CFP: Business and Finance in Latin America: From the Oil Shock to the Debt Crisis - Business History journal

Chamo a atenção para esta oportunidade. Gostaria de participar, mas acho que não terei tempo de produzir algo de valor em tão pouco tempo, a despeito que minha dissertação de mestrado tratou justamente do primeiro choque do petróleo na economia brasileira. 

CFP: Special Issue in Business History: Business and Finance in Latin America: From the Oil Shock to the Debt Crisis

by Paula de la Cruz-Fernández

Business and Finance in Latin America: From the Oil Shock to the Debt Crisis

Editors: Dr Carlo Edoardo Altamura (Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies Geneva) and Dr Sebastian Alvarez (Graduate Institute Geneva/University of Oxford)

Submissions due 31 August 2022

Since the 2008-9 financial crisis, Latin America has experienced a period of sluggish economic activity and increasing levels of external debt. In a world of low interest rates, the liquidity injected into the US and European banking systems flew over into Latin American economies as global demand dropped and commodities prices crashed downwards. The boom of private and public indebtedness over the past decade has increased the economic and financial vulnerabilities of a region that has historically been dependent on international trade and exposed to external shocks such as the current pandemic. In a context where governments have stepped in to offset the impact of the coronavirus crisis, debt levels are now approaching the peak seen during the international debt crisis of the 1980s, raising fears amongst policymakers and business leaders of new defaults and another “lost decade”.

This proposed special issue titled “Business and Finance in Latin America: From the Oil Shock to the Debt Crisis” aims to bring new insights into the current debates by looking at how local and foreign entrepreneurs, financiers and state actors reacted to the unstable economic and political context that preceded and followed the outbreak of the international debt crisis of 1982.

The scholarship on the business history of Latin America has expanded markedly over the last three decades. With the development and consolidation of the discipline since the mid-1980s, the number of historical studies of firms and entrepreneurship in the region grew considerably and covered a large variety of topics and sectors. This includes the foreign investment and diversification strategies of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in Latin America, the origin and evolution of local family-based economic groups and their connections with the social elites and the political ruling class. It encompasses regional and sectoral research on trade, banking, mining, transport, agricultural and manufacturing industries from a historical perspective that engages with the economic, social and organizational theories and other approaches to the study of the firm emerging in industrial countries. In so doing, this research has contributed to improving our understanding of the ways and conditions under which entrepreneurs and companies have succeeded or failed to develop their business activities in the region, as well as the specificities and distinctive character of Latin American capitalism.

However, while the bulk of the scholarship concentrates on firms that dominated before 1914 and the interwar and post-World War II years, the turbulent period of the 1970s and 1980s has received much less attention as firms and public institutions have only recently disclosed their files and opened archives for researchers. Moreover, the work that analyses the evolution of firms and national industries in Latin American during the second economic globalization since the 1980s has focused mainly on the liberalization, privatization and deregulatory policies adopted. Little is known, however, about how the economic crises that the region experienced in these years affected the way firms and entrepreneurs ran their businesses and overcame their debt and financial difficulties. In fact, while the long-term effects that the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s inflicted on the social and economic structures of the region have been extensively recognized and documented, the reasons why some companies disappeared while others survived has not yet been explored. Moreover, the policies implemented in the fifteen years between 1975 and 1990, first in Chile and Argentina, and then elsewhere following the 1982 crisis, totally changed the environment in which business in the region operated. This took the form of a wholesale shift from state-led ISI and a deepening distrust of FDI to open market economies characterised by policies emanating from the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’. Many older firms and business groups collapsed, some foreign investors withdrew while others, like Spanish MNEs, entered, and local business groups that survived and adapted to the new environment began to expand across frontiers, leading to the growth of the so-called ‘multilatinas’.

This Special Issue will contribute to filling this gap in the literature by providing a much more granular analysis of Latin American business and financial dynamics and bringing together a collection of new original historical studies from emerging and established scholars on business history in the region.

Our goal is to shed new light on how the multiple crises of the 1970s and 1980s affected industries and business organizations operating in Latin America and on the different ways in which they dealt with issues such as debt, investment and selling strategies as well as the economic and political risk assessments they undertook. It will do so by focusing on crucial but neglected actors in a region outside the Global North by drawing on material that was not previously available. To that end, the special issue focusses on contributions and interdisciplinary research from scholars who use historical methods and primary sources to explore:

1. The behaviour and business strategies of financial and non-financial companies in the run-up to, and the aftermath of, the 1982 financial fallout.
2. The impact of the debt crisis and the responses of MNEs and domestic firms in Latin America.
3. The way that national and international companies managed economic and political risk in the region during the 1970s and 1980s.
4. How business actors coped with foreign debt, inflation, and the uncertainties unleashed by changing government policies and crises during the 1970s and 1980s.
5. The effects of the debt crisis and economic and structural reforms on state-business and domestic-foreign capital relationships.
6. The long-term outcomes of the crisis and the reorientation of businesses in line with the neoliberal policies of Latin American politics.

In order to attract high quality papers for the special issue we will combine both strategies outlined in the guidelines for Business History special issues, i.e. invited contributions and a Call for Papers:

Three-four invited articles from the presentations at a Colloquium on the Latin American debt crisis of 1982.

Two-three articles from a Call for Papers for this Special Issue.

O Futuro do Grupo BRICS: webinar do IRICE, Ana Bierrembach, Marcos Troyjo e Paulo Roberto de Almeida

 Apenas agora, depois de absorvido por muitas outras tarefas, pude capturar o link do webinar patrocinado pelo embaixador Rubens Barbosa em torno de um "futuro" (se houver) para o Brics. O ceticismo é inteiramente meu...

O Futuro do Grupo BRICS

Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9Q9l8i4gyX4

 

Transmitido ao vivo em 30 de jun. de 2022 

Expositores: 

Ministra Ana Bierrembach, da Secretaria de Comércio Exterior e Assuntos Econômicos do Ministério das Relações Exteriores 

Marcos Prado Troyjo, atual Presidente do Novo Banco de Desenvolvimento (NDB), Banco do BRICS 

Embaixador Paulo Roberto de Almeida, Diplomata e Professor. Atualmente é Diretor de Publicações do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do DF 

Moderador: Rubens Barbosa, Presidente do IRICE e Editor da Revista Interesse Nacional

 

Permito-me registrar que, no dia em que eu participava desse webinar, eu tinha acabado de publicar este livro: 

 

A grande ilusão do Brics e o universo paralelo da diplomacia brasileira, Brasília: Diplomatizzando, 2022, 277 p.; ISBN: 978-65-00-46587-7; Edição Kindle: 1377 KB; ASIN: B0B3WC59F4; At Amazon.com: link: https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0B3WC59F4; na Amazon.com, link: https://www.amazon.com/grande-ilus%C3%A3o-Brics-diplomacia-brasileira-ebook/dp/B0B3WC59F4/ref=sr_1_1?keywords=A+grande+ilus%C3%A3o+do+Brics+e+o+universo+paralelo+da+diplomacia+brasileira&qid=1656513882&sr=8-1

 

E também este artigo, que não figura no livro, pois que terminado na própria noite do webinar: 

 

“O futuro do grupo BRICS”, Brasília, 30 junho 2022, 9 p. Texto conceitual sobre os caminhos enviesados do BRICS pós-guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a Ucrânia, e reflexivo sobre as ordens alternativas no campo econômico e político. Elaborado a propósito de webinar promovido pelo IRICE (embaixador Rubens Barbosa) sobre “O futuro do grupo Brics” (30/06/2022). Postado no Diplomatizzando (link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2022/06/o-futuro-do-grupo-brics-ensaio-por.html).

 

Why China wants to expand BRICS - Antara Ghosal Singh

 Why China wants to expand BRICS

• Antara Ghosal Singh
• Raisina Debates
• Jul 21 2022
• https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/why-china-wants-to-expand-brics/

China’s purpose to expand BRICS is to promote its agenda and grand strategy more forcefully through the BRICS mechanism and stage and diplomatically ease the containment of the US.

The recently concluded 14^th BRICS Leaders’ Meeting in Beijing has once again brought the issue of BRICS expansion into the limelight. This is the second time since the 2017 Xiamen Summit that China has expressed its interest in expanding the group of emerging economies. There have been reports that Iran and Argentina have also announced their interest in formally joining the group. At a time when China and India are locked in a deadly stalemate at the Line of Actual Control, the Chinese proposal to expand BRICS has raised concern in New Delhi. As India determines its stance on this contentious issue, it is important to look into the factors driving China’s BRICS strategy.

Chinese analysts are of the opinion that the economic distress in these countries has been causing domestic political changes, which, in turn, is weakening the BRICS countries’ common identity, position, and enthusiasm to continue promoting the cooperation mechanism.

The growing chorus in China is that of late, BRICS has started showing signs of weakness, has been in retreat, and is lacking coherence in actions. Therefore, by replenishing fresh blood—attracting new members—China plans to inject new impetus into its development. As per the Chinese assessment, the economic performance of BRICS including China, in the past seven or eight years, has deteriorated. In other words, “golden BRICS” has turned into “stone BRICS” (金砖变成石砖). The era of rapid growth of BRICS seems to have passed, most strikingly for member countries like Brazil, South Africa, and Russia. While Brazil’s economy grew at an average annual rate of 1 percent in 2017, South Africa’s average annual GDP growth has been around 1.2 percent during the same time. Meanwhile, Russia’s GDP grew 0.7 percent in 2014, -2 percent in 2015, 0.2 percent in 2016, and 1.8 percent in 2017.

Chinese analysts are of the opinion that the economic distress in these countries has been causing domestic political changes, which, in turn, is weakening the BRICS countries’ common identity, position, and enthusiasm to continue promoting the cooperation mechanism. For example, Brazil and South Africa, which have poor economic performance and unstable domestic political situations, are unwilling to prioritise the BRICS agenda, which they believe will weaken their foreign policy flexibility, and thereby, jeopardise their national interests.^[1]

Now, with the pandemic and the Russia–Ukraine war, the situation has turned grimmer with the original international competitiveness of the BRICS countries clearly losing traction. On the contrary, the economies of developed countries, represented by the United States (US) and the West, are gradually showing signs of recovery. Still occupying a leading position in a new round of technological revolution and industrial transformation, the US has begun to try and regain its leadership of the global economy.^[2] At a time when the overall strength of the BRICS countries has been declining and facing heightened competition from traditional developed country-led cooperation mechanisms, China feels that limiting the BRICS mechanism to its original five members will further reduce its overall global influence and right to speak at global platforms. Hence, China’s interest in further expanding BRICS members.

Still occupying a leading position in a new round of technological revolution and industrial transformation, the US has begun to try and regain its leadership of the global economy.

The second reason is the intensifying China–US competition. Chinese observers note how in the Obama era, the G2 proposition had weakened the significance of BRICS for Chinese foreign policy. However, under the Trump presidency, as the meaning of G2 quickly turned from high-level cooperation to high-decibel confrontation, a larger, better coordinated BRICS became China’s priority. It was also in 2017 when China, for the first time, proposed the concept of an expanded BRICS. Now, with Biden in power, Chinese observers believe that the ‘new Cold War’—initiated during the Trump era—has been taken to a higher level.

For instance, in the backdrop of the Russia–Ukraine war, Europe has been dragged into a new Cold War environment, wherein a cohesive western bloc has been formed, comprising the US and Europe, like the old Cold War era. The Russian–Ukrainian war, they note, has become an excellent glue between the US and Europe. On the other hand, it is argued that in Asia, the US is driving more and more countries—Japan, Australia, India, New Zealand, and South Korea—into ‘smaller circles’ like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, AUKUS, and even into North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Of particular concern to China is how amidst heightened geopolitics, trade conflicts, the impact of the epidemic, and industrial upgrading, the global industrial chain is being restructured at an accelerated pace and efforts are being made to replace the existing ‘US+West+China’ industrial model by newer models, particularly a ‘US+West+India’ model. This, they argue, is aimed at isolating China and delivering a blow to China’s power and position in the upcoming fourth wave of industrialisation. It is against this background that China wants to expand BRICS, promote “ a community of supply chains interests,” and get more and more emerging economies from all over the world to join the BRICS (read China’s) supply chain. By deeply embedding these countries in a China-led supply chain, potential competitors like India can be neutralised, and any effort of excluding or replacing China in the current round of reorganisation of supply chains can be thwarted.

Of particular concern to China is how amidst heightened geopolitics, trade conflicts, the impact of the epidemic, and industrial upgrading, the global industrial chain is being restructured at an accelerated pace and efforts are being made to replace the existing ‘US+West+China’ industrial model by newer models, particularly a ‘US+West+India’ model.

To sum up, for China, the purpose of the new round of BRICS expansion is to diplomatically ease the containment of the US and promote China’s agenda and grand strategy more forcefully through the BRICS mechanism and stage, while preventing existing BRICS members, particularly India, from drifting too far into the US/western camp.^[3]

---

^[1] Li Yiping and Fu Yuheng , “国际合作中的领导权竞争:以“一带一路”倡议与金砖国家合作的战略对接为例”, Southeast Academic Research, 2019, (03), 118-129+248

^[2] Zhao Chunzhe, “China’s thinking and path design for improving BRICs cooperation platform”, 全球化 2018, (11),81-93+134-135

^[3] Wang Zhuo, “Study on Sino-Indian Relation from the Perspective of BRICS”, Journal of Changsha University of Science and Technology (Social Science Edition), 2022,37(03):98-107

The Problem with the Current Russia Sanctions Regime - Mohamed A. El-Erian (Project Syndicate)

 Project Syndicate, Praga -  22.7.2022

The Problem with the Current Russia Sanctions Regime

There is much debate about the effectiveness of Western sanctions, the Ukraine war’s implications for markets and the global economy, and what the West’s next steps should be. While there are few good options, some are clearly worse than others.

Mohamed A. El-Erian

 

Cambridge  – It has been five months since Europe and the United States imposed tough economic and financial sanctions on Russia, a G20 country that was the world’s eleventh-largest economy on the eve of its invasion of Ukraine. While the sanctions have been gradually strengthened in the intervening months, debate rages about their effectiveness, the war’s broader implications for markets and the global economy, and what the West’s next steps should be.

On the first question, although the sanctions have been less effective than Europe and the US had hoped, they also are proving more onerous than the Kremlin claims. Russia’s central bank expects GDP to contract by 8-10% this year, while other forecasters expect a larger fall, together with longer-lasting damage to growth potential. Imports and exports have been severely disrupted, and inflows of foreign investment have essentially stopped. Shortages are multiplying, pushing inflation higher. At this point, the country no longer has a properly functioning foreign-exchange market.

The sanctions would have bitten much harder had the West not opted for a carve-out of Russia’s energy sector, and had many more countries joined the US and Europe in the effort. Because that didn’t happen, Russia has not felt nearly as much pressure as it would have. Moreover, it has been able to continue trading through various side and back doors that will likely become increasingly important as long as the sanctions regime, as currently designed, continues.

Nonetheless, it is only a matter of time before the Russian economy experiences a harder hit. Inventories of imported goods – including many critical technological and industrial inputs – are dwindling fast, and many sectors are becoming less resilient. The cumulative damage to Russia’s economy over time will be significant and long-lasting – a fact that has not yet been fully captured by consensus medium-term forecasts.

The second question concerns global spillovers from the war and the sanctions regime. Most observers agree that Russia’s invasion has increased not just energy insecurity but also food insecurity, highlighting the fallout from the war’s disruption to Ukrainian agricultural exports. But there is still much debate about the West’s use of the economic nuclear sanctions option: the curbs placed on Russia’s central bank and on Russia’s use of the international payments system.

These curbs are far more intrusive than the usual mix of restrictions on sanctioned government and private sector trade and on individuals’ financial dealings. Yet, because they are not subject to any internationally agreed standards, guidelines, or checks and balances, they fall outside the purview of relevant global-governance bodies such as the Bank for International Settlements, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization. 

In a time of war, such oversight might seem like a nicety. But some worry that the sanctions could significantly reduce the dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency and the US financial system’s role as the primary global intermediary for other countries’ savings and investments. After all, a growing number of countries undoubtedly now feel more vulnerable to the reach of US sanctions.

But it is impossible to replace something with nothing, which means that no significant loss of dollar or US financial primacy will occur in the immediate future. Rather, the sanctions will lend further momentum to the gradual process of global economic fragmentation, which was also fueled a few years ago by the tariffs imposed by the Trump administration. More countries now have even more of a reason to pursue greater financial resilience and inherently inefficient forms of self-insurance.

That brings us to the third debate. With no end in sight for the war, what should the West do next? Fearing the implications for energy prices and the supply of gas to Europe, many in the West are tempted to call for a moratorium on any new sanctions – or even for additional carve-outs. Others, however, favor additional measures to hold Russia accountable for its indiscriminate attacks on Ukrainian civilians.

In any case, maintaining the current sanctions regime is not problem-free, owing to the twin objectives of pressuring Russia and limiting the economic disruption to Europe. Moreover, as European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen recently said, it feels as if Russia is “blackmailing” Europe by threatening to disrupt gas supplies at any moment. No wonder the Commission is urging member countries to cut consumption by 15%.

Under the current sanctions regime, the West risks falling between two horses. While easing sanctions could help alleviate concerns about Europe’s economic outlook, this option is a non-starter, given the atrocities that Russian forces are committing in Ukraine. But if the West is serious about pressuring Russia through truly crippling economic and financial sanctions, it needs to bite the bullet and eliminate the carve-outs for energy.

Doing so would undoubtedly have a severe short-term economic impact on European economies and the rest of the world, amplifying the “little fires everywhere” syndrome that I warned about in May. It is therefore critical that governments use their available fiscal space to provide targeted support to vulnerable segments of the population, as well as to fragile countries; and multilateral agencies must support developing countries through aid and a more operational debt relief framework. If done properly, this option would yield better outcomes in the medium and long term than the current strategy.

Muddling through risks bringing about the worst of all possible worlds. It is insufficient to dissuade Russia from continuing its illegal war; it is fueling deeper fragmentation of the international monetary system; and it is not even protecting Europe from a winter gas disruption.

 

Mohamed A. El-Erian, President of Queens' College at the University of Cambridge, is a professor at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania and the author of The Only Game in Town: Central Banks, Instability, and Avoiding the Next Collapse (Random House, 2016).

 

Bibliografia seletiva sobre o BRICS e os Brics - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Bibliografia seletiva sobre o BRICS e os Brics 

 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Diplomata, professor

(www.pralmeida.org; diplomatizzando.blogspot.com)

Seleção de artigos e livros sobre o grupo e seus membros, para fins de palestra.

  

 

Alexandroff, Alan. “The BRICS start a second cycle. Rising BRICSAM; disponível: http://blog.risingbricsam.com/?p=2233 .

Allison, Graham. “China doesnt’t belong in the BRICS”, The Atlantic; disponível: http://theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/03/china-doesnt-belong-in-the-brics/274363/ .

Almeida, Paulo R. A grande ilusão do Brics e o universo paralelo da diplomacia brasileira. Brasília: Diplomatizzando, 2022, 277 p.; Kindle: https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0B3WC59F4 .

________ “Brasil”, In: Silva, Jorge Tavares da (ed.), Brics e a Nova Ordem Internacional. Casal de Cambra: Caleidoscópio; Aveiro: Mare Liberum, 2015, p. 71-115; disponível: https://www.academia.edu/10200076/108_Brasil_no_Brics_2015_ e https://www.academia.edu/attachments/36883658/download_file?s=work_strip. 

________ “O Bric e a substituição de hegemonias: um exercício analítico”, In: Baumann, Renato (org.). O Brasil e os demais BRICs: Comércio e Política. Brasília: CEPAL/IPEA, 2010, p. 131-154; disponível: link: http://www.academia.edu/5794579/086_O_Bric_e_a_substitui%C3%A7%C3%A3o_de_hegemonias_um_exerc%C3%ADcio_anal%C3%ADtico_perspectiva_hist%C3%B3rico-diplom%C3%A1tica_sobre_a_emerg%C3%AAncia_de_um_novo_cen%C3%A1rio_global_2010_.

________ .“To Be or Not the Bric”, Inteligência, ano XI, dez. 2008, p. 22-46; disponível: https://www.academia.edu/72941097/PRAlmeida_BRICs_Inteligencia_Dez.

________ . BRIC: reflexões a partir do Brasil (2008); disponível: https://www.academia.edu/5921117/1920_Bric_reflex%C3%B5es_a_partir_do_Brasil_2008_

Alves, André Gustavo de Miranda Pineli (org.). Os BRICS e seus vizinhos: investimento direto estrangeiro. Brasília: Ipea, 2014; disponível no site do Ipea.

Andrade, Alysson. O Brasil, os Brics e a agenda internacional; disponível: https://www.academia.edu/9951640/O_Brasil_os_BRICS_e_a_agenda_internacional

Arifon, Olivier et alii (coord.). Les Brics, un espace ignoré, Hermès 79. Paris: Éditions do CNRS, 2017.

Badin, Michelle Ratton Sanchez, et alii, “Os acordos regionais preferenciais de comércio do Brasil com o seu entorno”, in: Baumann, Renato; Oliveira, Ivan Tiago Machado (orgs.). Os BRICS e seus vizinhos: comércio e acordos regionais. Brasília: Ipea, 2014, p. 55-101; disponível no site do Ipea.

Ban, Cornel; Blyth, Mark. The BRICs and the Washington Consensus: An introduction. Review of International Political Economy 20 (2), 2013. p. 241–255; disponível: 10.1080/09692290.2013.779374 .

Baumann, Renato et alii (orgs.): BRICS: estudos e documentos. Brasília: Funag, 2015.

________ (orgs.). Os BRICS e seus vizinhos: comércio e acordos regionais. Brasília: Ipea, 2014; disponível no site do Ipea.

Carneiro, Izabel Patriota Pereira (org.). Catálogo Bibliográfico, Brasil, Rússia, Índia, China e África do Sul. 2^a. ed., revista e ampliada. Brasília: Funag, 2011; disponível na Biblioteca Digital da Funag.

Carneiro, Flavio Lyrio; Oliveira, Ivan Tiago Machado (2014), “As relações comerciais do Brasil com o seu entorno”, in: Baumann, Renato; Oliveira, Ivan Tiago Machado (orgs.). Os BRICS e seus vizinhos: comércio e acordos regionais. Brasília: Ipea, 2014, p. 15-54; disponível no site do Ipea.

Cohen, Stefan Philip. India, emerging power. Washington: Brokings Institution, 2000. 

Cozendey, Carlos Marcio. “BRIC a BRICS em um mundo em transformação”, in: Pimentel, José Vicente Sá (org.). O Brasil, os BRICS e a agenda internacional. 2^a. ed., rev., ampl.; Brasília: Funag, 2013; disponível na Biblioteca Digital da Funag.

Daldegan, William; Carvalho, Carlos Eduardo. Brics as a Dynamic and in Process Phenomenon of Global Planning: An Analysis Based on the 2009-2020 Annual Summit Declarations, Estudos Internacionais, abril 2022; disponível: http://periodicos.pucminas.br/index.php/estudosinternacionais/article/view/25807.

Domenach, Jean-Luc. La Chine m’inquiète. Paris: Perrin, 2008.

Fernandes, José Carlos Silvestre. “BRICS, IBAS e o contexto das relações entre o Brasil e a Ásia”, in: Barbosa, Pedro Henrique Batista (org.). Os desafios e oportunidades na relação Brasil-Ásia na perspectiva de jovens diplomatas. Brasília: Funag, 2017, p. 339-379; disponível na Biblioteca Digital da Funag.

Khanna, Parag. The Second World: How Emerging Powers Are Redefining Global Competition in the Twentieth-first Century. New York: Random House, 2008.

Lukyanov, Fyodor. “Russia on Brics: expectations and realities”, in: Pimentel, José Vicente Sá (org.). Brazil, BRICS and the International agenda. Brasília: Funag, 2013, p. 539-567; disponível na Biblioteca Digital da Funag.

Mahbubani, Kishore. The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East. New York: Public Affairs, 2008.

Moore, Candice. “BRICS partnership: A case of South-South Cooperation? Exploring the roles of South Africa and Africa; disponível: http://www.igd.org.za/home/206-brics-partnership-a-case-of-south-south-cooperation-exploring-the-roles-of-south-africa-and-africa .

Muhr, Thomas. Beyond ‘BRICS’: ten theses on South–South cooperation in the twenty- first century, Third World Quarterly 37 (4), 2016. p. 630–648; disponível: 10.1080/01436597.2015.1108161.

Oliveira, Ivan Tiago Machado; Carneiro, Flavio Lyrio; Bacelete, Ricardo G., “As relações comerciais da China com seus vizinhos”, in: Baumann, Renato; Oliveira, Ivan Tiago Machado (orgs.). Os BRICS e seus vizinhos: comércio e acordos regionais. Brasília: Ipea, 2014, p. 255-279; disponível no site do Ipea.

Oropeza Garcia, Areturo (coord.). BRICS, el difícil camino entre el escepticismo y el asombro. Mexico: UNAM, 2011.

Pimentel, José Vicente Sá (org.). O Brasil, os BRICS e a agenda internacional. 2^a. ed., rev., ampl.; Brasília: Funag, 2013; disponível na Biblioteca Digital da Funag.

________ (ed.). Brazil, BRICS and the International agenda. Brasília: Funag, 2013.

________ (org.). Debatendo o BRICS. Brasília: Funag, 2013; disponível na Biblioteca Digital da Funag.

Ribeiro, Jackson. O BRCIS e seu lugar na governança global: análise de suas instituições financeiras de uma perspectiva brasileira; disponível: https://www.academia.edu/57249772/O_BRICS_E_SEU_LUGAR_NA_GOVERNAN%C3%87A_GLOBAL_An%C3%A1lise_de_suas_institui%C3%A7%C3%B5es_financeiras_de_uma_perspectiva_brasileira.

Rodrik, Dani. “What the world needs from the BRICS”, Project Syndicate; disponível: https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-brics-and-global-economic-leadership-by-dani-rodrik .

Stuenkel, Oliver: The Brics and the future of global order. Lanham, MA: Lexington Books, 2015.

________ . Brics e o futuro da ordem global. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 2017.

________ . Why Brazil has not criticised Russia over Crimea, 2014; NOREF; disponível: https://www.oliverstuenkel.com/2014/05/27/criticised-russia-crimea/

Thorstensen, Vera; Oliveira, Ivan Tiago Machado (orgs.). Os Brics na OMC: políticas comerciais comparadas de Brasil, Rússia, China e África do Sul. Brasília: Ipea, 2012.

Toledo Stella, Tomas Henrique: O declínio relativo do G7 e a ascensão do Brics; disponível:https://www.academia.edu/44631330/O_decl%C3%ADnio_relativo_do_G7_e_a_ascens%C3%A3o_do_BRICS. 

________ . A reconfiguração do poder mundial após a crise de 2008: o declínio relativo do G7 e amergência do BRICS; disponível: https://www.academia.edu/44631284/A_Reconfigura%C3%A7%C3%A3o_de_poder_mundial_ap%C3%B3s_a_crise_de_2008_o_decl%C3%ADnio_relativo_do_G7_e_a_emerg%C3%AAncia_do_BRICS.

Wolf, Martin. Does the BRICS Group Matter? Council on Foreign Relations, 2021; disponível: https://www.cfr.org/interview/does-brics-group-matter .

 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 4203: 22 julho 2022, 4 p.

 

Zelenski critica neutralidade de Bolsonaro frente à invasão russa (O Povo)

 Zelenski critica neutralidade de Bolsonaro frente à invasão russa

O Povo, Jul. 22, 2022

 

Presidente ucraniano compara atitude do governante brasileiro à de líderes que permaneceram neutros no início da Segunda Guerra Mundial. "Preciso de uma posição do Brasil", diz ter cobrado durante telefonema.O presidente da Ucrânia, Volodimir Zelenski, criticou a "neutralidade" do presidente Jair Bolsonaro diante da invasão de seu país pela Rússia, cobrando uma posição brasileira e comparando a atitude do governante brasileiro com a de líderes que permaneceram neutros durante o início da Segunda Guerra Mundial.  Zelenski deu detalhes da conversa telefônica que teve com o colega brasileiro.

"Ontem eu falei com o presidente Bolsonaro e sou grato a ele por essa conversa. Não foi a minha primeira conversa com o presidente do Brasil. Eu não apoio a posição dele de neutralidade. Eu não acredito que alguém possa se manter neutro quando há uma guerra no mundo", afirmou Zelenski durante entrevista à TV Globo divulgada nesta terça-feira (19/07). 

"Na Segunda Guerra Mundial, muitos líderes ficaram neutros num primeiro momento. Isso permitiu que os fascistas engolissem metade da Europa e se expandissem mais e mais, capturando toda a Europa. Isso aconteceu por causa da neutralidade. Ninguém pode ficar no meio do caminho, ninguém pode dizer ‘vou ser um mediador'. Mediador de quê? Um mediador na guerra? Entre quem?", argumentou o presidente ucraniano. 

"Preciso de uma posição do Brasil"  "A guerra não é entre a Ucrânia e a Rússia, é a guerra da Rússia contra o povo ucraniano. Porque, mais uma vez, eles estão no nosso território. Nós não chegaremos a um meio-termo porque um país declarou guerra contra o outro. Não. Um país capturou uma parte do nosso território há oito anos", disse Zelenski, fazendo referência à anexação da Crimeia pela Rússia em 2014. 

"E nessa época havia muitas pessoas que queriam ser mediadoras e permanecer neutras. Por causa disso, permitiram, desde 2014, que a Rússia lançasse essa segunda onda de invasão, e eles estão invadindo outras partes. Esse é o significado de ‘neutralidade'", criticou. "Portanto, eu não apoio essa posição. Eu disse isso para o presidente: ‘Preciso de uma posição do Brasil'", acrescentou. 

Zelenski afirmou que a Ucrânia não ficaria neutra e apoiaria a soberania brasileira caso uma situação semelhante acontecesse no Brasil.  "Precisamos do apoio que mencionei ontem ao presidente. Eu disse para ele: ‘Queremos o apoio do Brasil'. Eu disse: ‘Se amanhã alguém atacar vocês, não ficaremos neutros, independentemente do histórico da nossa relação com esse país que venha a violar a sua soberania. Se alguém capturar a sua terra, matar o seu povo, estuprar as suas mulheres, torturar as suas crianças, como poderei dizer que sou neutro? Eu não tenho esse direito, esse é o mundo moderno'. Escolhendo a neutralidade, permitimos ao senhor Putin pensar que não está sozinho neste mundo, só isso. E as outras coisas, relações comerciais, são secundárias", afirmou Zelenski. 

Respondendo a uma pergunta sobre a conversa com Bolsonaro, o ucraniano disse que o brasileiro afirmou apoiar "a soberania e a integridade territorial da Ucrânia".  "Eu quero acreditar nisso. Ele me falou assim: 'o Brasil realmente compreende a dor do que está acontecendo com vocês, mas a nossa posição é neutra'", relatou Zelenski. 

Relação amistosa com Putin 

Na segunda-feira, Bolsonaro conversou pelo telefone com Zelenski, na primeira conversa entre os dois desde o começo da guerra, em 24 de fevereiro. O governo brasileiro não divulgou detalhes sobre a chamada.  O presidente ucraniano afirmou no Twitter que ambos falaram sobre medidas para desbloquear as exportações de trigo da Ucrânia, cujo escoamento está prejudicado pela invasão russa. Zelenski também frisou a importância de mais países aderirem às sanções do Ocidente contra a Rússia.  Desde o início da guerra na Ucrânia, Bolsonaro vem tentando manter uma posição não alinhada aos interesses de Moscou ou de Kiev. O presidente brasileiro tem uma relação amistosa com o presidente russo, Vladimir Putin, com quem se reuniu em Moscou poucos dias antes do início da guerra, e não chegou a condenar a invasão russa do país vizinho como os países ocidentais – mas tampouco faz críticas duras às sanções do Ocidente aplicadas contra Moscou, como a China.  

Bolsonaro e o ministro das Relações Exteriores, Carlos França, disseram que o Brasil quer comprar diesel da Rússia, e que um acordo estaria sendo negociado com o país para adquirir o combustível a um preço mais baixo, em dois meses. No último domingo, Bolsonaro afirmou que essas negociações estavam bastante avançadas, sem dar maiores detalhes.  md/lf (EFE, ots)

https://www.opovo.com.br/noticias/mundo/2022/07/22/zelenski-critica-neutralidade-de-bolsonaro-frente-a-invasao-russa.html

Un rapport du Sénat appelle à suspendre la réforme du corps diplomatique français - Le Figaro

Un rapport du Sénat appelle à suspendre la réforme du corps diplomatique

Par Le Figaro avec AFP

Publié le 19/07/2022 à 14:58, mis à jour le 19/07/2022 à 15:22

Un rapport du Sénat préconise de suspendre la réforme du corps diplomatique. laurencesoulez / stock.adobe.com

La réforme du corps diplomatique, à l'origine d'une grève rarissime au Quai d'Orsay début juin, risque en l'état d'affaiblir le rayonnement de la France à l'international et doit être suspendue le temps de lui adjoindre, a minima, des garde-fous, préconise un rapport du Sénat présenté mardi 19 juillet.

«Cette réforme n'apporte aucune amélioration, bien au contraire, au statut et à l'efficacité de nos diplomates», a déclaré Christian Cambon, président (LR) de la commission des Affaires étrangères du Sénat lors d'une conférence de presse à Paris. «C'est une affaire assez grave à un moment où plus que jamais nous avons besoin de renforcer notre diplomatie et (...) où nous avons besoin de diplomates aguerris et compétents», a-t-il ajouté, citant notamment le cas le dossier du nucléaire iranien ou les offensives diplomatiques de Pékin et de Moscou.

«Mise en extinction»

Voulue par Emmanuel Macron, la réforme de la haute fonction publique crée un nouveau corps d'administrateurs de l'État et prévoit que les hauts fonctionnaires ne soient plus rattachés à une administration spécifique mais soient, au contraire, invités à en changer régulièrement tout au long de leur carrière. Pour les quelque 700 diplomates directement concernés par la réforme, cela se traduit par une fusion puis une «mise en extinction» progressive d'ici à 2023 des deux corps historiques de la diplomatie française, ministres plénipotentiaires (ambassadeurs) et conseillers des Affaires étrangères.

À VOIR AUSSI - Reportage : près de 200 diplomates rassemblés devant le Quai d'Orsay contre la suppression des corps diplomatiques

 

En clair, ces deux corps pourront désormais être pourvus par des administrateurs de l'État - et non plus pour une grosse partie d'entre eux par des diplomates de formation - une évolution qui fait notamment craindre à ses détracteurs une perte d'expertise sur le terrain et en négociation et à terme une crise des vocations.

«Suspendre» l'application de la réforme

L'application de la réforme «fragilise l'appareil diplomatique français et affaiblira le rayonnement de la France qui tient son rang de puissance du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies de l'excellence de ses personnels diplomatiques plus que de ses performances économiques ou militaires», épinglent dans le rapport les sénateurs Jean-Pierre Grand (Les Indépendants - République et Territoires) et André Vallini(Socialiste, Écologiste et Républicain).

Face à ce constat, la commission du Sénat appelle à «suspendre» l'application de la réforme, à «prendre le temps d'ouvrir un dialogue approfondi avec les personnels» et à mettre en œuvre huit de ses préconisations conçues comme des garde-fous. Le rapport recommande notamment de poser comme condition pour devenir chef de mission diplomatique «d'avoir exercé pendant au moins trois ans des fonctions de numéro deux de mission diplomatique» - une exception pour 20% des postes d'ambassadeurs pourrait toutefois être prévue.

À LIRE AUSSILa suppression du corps diplomatique entérinée sous une pluie de critiques

Il préconise également la mise en place d'un droit de regard - sous la forme d'un avis public - des commissions «permanentes compétentes» du Parlement sur la nomination d'ambassadeurs au sein de grandes enceintes internationales, comme le G20. Le 2 juin, plusieurs dizaines de diplomates, soutenus sur Twitter par des ambassadeurs chevronnés, s'étaient rassemblés devant le Quai d'Orsay à Paris pour exprimer leur «fatigue» et leur colère face au «manque de considération» contenu selon eux dans la réforme.

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À VOIR AUSSI - Diplomates en grève: ce que révèle le mouvement

 

21 commentaires

• Chorebe

le 19/07/2022 à 16:28

Le Sénat est très bien inspiré de se saisir de l’affaire. La décision prise à l’Elysée pour s’attirer les bonnes grâces de la haute administration en permettant à chaque haut fonctionnaire d’espérer un jour être ambassadeur et de percevoir ainsi les indemnités de résidence attachées à la fonction diplomatique, était particulièrement redoutable. Le Quai d’Orsay est la seule administration où l’on parle vraiment des langues étrangères, bien que certains énarques ne brillent vraiment pas dans ce domaine. Croit-on vraiment que tout administrateur de ministère technique pourra faire ses discours et ses interviews en langues étrangères, et même en anglais? Et quid de la négociation? C’est un métier qui ne s’invente pas.

• gerard38lf

le 19/07/2022 à 16:28

Les senateurs ont bloqué le vote des femmes de 1920 a 1945
C’est dire si ce sont des fanatiques de la reforme
Snif

• anonyme

le 19/07/2022 à 16:16

Il y a toujours eu une part de hasard dans le choix des diplomates recrutés par l’ENA puisque c’est le rang de sortie qui déterminait si vous alliez au Quai d’Orsay ou à la sécurité sociale

 

 

A busca obsessiva de uma Ordem Mundial Alternativa - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

A busca obsessiva de uma Ordem Mundial Alternativa

Quando Amorim diz que não se pode continuar com a mesma ordem mundial de 70 anos atrás — entrevista a Roberto D’Avila, na GloboNews, em 21/07/2022 —, supõe-se que ele já tenha pensado em alguma proposta alternativa. 

Se for a proposta da dupla China e Rússia, ou por meio do Brics (que a China tem a intenção de transformar em uma organização que possa competir com o G7 e a OCDE), Amorim precisaria provar que, se por acaso implantada de forma concorrencial, ela será melhor  qualitativamente do que a de Bretton Woods (1944), baseada no multilateralismo irrestrito, em regimes políticos que são democracias de mercado, e na defesa de amplas liberdades e na promoção dos Direitos Humanos!

Alguém acredita nisso?

Meu quilombo de resistência intelectual, o blog Diplomatizzando, aguarda o detalhamento da nova política externa do lulopetismo diplomático versão 3.0 (a 2.0 foi um desastre, a primeira também).

Antes eram os altermundialistas ou antiglobalizadores de esquerda. Sumiram? Depois os idiotas antiglobalistas de direita: ridículos! Logo mais, voltam os alternativos de esquerda. Quanto besteirol suportaremos? Loucuras recorrentes de um extremo a outro?

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Um balanço provisório da ausência de politica externa de 2019 a 2022 - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Preparei um artigo mais longo, para a imprensa internacional, escrito diretamente em francês, em torno do balanço desastroso da (falta de) política externa no desgoverno Bolsonaro, assim como dos prejuízos incorridos pela diplomacia profissional. Já traduzi para o Português, mas aguardo as eleições para publicar no Brasil. 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Um balanço provisório da ausência de politica externa de 2019 a 2022

O Bozo não estará mais no poder para assumir os custos da política externa insana que impôs ao país, sobretudo no periodo do chanceler acidental, de janeiro de 2019 a março de 2021.
A perda de investimentos e a ausência de cooperação bilateral, ao lado de possíveis boicotes comerciais determinados por empresas e consumidores, são os prejuízos mais visíveis. Mas existem desgastes invisíveis e outros recuos intangíveis também, devido a ações erráticas e completamente fora dos padrões normais que se esperam de um grande país.
O Brasil de Bozo deixou de ser um Estado confiável, sobretudo na própria região onde sua diplomacia profissional costumava assumir a liderança de iniciativas de Integração. 
Foi como se um país inteiro tivesse sumido do mapa pela falta de diálogo e mesmo de presença com que o incapaz, ignorante e mal educado dirigente penalizou uma diplomacia outrora prestigiada na região e no mundo. 
O Brasil se apequenou, diminuiu de tamanho, se ausentou de interações e exibiu uma postura não cooperativa nas frentes ambientais, de direitos humanos e de contatos diretos entre chefes de governo durante o período do mais medíocre chefe de Estado de toda a história do Estado independente.
Não haverá NADA a comemorar no bicentenário; ao contrário, representará uma tentativa de sabotar o próprio sentido dessa data simbólica no itinerário da nação, dada a obsessão do dirigente em face de sua derrota iminente.