1988) Crise de confianca nos PIGS da Uniao Europeia: o euro na berlinda

Os dois grandes jornais americanos, NYT e WP, publicaram materias analiticas sobre a crise de confiança nos chamados PIGS: Portugal, Irlanda (e Itália), Grécia e Espanha.

Debt Crisis in Euro Zone Is Severe Political Test for Bloc
By STEVEN ERLANGER
The New York Times, February 6, 2010

PARIS — What began with worries about the solvency of Greece in the face of high deficits, fake budget figures and low growth has quickly become the most severe test of the 16-nation euro zone in its 11-year history.

Anxiety about the health of the euro, which has spread from Greece to Portugal, Spain and Italy, is not simply a crisis of debts, rating agencies and volatile markets. The issue has at its heart elements of a political crisis, because it goes to the central dilemma of the European Union: the continuing grip of individual states over economic and fiscal policy, which makes it difficult for the union as a whole to exercise the political leadership needed to deal effectively with a crisis.

A policy of muddling through may be comfortable in political terms, but experts warn it can have dire economic consequences. Jean-Paul Fitoussi, professor of economics at the Institute of Political Studies in Paris, said that European leaders had “handled this crisis very badly,” feeding market speculation and greed.

Greece’s ratio of public debt to gross domestic product is no higher than Germany’s, and Greece has not defaulted, he said, but European leaders have done too little to calm the markets and rating agencies.

While no one expects that the European Union will allow Greece or the others to default or the euro zone to collapse, European leaders and the Central Bank will almost surely have to bend the rules to provide guarantees or loans, if necessary. But even tiding over countries in trouble will not solve the main flaw in the euro: the sharp divergence of national economies that share a common currency without significant fiscal coordination, let alone a single treasury.

“The challenges facing the euro zone are very serious,” said Simon Tilford, chief economist for the Center for European Reform in London. “For countries that have become pretty uncompetitive in the euro zone and have weak public finances, the current environment is very dangerous.”

It does not help matters that the European Union is undergoing a major political transition to new leaders, a new Commission and Parliament, and a new governing treaty, the Lisbon Treaty, which creates a new president and foreign affairs chief. But even if all these positions were filled, serious questions remain about whether the union or its leading member states will take charge before further damage is done.

In some sense, there is a game of chicken being played, with Greece counting on help and other countries holding back until Athens pays a steep price for its profligacy and manipulation of statistics. But the delay is costly, and there are deeper structural problems that few want to discuss.

Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain — known now as the PIIGS, if Ireland is included — are the weak sisters of Europe, with high structural deficits matched with low prospects for the kind of economic growth and productivity improvements that can bring them back to health.

The north-south split is partly geographic, partly cultural, partly religious and partly historical, but the southerners tend to be poorer and to have less competitive economies.

“The markets are having fun testing the euro,” said Nicolas Véron, a senior fellow at Bruegel, an economic policy research institute in Brussels. But the markets are also increasing pressure on the biggest European economies, like Germany and France, to figure out ways to rescue Greece, which is already facing strikes in light of current austerity measures, and to bolster the others.

But with the European Union undergoing a triple political transition, it is not entirely clear where that leadership will come from.

“Who’s in charge now?” asked Antonio Missoroli, director of studies for the European Policy Center in Brussels. “Nobody yet, and it may still take time.”

There is a newly nominated European Commission and now a new European president, Herman Van Rompuy, and European minister for foreign affairs, Catherine Ashton. The commissioner in charge of this crisis, Joaquín Almunia, is a lame duck, due to switch jobs and become competition commissioner.

Mr. Van Rompuy has announced an informal economic summit meeting for next Thursday, to get the member nations to concentrate on the crisis.

Default for a member of the euro zone is simply unacceptable, European officials and analysts say — a country is not a bank. At the moment, even calling in the International Monetary Fund to help Greece is considered too embarrassing and not yet necessary, given the new Greek government’s apparent determination to deal realistically with its problems.

More likely, they say, is a set of bilateral loans or loan guarantees from richer countries like Germany. Leaders in France, Germany and other European nations have already begun discussing how such aid might be structured, officials said last week.

“It’s highly unlikely Greece will be allowed to default,” Mr. Missoroli said. “But no one wants to say that out loud to take the pressure off the Greek government.”

But it is also unprecedented, and difficult politically, for the European Union, or any member country, to impose conditions for economic adjustment on another member country, which is why some analysts urge the involvement of the International Monetary Fund.

Jacques Mistral, an economist at the French Institute for International Relations, said that the main actors now were Jean-Claude Trichet, president of the European Central Bank, and the leaders and finance ministers of Germany and France.

“That’s the troika, and they’re leading the process to explore different ways and compromises,” Mr. Mistral said. “When there is a will there is a path.”

But summoning that will has proved difficult in the northern tier, which mistrusts the southerners. Greece is a prime example of the disease in the euro zone, said Mr. Tilford, the economist in London, made worse by political mismanagement; the global recession, which has hit tax receipts; and the impossibility of devaluing a shared currency.

Portugal, the poorest country in the euro zone, has been stagnating for years, proving that membership in the euro “is not a panacea,” he added.

In addition, Portugal has something of a political crisis, with Parliament voting down an austerity plan on Friday that was promoted by the minority Socialist government.

Spain has relatively low debt, but high unemployment and weak banks, and after the bursting of the housing bubble it can no longer rely on construction and inflated asset prices to propel growth.

These aspects, together with the larger size of the Spanish economy, had led Nouriel Roubini, a professor at New York University, to suggest this week that Spain is a bigger threat to the euro zone than Greece.

At the same time, some northern countries, like Germany and the Netherlands, are still playing “beggar thy neighbor” by their reluctance to stimulate their own domestic purchasing, which could help weaker countries to export.

“The southerners can do their best to cut costs and be competitive,” Mr. Tilford said. “But they need the others to create more domestic demand and be less export dependent.”

Critics like Mr. Fitoussi are left wondering why the crisis was ever allowed to expand to this point. “This is much ado about nothing,” he said. “But the nothing can ruin the whole project. I don’t think the euro is in danger. But the leaders are taking too much time.”

==============

Debt crisis unsettles European economy
By Anthony Faiola
Washington Post Foreign Service
Saturday, February 6, 2010; A01

LONDON -- Governments in Athens, Madrid and Lisbon struggled on Friday to quell fears of a looming debt crisis in Europe that is pummeling the euro and rippling across global markets, as authorities vowed to impose fiscal austerity and plug their yawning budget deficits. The problem, however, is that investors don't appear to believe them.

Senior officials at the major rating agencies on Friday played down the risk of an immediate debt crisis, saying even nations such as Greece have enough reserves to put off for months a day of financial reckoning. Yet investor doubts over the will of Greece, Portugal and other nations to right their accounts have sparked a crisis of confidence that is seeping into stock and corporate bond markets across Europe and beyond. It is especially hitting banks and other institutions with broad exposure to the sovereign debt of the "PIGS" of Europe -- Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain.

Investor panic is threatening to drive up the cost of borrowing for myriad nations around the world and to destabilize global currency markets, with the falling euro and strengthening dollar already hitting U.S. exporters by making such items as American beef and U.S. steel more expensive overseas. The euro, the principal European currency, fell Friday to its lowest level in eight months, tumbling almost 1 percent against the dollar.

The crisis unfolding in Europe has some parallels to the debt crises that hit Latin America and Asia in the past, particularly in how Greece's problems have spread so quickly to other countries in the region with similar economic woes.

But there are major differences. Analysts said the healthy, large economies of the "eurozone" -- namely, Germany and France -- are likely to step in to prevent a default in a weaker neighbor, if only to head off the turmoil it might cause in the value of the euro.

Still, analysts remain concerned that the problems in Europe could spread to emerging markets. And although the chances of a default by Greece may be low, its impact would be felt by investors worldwide, including in the United States; roughly 70 percent of Greek bonds are held by foreigners, from pension funds to global commercial banks.

Investors also drove up to fresh highs the cost of insuring against a default in Greece, Spain and Portugal. In some instances, analysts say, those fears may not be wholly misplaced.

Portugal, in recent days, has been swallowed up in the debt market panic that began in Greece late last year. Portuguese officials have pledged to slash spending. Nevertheless, opposition lawmakers on Friday pushed through a controversial bill funneling tens of millions of euros to the Azores and Madeira islands in a move the country's finance minister openly warned could have "grave consequences for Portugal's public accounts."

In Greece and Spain, analysts additionally fear bouts of civil unrest that could roll back attempts to address the fiscal problems. The Greek government's pledge to slash spending and curb public- sector pay sparked protests in Athens on Thursday; customs officials and tax collectors walked off the job in the first of a number of planned mobilizations against government austerity measures set to continue next week.

Though E.U. officials demanding tighter spending have signed off on Greece's plan, they are dispatching a team to review government accounts, which were found late last year to have been grossly underestimating the extent of the country's economic woes.

In Spain, government union leaders on Thursday also vowed a series of protests against planned cuts, while opposition parties have threatened to hold a no-confidence vote on Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. So far, analysts note, only Ireland, whose bonds have been less hard-hit by the current turmoil, has pushed through the serious cuts that have demonstrated its willingness to deal with its huge deficit.

"The fix of this problem needs to be a political solution, and you can't easily persuade people or politicians to accept this kind of medicine," said Steven Bell, chief economist of GLC, the London-based hedge fund.

Analysts said some institutional holders are dumping Greek bonds in particular because stricter borrowing rules are coming back into effect later this year at the European Central Bank. The ECB has been allowing banks, including those holding significant portions of Greek bonds, to put up riskier investments as collateral for loans to help them through the financial crisis.

But the ECB is tightening those standards later this year, when banks will be allowed to use only top-rated bonds as collateral. Fears that Greek bond ratings may lose their investment-grade status in the coming months have led some banks to sell them at a loss.

"As they see the ratings on these bonds going down, investors can't wait anymore -- they are acting now, liquidating them at huge losses into the market," said Steven Major, head of fixed-income research at London-based HSBC.

A default by Greece or any other country in the 16-nation eurozone would be potentially catastrophic to the region, leading, analysts say, to possible eviction from the monetary union and severely testing the soundness of Europe's integration. Most analysts believe the eurozone's economic powerhouses might ultimately come to the aid of Greece, currently the most troubled nation in the region, in much the way Washington bailed out Mexico in the 1990s. European officials have offered mixed signals about their willingness to do so.

But analysts say the alternative -- having the International Monetary Fund rescue a eurozone country -- would be so deeply embarrassing to Europe's major powers that they would opt to aid Greece.

Analysts are also growing more worried about the U.S. budget deficit, which remains higher than that of most eurozone nations. But Greece, Spain and other troubled countries in Europe do not command the kind of economic clout the United States does and, in many cases, have yet to escape the Great Recession.

Spain, for instance, reported Friday that it has yet to climb out of the recession, announcing that its economy contracted by 0.1 percent in the fourth quarter of 2009. Its unemployment rate is hovering near 20 percent and is still foundering amid a U.S.-style real estate bust.

1927) Diplomacia partidaria: o Itamaraty muda os costumes

Brasil: Política Externa
Bandeiras ideológicas
Diogo Schelp
Revista Veja, edição n. , 2151 - 10 de fevereiro de 2010

A análise das notas oficiais do Itamaraty durante o governo Lula mostra subserviência aos interesses de Chávez e desrespeito a princípios universais

UM PESO, DUAS MEDIDAS
As notas do Itamaraty condenam a prisão da birmanesa Aung San Suu Kyi, mas ignoram a de Raúl Baduel (à dir.). As posições brasileiras sobre questões regionais parecem emanar diretamente de Chávez (ao lado, entre Lula e Celso Amorim)

Na Venezuela, há quarenta cidadãos presos apenas por discordar de Hugo Chávez. Um deles é Raúl Baduel, ex-ministro da Defesa, que rompeu com Chávez por se opor aos planos do tirano de se perpetuar no poder. O Ministério das Relações Exteriores do Brasil nunca emitiu uma única nota de repúdio à prisão de Baduel. Desde que Lula assumiu a Presidência, há sete anos, o Itamaraty mantém silêncio a respeito das medidas autoritárias na Venezuela. Outros países recebem um tratamento diferente. A diplomacia brasileira, por exemplo, divulgou três notas criticando a repressão política em Mianmar, na Ásia, duas delas contra a prisão domiciliar da vencedora do Prêmio Nobel da Paz Aung San Suu Kyi. O que motivou a posição desigual nos casos de Baduel e da dissidente birmanesa e em outros temas externos? Se fosse para defender os interesses nacionais do Brasil, o correto seria manter-se fiel aos princípios que norteiam as relações exteriores desde a promulgação da Constituição de 1988 – entre os quais a defesa dos valores democráticos e dos direitos humanos. "Contudo, o que tem orientado a diplomacia brasileira nos últimos anos são as posições ideológicas do partido que está no poder", diz Rubens Barbosa, ex-embaixador do Brasil em Washington. "Com isso, o Itamaraty trocou uma política de estado por uma política partidária." A primeira interessava ao Brasil. A segunda, ao PT. A primeira obedece a princípios. A segunda, a bandeiras partidárias.

A política externa é atribuição do Poder Executivo e, como tal, está subordinada ao presidente da República. Em governos anteriores, as decisões nessa área levavam em conta o conhecimento técnico dos diplomatas de carreira, a tradição brasileira e os princípios universalmente consagrados da convivência pacífica entre os povos. Essa tradição foi rompida ao se delegar a política externa aos humores dos radicais esquerdistas. Para compreender o alcance do viés ideológico na definição da política externa brasileira, VEJA fez um levantamento de todas as notas oficiais divulgadas pelo Itamaraty desde 2003, o começo do governo Lula. No total, foram mais de 4 600 comunicados, muitos deles informes técnicos sobre viagens do presidente. A reportagem se fixou na análise de 296 dessas notas, justamente aquelas em que o Itamaraty dá a saber a posição oficial do Brasil a respeito de questões conflituosas ou polêmicas. São notas reveladoras.

As notas sobre o conflito no Oriente Médio são a manifestação clara de opção ideológica em detrimento dos interesses nacionais permanentes (veja o quadro ao lado). Ao Brasil, que almeja legitimamente aumentar seu protagonismo internacional, interessaria não o engajamento ao lado de um dos contendores, mas a mais notória neutralidade nas complexas disputas do Oriente Médio. O comprometimento do Itamaraty é ainda mais evidente nos temas latino-americanos. As notas defenderam manobras liberticidas dos governos esquerdistas da Bolívia, da Venezuela e de Cuba, mas condenaram a deposição do presidente hondurenho Manuel Zelaya. Como ficou claro no episódio, Zelaya decidiu rasgar a Constituição de seu país para, com o apoio de Hugo Chávez, dar um golpe. "O episódio de Honduras confirmou um fenômeno preocupante: as posições do Itamaraty e de Chávez na política regional coincidem quase sempre", diz José Botafogo Gonçalves, presidente do Centro Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais, no Rio de Janeiro.

O Executivo tem todo o direito de buscar suas preferências em política externa e – desde que isso tenha sido abertamente discutido na campanha eleitoral – fazer guinadas nos rumos da diplomacia. Os limites dessas manobras, porém, são dados pela tradição diplomática do país e pela persecução dos interesses nacionais permanentes – aqueles que são revertidos em benefício da maioria, e não da minoria no poder. Nos Estados Unidos, o presidente Barack Obama mudou o tom da diplomacia, mas não seus objetivos básicos: vencer a guerra ao terror e barrar a proliferação nuclear em países párias, para citar dois exemplos. No Brasil, a mudança de rumo foi desastrosa. É antiga, legítima e positiva para todos os brasileiros a reivindicação de um assento permanente no Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas. A diplomacia petista está sempre reafirmando essa meta. Mas também não perde uma chance de arruinar qualquer possibilidade de isso vir a ocorrer. O alinhamento automático de Brasília com ditaduras da América Latina, Ásia e África é uma deferência aos radicais do PT, mas um desastre internacional de previsíveis, duradouras e trágicas consequências para as pretensões brasileiras.

1926) Universidades americanas: a excelencia vem de baixo

A receita é muito simples: se você quer ter universidades excelentes, comece com escolas primárias e secundárias excelentes, públicas, de preferência...

Tales Out of School
By CLAUDIA GOLDIN
The New York Times Book Review, February 7, 2010

Book Review:
THE GREAT AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
Its Rise to Preeminence, Its Indispensable National Role, Why It Must Be Protected
By Jonathan R. Cole
616 pp. PublicAffairs. $35

Of the top 20 universities in the world, according to one 2008 reckoning, just three were outside the United States. Of the top 50, just 14 were. American colleges and universities are unquestionably pre-eminent in teaching and research, attracting students and faculty members from around the world. We may no longer be the nation that exports cars. But we are the nation that exports higher education.

This is a relatively new phenomenon. Before the 1940s many of America’s greatest scholars and scientists went abroad to study. Americans have won a majority of Nobel Prizes in science and medicine since 1955, but before 1935 Americans took home far fewer of those trophies.

As provost of Columbia University for 14 years and a professor of sociology and dean of faculties before that, Jonathan R. Cole is in an excellent position to write about the rise of the American research university and its special contribution to American life. In “The Great American University,”he makes a case for the extraordinary role such institutions play in improving our daily lives. He also argues that these “jewels in our nation’s crown” face a host of serious threats.

As the parents of every prospective college student know all too well, America offers a mind-boggling array of choices. About 1,600 public and nonprofit private institutions grant a bachelor’s degree, while an additional 1,100 two-year colleges are often the gateway to a four-year education. But Cole is concerned primarily with research universities (and medical schools), the 125 or so institutions that do the most to foster innovations that “enhance our standard of living and our quality of life.”

He lists their dazzling achievements, which in biology and medicine include findings on gene-splicing, recombinant DNA, retroviruses, cancer therapies, coch­lear implants, the fetal ultrasound scanner, the hepatitis B vaccine, prions, stem cells, organ transplantation and even a treatment for head lice. In the physical sciences, universities have contributed to the Hubble telescope, lasers, LEDs, bar codes, radar, transistors, M.R.I. technology and numerous advances in computing. In a chapter on the social sciences, he cites, among many others, such useful innovations as theories of human capital and social mobility, research in linguistics and even the use of prices to reduce traffic jams.

No one can for a moment doubt the special role universities play in innovations that arise from research in pure science and an interest in solving problems. But a 150-page inventory like the one Cole provides here tells us as much about why some universities are “great” as a list of names of accomplished people in a large family shows us why their family is “great” relative to others. Moreover, it does nothing to illuminate whether universities did it alone and what kind of incentives were used to enhance researcher productivity.

Private enterprise and government agencies work with universities, as Cole’s own roll call of great achievements demonstrates; they also compete with them. For example, the University of California scientist who isolated the gene for insulin founded Chiron. The cancer drug Gleevec originated in research at M.I.T. and U.C.L.A. but was produced by Novartis. The fetal scanner was produced by Physionic Engineering Inc., formed by researchers who had left the University of Colorado. Organs can be transplanted only with the immunosuppressive drug cyclosporine, developed by Sandoz (now Novartis). The head-lice shampoo developed at Purdue was marketed by Nature’s Sunshine. The Hubble telescope was a joint venture among the European Space Agency, NASA and others, though the idea came from a Princeton astrophysicist. The laser came from research at American universities and Bell Labs.

Cole notes these collaborations but does little to address the numerous questions they raise. What is the optimal division of research among universities, private enterprise and the government? Some universities allow faculty members to hold patents; some give them joint interests in private sector ventures. Which arrangement is most advantageous for research output? Which is best for the integrity of the university? “At Columbia, we pursued technology transfer aggressively,” Cole writes. “If we succeeded, we could use the resources generated to compete effectively with wealthier universities.” But was Cole really just acting as a modern Robin Hood, or does the profit motive pervert the mission of his and other universities?

According to Cole, the current threats to the American university don’t come from the outside — no other nation’s universities are within striking distance — but from within our borders and even within the university itself. Since the Sept. 11 attacks, foreign students and professors find it more difficult to venture to the United States. Cole devotes two chapters to the Bush administration, which he sees as a “frightening example of how the distrust of scholarly and scientific work — because it chal­lenges the ideological views of the prince — can begin to seriously erode the structure of knowledge production that has made our universities the finest in the world.”

But he also sees a grave threat from inequalities among the great universities. A few universities have colossal endowments, but most do not. In 2008, before the financial crisis, 76 had endowments of more than $1 billion; 19 (including Columbia) had endowments of more than $5 billion; and 6 had endowments exceeding $10 billion. “The alarming growth of inequality among university endowments over the past two decades has produced an unnerving potential for a few institutions to be able to dominate the competition for talent,” thus sapping vital competition, Cole argues. But are such inequalities good or bad? Could 125 equally sized automobile firms produce cars as cheaply as a few very large ones? Probably not. So why isn’t that the case for university research as well?

In his conclusion, Cole plays with the notion that universities could engage in cross subsidies, as in baseball, where a luxury tax applies to total payroll. Only one team can win, and taxing rich teams keeps the game more interesting. But knowledge creation, unlike baseball, is not a zero sum game. Everyone can win.

Cole then reverses course and proposes cost-saving mergers among universities. Provosts may see institutional boundaries, but professors, separated by miles and oceans, already work together, sharing research ideas, course syllabuses and students. University researchers are truly scholars without borders; ideas do not wear school colors.

Today, the greatest threats to American higher education probably do not concern any of the things Cole discusses. Rather, they relate to the openness of the system and the academic preparedness of its students, who, as Cole acknowledges at the outset, play almost no role in this volume. But teaching and research cannot be so easily separated. The great research universities educate a substantial fraction of all four-year undergraduates and produce more than three-quarters of all Ph.D.’s. As Cole acknowledges, “excellence in teaching and excellence in research” are “mutually reinforcing.”

But many students are finding it harder to gain access to that teaching. In 1980 average private tuition was 20 percent of median family income, but it is 50 percent today; average public tuition was 4 percent of median family income in 1980 and is 11 percent today. We have witnessed, just this past year, the vulnerability of the great California system.

American universities became the very best in the world because of the nation’s early commitment to universal high school education. Maintaining excellence at the highest educational levels requires sustaining the pipeline from the lower levels. Without renewed commitment to preparedness and access, the great American university may not remain great.

Claudia Goldin is a professor of economics at Harvard. Her latest book, with Lawrence F. Katz, is “The Race Between Education and Technology.”

1925) Estatisticas deste blog (cinco dias e meio)

Recebi, do SiteMeter, estas estatisticas para este blog: Diplomatizzando
(desde 30 de janeiro as 14hs até o dia 4 de fevereiro as 24hs, ou seja, cinco dias e meio, aproximadamente)

-- Site Summary ---
Visits
Total ........................ 2,241
Average per Day ................ 315
Average Visit Length .......... 3:06
This Week .................... 2,206

Page Views
Total ........................ 3,540
Average per Day ................ 496
Average per Visit .............. 1.6
This Week .................... 3,469

1924) Avioes militares: nada como ser rico...

É samba, é ginga, é dinheiro que voa
Coluna Carlos Brickmann, 7 de fevereiro de 2010

É Brasil brasileiro, terra de samba e pandeiro. Fale de nós quem quiser falar, mas com os Rafale o ministro Jobim e o presidente Lula estão pertinho do céu.

Comprando os caças supersônicos franceses, os mais caros que participaram de nossa concorrência internacional, o Brasil mostrou uma série de virtudes:

1 - É soberano. Escolheu sozinho. Os Rafale são caros mas são nossos. E só nossos: nenhum outro país quis comprá-lo da França.

2 - Está com a economia em ordem. Países menos afortunados, como a Índia, anunciam ter recebido ofertas do Rafale por bem menos do que o Brasil pagou, e até agora o recusaram, por achá-lo caro. Aqui não se faz economia de tostões.

3 - O Brasil faz sua parte na luta contra a crise internacional. A fabricante do Rafale, que andou tendo problemas, agora respira tranquila. Além disso, o Brasil salvou alguns milhares de empregos na França, nossa aliada.

4 - O Brasil, caso raro entre os países latino-americanos, demonstra o predomínio dos civis sobre os militares. Não deu a menor bola para o relatório da Aeronáutica sobre a concorrência, que colocou o Rafale em terceiro lugar e o sueco Grippen em primeiro; militar, aqui, obedece às ordens do ministro civil, mesmo que o ministro adore vestir uma farda camuflada tamanho GG - XL, certamente fabricada sob medida, para acomodar tanta musculatura.

E, se o Brasil comprou da França um porta-aviões que, em dez anos de operação, passou quatro no estaleiro, por que iria reclamar dos supersônicos?

Brickmann & Associados Comunicação - B&A - 05/02/2010

1923) China: economia neoclassica ou neoliberal

Alguns ingênuos, sobretudo da academia brasileira, acreditam que o sucesso econômico da China se deve a políticas econômicas ainda intervencionistas ou dirigistas, não à sua adesão ao capitalismo de mercado, de pura concorrência, ou seja, de sua vertente neoliberal, como acredito que seja.
Pois bem, quem está dizendo que a direção do PCC segue a linha da economia de mercado, com ênfase na doutrina neoclássica, é simplesmente o Decano adjunto da Escola Nacional de Desenvolvimento e diretor do Centro Chinês para a Pesquisa Econômica da Universidade de Pequim, portanto, uma voz abalizada para ostentar tais tipos de argumentos.
Vejam seu artigo abaixo.

The End of the Beijing Consensus
Yang Yao
YANG YAO is Deputy Dean of the National School of Development and the Director of the China Center for Economic Research at Peking University.
Foreign Affairs, January/February 2010, Volume 1, Number 89, February 2, 2010

Can China's Model of Authoritarian Growth Survive?

Since China began undertaking economic reforms in 1978, its economy has grown at a rate of nearly ten percent a year, and its per-capita GDP is now twelve times greater than it was three decades ago. Many analysts attribute the country's economic success to its unconventional approach to economic policy -- a combination of mixed ownership, basic property rights, and heavy government intervention. Time magazine's former foreign editor, Joshua Cooper Ramo, has even given it a name: the Beijing consensus.

But, in fact, over the last 30 years, the Chinese economy has moved unmistakably toward the market doctrines of neoclassical economics, with an emphasis on prudent fiscal policy, economic openness, privatization, market liberalization, and the protection of private property. Beijing has been extremely cautious in maintaining a balanced budget and keeping inflation down. Purely redistributive programs have been kept to a minimum, and central government transfers have been primarily limited to infrastructure spending. The overall tax burden (measured by the ratio of tax revenue to GDP) is in the range of 20 to 25 percent. The country is the world's second-largest recipient of foreign direct investment, and domestically, more than 80 percent of its state-owned enterprises have been released to private hands or transformed into publicly listed companies. Since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) lacks legitimacy in the classic democratic sense, it has been forced to seek performance-based legitimacy instead, by continuously improving the living standards of Chinese citizens. So far, this strategy has succeeded, but there are signs that it will not last because of the growing income inequality and the internal and external imbalances it has created.

Ler o texto completo neste link.

1922) Diplomacia da generosidade - gas da Bolivia

'Brasil compra gás para ajudar Bolívia'
O Estado de S. Paulo - 04/02/2010

O presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva disse ontem que o Brasil continuará importando gás da Bolívia mesmo após atingir a autossuficiência na produção do combustível. A afirmação foi feita em cerimônia de inauguração do maior gasoduto brasileiro em capacidade, investimento, de R$ 2,54 bilhões, que vai garantir a chegada de até 40 milhões de metros cúbicos por dia aos principais mercados consumidores.

Segundo ele, o contrato com a Bolívia é uma forma de "ajudar" o país vizinho. "Eu acho que, dentro de algum tempo mais, a gente vai poder bater no peito e dizer: "Nós temos gás suficiente". E vamos continuar comprando da Bolívia, porque nós temos que ajudar a Bolívia, que é um país pobre. O papel de uma nação do tamanho do Brasil é ajudar os países menores do lado dele", disse o presidente.

"Temos boas relações com a Bolívia, nunca tivemos problemas para importar e não acreditamos no risco de um corte", acrescentou a ministra da Casa Civil, Dilma Rousseff, em entrevista após o evento.

O Brasil tem contrato para importar 30 milhões de metros cúbicos por dia da Bolívia até 2019. Embora haja excesso de oferta de gás no País, Lula voltou a afirmar que a prioridade para o uso do combustível está na geração de energia elétrica.

"É importante saber disso. Quem tiver fábrica, carro ou piscina a gás tem de saber que, se tiver uma crise energética, a primeira coisa que nós vamos utilizar para levar energia para as casas das pessoas é o gás'', destacou o presidente.

O gasoduto inaugurado pelo presidente, Cabiúnas-Reduc III (Gasduc III), começará a operar com algo em torno de 15 milhões de metros cúbicos por dia, por causa da demanda, que está abaixo da capacidade total.

A partir de março, quando está prevista a inauguração do Gasoduto Sudeste-Nordeste (Gasene), este duto permitirá levar o gás produzido na Região Sudeste ? e futuramente do pré-sal ? para abastecer o mercado nordestino, hoje deficitário e dependente do Gás Natural Liquefeito (GNL) importado.

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Comentário PRA:
Mesmo a generosidade, quando bem intencionada, e não apenas por falsa mangnanimidade, demagogia ou desejo de parecer benevolente (unilateralmente), não dispensaria algum cálculo de custo-benefício, apenas para que o Estado, e também a cidadania, possam fazer uma estimativa de quais são as melhores opções para se ajudar a Bolívia.
Pode-se, hipoteticamente, pensar, por exemplo, que seria melhor para a Bolívia deixá-la exportar o gás agora excedentário para terceiros países e passar a estabelecer outras relações de comércio com o país vizinho.
"Monopolizar" o gás boliviano apenas porque ela aparenta ser um país pobre (o que já constitui uma ofensa em si, no dizer) pode não ser a melhor coisa para ela ou para o Brasil.
Pessoas no governo deveriam fazer um simples cálculo de custo-oportunidade, para o Brasil e para a Bolívia. Apenas porque o presidente não sabe, ou não pensa nisso, não é motivo para uma assessoria competente, em primeiro lugar no MME, recomendar-lhe o que seja melhor para o Brasil e para a Bolívia.

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Addendum em 5.02.2010:
Bolívia reage à fala de Lula sobre gás
Jornal do Brasil, 5/02/2010

O governo boliviano reagiu negativamente às declarações do presidente brasileiro, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, que disse que o Brasil não deixará de importar gás natural da Bolívia por uma questão de "solidariedade".
O ministro da Presidência da Bolívia, Oscar Coca Antezana, enfatizou ontem que as negociações do hidrocarboneto com o Brasil estão sujeitas a um compromisso contratual, que "deve ser respeitado acima de outras disposições".
– Há contratos e nós trabalhamos com contratos.
Fez-se um duto que custou mais de US$ 2 bilhões porque havia um convênio e este tem que ser cumprido. Aqui não há sentimentos nem paixões – afirmou Coca Antezana.
Na quarta-feira, Lula discursou, durante a inauguração de um gasoduto no Rio, que o Brasil tem cada vez menos necessidade do produto importado da Bolívia, mas que continuaria importando o gás porque “o papel de uma nação como o Brasil é ajudar países menores”.
Coca Antezana rebateu as palavras de Lula explicando que “não é correto nem próprio” falar desta maneira “quando há um contrato no meio”.
– Definitivamente, o Brasil está cumprindo um acordo que foi assinado anteriormente.
O não cumprimento vai implicar-lhes sanções – advertiu o ministro.
A Bolívia exporta para o Brasil entre 19 milhões e 27 milhões de metros cúbicos de gás por dia. A quantidade varia segundo a demanda e o preço. Atualmente, com os índices de consumo de energia alcançando cifras recordes no Brasil, cerca de 40% do gás natural utilizado no país é boliviano.
Coca Antezana afirmou que discurso do presidente “não é correto.”

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Novo comentário PRA:

O ministro boliviano tem razão, especialmente quando disse: "Há contratos e nós trabalhamos com contratos."
Pena que o governo boliviano rasgou um tratado bilateral e contratos com a Petrobras para invadir e tomar uma propriedade que não era dele, ou seja, o governo boliviano agiu ilegalmente, traiçoeiramente e em total contradiçnao com práticas diplomáticas normais, e na ausência de qualquer reação digna por parte do governo brasileiro.
O que seria de se esperar, era um aviso da Bolívia que pretendia rever o tratado e os contratos, passar nota ao governo brasileiro propondo negociações e aguardar as conversações. Não, atuaram de modo totalmente desrespeitoso.
O que o governo brasileiro deveria fazer, quando o Brasil estiver totalmente abastecido de gás nacional, seria propor ao governo boliviano rever os contratos, apenas isso. Acredito que a Bolívia se sentiria, e se sairia, melhor, tendo liberdade para vender mais caro (se puder) o gás excedentário de que dispõe e do qual o Brasil não venha mais a necessitar. Afinal de contas tem o valor do transporte. Se a eliminação deste se coadunar com a amortização do gasoduto, creio que se pode considerar a mudança nos contratos.