Under Lula, Brazil Aims High But Falls Short - Richard M. Sanders (The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune)

Under Lula, Brazil Aims High But Falls Short by Richard M. Sanders The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, October 24, 2024 When Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva returned to Brazil’s presidency in 2023, it was clear that he wished to restore the high international profile which Brazil had enjoyed during his first two terms, 2003-2010. International expectations were high given that his predecessor, Jair Bolsonaro, had been largely uninterested in foreign policy. However, Lula has faced significant obstacles and it appears that while Brazil may be ready to enter the world stage, the world is less ready for Brazil than Lula may have hoped. Bring Back the Good Old Days During his first two terms, Brazil’s economy was humming as its agricultural and mineral products found ready markets, especially in China. Brazilian banks and construction firms started to look outward, especially within Latin America. Brazil’s state development bank provided financial muscle for exporters and investors. Politically it appeared that the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) was consolidating into a bloc that could negotiate with global counterparts such as the European Union. Under Lula, Brazil midwifed the creation of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), a regional political entity which Brazil looked to lead by sheer weight of population, geographic size and economy. On the broader international stage, Brazil opened embassies throughout Africa and the Caribbean, with the evident goal of gaining support for Brazil’s effort to obtain a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. Many observers found his combination attractive: leftist politics and willingness to confront the developed West together with his impeccable democratic credentials. During his thirteen years out of office, Lula battled corruption charges which led to his imprisonment. (His conviction was ultimately reversed on procedural grounds.) And the good times over which he had presided vanished, as commodity prices tumbled and the country struggled with fiscal imbalances built up during the boom years of his administration. The failures of his successors, most recently the erratic right-wing Jair Bolsonaro, however, gave him another chance at power and with it, international prominence. A Failed Effort with Venezuela Within the Western Hemisphere, Lula’s most notable, although thus far unsuccessful, initiative has been his effort, together with Colombia’s Gustavo Petro and (initially at least) Mexico’s Andres Manuel López Obrador, to address the crisis in Venezuela. In Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro remains in power despite convincing evidence that he in fact lost the presidential election held on July 28. Lula had maintained a warm relationship with his predecessor Hugo Chávez. Brazil shares a common border with Venezuela and has a strong interest in limiting further refugee flows. And the Biden administration was prepared to support his diplomacy, since it wanted to avoid or postpone tough decisions regarding the re-imposition of sanctions on Venezuela it had earlier lifted in an effort to encourage free elections. Also, Brazil had played a role earlier in urging Maduro to back off from his threats against neighboring Guyana over the two countries’ border dispute. Lula sent Celso Amorim, former Brazilian foreign and defense minister, now a presidential adviser, to Caracas to broker a deal. He raised suspicions among Venezuela’s opposition and its supporters when he floated the idea of holding a second election at a later date as somehow being the solution. In any event Maduro’s unyielding insistence on the validity of his election and his arrests of opposition figures condemned this initiative to irrelevance. In a particular slight, the regime harassed opposition figures for whom Brazil had agreed to assume responsibility. It appears that Lula thought his personal prestige and history with Venezuela would be enough to persuade Maduro to accept a democratic outcome and leave power. As a result, Lula’s pretensions of hemispheric leadership have taken a hit. The subject was embarrassingly missing from his speech at the UN General Assembly which painfully contrasted with that of Chile’s Gabriel Boric, another left-leaning Latin leader, who called out Maduro’s actions in no uncertain terms. If Lula was incautiously bold in Venezuela, he took the opposite tack regarding Haiti, where he declined to support the creation of a multinational force to restore order. Brazil had been active in earlier UN-authorized peacekeeping missions, even providing a Brazilian general as leader. But Brazil is hardly alone in not wanting to return, especially as the earlier mission was marked by ugly accusations of sexual abuse of Haitian women by peacekeepers. His reluctance to undertake an admittedly hard, unrewarding effort does make claims of regional leadership ring somewhat hollow. Trying to Reanimate a Regional Bloc Lula’s broader efforts to recover Brazil’s position in Latin America have also fallen a bit flat. Shortly after returning to office he sought to revive the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), a grouping created at a time when left-of-center governments seemed on the rise. But there is little enthusiasm today, with the ideological complexion of the region more varied. Chile’s Boric provided the coup de grâce, suggesting that ideologically based groupings such as UNASUR were unnecessary. We have yet to see new dynamism in the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) under Lula’s leadership. The bloc’s 25 year-long effort to conclude a free trade agreement with the European Union is always on the verge of a breakthrough which never actually happens. The parties are reportedly close to agreement on a text which addresses the issue of environmental commitments, always a sensitive subject for Brazil, but France reportedly is trying to create a blocking minority within the EU. While success cannot be ruled out, the outlook remains uncertain. Centrifugal forces within MERCOSUR are hard for Brazil to manage. Uruguay has started discussing a bilateral free trade agreement with China, though Brazil has always insisted that such negotiations be organized as a bloc. Brazil’s relations with Argentina, the cornerstone of MERCOSUR, have become complicated with the election of Argentina’s libertarian president, Javier Milei. Both Lula and Milei have traded barbs at each other, and relations reached a low point when Milei chose not to attend a recent semi-annual MERCOSUR summit, though he did make an unofficial visit to Brazil for a conference of regional conservative activists. Global Ambitions—Ukraine, BRICS and UN Security Council Lula’s ambitions go beyond Latin America. Perhaps drawing on his experience as a labor leader, he often views international issues as ripe for negotiation, with Brazil placed to act as a mediator. This is not new. In 2010 he had sought to engage in nuclear diplomacy between the United States and Iran, pushing a disarmament plan which the US found to be inadequate. Lula has sought a role in the Russo-Ukraine War, while following his predecessor’s position of condemning Russia’s invasion itself but not imposing any sanctions against Russia. He has repeatedly called for a negotiated solution, urging Ukraine to give up its claim to Crimea in the name of global “tranquility.” Brazil and China have made a joint proposal which includes an immediate ceasefire in place, though neither Ukraine nor Russia have accepted it, Regarding the Gaza war, Lula has been quick to denounce Israel’s response to the October 7 attack by Hamas, going so far as to term it “genocide” comparable to “when Hitler decided to kill the Jews.” He also recalled his ambassador in Tel Aviv. However, Brazil’s response following Iran’s missile attack on Israel was limited to a terse statement issued by the Foreign Ministry expressing “concern.” An important part of Brazil’s quest for an international role is its participation in BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China with South Africa joining later) a grouping which Russia initiated in a meeting in Yekaterinburg in 2009. While some effort has been made to institutionalize the BRICS as a forum for policy coordination and economic integration, beyond summit communiques which have a limited shelf life, the principal achievement has been the creation of the New Development Bank based in Shanghai, also known as the BRICS bank. Lula can claim one victory in the naming of Dilma Rousseff, his hapless successor as Brazil’s president, to be the Bank’s president. But in many ways Brazil is an outsider among the BRICS. Of the four founding members, it has the smallest gross domestic product. Geographically it is distant from Eurasia where Russia, China and India are located. Its military power is dwarfed by that of the other founding states. Other than its occasional and so far unsuccessful diplomatic forays, it is not consistently engaged outside of the Americas. BRICS appears to be widening rather than deepening, with Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Iran and Ethiopia having already joined. Saudi Arabia is considering an invitation, while Turkey has applied to join. Brazil had sponsored Argentina’s entry, but after the election of Javier Milei, who sees Argentina’s future lying with the West, it has declined. BRICS may evolve into a new version of the moribund Non-Aligned Movement with its 120 members. Brazil may be able to point to progress in gaining more power for the Global South vis-a-vis the US and Western Europe, but it runs the risk of becoming just one member state among many. All in all, the BRICS have been a net plus for Brazil, but its role should not be exaggerated The other pillar of Lula’s effort to carve out a major international role is his promotion of Brazil’s effort to obtain a permanent seat on the United Nation Security Council. He can take some satisfaction from the results of the recent meeting of the General Assembly which approved the “Pact for the Future” which called for increased representation for African, Latin American and Caribbean, and Asia-Pacific states. Welcome as this may have been in Brasilia, this does not mean that it is likely to happen soon. Any Brazilian claim based on its alleged leading role in Latin America would be challenged by other states in the region. Also, Brazil’s limited engagement in UN peacekeeping operations (although it has participated in some) and the lack of success from its occasional efforts as a mediator may also weigh against its candidacy. For Now, Brazil’s Reach Exceeds Its Grasp It is not news that Lula thinks big. In 2008 he said: “Brazil has finally found its destiny and intends to transform itself into a great nation.” Internationally at least, its time has not yet come. Its military is relatively small given its size and lacks capacity to project itself beyond its borders. It is yet to find a major international crisis where it can successfully act as a mediator. (Venezuela would have been a natural opportunity but Brazil’s hopes have collapsed in the face of Maduro’s stonewalling.) Its efforts to put itself at the center of regional groupings or the over-hyped BRICS have had unimpressive results. At the same time Brazil is more than just another country—its size, resources, and population are impressive. It is a true giant in agriculture, and is approaching that status in oil production. It manufactures aircraft and has a launch center allowing it to partner with other countries with space programs. It has a dynamic culture with many achievements in music and film/television. There are areas, such as the intersection of energy, environment and economics, where Brazil already has a large enough presence that it can now speak internationally with authority. But Brazil’s efforts to use diplomacy to bootstrap itself into the top rank of global leadership seem likely to meet with frustration for the foreseeable future. Richard M. Sanders Richard M. Sanders is Senior Fellow, Western Hemisphere at the Center for the National Interest and a Global Fellow of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. A former member of the Senior Foreign Service of the State Department, he served as Director of the Office of Brazilian and Southern Cone Affairs, 2010-13.

What Happened to Lula? - Matias Spektor (Foreign Affairs)

Não é que algo tenha "acontecido" com Lula: ele sempre foi assim, apenas estava um pouco contido anteriormente. (PRA)

 

What Happened to Lula?

How He Dashed High Hopes for Brazil’s Foreign Policy—and How He Can Get Back on Track

By Matias Spektor

Foreign Affairs, February 28, 2024

 

Few leaders could claim, on taking office, to have induced sighs of relief from both Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Joe Biden. Yet in January 2023, that is exactly what Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva did. His narrow victory over Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, a right-wing extremist and an admirer of Donald Trump, sparked optimism across borders. Democratic leaders everywhere saw Lula’s win, which returned him to power for a third term after a 12-year hiatus and a stint in prison over corruption charges, as the herald of an antiauthoritarian tide. Autocrats the world over relished him as a seasoned statesman with a reputation for standing up to the West. And developing countries of all kinds recognized him as someone who knows better than most how to exact concessions from the global North. “Brazil is back,” read headlines, as Lula seized the spotlight.

But during his first year in office, Lula has struggled to translate his vision for a more progressive global order into action. His foreign policy thus far has been beset by diplomatic missteps that have strained relations with partners in both the West and the developing world. His statements and actions have cast doubts on his role as peacemaker, coalition builder, and champion of the marginalized. His commitment to environmental leadership has been marred by his decision to turn Brazil into the latest petrostate. And his grand design overlooks his country’s most pressing threat: the explosive expansion of criminal networks that are working hard to turn Brazil into a failed state and that are undermining the ecological integrity of the Amazon rainforest.

To fix these problems and deliver on his vision of a progressive international order, Lula will have to change course. He must reengage partners in the West and Latin America after a year of growing estrangement. He must unequivocally come out in defense of democracy in neighboring Venezuela. He has to craft a new set of climate policies, ones that allow him to use Brazil’s newly discovered oil reserves without becoming another regressive member of OPEC. And Lula must revamp the country’s intelligence apparatus and better coordinate with outside partners to reverse the dangerous growth of Brazil’s criminal networks.

TRIALS AND ERRORS

Before taking office, Lula suggested that his foreign policy ambition was to bridge the vast gaps between the rich North and the developing South. He promised to actively pursue international cooperation, facilitating dialogue between the West and the rest, and he declared that Brazil would, again, lead Latin America. His administration hoped to secure major policy victories at the next G-20 summit and at the 2025 UN climate change conference—both of which Brazil will host. To this end, Lula has unveiled plans to launch a global initiative to combat hunger, facilitate the flow of climate finance toward developing countries, and help Africa secure seats in global governance institutions.

Yet since assuming power, Lula has made a sequence of costly mistakes. He committed his first foreign blunder with the United States. The Biden administration broke with tradition to all but endorse Lula during his campaign, cautioning Bolsonaro against using unconstitutional interventions to stay in power. Lula, however, has not leveraged the United States’ rare opening to advance his vision. Instead of pushing Biden on the long list of deliverables Brazil wants for the G-20 and the climate conference, Lula squandered his goodwill by blaming the war in Ukraine on President Volodymyr Zelensky, NATO, and ultimately the United States. A much-anticipated presidential meeting between Biden and Lula produced meager outcomes, leaving the bilateral relationship in a fraught and constrained state.

Brasília has legitimate grievances with Washington. In October, the United States single-handedly blocked a Brazilian-led UN Security Council resolution for a Gaza cease-fire, which Lula’s government had heavily campaigned for in close consultation with American officials. And Lula is persuaded that the U.S. Department of Justice was behind his imprisonment over a vast corruption scandal, marring his relationship with Washington (although evidence of U.S. involvement remains thin at best). But with the G-20 summit in Rio de Janeiro on the horizon, just after the U.S. elections in November, Brazil cannot afford this estrangement. Biden, after all, could easily torpedo Lula’s initiatives by either ignoring or opposing them.

The initial enthusiasm that greeted Lula’s return has dissipated.

The United States is not the only Western country Lula is alienating. His comments on the war in Ukraine and his penchant for describing NATO as a source of instability have made him less popular among European countries, as well. Germany and Portugal, Brazil’s closest partners on the continent, have felt particularly slighted, unable to decipher the president’s aims. These tensions have been compounded by the collapse of trade talks between the EU and Mercosur (a South American trade bloc led by Brazil), which was prompted by French agricultural protectionism and Mercosur disunity. Given that the EU plays a central role in doling out foreign aid, financing climate projects, and reforming international institutions, this discord could cost Lula his ambitious G-20 agenda.

Such failures in the global North might be less concerning if Lula had racked up victories in the global South. But he hasn’t. In South America, the initial enthusiasm that greeted his return to office has dissipated. He failed to dissuade Uruguay from seeking trade deals with China outside Mercosur, a move that severely weakens Brazil’s influence in its region. Lula’s bid to revive the Union of South American Nations proved futile. And his vocal endorsement of the unsuccessful Argentine presidential contender Sergio Massa, coupled with his absence from the inauguration of the victorious right-wing candidate, Javier Milei, have unsettled Brazil’s closest relationship. Its regional plans are contingent on the tacit support of Argentina, which has enough diplomatic influence to bolster or hinder its neighbor’s initiatives. As a result, any enmity between Lula and Milei could seriously undermine the former’s ambitions.

Lula has also run into trouble with fellow leaders on the South American left. He is engaged in a public rift with Colombian President Gustavo Petro over oil drilling in the Amazon. Brazil’s geographic distance from Mexico has made it hard for Lula to cooperate with Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, better known as AMLO, on critical issues for Lula, such as his G-20 agenda or the election of the next secretary-general of the United Nations. Lula has offered unwavering support for Venezuela’s purportedly left-wing but brutal, kleptocratic autocracy, yet this stance has earned the ire of progressive leaders elsewhere in the region—including Chilean President Gabriel Boric. Lula’s support for Venezuela has also backfired. In December, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro threatened to invade Guyana, dragging Brazil into a regional dispute that could lead to war.

Lula believes he can strengthen his international hand by partnering with China to secure concessions from the West, so he wants to closely coordinate policy with Beijing. “The BRICS is the most important development in world politics in recent times,” reasoned the presidential adviser Celso Amorim last January, referring to a consortium of non-Western states. (The acronym stands for Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.) “The group has awakened Western nations to the need to strengthen the G-20, which ought to be the main institution [for global governance].” But even if Amorim’s assessment is correct, Brazil can gain support from the global North for Lula’s progressive vision only if his country maintains clear autonomy; any hint of subservience to China will draw Western backlash. And for all the government’s positive talk about China’s rise, ties between Beijing and Brasília are not particularly close. The Chinese continue to play hardball on UN Security Council reform, which could land Brazil a permanent seat, as well as when it comes to bilateral trade and investment. China’s growing diplomatic clout in South America could also make it hard for Brazil to advance its interests in the region.

It still makes sense for Lula to partner with China and other BRICS members, especially since they can help him achieve his G-20 goals. Yet his uncritical collaboration with these states exposes him to accusations of hypocrisy. Lula is known for his readiness to call out Western violations of international law, but he has been silent about China’s brutal oppression of Uyghurs and India’s crackdown on dissent. He has also been quiet when it comes to Russia’s indiscriminate killing of civilians in Ukraine. Confronted by the media about Alexei Navalny’s death in prison, Lula said the world should wait for forensic results before blaming Putin. And although Lula condemned the October 7 Hamas attack, he created an uproar in mid-February by declaring that “what is happening in the Gaza Strip with the Palestinian people has not occurred at any other moment in history—actually, it has, when Hitler decided to kill the Jews.”

Leaders everywhere, of course, have loudly criticized Israel’s war in Gaza, so Lula is far from alone. But to be a successful progressive voice and advocate at a time when the world is so profoundly divided, Lula has to establish himself as a broker who is intensely focused on finding pragmatic solutions. He cannot express moral outrage only when it is convenient.

RIGHTING THE SHIP

Fortunately for Lula, changing tack is possible. In Brazil, the executive branch has unilateral authority to set foreign policy. And for all his missteps, Lula still wields a unique set of strategic and diplomatic assets that can help him claim global leadership.

At a time when almost all major powers are coping with war or its specter, Brazil’s geographical and political distance from the primary zones of conflict allow Lula to try to refocus global attention on the scourges of poverty and inequality. The country has sovereignty over the Amazon—the planet’s most extensive rainforest—and is a top-tier food producer, giving it a major say in climate governance. And Brazil, with its turbulent but instructive history of democratic resilience and poverty alleviation, can provide other developing states with insights on how to push back against the threat of populist extremism.

Lula’s eight-decade journey from hardship to the presidency remains a source of universal admiration, earning him a superstar reception everywhere he goes. This personal allure is not cosmetic; it is a testament to his pivotal role in lifting millions of people from poverty, which he continues to do. In the first year of his third term, Lula secured legislative backing to pass a sweeping tax reform, skillfully quelled a populist insurrection, and aligned military factions. He introduced policies that have effectively slowed Amazon deforestation. Following in Biden’s footsteps, he unveiled an ambitious industrial policy alongside plans for a green transition. And despite uncertainty about Brazil’s future economic trajectory, GDP growth in Lula’s first year impressively neared three percent—more than triple earlier market projections. These triumphs have reinforced Lula’s political capital. A recent Atlas Intel poll shows that 58 percent of Brazilians rate his administration positively.

Lula still wields a unique set of strategic and diplomatic assets.

Yet the best card in Lula’s deck is simple serendipity. The fact that Brazil will host both the G-20 summit in 2024 and the COP30 conference in 2025 means that Lula will have two global stages on which to unveil and champion a progressive foreign policy agenda centered on poverty reduction, equitable representation for emerging states, and climate justice—a reshuffling of the deck in favor of the global South. These summits demand the painstaking construction of big-tent coalitions. But this is a task at which Lula should excel, provided he can rework relations with other world leaders.

Lula can start by rebuilding ties with the United States. He should do so by focusing on his administration’s mutual interests with Biden, such as the green transition and food security, and by encouraging the White House to follow through on its professed commitment to UN reform. He should make the case that Brazil’s G-20 conference will offer a showcase for the Biden administration to promote a progressive global order, one that distinguishes it from the policies Trump would pursue. But Lula should also initiate dialogue with Republican counterparts now in the event the GOP wins in 2024, capitalizing on his innate capacity for engaging ideological adversaries. Although Trump is an unpredictable politician, Lula managed to craft excellent and profitable relations with former Republican President George W. Bush, even as Brazil staunchly and publicly opposed the Iraq war.

Lula must rebuild ties with other countries in South America, as well. Here, humility will be key. Lula should acknowledge that Brazil’s recent domestic turmoil has tarnished its brand, not least because the cross-border corruption scandals unearthed during Lula’s tenure eroded trust in the country and implicated numerous South American leaders. A better Latin America policy also entails a new approach to Venezuela. Lula has historically protected Venezuela from external criticism, even as it immiserates its people, by arguing that any liberalization is contingent on the regime’s acquiescence. But the reality remains that without concerted international pressure, liberalization is unlikely. As a result, Lula must stop defending Venezuela’s autocrats.

Brazil will have to cooperate with NATO in the South Atlantic.

To be a true progressive leader, Lula will need to make strides on climate change. His administration may have slowed deforestation rates, but it must make fundamental changes to Brazil’s increasingly carbon-intensive economy if it wants to stop rising emissions. It will have to realign the country’s voters, agricultural sector, and industrial sector toward sustainability in a way no Brazilian government has done before. To succeed, Lula must introduce legislation to compensate the losers of the ecological transition, such as farmers and ranchers, so they do not fight as Brazil makes the switch. He should reconsider his November 2023 initiative to fully integrate Brazil into OPEC and instead harness the country’s oil reserves as a catalyst for its green transformation, channeling revenues into sustainable energy initiatives. He should modernize Petrobras, Brazil’s state-owned oil company, to lead in eco-friendly innovation. Finally, Lula must root out criminal actors in the immensely complex Amazon region, which are responsible for much of Brazil’s deforestation.

Lula must also take on organized crime more broadly. Successive Brazilian administrations, including Lula’s, have allowed the country’s gangs to grow in size and scope, resulting in groups that are now powerful enough to seriously challenge the authority of the state. Criminal rings influence politics at all levels of government, co-opting state institutions that oversee roads, ports, airports, border controls, financial systems, and even law enforcement and the armed forces. They also control cross-border illicit trades in narcotics, counterfeit goods, auto parts, and human beings. The toll on ordinary Brazilians has been brutal. With an average of 110 murders per day, Brazil’s homicide rate is one of the highest in the world. The country is home to 17 of the globe’s 50 deadliest cities.

With respect to crime, there will be no strictly national solutions. Brazil’s criminal networks span many borders, so reversing the trend will require deep international cooperation of the kind not only that Brasília is unused to but that its foreign policy elites have also traditionally rejected. Yet the country will have to work with poorer and weaker neighbors to clean up their security forces, which have sometimes fallen under the sway of criminal organizations. Lula must also reorient Brazil’s intelligence apparatus—which Bolsonaro tried to train on domestic opponents—toward tracing and rooting out gangs, wherever they operate. And Brazil will have to cooperate with NATO in the South Atlantic. Working with the alliance may be toxic to Brazilian diplomats and military officials, but it’s simply a fact that many of Brazil’s criminal networks are transatlantic. As a result, the country needs to collaborate with Europe.

Revamping Brazil’s grand strategy is a formidable task, and the timing is urgent—the G-20 summit is just ten months away. But if Lula plays his cards right, he can still mend strained partnerships and rebuild his reputation as a diplomatic broker. He can help stabilize his region and his country. He can, in other words, deliver on the core promise of a progressive global order: using diplomacy to solve problems, even as fires proliferate in a politically fragmented world.

MATIAS SPEKTOR is Professor of International Relations at Fundação Getulio Vargas in São Paulo and a Nonresident Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

 

Brazil, China and International Relations: Call for papers: Special issue of JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

 Call for papers: Special issue of JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations (https://janusonline.autonoma.pt/en/)

  Francisco Leandro: fleandro@um.edu.mo (University of Macau) Kaian Lam: kaianlam@um.edu.mo (University of Macau) Yichao Li: liyichao@zjnu.edu.cn (Zhejiang Normal University)

 Special Issue 1: Brazil, China and International Relations

Submission of article ready for review by June 2024

Brazil is a major economy of Latin America that acts with increasing prominence on the global economic and political stage. Brazil has over 200 million people. It is a member of international groups as diverse as G20, Mercosur and BRICS. Brazil has diversified sectors and abundant natural resources. It continues to be a global leader in the export of agricultural commodities and present promising economic growth indicators. The country has also in recent decades managed to expand its industries and service sector, attracting both domestic and foreign investments. The political landscape of Brazil is a complex one. While the country has witnessed economic growth and social progress, it has also been confronted with major challenges related to social inequality, corruption and political trust. Against this background, JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations will be publishing a special issue that discusses Brazil in a greater context. It is hoped that this initiative will bring together experts and scholars interested in the Federative Republic of Brazil and its international forays, asking what the future holds for emerging partners hailing from as far

   as the People’s Republic of China. We call for:

• New approaches for the study of Brazil with a focus on world engagement preparedness

 o Novel epistemologies and conceptualizations that advance our knowledge of Brazil and its preparedness for engagement;

o Studies of Brazil that address “the modern international” using innovative and unconventional IR methods; o Up-to-date studies of Brazil by humanistic social sciences scholars that also pertain to “the modern

international”;

o Studies of Brazil that actively engage with the latest Global South, Feminist and Post-Humanist

epistemologies;

 • Studies on Brazil with a focus on Chinese presence, engagement and interests;

• Studies that highlight the knowledge produced in Brazil / the South Atlantic that is also applicable to our

understanding of Chinese action in the world;

• Studies that advance our understanding of Global China and its global engagement;

• Studies that put Asian Studies, Latin American Studies, Lusophone Studies and other area studies in

conversation;

• Historicized transcontinental studies of agency and identity that promote greater awareness of world

connectivity and interdependence;

 Scholars may use qualitative, quantitative and mixed method approaches. They may be interested in different subjects and based in different parts of the world. While we may expect greater interest from International Relations scholars, we are open also to submissions from other members of the learned community. They are expected to place Brazil and its connections with the outside world, especially Asian partners such as China, at the center of their analysis. It is hoped that the special issues will be published in December 2024.

Important notes:

 • The article should be written in good, scholarly English.

• Interested authors are welcome to discuss their ideas with the editors before they prepare their first draft.

• For additional information and administrative matters, you may send an email, in either English or Portuguese,

  to Kaian Lam (kaianlam@um.edu.mo).

• Your article should be ready for review no later than June 2024.

• Submission may be directed to Kaian Lam’s mailbox (kaianlam@um.edu.mo).

   We look forward to receiving your proposals! Guest editors:

Francisco Leandro: fleandro@um.edu.mo (University of Macau) Kaian Lam: kaianlam@um.edu.mo (University of Macau) Yichao Li: liyichao@zjnu.edu.cn (Zhejiang Normal University)

    

Brazil and the 1919 Peace Negotiations: a newcomer among the greats - Paulo Roberto de Almeida (Revista de Direito Internacional)

 Meu mais recente artigo publicado, mas foi elaborado em 2019, para uma conferência sobre as negociações de paz de Paris, em 1919: 

Revista de Direito Internacional (Uniceub)

Capa > v. 19, n. 3 (2022) > Almeida

Brazil and the 1919 Peace Negotiations: a newcomer among the greats

Paulo Roberto Almeida

https://www.publicacoes.uniceub.br/rdi/article/view/8138

Resumo

After some huge funding loans at the end of the Monarchy and in early Republic, to consolidate old debt into new debt, the Great War represented a serious disturbance for Brazil’s fragile economy: reduction of its exports (mainly coffee) to Europe and no one cent lent by Brazil’s official bankers, the London Rothchilds, during the whole duration of the war. Brazil had a minor participation in the fights, either naval or terrestrial, having declared a state of war against the German Empire only in the second semester of 1917, with some naval patrols in the Atlantic waters and a “Brazilian hospital” in Paris, but most of the personnel sent to Europe succumbed to the Spanish flu at the end of the conflict. Brazilian participation in the peace conference was assured by an especial delegation, having at the head a prestigious envoy, Mr. Epitácio Pessoa, who was not only selected as presidential candidate, but also was to be elected while in Paris, without any campaign at home. Main issues in defense of Brazilian interests at the Paris Peace Conference were the payment of Brazilian coffee stocks in Hamburg and Trieste, retained by the central empires, and a financial or material compensation to be offered against German ships retained in Brazilian ports. Brazil signed only the Versailles treaty, was admitted in the League of Nations, but choose to quit the organization five years later, when Germany was elected to a post Brazil expected to be assigned for it.

Palavras-chave

Great War. Paris Peace negotiations. Brazil’s delegation. Epitácio Pessoa.

Texto completo:

PDF (English)

Referências

Sources:

BRASIL. Câmara dos Deputados. Mensagens presidenciais (1919-1922): Delfim Moreira e Epitácio Pessoa. Brasília: Centro de Documentação e Informação, 1978.

_____ . Diplomatic Historical Archives of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry (AHD-Itamaraty), in Rio de Janeiro; series Paris Peace Conference (273, 2, 08-11).

_____ . Ministério das Relações Exteriores. Guerra da Europa: documentos diplomáticos, atitude do Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1918.

LYRA, Heitor. Minha vida diplomática. Brasília: UnB, 1981, 2 vols.

PESSOA, Epitácio. Pela Verdade. Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Francisco Alves, 1925.

_____ . Obras completas, vol. XIV: Conferência da Paz; diplomacia e direito internacional. Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Nacional do Livro, 1961

_____ . Obras completas, vol. XVII: Mensagens ao Congresso. Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Nacional do Livro, 1956.

U.S. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, Treaty of Versailles; text in English; available at: https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000002-0043.pdf ; access in June 4, 2019.

Bibliography:

BARACUHY, Braz. Vencer ao perder: a natureza da diplomacia brasileira na crise da Liga das Nações (1926). Brasília: Funag, 2005.

BARRETO, Fernando de Mello. Os sucessores do Barão: relações internacionais do Brasil, 1912-1964. São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 2001.

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DUROSELLE, Jean-Baptiste. Histoire diplomatique de 1919 à nos jours. 11ème éd.; Paris: Dalloz, 1993.

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.5102/rdi.v19i3.8138 

ISSN 2236-997X (impresso) - ISSN 2237-1036 (on-line)

Brazil and Argentina to start preparations for a common currency - Financial Times

Brazil and Argentina to start preparations for a common currency

Financial Times, 22 January 2023

https://www.ft.com/content/5347d263-7f24-4966-8da4-79485d1287b4

Other Latin American nations will be invited to join plan which could create world’s second-largest currency union 

Brazil and Argentina will this week announce that they are starting preparatory work on a common currency, in a move which could eventually create the world’s second-largest currency bloc. 

South America’s two biggest economies will discuss the plan at a summit in Buenos Aires this week and will invite other Latin American nations to join. The initial focus will be on how a new currency, which Brazil suggests calling the “sur” (south), could boost regional trade and reduce reliance on the US dollar, officials told the Financial Times. 

It would at first run in parallel with the Brazilian real and Argentine peso. “There will be . . . a decision to start studying the parameters needed for a common currency, which includes everything from fiscal issues to the size of the economy and the role of central banks,” Argentina’s economy minister Sergio Massa told the Financial Times. “It would be a study of mechanisms for trade integration,” he added. “I don’t want to create any false expectations . . . it’s the first step on a long road which Latin America must travel.” 

Initially a bilateral project, the initiative would be offered to other nations in Latin America. “It is Argentina and Brazil inviting the rest of the region,” the Argentine minister said. A currency union that covered all of Latin America would represent about 5 per cent of global GDP, the FT estimates. 

The world’s largest currency union, the euro, encompasses about 14 per cent of global GDP when measured in dollar terms. 

Other currency blocs include the CFA franc which is used by some African countries and pegged to the euro, and the East Caribbean dollar. However, these encompass a much smaller slice of global economic output. The project is likely to take many years to come to fruition; Massa noted that it took Europe 35 years to create the euro.

An official announcement is expected during Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s visit to Argentina that starts on Sunday night, the veteran leftist’s first foreign trip since taking power on January 1. 

Brazil and Argentina have discussed a common currency in the past few years but talks foundered on the opposition of Brazil’s central bank to the idea, one official close to the discussions said. Now that the two countries are both governed by left-wing leaders, there is greater political backing. 

A Brazilian finance ministry spokesman said he did not have information about a working group on a common currency. He noted that finance minister Fernando Haddad had co-authored an article last year, before he took his current job, proposing a south American digital common currency. 

Trade is flourishing between Brazil and Argentina, reaching $26.4bn in the first 11 months of last year, up nearly 21 per cent on the same period in 2021. 

The two nations are the driving force behind the Mercosur regional trade bloc, which includes Paraguay and Uruguay. The attractions of a new common currency are most obvious for Argentina, where annual inflation is approaching 100 per cent as the central bank prints money to fund spending. 

During President Alberto Fernández’s first three years in office, the amount of money in public circulation has quadrupled, according to central bank data, and the largest denomination peso bill is worth less than $3 on the widely used parallel exchange rate. However, there will be concern in Brazil about the idea of hitching Latin America’s biggest economy to that of its perennially volatile neighbour.

Argentina has been largely cut off from international debt markets since its 2020 default and still owes more than $40bn to the IMF from a 2018 bailout.

Lula will stay in Argentina for a summit on Tuesday of the 33-nation Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), which will bring together the region’s new crop of left-wing leaders for the first time since a wave of elections last year reversed a right-wing trend. 

Colombia’s president Gustavo Petro was likely to attend, officials said, along with Chile’s Gabriel Boric and other more controversial figures such as Venezuela’s revolutionary socialist president Nicolás Maduro and Cuban leader Miguel Díaz-Canel. 

Mexico’s president Andrés Manuel López Obrador generally shuns overseas travel and is not scheduled to participate. Protests against Maduro’s attendance are expected in Buenos Aires on Sunday. 

Argentina’s foreign minister Santiago Cafiero said the summit would also make commitments on greater regional integration, the defence of democracy and the fight against climate change. Above all, he told the Financial Times, the region needed to discuss what sort of economic development it wanted at a time when the world was hungry for Latin America’s food, oil and minerals. “Is the region going to supply this in a way which turns its economy [solely] into a raw material producer or is it going to supply it in a way which creates social justice [by adding value]?,” he said. 

Alfredo Serrano, a Spanish economist who runs the Celag regional political think-tank in Buenos Aires, said the summit would discuss how to strengthen regional value chains to take advantage of regional opportunities, as well as making progress on a currency union. “The monetary and foreign exchange mechanisms are crucial,” he said. “There are possibilities today in Latin America, given its strong economies, to find instruments which substitute dependence on the dollar. That will be a very important step forward.” 

Manuel Canelas, a political scientist and former Bolivian government minister, said that CELAC, founded in 2010 to help Latin American and Caribbean governments co-ordinate policy without the US or Canada, was the only such pan-regional integration body which had survived over the past decade as others fell by the wayside. 

However, Latin America’s leftist presidents now face more difficult global economic conditions, trickier domestic politics with many coalition governments, and less enthusiasm from citizens for regional integration. “Because of this, all the steps towards integration will certainly be more cautious . . . and will have to be focused directly on delivering results and showing why they are useful”, he cautioned.

Brazil: A Growing Agribusiness Giant - Javier Chavarro (Agribusiness Global)

 Agribusiness Global, Ohio (EUA) – 1.6.2022

Brazil: A Growing Agribusiness Giant

Javier Chavarro

 

The agrochemical market in Brazil was valued at US $13.5 billion in 2019. By 2020, the value for crop protection products dropped to US $12.1 billion, a decrease of 10.4%. For the year 2021, the National Union of Vegetal Defense Products Industry (SINDIVEG), calculated agrochemicals will have a turnover in the country of around US $13.3 billion, a 9.9% increase over 2020.

This represents approximately 536,000 tons of agrochemical products to be applied in Brazilian fields, according to the Brazilian Association of the Chemical Industry (ABIQUIM). In 2021, 499 registrations were obtained, the highest number of products registered by the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply (MAPA) in Brazil in recent years.

 

 

Registrations granted by the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply (MAPA) in Brazil from 2000-2021.

Among the new registrations, six were new technical products based on the following active ingredients registered in the year 2021.

Seven of the new registered products had a formulation based on a new active ingredient. The following are the new formulated products registered also in the year 2021.

The registrations of 499 crop protection products approved by MAPA in 2021, became a turning point in the historical series of approvals with 16 registrations between technical product, 77 biological, 243 formulated chemicals, of which 470 (94%) are post-patent. Approvals have been increasing since 2016, when there was an opportunity to register only for 277 products (MAPA). In the MAPA chart, it shows records obtained since 2015.

According to SINDIVEG, the agrochemicals applied in Brazil are divided into four categories according to how they are used. Herbicides have the largest share of the market, followed by insecticides, fungicides, and other products.

The highest proportion of agricultural pesticides applied in Brazil, about 81%, is used for soybean, corn, sugar cane, and cotton crops, according to SINDIVEG.

This growth in products used as agricultural pesticides goes together with the impressive growth of the planted areas in the country. According to Companhia Nacional de Abastecimento / National Supply Company (CONAB), in 2020-21, a little more than 69 million hectares were planted, growth of 4.6% in the planted area from the prior year. For the 2021-22 season, the forecast made by CONAB in December 2021 is 72 million hectares, which indicates a growth of 4.3% in total planted area; confirmed in the evaluation done by CONAB in April 2022 with a value of 72.7 million hectares, growing 4.4% over last year.

These increases in 2021-22 occurred mainly in soybeans going from 39.2 million hectares to 40.7 million hectares, and corn with a growth of 6.5%, going from 19.9 million hectares to 21.1 million hectares. These two crops account for 62 million hectares, which represents 85% of the planted area.

With reference to the estimated production of grains in Brazil, the bet is even higher. It is expected that for the 2021-22 season that grain production will be approximately 269.3 million tons, up 5.4% over last season, which was 255.5 million tons. Most of the volume is concentrated in soy and corn production, which represent 88.4% of the total production in Brazil.

With respect to agrochemical products and according to ABIQUIM, the future of the national chemical industry passes through regulatory stability, commercial defense, legal security, infrastructure, and competitive access to raw materials and supplies.

ABIQUIM indicated that Brazil imported US $6.4 billion in chemical products in November 2021. The unprecedented value represents increases of 4.3% compared to October (a monthly record, until then) and a massive 65% increase compared to November 2020.

In regards to the imports of nearly 6.2 million tons (increases of 0.7% compared to October and 17.1% compared to the same month last year), it is also a record, and confirms the stabilization trend of foreign purchases to an alarming new level of products that could be manufactured in the country, if competitive conditions were more favorable.

The value of Brazilian pesticide imports from January to August 2021 was lower by 22.3% compared to the same period in 2020.

ABIQUIM noted that through November, imported chemical products totaled US $55 billion, an increase of 45.6% compared to the same period last year.

For Ciro Marino, General Director of ABIQUIM, the results of the trade balance of chemical products are at the same time discouraging, since they show the high level of external dependence on critical products for the sustainable development of the national economic activity (industrial uses) and for the country itself, such as fertilizers and pesticides.

One point that significantly affects the development of Brazilian agriculture, as it did in 2021, is the shortage of inputs in the country. It is important to note that the soybean planting in Brazil began in mid-October of 2021, developing slowly due to drought. During this time the need for inputs is quite high, as crops obviously require a critical time for their application.

Data from the Foreign Trade Secretariat (SECEX) of the Brazilian Ministry of Economy reveal that the phytosanitary products formulated are mainly from the United States, China, and India. By volume, China accounted for 32% of the total in 2020, ahead of the United States and India with 11% each.

According to the Brazilian Association of Post-Patent Defensives (AENDA), in a study by IBAMA and Phillips McDougall Consulting, the active ingredients most used in Brazil in their order of importance by business class:

• Herbicides: glyphosate, 2,4-D, atrazine, paraquat, diuron, s-metolachlor, mesotrione, acetochlor, dicamba, and sulfentrazone
• Fungicides: mancozeb, copper-based compounds, sulfur, pyraclostrobin, azoxystrobin, prothioconazole, fluxapiroxade, tebuconazole, and epoxiconazole
• Insecticides: acefate, imidacloprid, and bifenthrin

In terms of supply of raw materials and formulated products, China is a key supplier of raw materials for formulating agrochemicals in Brazil, in addition to formulated products imported from there.

Recent decisions by the Chinese government on the environment have the potential to bring very positive results to global climatic conditions.

However, they generate strong short-term uncertainties regarding the delivery time and costs of products.

The shortage of agricultural chemicals due to current situations and high prices may affect the 2022 growing season, because the coal shortage and power cuts in China have also affected the supply chain for agrochemicals and fertilizers.

China’s energy policy will affect the supply and price of agrochemical intermediaries and active ingredients, as the impact on factories in Yunnan and Jiangsu provinces, where yellow phosphorus production serves as a feedstock for glyphosate, acetate, and malathion.

The situation affects to a greater extent the price of glyphosate, its intermediaries and raw material such as glycine, since its extraction requires a lot of energy. There has already been an increase in the price of glyphosate. (The price of technical material in Brazil doubled as of September 2021).

On the other hand, American farmers are already preparing for less herbicide availability in 2022.

Glyphosate and glufosinate are the two main active ingredients that may potentially be in short supply for the upcoming growing season. And as indicated, China is also an essential source of raw materials and intermediaries for the formulation of agricultural pesticides. The increase in the prices of precursors has a cascading effect on other manufacturing countries, and the impact will be felt by nearly all Latin  America, which is a net importer of pesticides.

According to IBAMA, 72% of the active ingredients in agricultural pesticides marketed in Brazil are imported, either formulated or in the form of technical products to be formulated in the country.

Another point that must be considered are the impacts of the lack of containers that have not yet been normalized.

An important element that requires all the consideration that affects the commercialization of agrochemicals in Brazil is the threat of the illegal market of agricultural pesticides. The Institute for Border Economic and Social Development (IDESF) carried out the study, “The Illegal Market of Agricultural Defenses in Brazil,” where it is indicated that the illegalities of the market are characterized by theft, counterfeiting, smuggling, and deviation of the purpose of use. The most smuggled products in Brazil are emamectin benzoate, thiamethoxam, and paraquat, in addition to many others.

However, it appears that more pesticides are being smuggled from neighboring Paraguay, where regulations on these products are much more relaxed.

In the report by IDESF, it is estimated that 25% of the pesticides sold in Brazil are of illegal origin and 30% of the seeds have an unknown origin.

According to the National Association of Agricultural and Veterinary Supplies Distributors (ANDAV), distribution issues reach the field with knowledge, technologies, and innovation, approximately 50% of all inputs that arrive today in the Brazilian field go through a distributor, and ANDAV has grouped more than 2,000 distributors nationwide for more than 30 years.

How does the war between Russia and Ukraine affect agricultural businesses in Brazil?

The impact on agricultural business in Brazil is important, since it imports about 85% of its fertilizer needs with Russia as the main supplier of fertilizers to Brazil.

One of the main inputs for agricultural production are the fertilizers that Brazil imports from different countries globally, and 80% of the flow of fertilizers comes from ten countries, among which are the Russian Federation, Morocco, Canada, the United States, China, Belarus, Qatar, Israel, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia.

The flow of fertilizers to Brazil indicates that it has a 13% share in the global fertilizer trade of a total of US $64.8 billion and that the Russian Federation is the main supplier of potassium fertilizers, nitrogenous fertilizers, and mixed fertilizers for an approximate value of US $1.7 billion that correspond to 20% of the fertilizers that Brazil buys during the year 2020, Brazil imported fertilizers from more than 60 different countries with a value of US $8.5 billion (according to resourcetrade.com). The export of fertilizers to Brazil is led by the Russian Federation, from which 20% is imported according to the portals of The Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) and Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs; followed by Morocco with 11%, Canada with 9.7% and the United States with 8%. Being 10 countries that export 80% of the fertilizers to Brazil.

These are the fertilizers imported to Brazil: 32.3% mixed, 31.8% potassium, 31.7% nitrogen, 3.9% phosphate, and 0.2% organic.

On the other hand, Brazil exports 0.73% to Russia of its total export volume, which corresponds to US $1.6 billion, represented mainly in the following products: soybeans, walnuts, coffee, sugar, and tobacco among others that represent almost 50% of exports to Russia.

According to the Brazilian Agency of the Brazilian Communication Company, to manage this situation of importing fertilizers, Brazil launched the “National Fertilizer Plan” since the country depends on imported nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium. According to the Minister of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply, food security is a matter of national security, and fertilizers play an important role in avoiding a food crisis.

Deu no Washington Post: Bozo vira "amigo dos pobres" (para inglês ver...) - Anthony Faiola (WP)

 Por obra e graça das eleições, o Bozo pretende se converter em alguém que ele nunca foi: o amigo dos pobres. Esse jornalista que conhece bem o Brasil desmonta o mito...

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Supporters in Brasilia watch TVs showing Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro speaking at a ceremony where he officially joined the centrist Liberal Party on Nov. 30. (Raul Spinasse/AP Photo)

Brazil’s far-right Bolsonaro reaches for an unlikely title: President of the Poor

By Anthony Faiola

The Washington Post, December 1, 2021

For many Brazilians, Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency has been no fairy tale. Since his convincing victory in 2018, he has stood accused of encouraging massive deforestation in the Amazon rainforest and undermining the free press. A Senate panel recommended he be charged with crimes against humanity for willful mismanagement of the coronavirus, which he dismissed as a “little flu.”

And yet, to the surprise of some, the same welfare critic who once suggested that one cure for poverty was birth control has also sought to reinvent himself as something of a fiscal Robin Hood, taking from Brazil’s public coffers to give to the poor. His latest and largest effort: a potentially historic — some say catastrophic — revision to the social safety net that critics fear could break Brazil’s national piggy bank.

Bolsonaro’s Auxílio Brasil, or Brazil Aid, program would beef up financial assistance to the less fortunate ahead of next year’s election. So expensive as to blast through Brazil’s mandatory fiscal ceiling, the social spending spree requires approval in both legislative houses for a rejiggering of state finances to afford it. After clearing the lower house this week, it has moved to the Senate, which has promised a quick airing.

The cornerstone of Bolsonaro’s hastily slapped together social agenda, Auxílio Brasil will replace Bolsa Familia, the much-hailed aid effort cobbled together nearly two decades ago by his political archenemy, leftist former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Perhaps not coincidentally, the two may square off in a clash of political titans in next year’s presidential vote. Neither has officially declared their intentions, but many Brazilians expect they will run and the success or failure of Auxilio Brazil is likely to emerge as a hot button topic on the campaign trail.

Yet even some of Bolsonaro’s critics concede the far-right leader should be credited with doing right, at least for a time, by Brazil’s poor during the pandemic — even if he appeared to do so in a reach for political gain. As Congress last year was debating support for the poor, Bolsonaro appeared to sense an opportunity. His government had proposed a modest pandemic bonus for the poor, a number Congress decided needing beefing up. Not to be outdone, Bolsonaro vowed to one-up Congress’s offer.

The result became a globally watched experiment in poverty reduction. By August of last year, as monthly cash assistance for some families reached the equivalent of about $232, extreme poverty hit a historic low of 2.3 percent. In fact, a World Bank report found that out of the 22 million people lifted out of poverty across Latin America by pandemic-related government transfers in 2020, 77 percent of them were in Brazil. Compare that to less generous pandemic assistance offered under leftist President Andrés Manuel López Obrador in Mexico, where 3.8 million more people fell into poverty during the pandemic.

“I don’t think anyone would argue that he should not have done something along these lines,” Cesar Zucco, a political scientist at Brazil’s Getulio Vargas Foundation, told me of Bolsonaro’s pandemic efforts for the poor. “Maybe you have to give that one to him. But it was excessive, and it wasn’t well designed. It did help him boost his popularity.”

Bolsonaro’s popularity, in fact, shot through the roof, as the poor backed him in record numbers.

“He became a hero,” Ricardo Fernandes, a 31-year old actor from Rio de Janeiro’s City of God favela, told the Guardian last year. Gradually, however, that aid was scaled down and millions of Brazilians cascaded back into poverty. As they did, Bolsonaro’s approval ratings tanked.

With elections looming next year, he appears to have learned that you can buy popularity.

“He is obsessed with the idea that he needs to give out money in order to boost his popularity,” Zucco said.

Doling out cash or food baskets, particularly ahead of elections, is a common political ploy in parts of Latin America. But for Brazil, the impact of Bolsonaro’s social safety net revamp could be far longer lasting.

By creating Auxilio Brasil, he is effectively killing Bolsa Familia, the globally recognized effort launched in 2003 that offered cash assistance to the poor in exchange for those families ensuring, for instance, that their children go to school and are properly vaccinated. Over the years, Bolsa Familia has helped lift millions out of poverty and contributed to a reduction in income inequality, of which Brazil has one of the world’s highest rates.

Apparently eager to stake his own claim to being a president of the poor, Bolsonaro offers more money to more families in his new program. But critics like Zucco say it has substantial failings — not least of which is that it would be funded for only one year, requiring a new vote in 2022 to keep it alive.

Critics also argue that Bolsonaro’s program does not appropriately deal with the realities of extreme poverty. A day-care voucher, for instance, would be offered only to families that demonstrate that they have a job, effectively omitting the unemployed.

“The government has not explained how it will implement the new benefits or who will be responsible for their implementation, evaluation and monitoring,” Luciana de Souza Leão, an assistant professor of sociology at the University of Michigan, said in a university publication. “Launching a new program like this is destined to be a failure. Poor families will be the most affected since they will have to navigate a system that not even policymakers seem to understand besides dealing with the uncertainties about the program’s future.”

It is also very expensive, appearing designed less as a vehicle for long-term poverty reduction and more as a quick way to win votes in the favelas, or urban slums. Calling Bolsonaro bad for Brazil’s economy, the Economist also notedthat his spending bill allots a “large chunk” of extra money to financing “opaque budget amendments that grant overpriced public-procurement contracts to individual legislators in return for their support for president.”

As the Financial Times reported, investors are dismayed by the prospect of heavily indebted Brazil exceeding its mandatory spending ceiling — passed in 2016 to rein in budgets and enforce longer-term financial health.

“Bolsonaro has always been against Bolsa Familia — he always hated it as the typical ‘money for lazy people’, etc.,” Filipe Campante, a Brazilian professor of economics at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, told the Financial Times. “But at the same time he knows he needs to give people something so he can have a shot at reelection.”