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Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida;

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Mostrando postagens com marcador Brazil. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador Brazil. Mostrar todas as postagens

quinta-feira, 22 de outubro de 2015

How Brazil was downgraded: PRAlmeida at Yale

My talk debate last week at Yale School of Management. Here is the link: http://som.yale.edu/blog/2015/10/too-introverted-economist-paulo-roberto-de-almeida-brazil

‘Too Introverted’: Economist Paulo Roberto de Almeida on Brazil

Yale Communication, October 22, 2015 
 
When Standard & Poors downgraded Brazil’s bonds to junk grade last month, the immediate cause was the country’s struggling economy and growing deficit. But the roots of the crisis, economist Paulo Roberto de Almeida told students at Yale School of Management on October 13, lie in Brazil’s major structural problems, including imbalanced public finance, inadequate savings and investment, high tax burdens, and low productivity.
The Latino Leadership Association hosted the talk by Almeida, deputy consul general of Brazil in Hartford and professor of political economy at University Center of Brasília, at Yale SOM. Almeida discussed Brazil’s current fiscal crisis in a talk titled “How Brazil was Downgraded: Economic Challenges and Political Turmoil.”
Among Brazil’s longstanding problems, Almeida said, is an insular approach to trade that prevents it from playing a major role in the world economy.
“Brazil is too introverted,” Almeida said. “The coefficient of opening [in] the Brazilian economy is less than 20% compared to the world average of more than 40%—China [is] 60%.”
Despite some historical periods during which Brazil had a larger share in world trade—during the post-World War II era, for example—insularity has long been the norm for the Brazilian economy, Almeida said.
“Historically, Brazil [accounts for] just 1% of the world trade,” he said. “Even in the last decade, when Brazil benefited from the Chinese bonanza, there was much more increase in value than in volume. For an economy who pretends to be the sixth- or the seventh-largest economy, it’s too low a share.”

segunda-feira, 5 de outubro de 2015

In Brazil, Free-Market Ideas Rise as the Economy Falls - Antony P. Mueller (Mises Daily)

In Brazil, Free-Market Ideas Rise as the Economy Falls
Antony P. Mueller
Mises Daily, October 5, 2015
 
The Mises Institute spoke with Associated Scholar Antony Mueller last week about recent economic and ideological trends in Brazil. Prof. Mueller teaches economics at Federal University of Sergipe (UFS) in Brazil.


Mises Institute: For those of us not in Brazil, it is hard to interpret the commentary on Brazil’s economy right now. Brazil’s debt was recently reduced to junk status, and we can see that Brazil’s economy is not doing well. But how severe is the crisis?

Antony Mueller: Part of the explanation is that for a large part of the population and for the government itself, the crisis came as a shock. At first, the Brazilian government ignored the coming of the crisis and when it arrived, the government ignored its existence.

Imagine Brazil like a family with a lot of inherited wealth that spends as if there were no tomorrow. Yet someday this family wakes up to the fact that its wealth has been squandered and its financial accounts are in the red. The government did not recognize that the boom would be temporary. The Brazilian economy began to sputter as commodity prices fell and the demand from China decreased. Yet in order to adapt to the new situation and cut expenditures, the Brazilian government spent even more.

Incumbent President Dilma Rousseff from the Workers Party, which has been in power since 2003, won a second term in 2014 with a campaign that deceived the population about the true state of the economy. The government implemented a series of cheap financial tricks such as delaying the rise of the prices for fuel and electricity and of other items in the large list of administered prices.

After the election, hell broke loose and the true state of the economy became visible for the broad public. The popularity of the president began to fall to single-digit approval ratings. The crisis is serious in itself, yet its psychological impact becomes more severe because of the shock of disillusion. In part, this shock also applies to foreign observers and investors who bought into government propaganda or based their outlook on the projections of the International Monetary Fund whose prognosis in 2013 said that Brazil would maintain economic growth rates of at least over 4 percent for each of the years to come up to 2018.

MI: Ambrose Evans-Pritchard is writing off Brazil as if it’s a total disaster area, and he quotes one observer who says “things will get much worse before they get better.” Is this true, and if so, what are the obstacles to improvement?


AM: Evans-Pritchard’s remarks reflect the consensus among foreign observers and there is indeed little doubt that the crisis will deteriorate before it gets better. Even worse, the recuperation could take much longer than is generally assumed. The reason for a pessimistic outlook comes from the fact that the crisis is not only economic, but also political in character. Not only members of the present government, but also figures of the opposition parties are under investigation about massive corruption linked to the major Brazilian oil company Petrobras. There is much frustration in the country because there is no promising alternative in sight.

MI: Assuming we are looking at real declines in standards of living, how long will it take the country to get back to where it was at the height of the boom?

AM: This is a difficult question for a specific answer. So let me answer in a more fundamental way. Brazil’s economic development has been on a roller coaster ride for centuries. Phases of extraordinary booms were followed by long periods of busts and stagnation.

In the second half of the twentieth century, the boom of the 1950s, with the promise that Brazil would achieve growth and development of “fifty years in five years” ended in economic disaster and the military dictatorship that lasted from 1964 to 1985, which in turn ended with Brazil’s catastrophic foreign debt crisis. It took a “lost decade” for the country to recuperate.

The 1990s saw a series of reforms that put the country back on the track. In 2003, when the newly elected president, Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva from the Workers Party took over the government, the economy was already on a growth path. Then came the commodity boom with a seemingly insatiable appetite for Brazilian natural and agricultural products. Yet, instead of using the good times that filled the coffers of the Brazilian treasury to carry out highly necessary reforms, the Labor government pursued a populist policy of generous social spending, particularly for the poor parts of the population.

Now, these achievements of reducing poverty and inequality have come under threat because of the lack of financial funds. This means that Brazil must face not only an economic and a political crisis, but also a social crisis. The confluence of such a triple crisis increases the risks that any one of them gets worse because each individual crisis affects negatively the other crises. The consequential chain from the economic to the political and from there to the social crisis then goes into reverse and the social crisis worsens the outlook to get out of the political and the economic crisis.

MI: Brazil was a big part of the BRICS effort to create a group of up-and-coming economies that could rival the big economies like the US and Germany. Is that idea totally dead, or is the demise of BRICS overstated?


AM: The BRICS never managed to operate as a coherent group. Now, that not only Brazil is in crisis, but also Russia, and that China is in troubled waters, the outlook for the BRICS as a group of playing a major role in global affairs has diminished even more.

It is similar with MERCOSUL, the common market project in South America. Instead of achieving free exchange, trade conflicts are on the rise and not a single supranational institution has become effective. From my observations of Latin America and of Brazil in particular, I conclude that there are still vast mental and ideological barriers in place that work against sustained prosperity. The ideological dominance of statism, socialism, and interventionism is present in every layer of the Brazilian society — not only in politics or academia, but also in the business community itself.

Bureaucracy is a nightmare without end. Taxation is high and brings little return. The public educational system is in shambles. The legal system is unable to cope with an enormous backlog of unresolved cases, while at the same time, judges and other legal authorities enjoy grandiose privileges. Salaries in the judiciary are astronomical compared to what the average person or the poorer parts of the Brazilian society earn.

The public sector in general is extremely inefficient and is an El Dorado of rent-seekers. I do not expect that any of these obstacles will be resolved in the coming years. I fear that it is not much different in some other BRICS countries. They are all stuck in the “middle income trap,” as they are apparently unable to change from a statist to a free market system. There are many vested interests in place, in both politics and in established business, preventing change from state capitalism to an entrepreneurial capitalism. Only based on a fundamental change of ideology in favor of markets and individual and entrepreneurial liberty, will countries like Brazil gain long-term prosperity. I would also say that the same holds for China and the other members of the BRICS and emerging markets in general.

MI: Ideologically, is there any hope of a shift in Brazilian ideology? Some in the US media have featured libertarian free market groups in Brazil and suggested there is a change going on. Do you see any of that?

AM: Well, there is hope, yet it is a long way down the road. The Brazilian libertarian movement is gaining strength, particularly among students and young people in general. In fact, the spread of libertarian ideas among young Brazilians is amazing. The Brazilian Mises Institute is overwhelmed by visits to its site and the Institute’s events are grandiose. There is much good will, high hopes, a lot of serious dedication and extreme diligence at work in the libertarian movement of Brazil. If this trend continues, the walls that surround the established ideology will finally crumble. Anybody with an alert mind must see that statism has failed; that the ideas of socialism and interventionism are sterile and that they produce mainly frustration, stagnation, and crises. The libertarian movement in Brazil is the new avant-garde; its members are the true “progressives.”

The modern electronic media help to accelerate their ascendancy to influence and recognition. The current crisis will be a further wake-up call for young people to recognize that it is their future which is at stake if Brazil should continue in its old ways. With ever more young people joining the libertarian movement, I am sure that sometime in the future a critical mass will be reached and things will change.

quarta-feira, 23 de setembro de 2015

Economic Freedom of the World: Brasil na rabeira

Acaba de sair o relatório 2015 das liberdades econômicas no mundo:

Economic Freedom of the World 2015 

O Brasil, como seria de se esperar, não só ocupa o ÚLTIMO LUGAR na lista dos grandes países, como não para de recuar nas liberdades econômicas.
Vejam neste link: 
http://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/economic-freedom-of-the-world-2015.pdf


Os paises economicamente mais livres (e o Chile passa à frente dos EUA):

Top-rated countries
Hong Kong and Singapore, once again, occupy the top two positions. The other nations in the top 10 are New Zealand, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, Mauritius, Jordan, Ireland, Canada, and the United Kingdom.


Outros grandes países, e sua posição, o Brasil ocupando o último lugar das grandes economias:

Other major countries
The rankings of some other major countries are the United States (16th), Japan (26th), Germany (29th), South Korea (39th), Italy (68th), France (70th), Mexico (93st), Russia (99th), China (111th), India (114th), and Brazil (118th).

A ficha para o Brasil vai aqui reproduzida: 
 

domingo, 13 de setembro de 2015

How Brazil got junked (it could have happenned sooner) - Economist

Attack of the rating agencies
Brazil junked
The mystery is why it didn't happen sooner
The Economist, September 10th 2015 | SÃO PAULO

WHEN Dilma Rousseff, Brazil's president, presented a budget with a gaping primary deficit (before interest payments) of 0.5% of GDP last week, many (including this newspaper) despaired. It was only a matter of time, the worriers warned, before such fiscal incontinence would cost Brazil its cherished investment-grade credit rating. Few expected the raters to react quite so quickly. On September 9th Standard & Poor's, which in 2008 had led the way in upgrading Brazil to respectability, became the first agency to downgrade the country's foreign-currency government debt back to junk. S&P has kept Brazil on negative watch, saying it has a one-in-three chance of sinking deeper into speculative territory.
To some extent, S&P's decision had been priced in already. For months the cost of insuring Brazilian government bonds against default has been higher than for Turkish ones, which are rated as junk. Following last week's budget announcement the real slid by 6% against the dollar. 
As our article went to press markets were nevertheless bracing for a jumpy Thursday (S&P moved after they closed the night before). In after-hours trading in New York, a basket of Brazilian equities lost 4%; Petrobras, the state-controlled oil giant, saw its American-listed shares drop by 5%. Another hint that not everything was priced in, notes Alberto Ramos of Goldman Sachs, an investment bank, were the 200 anxious e-mails which flooded his inbox in the hour following S&P's announcement.
Some capital flight is inevitable. Pension and mutual funds which can only hold investment-grade assets will now offload Brazilian government bonds at a brisker pace, in anticipation of similar downgrades by Moody's and Fitch (typically, two of the big three rating agencies need to declare junk status to force divestment). This will not cripple Brazil of today, with its diversified economy and plump foreign-exchange reserves, as it might have in more chaotic days. But the government's already-high borrowing costs will rise further, raising the risk of another downgrade. Capital will also become pricier for companies. None of this will help Brazil shake off the recession it slid into in the second quarter. 
How politicians will react is less clear. The downgrade is certainly a slap in the face for the finance minister, Joaquim Levy, a hawkish former investment banker brought in last year mainly to prevent it. To be fair, many of his proposed fiscal measures, including modest cuts to welfare spending, were watered down by an unruly Congress over which Ms Rousseff—with her popularity in single digits and a huge corruption scandal plaguing her coalition—has no control. Only Congress can unlock the roughly 90% of the budget that is currently ring-fenced, that it might be sheared. S&P may yet motivate them to do so. Then again, now that the cosh has fallen, congressmen (and ministers inimical to Mr Levy's belt-tightening) may conclude that further austerity is pointless. It wouldn't be the first time.

Related topics

quinta-feira, 16 de julho de 2015

Latin American development trends and Brazil’s role in the region - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Mais recente artigo publicado:


1181. “Latin American development trends and Brazil’s role in the region”, revista Paiaguás: revista de estudos sobre a Amazônia e Pacífico (UFMS; vol. I, n. 1, 2015; link para a revista: http://seer.ufms.br/index.php/revpaiaguas; link para o artigo: http://seer.ufms.br/index.php/revpaiaguas/article/view/997; em pdf: http://seer.ufms.br/index.php/revpaiaguas/article/view/997/606). Relação de Originais n. 2830.

Latin American development trends and Brazil’s role in the region

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Resumo

Analytical essay dealing with Latin American integration process, its peculiarities and  the recent development trends in the region. Instead of deepening its integration process, Latin America is experiencing a clear fragmentation path, with many divergences among leading countries in the domains of economic policies and the integration processes, notwithstanding the fact that new instances were created for that objective (Unasur, Celac). The essay also examines Brazil’s economic and political role in the region, and concludes by an assessment of current trends (comparing the region with Asia Pacific) and advance prospects for divergent trends in Latin America.

quinta-feira, 5 de junho de 2014

Deu no New York Times: a Copa pode ser ruim para o Brasil...

...segundo os brasileiros, aliás.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

The World Cup Is Bad for Brazil, Many Brazilians Say


The World Cup, the championship tournament of the world’s most popular sport, gets underway on June 12 in São Paulo, Brazil. In advance of the tournament, few Brazilians see hosting the event as advantageous for their country, a new survey shows.
In the survey by the Pew Research Center, 61 percent of respondents said holding the competition in Brazil was bad for the country because it took resources from schools, health care and other public services. Just 34 percent said the World Cup, whose events will be held in 12 cities, would create jobs and help the economy.
Inflation and joblessness are considered very big problems in the country, and two-thirds describe the economic situation as bad.
While 51 percent of those polled said they had an overall favorable opinion of President Dilma Rousseff, Brazilians’ assessment of her handling of specific concerns was far more negative. There is widespread disapproval of how Ms. Rousseff has been dealing with many of Brazilians’ top concerns, including corruption, crime, health care and education. Two-thirds said they disapproved of how she had been preparing for the World Cup, and nearly as many were unhappy with her stewardship of the economy.
The public is divided about the repercussions of the large street protests in Brazilian cities a year ago. Nearly half of the survey respondents, 47 percent, said the demonstrations benefited Brazil by bringing attention to important issues, while 48 percent said the country’s image was damaged internationally.
Brazilians are also split over how the World Cup will affect the country’s image around the world: 35 percent said it would enhance Brazil’s position, 39 percent said it would hurt Brazil, and 23 percent said it would have no effect. Three-quarters of Brazilians think the country deserves more respect internationally than it currently receives.
At the same time, Brazilians are feeling less confident about their country’s place in the world. Four years ago, during a previous national Pew survey of Brazil, 24 percent of respondents said it was already one of the most powerful nations, and 53 percent said it would eventually be. In the latest poll, 20 percent see Brazil as one of the most powerful countries and 39 percent are optimistic that it will be.
The face-to-face survey was conducted April 10 to 30 throughout Brazil with 1,003 adults and has a margin of sampling error of plus or minus four percentage points.


terça-feira, 14 de janeiro de 2014

Economic Freedom of the World: Brasil is Most Unfree, of course...

Preciso acrescentar algo?: o Brasil ocupa o lugar 114 (indo para baixo, sempre) numa escala que tem 178 países, sendo que os dois últimos são Cuba (177) e Coreia do Norte (gloriosamente o último, como deve ser).
Apenas para registrar: o Chile está em 7 lugar, à frente de vários países avançados...

Quem desejar saber mais, veja o relatório 2014 da Heritage Foundation, Economic Freedom of the World: 

segunda-feira, 16 de dezembro de 2013

Republica Federativa do BNDES: um banco maior que o Brasil - Juan Forero (WP)

A bank that may be too big for Brazil

By  

The Washington Post: December 14, 2013

RIO DE JANEIRO — To dodge the global economic crisis, Brazil cranked up its spending, expanding subway lines and shipyards for oil platforms while building hydroelectric dams and stadiums for soccer’s 2014 World Cup.
There would be no austerity as in Europe, Brazil’s leaders pointedly promised. And Brazil had a well-oiled machine to keep its economy humming: the state development bank, an institution little known outside this country but central to policymakers here.
The bank has loaned a third of a trillion dollars since 2010, twice the amount the World Bank provided to about 100 countries combined, with much of the bounty going to the mining, agriculture and construction giants that are pillars of Brazil’s economy.
Economists at BNDES, as the bank is known, say the benefits are felt evenly across Brazil: low unemployment and an economy that was kept on track while others seemed to careen out of control.
But the global downturn is finally being felt in Latin America’s largest economy. And critics say a big part of the problem is Brazil’s strategy of doling out loans worth billions of dollars from the bank to the country’s richest and most politically connected companies.
Economists and opposition leaders say this focus on Brazil’s “national champions” neglects smaller, nimbler firms that are developing new technologies and products to diversify a commodity-dependent economy. They also say that BNDES’s huge loans are fueling inflation that the Central Bank of Brazil must scramble to control.
Sergio Lazzarini, who works at the Insper business school in São Paulo and writes about BNDES, said the bank’s role has become more difficult to justify in the face of an economy completing its third year of disappointing growth.
“Despite these trends,” Lazzarini said, “the bank has become more aggressive, bigger, with more direct transfers from the government to the bank,” a reference to the treasury funds and payroll tax revenue used for loans.
At the bank’s fortresslike offices in bustling downtown Rio, executives and economists speak proudly of a 61-year-old institution that has backed companies in the past decade whose growth helped make Brazil the world’s seventh-largest economy.
João Ferraz, BNDES’s vice president, called such projects central to an economy that posted solid growth in the 2000s, capped by a blistering 7.5 percent expansion in 2010.
“Can you build a hydroelectric plant with small firms? Can you build a pulp plant or a car factory with small firms?” Ferraz said.
In approving loans, the bank considers the quality of the companies and the benefits of the projects, he said, calling critics misguided in accusing BNDES of cronyism. He spoke about one well-known recipient of BNDES loans, the construction giant Odebrecht, which has 175,000 employees in 26 countries and built BNDES’s modernist high-rise headquarters.
“I am not friends with Odebrecht,” he said of the São Paulo-based conglomerate. “I am friends with the good projects of Odebrecht.”
But Adriano Pires, a prominent government detractor and director of a consulting firm specializing in energy, said the bank’s disbursements — $81 billion this year, its biggest outlay ever — are generating worrisome levels of debt and an outsize role for the state in the economy.
“What is the policy behind this?” Pires said. “It’s an ideology that holds that the state has to have a strong role in the economy.”
Indeed, in exchange for loans, BNDES has acquired a minority stake in dozens of private companies, giving the bank’s executives a say in their operations.
The bank also remains opaque about how it chooses which companies to shower with loans, said João Lopes Pinto, coordinator of the group More Democracy, which has met with bank officials to lobby for more transparency.
Bank executives say they are working to be more forthcoming, although they say regulations prevent them from providing details about loans.
A boon for big borrowers
With disbursements having gone up by a factor of five over the past decade, Pinto said, there has been more of a windfall for big borrowers such as the São Paulo-based meatpacker JBS.
A decade ago, JBS wasn’t even among Brazil’s top 400 companies. But BNDES provided $4.4 billion from 2008 to 2010, essential as the company went abroad to acquire Swift, National Beef, Smithfield Beef and Pilgrim’s Pride. That made JBS a worldwide leader in beef production.
In 2010, JBS was also the largest contributor to President Dilma Rousseff’s campaign, donating $4.7 million, according to a report on BNDES and Brazil’s economy by Mansueto Almeida, an economist at the government-funded Institute of Applied Economic Research. He questions what Brazil has gotten out of supporting the company in its heavy expansion into the U.S. market.
“I don’t see any kind of social outcome or social return that would justify BNDES in promoting this firm,” Almeida said. JBS declined to comment.
Almeida said the problem is that BNDES often acts as an investment bank, not a public institution focused on fostering social development.
In contrast, Almeida said, fast-developing South Korea boosted dynamic companies that developed electronics, among them Samsung.
“In Brazil, we don’t do that,” Almeida said. “We give you subsidized credit so you can do the same thing or go overseas and buy your competitors.”
Ferraz, the BNDES vice president, said such assertions overlook an increasingly diverse portfolio. He said the bank is focusing more on companies with gross revenues of $40 million or less, in categories the bank calls micro, small or medium-size. In 2009, 21 percent of loans went to those companies; this year, 37 percent has been provided to them, according to bank documents.
The bank is also accelerating spending on projects that economists say the country desperately needs, such as energy generation plants, highways, ports, airports and other infrastructure that “will be a big driver of economic growth,” said Nelson Siffert, BNDES’s superintendent for infrastructure.
Still, the bank’s relationship with giant companies and well-connected billionaires has created problems for its executives and government.
Although BNDES was not explicitly one of their targets, protesters who staged huge nationwide rallies in June directed much of their ire at government policies they said benefit the elite in a country of grinding income inequality.
One was would-be oil baron Eike Batista, a flamboyant billionaire whose EBX Group received more than $4 billion in loans, prompting him to call BNDES “the best bank in the world.” But now his empire is collapsing, and opposition leaders are questioning BNDES over its support of his money-losing companies.
“The money cannot go to a few lucky ones,” said César Colnago, an opposition lawmaker in Congress.
Batista’s office did not return calls seeking comment.
Dependent on BNDES
To be sure, credit is expensive in Brazil and BNDES fills that need, particularly the huge loans needed by companies such as the state-controlled Petrobras oil giant and Vale, a mining company that has $5 billion in outstanding loans from the bank.
Vale has grown into a $46 billion company employing tens of thousands of workers.
Sonia Zagury, global head of finance at Vale, said BNDES’s role “in the Brazilian economy is an important one, and they are an important partner for Vale.”
But analysts say there is another downside to BNDES’s big spending: It fans inflation, which has remained stubbornly high at just under 6 percent a year.
To keep it under control, the Central Bank on Nov. 27 raised its benchmark rate to 10 percent. Such a high interest rate — the highest of any developed country — is believed to crowd out the development of private lenders.
That leaves companies perpetually dependent on BNDES and its cheaper loans, according to Almeida, the economist.
“No bank, no matter how smart it is, can compete with a bank that receives subsides from the government,” he said.

Reporting for this article was supported by a grant from the Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting.

quarta-feira, 23 de outubro de 2013

Brazil economy: special 2013 survey by OECD - summary

Economic Survey of Brazil 2013




OECD Economic Surveys: Brazil 2013
Click to Read
Overview (Portuguese version)

Speech in English and in Portuguese by OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría
Brazil has moved up the ranks of the world’s largest economies while achieving much more inclusive growth than in the past. Stable and predictable macroeconomic policies underpinned these gains. More recently, demand has been supported by macroeconomic stimulus, which has encouraged the expansion of the non-tradable sector, while manufacturing is suffering from declining competitiveness, and supply-side constraints appear to be biting. Inflation has remained high and has been allowed to drift momentarily above the tolerance band, and monetary policy credibility risked being undermined by political statements about the future trajectory of interest rates. The central bank started a tightening cycle in April of 2013. The fiscal rule has also been undermined, as the inflexible fiscal target ‑ defined in terms of a primary surplus – has required unusual but legal measures to account for cyclical weakness and meet the target, reducing clarity. Fiscal challenges in the longer term are rising as the population will start to age fast in a decade from now and pension expenditures are already rising.
The global crisis has brought shortcomings in productivity and cost competitiveness to the fore. Supply-side constraints, which are increasingly impeding growth, include pressing infrastructure bottlenecks and a high tax burden, exacerbated by an onerous and fragmented tax system. A tight labour market and continuing skill shortages have resulted in strong wage increases. Although credit is rising at a substantial pace, investment financing at longer maturities continues to be scarce. Further development of long-term credit markets is hampered by a lack of private participation, owing to a uneven playing field caused by strong financial support to the national development bank which dominates long-term lending. Brazil’s participation in international trade and its integration into global production chains is below what would be expected in an economy as large and sophisticated as Brazil’s, and domestic producers continue to be shielded from foreign competition.
Substantial progress has been made in the sustainable use of natural resources. Energy generation relies strongly on renewable sources. Ethanol is a key ingredient of this strategy, but the pricing decisions of the majority government-owned oil company have resulted in petrol prices below import costs, undermining the ethanol industry. Carbon emissions have declined and deforestation has slowed, although its current pace still implies the destruction of forests of the size of Belgium (or the Brazilian state of Alagoas) every 5‑6 years.
Successful policies to spread the benefits of economic growth more widely have substantially reduced poverty and income inequality. Wider access to education have allowed more Brazilians to move into an expanding number of better paid jobs. However, the quality of education has not kept pace with the impressive expansion of the system. There are severe shortages in physical school infrastructure. A still-large number of students drop out from secondary education, and the vocational education sector is small, although increasing. Transfer payments have also relieved poverty and enhanced incentives to invest in human capital. Social expenditures have been heavily focused on pension payments, although conditional cash transfers have proven an effective tool to address poverty and inequality. The tax system, by contrast, is characterised by a low degree of progressivity which limits its redistributive impact.
 
Click on link to Access Data
How to obtain this publication
 The complete edition of the Economic Survey of Brazil is available from:
Additional information
For further information please contact the Brazil Desk at the OECD Economics Department ateco.survey@oecd.org.
The Secretariat’s draft report was prepared for the Committee by Jens Arnold and João Jalles under the supervision of Pierre Beynet. Research assistance was provided by Anne Legendre and secretarial assistance by Sylvie Ricordeau. 


sábado, 3 de agosto de 2013

O Brasil parece querer chatear o mundo - Samantha Pearson (Financial Times)

High quality global journalism requires investment. Please share this article with others using the link below, do not cut & paste the article. See our Ts&Cs and Copyright Policy for more detail. Email ftsales.support@ft.com to buy additional rights. http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2013/07/31/a-brief-history-of-brazilian-bolshiness/#ixzz2awyfC5Zl

A brief history of Brazilian bolshiness


Brazil has been putting its weight about again, this time throwing a spanner into the IMF’s efforts to secure an €11bn bailout for Greece from the eurozone countries. Even if Brazil’s economic weight is not what it used to be, it seems it can still rile the old world when it feels like it.
So for the benefit of beyondbrics readers, here is a timeline of Brazilian bolshiness:
  • October 2009 – Brazil becomes a net creditor of the IMF for the first time after providing $10bn of financing to help developed nations hit by the financial crisis. In a gleeful press conference, finance minister Guido Mantega, says the “radical change” is proof that Brazil is faring much better in the crisis than other countries.
  • May 2010 – Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Brazil’s president at the time, takes it upon himself to help Turkey broker a nuclear fuel swap deal with Iran. His cosy relationship with Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, including lots of public hugging and hand-holding, is seen as an attack on US foreign policy.
  • September 2010 – On a roll now, Brazil’s Mantega declares the world is engaged in a global “currency war”, criticising US monetary stimulus and the subsequent weak dollar for ruining the competitiveness of other countries’ exports. “Everybody wants the US economy to recover, but it does no good at all to just throw dollars from a helicopter,” he declares.
  • April 2012 – Mantega takes the face-off between the ‘developed’ and the ‘developing’ world to a new level. He says the Brics countries are working together to elect a candidate from the developing world as president of the World Bank. However, the Russian government soon declares its support for Jim Yong Kim, the US candidate.
  • March 2013 – Undeterred, Brazil goes one step further announcing that it and the other Brics countries have agreed to create their own development bank to rival the World Bank and the IMF. However, the countries struggle to agree on the bank’s funding or its location.
  • July 2013 – Brazil asks the IMF to change its methodology for calculating nations’ gross debt, complaining it inflates Brazil’s own liabilities. Under the IMF’s methodology, Brazil’s gross debt at the end of last year accounted for 68 per cent of GDP, while the country’s central bank puts the number at 59 per cent.
  • July 2013 – Paulo Nogueira Batista, Brazil’s executive director at the IMF, abstains from approving the fund’s new €1.8bn contribution to Greece’s bailout, in a sign of growing frustration over the bailout of debt-ridden Europeans. Nogueira, who also represents 10 nations from Central and South America and the Caribbean, said he was dissatisfied with almost all areas of Greece’s reform programme.

quarta-feira, 26 de junho de 2013

Ate o Wall Street Journal se confunde com a confusao politica brasileira

A matéria pretenderia ser informativa, mas só consegue ser confusa, como aliás tudo o que ocorre no Brasil atualmente. O jornalão capitalista está perdoado: o Brasil não é para principiantes, só para acabantes...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Brazil's President Offers Referendum

    By 
  • JOHN LYONS
  •  And 
  • MATTHEW COWLEY
The Wall Street Journal, 25/06/2013
SÃO PAULO—Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff called for a national referendum on overhauling a political system often criticized as unaccountable and corrupt, unveiling a far-reaching response to two weeks of mass demonstrations that have rocked this South American nation.
AFP/Getty Images
Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff Monday summoned state governors and city mayors to hear the grievances of protesters.
Under Ms. Rousseff's plan, Brazilians would vote on whether to convene an assembly to potentially alter the country's 1988 constitution. She announced other initiatives, including a bill to make political corruption a serious felony, rather than a minor offense, and additional funding for health and education.
The plan, announced at an emergency meeting with state governors and city mayors, underscored concern with the near-daily protests that have killed four people, brought cities to a standstill and threatened Ms. Rousseff's popularity. In it, Ms. Rousseff seeks to resolve what many see as the root of a matrix of national grievances expressed by protesters, from the poor quality of public services to corruption.
"This could release enormous political energy and, if done right, could be a way for her to come out on top," said Paulo Sotero, who directs the Brazil Institute at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington. "Every Brazilian knows the political structure is completely messed up, and though the initiative to change it is coming from the street, she is showing she is listening and understands it."
By responding to protesters' demands, Ms. Rousseff has adopted a different strategy from the heavy-handed responses of other developing-world leaders who have faced mass demonstrations, such as Turkey's Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Much of the explanation lies in the fact protesters weren't targeting Ms. Rousseff explicitly. And Ms. Rousseff, a former Marxist guerrilla and the country's first female president, still sees herself as a revolutionary in office dedicated to improving governance in a country that shed a military dictatorship in 1985.
In her speech, Ms. Rousseff defended her record, and that of her Workers Party, in power for the past decade. She cited low employment, years of economic growth and promised to leverage the street protests into long-standing changes.
"Everyone knows what the problems are. And we also know about the innumerable difficulties to resolve them," Ms. Rousseff said. "I have encountered since taking office, numerous obstacles, but the energy that is coming from the streets is bigger than any obstacle."
Protests began two weeks ago over bus fares in São Paulo, and spread countrywide. At least a million people have taken to the streets in protests that were tinged with violence last week. Rio de Janeiro officials reported looting outbreaks, while in Brasília a mob trashed the entrance to the Foreign Ministry. Demonstrators set fires and blocked roads, while police responded with tear gas and rubber bullets.
At the center of the complaints is a perception of impunity for corrupt politicians. Mass protests helped bring down a president, Fernando Collor, in 1992, amid corruption charges. But he is back in the Senate. The supreme court convicted two dozen politicians in a vote-buying scheme this year, but none has gone to jail.
Brazilian leaders have long talked about overhauling the political system, but the proposals died in Congress. Chief among the proposals is making representatives more accountable to voters. Under the current system, lawmakers are appointed by their parties and don't have to campaign against challengers in home districts. Proposals to create district votes and primaries would likely be discussed by a constitutional assembly. Although there is broad support for changes to the system, debate over the changes will be heated, and some opposition officials said they are skeptical.
"We still don't know what she's proposing, it's just another empty speech so far," said Rubens Bueno, leader of the Socialist People's Party in Brazil's lower house of Congress.
It isn't clear whether all Ms. Rousseff's ideas will get through Congress. For example, she wants to dedicate oil royalties to education, a move state leaders have opposed. She also called for importing doctors from Cuba and elsewhere, a plan opposed by Brazilian doctors' groups.
The demonstrations have come at a tricky time for Brazil. The country currently is hosting a Confederations Cup soccer tournament, a dry run for next year's soccer World Cup. But the expensive World Cup stadiums have attracted the ire of protesters who say the money should have been spent on hospitals and schools. It wasn't clear how Ms. Rousseff's overtures would be received on the streets. Protests are planned for Wednesday in the city of Belo Horizonte and perhaps on Sunday in Rio de Janeiro, the site of the soccer tournament finals.
"It is one way, at least, that the government shows they understand that the people were not heard in elections and in the media," said Ernani Fernandes, co-founder of the Movement Against Corruption, one of the protest groups.
—Tom Murphy, Luciana Magalhaes and Loretta Chao contributed to this article.
Write to Tom Murphy at tom.murphy@dowjones.com
A version of this article appeared June 25, 2013, on page A11 in the U.S. edition of The Wall Street Journal, with the headline: Brazil's President Offers Referendum.