O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida.

segunda-feira, 30 de junho de 2008

900) O Brasil e os Estados falidos

Primeiro, uma apresentação do relatório de 2008 do índice de Estados falidos.
Mais abaixo, o relatório sintético sobre o Brasil

The Failed States Index 2008
Foreign Policy, July/August 2008

Whether it is an unexpected food crisis or a devastating hurricane, the world’s weakest states are the most exposed when crisis strikes. In the fourth annual Failed States Index, FOREIGN POLICY and The Fund for Peace rank the countries where state collapse may be just one disaster away.

When troops opened fire in the streets of Mogadishu in early May, it was a tragically familiar scene in war-torn Somalia. Except on this day, soldiers weren’t fighting Islamist militias or warlords. They were combating a mob of tens of thousands rioting over soaring food prices.

On top of the country’s already colossal challenges, a food crisis seems an especially cruel turn for a place like Somalia. But it is a test that dozens of weak states are being forced to confront this year, with escalating prices threatening to undo years of poverty-alleviation and development efforts. The unrest in Mogadishu echoes food riots that have erupted on nearly every continent in the past year. Tens of thousands of Mexicans protested when the price of corn flour jumped 400 percent in early 2007. Thousands of Russian pensioners took to the streets in November to call for a return to price controls on milk and bread. In Egypt, the army was ordered to bake more loaves at military-run bakeries after riots broke out across the country. Kabul, Port-au-Prince, and Jakarta experienced angry protests over spikes in the price of staples.

But if few foretold the hunger and hardship that have followed the uptick in prices, the events of 2007 revealed that unexpected shocks can play a decisive role in the stability of an increasing number of vulnerable states. Primary among last year’s shocks was the implosion of the U.S. subprime market, which burst housing bubbles worldwide, slowed trade, and sent currencies into tailspins. A contested election in Kenya in December swiftly shredded any semblance of ethnic peace in a country that many had considered an African success story. And though Benazir Bhutto feared her own assassination upon returning to Pakistan, her murder reverberated in a country already contending with the challenges of ambitious mullahs, suicide bombers, and an all-powerful military.

These shocks are the sparks of state failure, events that further corrode the integrity of weak states and push those on the edge closer to combustion. As the food crisis has shown, these political and economic setbacks are not unique to the world’s most vulnerable countries. But weak states are weak precisely because they lack the resiliency to cope with unwelcome—and unpleasant—surprises. When a global economic downturn pinches the main export base, an election goes awry, or a natural disaster wipes out villages, the cracks of vulnerability open wider.

Because it is crucial to closely monitor weak states—their progress, their deterioration, and their ability to withstand challenges—the Fund for Peace, an independent research organization, and FOREIGN POLICY present the fourth annual Failed States Index. Using 12 social, economic, political, and military indicators, we ranked 177 states in order of their vulnerability to violent internal conflict and societal deterioration. To do so, we examined more than 30,000 publicly available sources, collected from May to December 2007, to form the basis of the index’s scores. The 60 most vulnerable states are listed in the rankings, and the full results are available at ForeignPolicy.com and fundforpeace.org.


E agora o resumo para o Brasil, neste link (onde também pode ser vista a tabela inicial, que está toda desformatada neste blog).

Brazil

Total Score
Indicators
Social Economic Political/Military
2005 81.0 9.0 5.0 5.7 5.9 9.0 2.0 7.8 8.3 6.7 6.5 8.7 6.4
2006 63.1 6.5 3.6 5.7 5.0 8.5 2.7 5.5 6.7 5.3 5.7 3.2 4.7
Point Change -17.9 -2.5
-1.4 0 -0.9 -0.5 +0.7 -2.3 -1.6 -1.4 -0.8 -5.5 -1.7
Pct Change -14.9% -25% -14% 0% -9% -5% +7% -23% -16% -14% -8% -55% -17%

Overview
Brazil, a former colony of Portugal, has the distinction of being the only country in South America that is non-Spanish speaking. After nearly a half-century of military rule, Brazil has been under civilian leadership since 1985, when the military regime peacefully transitioned power to civilian leaders. Brazil, the largest country in South America, is located in eastern South America and has a population 188 million. With a per capita GDP of $8,400, Brazil has a large and diverse economy. The population is 53.7% white, 38.5% mulatto, 6.2% black, 0.9% other ethnicities and 0.7% unspecified. It is also 73.6% Roman Catholic, 15.4% Protestant, with the rest of the population belonging to other religions or no religion.

Social Indicators
Demographic pressures improved from a 9.0 in the Failed States Index 2005 (FSI 2005) to a 6.5 in the FSI 2006. One reason for the extremely high rating in the FSI 2005 was Hurricane Catarina, which hit Southern Brazil in 2004 and caused an estimated US$350 million in damages. There continued to be severe overcrowding in sections of Brazil’s densely populated urban centers, however, which remained mostly unchanged in the FSI 2006. The rating for refugees and IDPs improved from a 5.0 in the FSI 2005 to a 3.6 in the FSI 2006, largely the result of decreased reports of Colombians fleeing violence across the border into Brazil. The score for group grievance remained unchanged between the two years and human flight improved slightly from a rating of 5.9 in the FSI 2005 to 5.0 in the FSI 2006, although many young professional Brazilians still chose to leave the country in search of better employment opportunities abroad.

Economic Indicators
The indicator for the economy worsened slightly from a rating of 2.0 in the FSI 2005 to 2.7 in the FSI 2006 but it is still extremely low, reflecting Brazil’s relatively diversified economy and 5% rate of GDP growth. However, despite its fairly strong economy, Brazil has a very high level of inequality, which resulted in a rating of 9.0 for uneven development in the FSI 2005. This rating fell to 8.5 in 2006 due to the efforts of the government of President Lula da Silva in regards to social reform, although the improvement was only slight because the reforms fell far short of what had been hoped for. Particularly in the rural interior of the country, many Brazilians live in abject poverty, with the indigenous population suffering the most from labor exploitation and the expropriation of their lands, mainly for mining purposes. It is estimated that up to 22% of Brazil’s population lives below the poverty line.

Political/Military Indicators
The legitimacy of the state improved from a rating of 7.8 in the FSI 2005 to 5.5 in the FSI 2006. This was partly due to the creation of an Anti-Corruption and Government Transparency Council in late 2004 and the corruption charges brought against Paulo Maluf, the former mayor of Sao Paulo, who has been accused of running organized criminal activities within the Brazilian government. He is accused of transferring $446 million out of the country illegally, and once ran under the campaign slogan of “Yes, he robs, but he gets things done.” His arrest and removal from power were viewed as a significant sign that the government of President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (popularly known as Lula) was getting tough on high-level corrupt officials.

Brazil’s public services are poor, with the rural interior areas of the country lacking even the most basic access to medical care. Conditions in overcrowded and crime-ridden areas of urban centers are also poor. Although Brazil has an excellent system of free public universities, the entrance requirements are very high and most students are from wealthier families, forcing poor students to attend fee-based private universities. The government has attempted to reverse this trend by offering need-based financial aid and instituting quotas for low-income students at public universities, contributing to the improved rating for public services - from an 8.3 to a 6.7 in the FSI 2006. Government efforts to combat HIV/AIDS also contributed to an improvement in the score.

Human rights improved from a rating of 6.7 to 5.3 in the FSI 2006. These ratings reflected the fact that, although human rights were generally respected, there remained several incidents of serious abuses. These included torture and abuse of detainees, and police involvement in killings for hire. The situation improved somewhat from the previous year, however, with both police and military forces receiving more human rights training. The security apparatus indicator did not change significantly, mostly due to the continued presence of violent gangs in Brazil’s main cities that are responsible for many of the extrajudicial killings that plague the urban areas.

Factionalized elites improved from a rating of 8.7 to 3.2 in the FSI 2006. During 2003, the ruling PT party expelled from government the legislators who had voted against its social security reform, which reduced the diversity of interests represented in government and led to the high score in this category on the FSI 2005. However, following the resignation of several prominent members of the opposition parties for corruption-related scandals and Lula’s attempts to reach out to more opposition groups, this score will likely continue to fall.

Core Five State Institutions
Leadership Military Police Judiciary Civil Service
Moderate Moderate Weak Moderate Moderate

President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva was elected by a landslide in a free and fair election in 2002, creating Brazil’s first left-wing government. The president retained a high level of popularity until 2005, when a number of corruption scandals in his government damaged his party’s credibility.

Brazil has the largest armed forces in the region with a total of 189,000 troops. The political influence of the army has waned since the return to democracy, but some high-ranking officers retain some political influence. The Brazilian military is generally professional and well trained.

The police are inefficient and their low wages make them prone to corruption. The security forces have also been involved in human rights abuses, including unlawful killings, torture and abuse of detainees, and police involvement in killing for hire.

The judicial process is slow and the legal system is unwieldy.

The civil service is bureaucratic and inefficient, despite the presence of many skilled employees. Clientelism is also present in the civil service.

Prognosis
Although Brazil is relatively stable and the economy is performing well, Brazil faces a number of challenges, the most pressing of which is the high level of inequality. Organized crime and gang violence are also major problems in the larger cities, and more needs to be done to address the high levels corruption in government. The current government has made some efforts to address these issues, including creating an Anti-Corruption and Government Transparency Council, but corruption continues to be a serious problem. Elections scheduled for 2006 will indicate whether the recent corruption scandals that have mired the Lula government will prove costly to his party in the polls.

Copyright (C) 2006 The Fund for Peace


Farei uma análise destes números e algumas considerações sobre metodologia assim que dispuser de um pouco de tempo
(30 Junho 2008)
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Paulo Roberto de Almeida
pralmeida@mac.com www.pralmeida.org
http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/


On 29/06/2008, at 17:57, Paulo Roberto de Almeida wrote:

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