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quarta-feira, 3 de março de 2010

1743) Soviet penetration of Brazil (é o caso de se dizer...)

Na verdade, se trata do trabalho de inteligência dos serviços de espionagem soviéticos envolvendo o Brasil, tal como pode ser lido neste livro, que revela apenas uma parte, pequena provavelmente, desse mundo obscuro.
Limito-me a transcrever a informação pertinene ao Brasil contida no livro, sem comentários no momento.

The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World
New York: Basic Books, 2005.

Brazil: 89, 96, 104-107; 477
Brasilia KGB Residence: 105-106

p. 96: (1976):
“Among the DGI operations in Angola carried out to assist the KGB was a penetration of the Brazilian Embassy to obtain intelligence on its cipher system. A technical specialist from the Sixteenth (SIGINT, intelligence derived from interception and analysis of signals) Directorate flew out from Moscow with equipment which enabled a DGI agent to photograph the wiring of the embassy’s Swiss-made TS-803 cipher machine.”(33)
(Note 33, p. 519: “k-22, 150. The DGI carried out a similar operation , at the request of the KGB, aginast the Venezuelan Embassy in Havana.”)
[k stands for “k series: handwritten notebooks containing notes on individual KGB files”, p. 595, on Bibliography, 1. Mitrokhin Archive]

p. 105:
“For most of its existence, the military regime which held power from 1964 to 1985 made Brazil a relatively hostile environment for KGB operations. There was little prospect during the 1970s either of acquiring confidential contacts within government, as in Argentina and Peru, or of finding contacts with direct access to the President, as in Mexico. The KGB’s best intelligence on Brazil probably came from its increasing ability to intercept Brazil’s diplomatic traffic. By 1979 the radio-intercept post (codenamed KLEN) in the Brasilia residency was able to intercept 19,000 coded cables sent and received by the Foreign Ministry as well as approximately 2,000 other classified official communications”(67)
(Note 67, p. 520: “k-22, 128. “Since Mitrokhin had no access to the KGB Sixteenth (SIGINT) Directorate, he was unable to note the contents of any decrypts.”)

“SIGINT enabled the Center to monitor some of the activities of probably its most important Brazilian agent, codenamed IZOT, who was recruited while serving as Brazilian ambassador in the Soviet bloc.(68)
(Note 68, p. 521: “IZOT is the highest-ranking Brazilian agent identified in the files noted by Mitrokhin. He provided recruitment leads on three fellow diplomats, including the ambassador of a NATO country in Prague. IZOT had himself been talent-spotted for the KGB by another Brazilian ambassador, an agent codenamed ALEKS; k-22, 235-7”)

“As well as providing intelligence and recruitment leads to three other diplomats, IZOT also on occasion included in his reports information (probably disinformation) provided by the KGB. Assessed by the KGB as ‘adhering to na Anti-American line and liberal views concerning the development of a bourgeois society’, IZOT was a paid agent. His remuneration, however, took a variety of forms, including in 1976 a silver service valued by the Centre at 513 rubles. The Centre has increasing doubts about IZOT’s reliability. On one occasion it believed that he was guilty of ‘outright deception’, claiming to have passed on information provided by the KGB to his Fioreign Ministry when his decrypted cables showed that he had not done so.” (69)”
(Note 69, p. 521: “k-22, 235-7; k-8, 551.)

p. 106:
“Despite hard-line opposition, Figueiredo issued an amnesty for most of Brazil’s remaining political exiles, including Prestes and other leading Communists.”(72)
(Note 72, p. 521: "In May 1980 Prestes was succeded as a leader of the Brazilian Communist Party by Giocondo Dias. In December Dias sent his thanks to Moscow, via the Brasilia residency, for allowing him, likek his predecessor, to nominate Party members for free visits to Soviet sanatoria and holiday homes; k-26, 339”)

p. 106:
“In the spring of 1980 a Soviet parliamentary delegation headed by Edwrd Shevardnadze, then a candidate (non-voting) member of the Politburo, visited Brasilia. Unknown to their hosts, the plane (Special Flight L-62) carried new radio interception equipment to improve the performance of the residency’s SIGINT station, and took the old equipment with it when it left. (...) (74)
(Note 74, p. 521: “k-22, 1, 3”)

[End of transcriptions related to Brazil]

ANDREW, CHRISTOPHER & MITROKHIN, VASILI. The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World (New York: Basic Books, 2005).

See also, by the same authors: The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB.
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