanced anti-missile systems.
- Maintains diplomatic channels, but increases credible deterrence in a crisis scenario.
- Offers economic diversification options (e.g. ASEAN).
- Fewer of the Cold War 2.0 cons.
- Slower to blunt China’s economic gains.
- Higher chances of coordination failure.
- Does not offer an final end-state for US-China relations beyond steady state competition.
- Strategic position in the Indo-Pacific.
- Low cost of labor and a growing middle class.
- Expanded Quadrilateal Security Dialogue.
- Not mutually exclusive to Option II.
- Offers an alternative that amplifies US clout and alliances.
- Plays to US strengths such as the rule of law, that have a proven track record in spurring development (e.g. Asian Tiger economies).
- Requires high degree of buy-in from partners.
- Slow on immediate economic and security concerns.
- Requires domestic US appetite for international multilateralism.
- Our strategy is one of countering China’s regional aggressions, by consolidating our deterrence capacity with regional allies across all domains.
- “Ending the forever wars” and refocusing our efforts on the most economic dynamic region of the 21st century, where middle classes are growing and America can benefit from a deeper economic and strategic presence.
Honorable Mention: Patrick Kolesiak
- While we look to keep America’s interests first, we still find numerous areas where we can work with China over the years ahead to combat global issues like global warming, transnational terrorism, and bringing developing countries into the twenty-first century.
- The US will work with our allies and international organizations to ensure that China does play by international norms in the realm of global trade, finance and economics. For every country to have fair and equal access to international markets and financing, every country needs to play by a fair and standard set of rules.
- We in the US—and we urge our allies to join us—will enforce reciprocal trade and finance arrangements on China. When China implements policies that undermine our interests in preserving intellectual property, devalue our currency, or seek to economically punish our allies, we will act in response.
- The US will work with China and all of our regional partners in the Pacific to develop protocols to follow when we have our militaries operating in close proximity. These protocols will prevent accidents from turning into escalating military crises.
- We will work to invest in the developing world so that countries can bring their own people out of poverty and engage with the world. Our actions in this regard are not to force countries into a quid-pro-quo or use debt to hold a country hostage to US interests, but rather to ensure that every country can develop an economy that benefits its own citizens.
Honorable Mention: Jessica Robyn Jordan
- Shaping an international system in which the U.S. continues to thrive. [iii]
- Preventing the emergence of a hostile major power, [iv] and, to that end,
- Pursuing harmonious, non-adversarial relationships with nations that pose a threat. [v]
- The People’s Republic of China (PRC), under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), will likely assertively respond to a U.S. “Cold War II” posture by continuing to violate international norms and threaten rules-based order in launching cyber theft campaigns of global scale, in further militarizing the South China Sea and developing anti-access area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, and exhibiting economically and militarily coercive behavior toward other countries. [vi]
- Russia and China will likely continue to strengthen ties, as witnessed by recent bilateral military exercises. [vii]
- China faces numerous security challenges and governance troubles: a slowing economy; shrinking aging force; on-going territorial disputes, and pressure to capitalize on a “window of strategic opportunity.” [viii]
- A robust Indo-Pacific partnership enables sharing of intelligence/resource/access to better understand China’s interests, intents, and capabilities.
- U.S. force posture affords capability and credibility to U.S. allies in region.
- f China is driven by desires for territorial, military, and economic dominance, it is prudent to build U.S. defense capabilities—but:
- ...does this force posture and partnership strength drive China to more deeply entrench its military presence?
- Risks accidental war; China misreading U.S. “protection” and securitization intentions.
- Resource heavy; costly; strains bandwidth if another conflict demands U.S. attention.
- U.S. ending defense commitment to Taiwan reduces possibility of war with China; [x] U.S. not caught in crossfire if independent decision-making in Taipei escalates tensions.
- Taiwan is not a U.S. vital interest.
- Might signal to China U.S. not unwilling but unable to provide for defense of Taiwan; risks China becoming militarily assertive in response.
- Implementation requires repeal of Taiwan Relations Act by U.S. Congress.
- Bargain might erode perception of credibility among allies.
- Informs whether to continue status quo (option 1), or moderate, heighten, lessen; whether a “grand bargain” might appeal to China.
- Guard against politicization; requires time input by policymaker.
- Consult doctrine (the IPSR, NDS, NSS), request NIEs (National Intelligence Estimates); review prior NIEs to understand U.S-China relationships over time/key trends; ask strategic questions of the IC (see Appendix II).
- Meet with IC regularly to exchange views and explore ideas; guide collection and research efforts not only at the outset of request, but provide iterative feedback to the IC.
- Ask analysts to defend their work. An analytically rigorous debate enables both parties to engage in a productive discussion without risking inappropriate fraternization, as the focus is on testing the integrity of the product.
- If intelligence chafes against a policymaker’s intuition or desired course of action regarding China in a way that is impossible for him to overcome, instead of abandoning the intelligence entirely, request a hearing of the differing analytic perspectives on that topic. Although IC products are corporate/collaborative, there may be occasions in which the policymaker can probe for understanding of alternative readings in an effort to unearth the most solid estimate, not to sow seeds of division.
- Both parties should be sensitive to overt (and covert) policy goals that may distort China analysis; the burden remains on both parties to be aware of, and actively guard against, politicization.
- As Gates advises, policymakers ought not to “dictate the line of march” they anticipate analysts to take. [xi]
- A thoughtful diagnosis of China’s threats will enable U.S. policy to be crafted in a way that meets Beijing’s interests, to avoid escalation and war. Here the IC is key. Share best practices for combatting mutual problems: when there is more value to be had in collaboration than competition, the pendulum shifts in favor of coordination and cooperation. U.S. should work to demonstrate those areas of perceived mutual value. Result in a de-escalation of tensions.
- U.S. needs better clarification about whether China is driven by security concerns, or desire for dominance; understanding this question better informs all policy options in response. Is it that China seeks to challenge the U.S. led order [xii] or, rather, gain influence within it? How can the U.S. shape conditions for China to pursue the latter? Thoughtfully interrogate, and not assume, what China’s key intentions and vital interests are (not necessarily America’s). Engaging the IC here is critical to effectively answering these questions. A fractious relationship between the IC/policymaking community is itself a threat; elevate intelligence as the single most important driver of decision-making regarding China. Policymakers: not competing with IC for influence; rather, invaluable asset/ally in making sense of strategic options.
- On a broader strategic plane, U.S. security might be best realized through a multipolar system (e.g. bi-hegemony with China) than through the exhaustive and ultimately futile efforts of exerting continued preeminence. [xiii] Given that security is of vital interest of the U.S., a multipolar system must be not just seriously entertained – but embraced by the U.S. – if it is vehicle through which U.S vital interest(s) are most reliably met. To this end, China is best received as a friend to the U.S. than fought as its foe. The NDS charges policymakers to pursue a long-range course of “transparency and non-aggression” [xiv] between U.S. and China; a strategy of restraint in service to avoiding the Thucydides’s Trap.
- How deeply does President Xi Jinping care about maintaining cordial relations with Washington vis-à-vis a trade deal (or generally?) How inclined is Xi Jinping to approach a U.S. trade deal in a way that avoids an adversarial relationship with Washington?
- What threats does Mr. Xi Jinping face that could affect his decision-making vis-à-vis securing a satisfactory trade deal?
- How splintered is Xi Jinping’s economic advisory team, and who most closely influences his decision-making vis-à-vis a potential U.S. trade deal? (Idea being that if we can target/influence the decision makers that affect Xi Jinping’s willingness to broker a deal, we can potentially affect the outcome favorable to U.S. interests.)
- What are the risks to the U.S. if a “decoupling” from China occurs? Benefits? Which U.S. strategic partners have the closest economic relationships with China, and what is at stake for them as the U.S. brokers a potential trade deal? Which international actors are helped and hurt by an escalation of the U.S. trade war with China?
- How will the outcome of China’s willingness to play ball with a U.S. trade deal affect, more broadly, U.S./China relations?
- How does China’s predatory economic practices influence their military modernization program?
- How do U.S. allies perceive the trustworthiness and reliability of the U.S. (in the event coalition building is required vis-à-vis engaging China with the world economy in a constructive way?)
- How will the escalating trade-war with China affect the U.S. economy? What is the main concern/interest of China heading into trade deal talks?
- How will the outcome of a trade deal with China affect U.S. markets?
- How will China react to a firmer U.S. posture during trade deal talks? A weaker one? What are President Xi Jinping’s most pressing economic concerns for China, heading into trade talks?
- Who are Mr. Xi Jinping’s closest economic allies, and how are they affecting his decision-making vis-a-vis a U.S. trade deal?
- How does China’s softening economic climate affect Mr. Xi Jinping’s eagerness to broker a U.S. trade deal?
EUA continuam a ver a China como adversária - Council on Foreign Relations
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Grand strategy toward China needs ‘coalition of the democratic willing’
level in Washington, Blackwill adds: