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Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida.

Mostrando postagens com marcador Mercosur. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador Mercosur. Mostrar todas as postagens

terça-feira, 4 de abril de 2023

Mercosur, Brasil y Argentina en el año 2035: um exercício de futurologia - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

O que,  em 2004, eu previa para o Mercosul em 2035? Só faltam 12 anos...

Mercosur, Brasil y Argentina en el año 2035

Paulo Roberto de Almeida


Respostas a perguntas colocadas pelo jornalista argentino Tomás Vela.

 

1) -¿Cómo prevé para la Sudamérica del año 2035 (marco referencial de la nota) que esté integrado el bloque MERCOSUR / UNIÓN SUDAMERICANA?, 

PRA: Union SudAmericana no tendrá ningun rol, pues que correspondiendo a un empreendimento politico sin cualquier contenido real. Desaparecerá sin dejar trazos, en los proximos anos.

Mercosur no desaparecerá, pero tendra funcciones marcadamente politicas y de cooperacion ampliada, pues sus funcciones comerciales y económicas tendran sido absorbidas sea por el esquema hemisferico de liberalizacion ampliada, sea por el crescimiento de la liberalizaion multilateral, bajo el liderazgo de OMC.

 

2) -En caso de que esta unión prospere, y siempre ubicados en la Sudamérica de 2035, ¿qué beneficios traería el bloque a la Argentina y a Brasil? 

PRA: Brasil y Argentina habran superado sus mas renitentes problemas de inestabilidad económica, de desigualdades sociales, de disfuncciones institucionales, pero solo parcialmente estos logros serán debidos a Mercosur. En general, y por la maior parte, los esfuerzos seran determinados sobretodo internamente, como resultado de la consciencia de sus propios pueblos que ya les bastaba decadas de inestabilidad, injusticia, corrupcion politica y deterioro institucional.

Las realizaciones mas importantes haran estos dos paises por sus proprios esfuerzos, por determinacion nacional, porque es asi que se pasa en todas las experiencias nacionales: lo principal se hace en casa, no externamente. Los bloques de integracion no tienen mucha capacidad transformadora si los proprios pueblos no quieren transformarse a si mismos.  

 

3) -¿Qué relación podría llegar tener el bloque con la Unión Europea y los Estados Unidos para el 2035

PRA: En 2035, estas relaciones ya no tendran tanta importancia substantiva como han tenido durante el auge del “minilateralismo selectivo”, durante la “fiebre de los bloques” que atingió el mundo alrededor de los anos 2005-2015. Progresivamente despues de esta fecha, el mundo empezará a superar este maximo de discriminacion minilateralista representado por los bloques, para reanudar con en multilateralismo de la OMC.

Mercosur, aunque teniendo fuertes lazos economicos, politicos, culturales, tanto con UE como con los EUA, desarrollará estos vinculos de cooperación en el cuadro de un sistema politico y económico fuertemente multilateralizado, en el cual em grueso de las relaciones económicas y comerciales se llevaran por medio de las regras universales de la OMC, que ha logrado, a partir de 2015, recuperar el liderazo del proceso de liberalizacion irrestrita e incondicional, que por un momento habia sido “secuestrado” por los bloques geograficos restritos.

 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 26 novembro 2004

 

From: Tomás Vela [mailto:tomasvela@mvprensa.com.ar]

Sent: Thursday, November 25, 2004 2:29 AM

Subject: Breve consulta periodística sobre el MERCOSUR para Argentina


Dr. Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Hola, mi nombre es Tomás Vela; soy fotógrafo, periodista y estudiante de la escuela de periodismo TEA, la más importante de la Argentina, y quería saber su opinión sobre el futuro del MERCOSUR para un trabajo que será publicado el 5 de diciembre en el diario Domingo de la mencionada institución formativa. Se trata de sólo tres preguntas sobre la hipotética situación socio-política del MERCOSUR y la Unión Sudamericana para dentro de 30 años.

Si bien esto es sólo una proyección muy difícil de llevar a cabo dada la cantidad y calidad de cambios políticos de la región, resulta fundamental el punto de vista que usted nos pueda llegar a compartir, junto con el de su compatriota Dr. Mario Marconini, sobre: 

-¿Cómo prevé para la Sudamérica del año 2035 (marco referencial de la nota) que esté integrado el bloque MERCOSUR / UNIÓN SUDAMERICANA?, 

-En caso de que esta unión prospere, y siempre ubicados en la Sudamérica de 2035, ¿qué beneficios traería el bloque a la Argentina y a Brasil? Y

-¿Qué relación podría llegar tener el bloque con la Unión Europea y los Estados Unidos para el 2035? 

Lamentablemente es probable que, aunque pueda y quiera responder estas preguntas, el tiempo no juegue a mi favor y se me complique incluir en la nota final su valiosísimo punto de vista, porque debo cerrarla mañana jueves 25 de noviembre antes de las 20. De todas formas me gustaría mucho en algún momento poder entrevistarlo sobre este y otros temas relacionados con la sociedad sudamericana para el medio periodístico y fotoperiodístico MVPrensa (http://www.mvprensa.com.ar/), del cual soy el director. Sería un gran honor e inmensa oportunidad de aprendizaje el mantener una entrevista vía mail con usted.

Muchísimas gracias por su tiempo. 

Atentamente,

 

domingo, 22 de janeiro de 2023

Brazil and Argentina to start preparations for a common currency - Financial Times

Brazil and Argentina to start preparations for a common currency

Financial Times, 22 January 2023

https://www.ft.com/content/5347d263-7f24-4966-8da4-79485d1287b4

Other Latin American nations will be invited to join plan which could create world’s second-largest currency union 

Brazil and Argentina will this week announce that they are starting preparatory work on a common currency, in a move which could eventually create the world’s second-largest currency bloc. 

South America’s two biggest economies will discuss the plan at a summit in Buenos Aires this week and will invite other Latin American nations to join. The initial focus will be on how a new currency, which Brazil suggests calling the “sur” (south), could boost regional trade and reduce reliance on the US dollar, officials told the Financial Times. 

It would at first run in parallel with the Brazilian real and Argentine peso. “There will be . . . a decision to start studying the parameters needed for a common currency, which includes everything from fiscal issues to the size of the economy and the role of central banks,” Argentina’s economy minister Sergio Massa told the Financial Times. “It would be a study of mechanisms for trade integration,” he added. “I don’t want to create any false expectations . . . it’s the first step on a long road which Latin America must travel.” 

Initially a bilateral project, the initiative would be offered to other nations in Latin America. “It is Argentina and Brazil inviting the rest of the region,” the Argentine minister said. A currency union that covered all of Latin America would represent about 5 per cent of global GDP, the FT estimates. 

The world’s largest currency union, the euro, encompasses about 14 per cent of global GDP when measured in dollar terms. 

Other currency blocs include the CFA franc which is used by some African countries and pegged to the euro, and the East Caribbean dollar. However, these encompass a much smaller slice of global economic output. The project is likely to take many years to come to fruition; Massa noted that it took Europe 35 years to create the euro.

An official announcement is expected during Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s visit to Argentina that starts on Sunday night, the veteran leftist’s first foreign trip since taking power on January 1. 

Brazil and Argentina have discussed a common currency in the past few years but talks foundered on the opposition of Brazil’s central bank to the idea, one official close to the discussions said. Now that the two countries are both governed by left-wing leaders, there is greater political backing. 

A Brazilian finance ministry spokesman said he did not have information about a working group on a common currency. He noted that finance minister Fernando Haddad had co-authored an article last year, before he took his current job, proposing a south American digital common currency. 

Trade is flourishing between Brazil and Argentina, reaching $26.4bn in the first 11 months of last year, up nearly 21 per cent on the same period in 2021. 

The two nations are the driving force behind the Mercosur regional trade bloc, which includes Paraguay and Uruguay. The attractions of a new common currency are most obvious for Argentina, where annual inflation is approaching 100 per cent as the central bank prints money to fund spending. 

During President Alberto Fernández’s first three years in office, the amount of money in public circulation has quadrupled, according to central bank data, and the largest denomination peso bill is worth less than $3 on the widely used parallel exchange rate. However, there will be concern in Brazil about the idea of hitching Latin America’s biggest economy to that of its perennially volatile neighbour.

Argentina has been largely cut off from international debt markets since its 2020 default and still owes more than $40bn to the IMF from a 2018 bailout.

Lula will stay in Argentina for a summit on Tuesday of the 33-nation Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), which will bring together the region’s new crop of left-wing leaders for the first time since a wave of elections last year reversed a right-wing trend. 

Colombia’s president Gustavo Petro was likely to attend, officials said, along with Chile’s Gabriel Boric and other more controversial figures such as Venezuela’s revolutionary socialist president Nicolás Maduro and Cuban leader Miguel Díaz-Canel. 

Mexico’s president Andrés Manuel López Obrador generally shuns overseas travel and is not scheduled to participate. Protests against Maduro’s attendance are expected in Buenos Aires on Sunday. 

Argentina’s foreign minister Santiago Cafiero said the summit would also make commitments on greater regional integration, the defence of democracy and the fight against climate change. Above all, he told the Financial Times, the region needed to discuss what sort of economic development it wanted at a time when the world was hungry for Latin America’s food, oil and minerals. “Is the region going to supply this in a way which turns its economy [solely] into a raw material producer or is it going to supply it in a way which creates social justice [by adding value]?,” he said. 

Alfredo Serrano, a Spanish economist who runs the Celag regional political think-tank in Buenos Aires, said the summit would discuss how to strengthen regional value chains to take advantage of regional opportunities, as well as making progress on a currency union. “The monetary and foreign exchange mechanisms are crucial,” he said. “There are possibilities today in Latin America, given its strong economies, to find instruments which substitute dependence on the dollar. That will be a very important step forward.” 

Manuel Canelas, a political scientist and former Bolivian government minister, said that CELAC, founded in 2010 to help Latin American and Caribbean governments co-ordinate policy without the US or Canada, was the only such pan-regional integration body which had survived over the past decade as others fell by the wayside. 

However, Latin America’s leftist presidents now face more difficult global economic conditions, trickier domestic politics with many coalition governments, and less enthusiasm from citizens for regional integration. “Because of this, all the steps towards integration will certainly be more cautious . . . and will have to be focused directly on delivering results and showing why they are useful”, he cautioned.


terça-feira, 6 de dezembro de 2016

Venezuela suspensa do Mercosul: deveria ter entrado? - Carlos Malamud (InfoLatam) e Paulo Roberto de Almeida

O mais incrível de toda essa história é a sucessão de ILEGALIDADES que foram cometidas por TODAS as partes desse bloco antes promissor e depois praticamente destruido pelas diplomacias lulopetista, kirchnerista, chavista e bolivarianas, de forma geral.
Em 2005, quando Chávez anunciou sua decisão -- sim SUA, não do país, da burocracia técnica, dos empresários, do parlamento venezuelano -- de ingressar no Mercosul deixou MUITO CLARO que não queria o Mercosul neoliberal, como ele afirmava, e sim que iria destruir o Mercosul livre-cambista para colocar em seu lugar um Mercosul "de los pueblos", ou seja, conforme ao "socialismo do século XXI".
NINGUÉM, na época, do governo brasileiro ou de qualquer outro governo, protestou CONTRA essa afirmação absurda do caudilho bolivariano, NENHUM representante do Brasil levantou-se para condenar essa atitude absolutamente contrária, negativa, prejudicial ao Mercosul, contrariando todos os seus valores, princípios, objetivos e mecanismos de funcionamento.
Todos continuaram como se fosse normal um "futuro sócio" afirmar com todas as letras que, ao ingressar no "clube", pretendia mudar todas as suas regras, num sentido claramente contrário a tudo o que tinha sido feito até então.
Passaram-se os quatro anos acordados para a concretização do acesso da Venezuela (ou do Chávez?) no Mercosul, e absolutamente NADA ocorreu, ou seja, a Venezuela JAMAIS cumpriu os objetivos mínimos da união aduaneira.
Em 2010, constatando que NADA tinha sido feito pelo país pretensamente interessado em ingressar no bloco, sequer protestaram, e concederam mais QUATRO anos para que a Venezuela se movimentasse de alguma forma.
Em 2012, quando aproveitando (ILEGALMENTE) o impeachment do presidente paraguaio Fernando Lugo (aquele bispo reprodutor) pelo parlamente do país, estritamente dentro das regras constitucionais, os três sócios SUSPENDERAM (ILEGALMENTE, pelas regras do Protocolo de Ushuaia) o Paraguai, e colocaram a Venezuela para dentro, também ILEGALMENTE, pois o país andino SEQUER tinha RATIFICADO o seu próprio Protocolo de acesso ao Mercosul, ou seja, não cumpria regras mínimas para ingressar na união aduaneira.
A Venezuela sequer ratificou o ACE-18, ou seja, o Tratado de Assunção, tal como registrado na ALADI, e portanto NÃO PODERIA ser considerada membro do Mercosul, e os demais membros agiram mais uma vez ILEGALMENTE ao sancionar tal decisão.
Grande parte da responsabilidade incumbe ao Brasil dos companheiros, à estupefaciente diplomacia lulopetista, a maior fraude que já ocorreu em nossa política externa.
Como isso pôde (sim, gosto deste circunflexo) ocorrer, durante tanto tempo, sem qualquer protesto por parte dos servidores e envolvidos nessas ilegalidades, é ainda algo estranho para mim, mas como estive fora do Itamaraty (ou pelo menos sem cargo nenhum durante toda a gestão companheira) não sei explicar como tantos absurdos ocorreram. É o que vou agora investigar.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Brasilia, 6 de dezembro de 2016

Carlos Malamud: Mercosur Venezuela

Mercosur suspende a Venezuela

mercosur
Infolatam
Madrid, 4 diciembre 2016
Por CARLOS MALAMUD
(Infolatam).- La suspensión de Venezuela como miembro del Mercosur ha servido para enviar a la comunidad internacional mensajes claros y muy diversos. En primer lugar, que el tiempo político en América Latina ha comenzado a cambiar con la llegada de gobiernos menos respetuosos de los “usos y costumbres” propios de la diplomacia bolivariana, hasta ahora más partidaria del ordeno y mando que del diálogo y la negociación, inclusive con sus socios importantes. En segundo lugar, consecuencia de lo anterior, pero también de la muerte de Hugo Chávez y de la profunda crisis económica venezolana, la decadencia del ALBA y con ella un creciente aislamiento regional del proyecto bolivariano. Y por último, el estilo prepotente, casi barriobajero, de quienes deberían representar a Venezuela en la escena internacional, comenzando por Nicolás Maduro y su ministra de Exteriores Delcy Rodríguez.
Tras el conflicto creado por la pretensión de Argentina, Brasil y Paraguay de que Venezuela no ejerciera la presidencia pro tempore de Mercosur, los cuatro países fundadores decidieron darle al gobierno de Caracas un plazo relativamente breve, hasta el 1 de diciembre, para adecuar su legislación al acervo comunitario. Pese a que Maduro afirmó haber cumplido con el 95% de lo requerido, el punto de vista mayoritario es exactamente el contrario. Incluso el viceministro de Exteriores de Uruguay José Luis Cancela señaló que Venezuela aún debe incorporar 228 normas a su legislación, siendo las dos más relevantes las referidas al protocolo de derechos humanos del Mercosur y al Acuerdo de Complementación Económica Nº18 (ACE18). Este último “es el corazón… del propio Mercosur”, al regular “la arquitectura comercial de la vinculación entre los socios”.
CARACAS (VENEZUELA), 02/12/2016.- EFE/Cortesía Palacio de Miraflores/SOLO USO EDITORIAL/NO VENTAS
Debida a esta circunstancia Maduro se mostró dispuesto a viajar a Montevideo para entrevistarse con el presidente Tabaré Vázquez para solucionar las cosas, tras pedirle: “No le haga eso a Venezuela”.
Se da la circunstancia de que Uruguay ha sido hasta ahora el país menos proclive a sancionar a Venezuela o a apartarlo de Mercosur, pese a que hace ya más de cinco años que se exige completar la adecuación normativa. Incluso el propio Cancela ha dicho que el gobierno de Caracas debía seguir participando en las distintas estructuras del bloque con voz pero sin voto. Debida a esta circunstancia Maduro se mostró dispuesto a viajar a Montevideo para entrevistarse con el presidente Tabaré Vázquez para solucionar las cosas, tras pedirle: “No le haga eso a Venezuela”.
Pese a la consideración mostrada con Uruguay, la norma ha sido la opuesta. Para comenzar habría que recordar el uso indiscriminado y peyorativo del concepto “Triple Alianza” para descalificar a Argentina, Brasil y Paraguay. La ministra Rodríguez insistió en un tuit que “Venezuela no reconoce este acto írrito sustentado en la ley de la selva de unos funcionarios que están destruyendo el Mercosur” y acusó a sus “burócratas intolerantes” de secuestrar los mecanismos de la integración para expulsarlos del bloque.
No sólo eso. En un acto de clara injerencia en los asuntos de los demás países le pidió a sus ciudadanos que se manifestaran delante de las instituciones comunitarias para impedir la expulsión de Venezuela. Si alguno de los gobiernos acusados hubiera tenido una reacción de ese estilo la respuesta venezolana hubiera sido estentórea y clamorosa, sumando incluso, como en el pasado, las acostumbradas muestras de solidaridad de Rafael Correay Evo Morales.
Este reciente apego bolivariano por las normas y las instituciones contrasta con el desprecio de 2005, cuando los entonces presidentes de Mercosur (Néstor Kirchner, Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, Nicanor Duarte y Tabaré Vázquez) accedieron al pedido de Hugo Chávez de integrarse como miembro de pleno derecho tras su salida de la CAN (Comunidad Andina). Esto ocurrió sin ningún tipo de discusión, ningún estudio previo sobre el impacto de dicha medida ni ninguna política de convergencia con la realidad económica institucional, del bloque. Eran otros tiempos, los tiempos en que los deseos de Chávez debía satisfacerse sin discusión, pese a estar vigente la cláusula democrática.
Hoy las cosas han cambiado. La actitud beligerante de Paraguay contra Venezuela, producto de su suspensión de Mercosur en 2012, tras el juicio político que destituyó a Fernando Lugo, ha sido acompañada por la postura crítica de Argentina y Brasil. En aquel entonces se dio la circunstancia de que prácticamente el mismo acto también permitió el ingreso definitivo del gobierno bolivariano en Mercosur. Claro está que para que esto pudiera producirse hubo que doblegar las normas, o como reconoció el entonces presidente uruguayo José Mujica, los elementos políticos prevalecieron sobre los jurídicos. Pero entonces nadie protestó, ni se quejó de un “golpe de estado”, como hizo en esta oportunidad la ministra Rodríguez.
En relación con otros golpes imaginarios, la ex presidente brasileña Dilma Rousseff se solidarizó con la posición bolivariana al afirmar tajante que la medida atenta contra la soberanía venezolana y que la acción estuvo guiada por intereses imperiales: “La suspensión es un recurso extremo e inadecuado. Sin embargo, no se puede esperar mucho de un Gobierno ilegítimo que ha usurpado mi mandato por medio de un golpe parlamentario disfrazado de impeachment. La medida muestra la pequeñez del Gobierno de Brasil a las demandas de América Latina”. Su incomprensión del nuevo clima que empieza a vivirse en la región se confirma con su afirmación de que se trata de un acto peligroso e irresponsable que compromete la convivencia entre las naciones de América del Sur.
Lo que es indudable, más allá de las declaraciones más o menos altisonantes de las autoridades bolivarianas, es que su influencia regional ha mermado considerablemente. Poco antes de la muerte deFidel Castro, el presidente argentino Mauricio Macri señalaba en relación al triunfo de Donald Trump que: “La nueva corriente de líderes latinoamericanos no está pendiente de Cuba”. Esta misma frase se podría perfectamente hacer extensiva a Venezuela. Sin embargo, por otras razones, especialmente por los efectos desestabilizadores que su crisis podría tener sobre el conjunto de América Latina, los presidentes regionales deberían estar mucho más pendientes de lo que allí ocurre. Pero no para acatar ciegamente las órdenes o deseos del mandatario de turno, sino para evitar una desgracia de incalculables consecuencias, tanto para Venezuela como para el conjunto de la región.

quinta-feira, 15 de setembro de 2016

Mercosur: At the Mercy of Other Markets - Diego Solis (Stratfor)

Mercosur: At the Mercy of Other Markets
Diego Solis
Analysis SEPTEMBER 13, 2016
(Stratfor)

Summary
Editor's Note: This is the second installment of a seven-part series examining how the world's regional economic blocs are faring as the largest of them — the European Union — continues to fragment.

The Common Market of the South, better known by its Spanish acronym Mercosur, emerged in the early 1990s as a small bloc with a big goal: to ease the movement of people and goods throughout South America. The continent's leaders hoped that by bringing together South America's biggest economies, Brazil and Argentina, they could someday unite the entire Southern Cone. Much like France and Germany in the European Union, Brazil and Argentina have led their bloc since its inception, albeit unequally. (Because the Brazilian economy is notably larger than Argentina's, Brasilia has far greater clout within Mercosur than Buenos Aires.) By comparison, the economies of Mercosur's three remaining members — Venezuela, Uruguay and Paraguay — are too small or too specialized to claim much influence over the bloc's decision-making.

Given Brazil and Argentina's advanced economic development relative to their fellow Mercosur members, the distribution of power within the bloc is unlikely to change any time soon. The same cannot be said for Mercosur's policies. With demand from the bloc's largest buyers stagnating or declining, Mercosur members are pushing to open the traditionally protectionist trade union to new markets. But doing so would also risk inciting protests as local industries unaccustomed to external competition struggle to adapt, a pill few South American governments are eager to swallow. Even so, Mercosur will continue to mull the idea of liberalizing its policies in the coming decade, leaving the bloc's fate to fluctuations in commodity prices and regional trade in the meantime.

Analysis
Mercosur owes much of its design to South America's geography and the economic opportunities that arose from it. The sheer size of Brazil, for example, guaranteed it a prominent spot among the continent's economies, while terrain favorable to agriculture enabled Argentina to become an important part of international trade routes. Uruguay, located at the mouth of the Rio de la Plata, similarly used its trade advantages to industrialize rapidly. Yet to the north, landlocked Paraguay developed more slowly, hampered as it was by its landscape and inaccessibility.

Brazil’s Geographic Challenge
Isolated from the rest of the continent both geographically and linguistically and lacking internal cohesion, Brazil has traditionally been inward looking. Watch the video

Geopolitics created the conditions for an economic partnership between Brazil and Argentina, but domestic politics dictated the institutional framework that shaped its formation. Starting in the mid-20th century, the two giants adopted a policy of import substitution industrialization (ISI), raising trade barriers to foreign goods entering the country in order to expand their own industrial bases and reduce their reliance on costly imports of inputs and finished products. In practice, Brasilia and Buenos Aires gave their domestic industries a chance to compete for a slice of the Brazilian and Argentine markets, and in some ways it worked. Several higher-value industries, such as the automotive sector, sprang up in both countries and were shielded from the most damaging effects of foreign competition.

Free Trade Gains Traction
But after a few decades, the ISI strategy had run its course. Though it had created domestic industries as Brazil and Argentina had intended, both nations still relied heavily on revenue generated by agricultural and mineral exports, which made them vulnerable to spikes and dips in commodity prices. Fiscal instability from the 1950s to the 1980s also made it more difficult for the Brazilian and Argentine governments to fund their ISI policies. Deep deficit spending led to occasional bouts of high inflation, and by the late 1980s, the two countries had begun to move away from the ISI approach altogether. In the wake of a sharp decline in the global commodities market and a series of Latin American debt crises, they began to search for a lifeline to bail out their sinking economies. The solution they settled on was freer trade, and they started to lower the barriers between their economies in the hope of striking an eventual trade agreement.

At the same time, the rest of the world's perception of trade was changing. Many protectionist countries, having encountered problems similar to Brazil's and Argentina's, began to weigh the virtues of free trade, and in 1991, Uruguay and Paraguay joined their larger neighbors to form the Mercosur customs union. Under the terms of membership, all four states agreed to lower tariffs and implement a common tax of up to 35 percent on certain imports. They also prohibited Mercosur states from signing preferential trade deals with other countries or blocs without first obtaining the unanimous approval of their fellow members. (Some notable exceptions were made for pre-existing trade agreements, including those between Mercosur members and Mexico.)

Pressure Builds
As an economic union, Mercosur has succeeded at more closely integrating South American economies, which historically have been focused overseas. In many ways this is unsurprising, considering the size and complexity of the two markets that anchor the bloc, and its members continue to coordinate their trade policies to some degree. Moreover, citizens of a full Mercosur member state can live and work freely throughout the bloc, so long as they do not have a criminal record. Political integration, however, has lagged. Though Mercosur was conceived as an organization that would someday develop political unity akin to that of the European Union, it has primarily functioned as a simple trade bloc.

But institutional changes are on the horizon. In the coming years, Mercosur will likely come to depend more on commodity exports, even in spite of the tighter industrial integration that trade among its members has encouraged. Brazil and Argentina have experienced considerable economic growth over the past two decades, much of which has been driven by China's rising demand for agricultural and mineral products — not for industrial outputs. Manufacturing's share of both economies has consequently fallen from 20 percent to 12 percent in Argentina and from 17 percent to 9 percent in Brazil since 1990. The erosion of these manufacturing sectors has made the effects of diminishing growth in Chinese demand for commodities all the more acute in recent years. This, combined with dwindling consumption, scandals and persistent economic troubles inside the bloc, has slashed Mercosur's overall growth.

This, in part, explains the need to diversify the bloc's trade options. Brazil currently accounts for the most trade and wealth within Mercosur. It absorbs one-fifth of Argentina's exports and contributes 42 percent of the bloc's gross domestic product. Free trade among it and other Mercosur members has proved beneficial to all parties involved, but it has also made them more vulnerable to downturns in one another's economies. Now that the "bust" portion of the commodities trade cycle has hit, Mercosur's members need to reach trade deals with other partners to revive their economies. But because those deals would first need to survive the lengthy process of gaining unanimous approval from other Mercosur states, they may not come soon enough.

Members will likely try to loosen the organization's restrictive regulations in the coming years. In fact, some nations have already begun to take steps to look for buyers abroad that could help bolster their manufacturing exports. Brazil and Argentina, for instance, are expanding their existing trade agreements with other Latin American states such as Mexico, while several of the countries' high-ranking officials have called for the bloc to relax trade restrictions on individual members.

Nevertheless, independently forging new free trade agreements with other states or blocs is not possible for Mercosur countries, at least currently. Members will continue to float the idea of liberalizing the bloc's trade agreement process, but making substantive progress on the issue would require the buy-in of every member and would likely take several years of negotiations. Actually implementing such changes, should they be passed, would create additional problems. Opening sectors that are currently protected by Mercosur's policies would undoubtedly harm some political constituencies, cutting into member governments' support bases and inciting protests across the bloc.

As Mercosur's de facto leaders, Brazil and Argentina will be at the forefront of any change that does take place in the bloc's trade deal policies, though the chances of one occurring in the immediate future are slim. Until then, the bloc's fortunes will continue to be determined by commodity prices and internal trade rather than by newfound access to the lucrative markets outside its borders.
--
Diego Solis
Latin America Regional Director
STRATFOR - Global Intelligence
P.O. Box 92529
Austin, Texas 78709-2529
Phone: 512.925.8631
 www.stratfor.com

segunda-feira, 25 de abril de 2016

Impeachment: uma ultima traicao a patria, antes de cair definitivamente - InfoLatam

Se não fosse por qualquer outro crime -- dois efetivamente praticados, e objetos do pedido em tramitação, mas existe uma penca de outros, também, que reforçarão o julgamento político -- esta última traição à pátria por Madame Pasadena sela o seu destino inglório à frente da Presidência.
O autor do pedido de intervenção nos assuntos internos do país foi seu assessor internacional, um apparatchik do PT, e homem de confiança dos cubanos no Foro de São Paulo, o mecanismo de controle e coordenação dos partidos dito progressistas da América Latina pelos comunistas cubanos, e esse aspone amador em diplomacia merece também ser acusado de crime de responsabilidade, pois o que praticou é um pedido de intervenção externa contra o Brasil, num organismo controlado por bolivarianos (ou seja, cubanos).
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasil crisis

Rousseff pide ayuda a Mercosur y Unasur contra su impeachment

Infolatam/Efe
Brasilia, 24 de abril de 2016

La presidenta brasileña, Dilma Rousseff, antes de regresar a Brasil después de participar durante los últimos dos días en una reunión de la ONU en Nueva York, pidió al Mercosur y a la Unasur que “miren” con atención el proceso de apertura de un juicio legislativo en su contra.
En un encuentro con periodistas brasileños, luego de intervenir en el segundo día de la ceremonia de firma del Acuerdo de París sobre el cambio climático, Rousseff afirmó que “en Brasil está en curso un golpe, un golpe que ni sé de quién es, entonces me gustaría que el Mercosur y la Unasur mirasen ese proceso”.
Para Rousseff, la crisis política por la que pasa Brasil propicia el “momento” para hacer uso de la Cláusula Democrática del Mercosur, en la que el bloque integrado además por Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay y Venezuela garantiza la legitimidad de los procesos democráticos en esos países.
En ese sentido, la jefa de Estado aclaró que la idea no es retirar a Brasil del bloque, como también estipula ese mecanismo, pero si realizar “una evaluación del asunto, como nosotros siempre lo hicimos” en otros casos, como el del proceso que retiró del poder en 2012 al expresidente paraguayo Fernando Lugo.
Rousseff se apartó del cargo por dos días, período en el que asumió su vicepresidente Michel Temer, acusado de “conspiración” por la propia mandataria.
Temer forma parte del Partido del Movimiento Democrático Brasileño (PMDB), la más numerosa en el Congreso y que en marzo rompió filas con la base oficialista para apoyar la apertura de un juicio político con fines de destitución contra Rousseff.
El jefe de los Diputados, Eduardo Cunha, también del PMDB y contrario a Rousseff, incluso desde mucho antes de que ese partido se retirara del oficialismo, fue quien comandó en la Cámara Baja el proceso del eventual juicio.
La Cámara de Diputados, con 367 votos a favor, 137 en contra, siete abstenciones y dos ausencias, consiguió el domingo pasado más de los dos tercios del plenario para aprobar la apertura del juicio, una decisión que ahora deberá ser ratificada por la mayoría simple (41) del Senado.
En ese caso, Rousseff se apartaría por 180 días para su defensa, Temer asumiría y, en caso de ser declarada culpable por los dos tercios del Senado (54 votos), la Cámara Alta deberá entonces decidir si el presidente encargado termina el mandato hasta el 1 de enero de 2019 o si se convoca a unas nuevas elecciones.
El lunes, se instalará en el Senado la Comisión Especial de 21 legisladores, con sólo cinco del oficialismo, que analizarán los documentos del proceso remitidos por la Cámara Baja.
La gobernante es acusada de realizar maniobras fiscales para maquillar el informe de cuentas públicas en la gestión de 2014 y 2015.
Antes de retomar al poder en Brasilia, Rousseff manifestó que confía en las instituciones del país.
“Las instituciones son obras humanas. Nosotros tenemos instituciones cada vez más fuertes. Podemos comprometer esas instituciones, pero jamás destruirlas. Comprometerlas sí podemos”, evaluó la mandataria.
En su paso por Estados Unidos, la gobernante manifestó que es “víctima de un proceso ilegal, golpista y conspirador” y por eso comparecerá al Senado para su defensa en compañía de los ministros de Justicia y Hacienda.
“Mi mandato es garantizado por 54 millones de votos del pueblo”, resaltó Rousseff, quien descartó nuevamente que vaya a presentar su renuncia o convocar a nuevas elecciones.
Así, Rousseff justificó: “no estoy en contra, de ninguna manera, de las elecciones, pero una cosa es la elección directa con votos secretos de las personas y el pueblo brasileño participando. Ahora tengo el derecho a defenderme. No soy apegada al cargo, pero tampoco acuso a nadie de golpista si se propone una elección directa”. EFE

Brasil, la amarga verdad

El análisis
Carlos D. Mesa
(Página Siete. Bolivia)-.”Son ya 13 largos años de gobierno, ocho de Lula y cinco de Dilma, que han triturado buena parte de ese discurso de esperanza que mejoró la vida de tantos brasileños sobre todo en la primera gestión de Lula. La gente se ha cansado, ha perdido la ilusión, se encuentra con un mar de miserias humanas traducido en miles de millones de dólares robados al Estado…”
“.

sexta-feira, 14 de novembro de 2014

Mercosul: o fracasso de seu sistema de solucao de controversias - Alejandro Perotti

El final de una zaga, y la muestra palpable de la
ineficacia del sistema jurisdiccional del MERCOSUR 
en su versión “clásica”.

En 2001, el Estado uruguayo, endosando el reclamo de la empresa Motociclo (fabricante de bicicletas, y una de las empresas más grandes de la Banda Oriental), demandó a la Argentina, en el marco del sistema de solución de controversias previsto en el Protocolo de Brasilia, alegando que este último Estado Parte violaba las normas regionales al desconocer el “origen” uruguayo de la bicicletas exportadas por dicha firma a la Argentina.

En su Vº Laudo, el Tribunal ad hoc del MERCOSUR condenó a la República Argentina por violación de las normas comunitarias, dado que nuestro país no había aportado pruebas suficientes para desvirtuar la presunción de veracidad del origen que implican los “certificados de origen”.

Definitivamente, Uruguay – y con ello Motociclo – ganó la controversia. El resultado fue que la empresa en cuestión no logró en el futuro exportar a la Argentina bicicletas pues sistemáticamente le fueron impuestas condiciones de seguridad que eran imposible de cumplirse, dado su forma de instrumentación.

En el año 2003, Motociclo presentó una demanda de daños y perjuicios contra el Estado argentino, ante el Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo Federal Nº 2, con sede en Buenos Aires, alegando fundamentalmente el laudo antes mencionado.

En primera instancia, el juzgado interviniente rechazó la demanda, lo cual fue ratificado por la Sala Vª de la Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Contencioso Administrativo Federal, por sentencia del 7 de diciembre de 2011. 

Acto seguido, la firma uruguaya presentó un recurso ordinario ante dicha Cámara, el cual fue concedido, por lo que el expediente arribó a la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación (CSJN).

La CSJN, por sentencia del 19 de noviembre de 2013 rechazó el recurso ordinario; decisión disponible en http://www.csjn.gov.ar/confal/ConsultaCompletaFallos.do?method=verDocumentos&id=706331.

Finalmente, en el marco del procedimiento que tramitaba ante la Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Contencioso Administrativo Federal, Motociclo presentó un recurso extraordinario contra la sentencia de la citada cámara, el cual fue desestimado por decisión del 17 de julio de 2014, la cual está disponible en http://www.cij.gov.ar/scp/include/showFile.php?acc=showFAR&tipo=fallo&id=86277780&origen=SGU.

Llama la atención que la empresa, en ninguna de las instancias, planteó la elevación de una opinión consultiva al Tribunal Permanente de Revisión; ello hubiera dado la posibilidad de crea nuestro Francovich mercosureño (señera sentencia del tribunal europeo sobre responsabilidad patrimonial del Estado por los daños provocados por la violación del Derecho comunitario; TJUE, sentencia del 19 de noviembre de 1991, asunto 6/90, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ES/TXT/HTML/;ELX_SESSIONID=xjbjJglhXw6QnwsFNh4mfSMbgZ8RJbpgcsyhhWGK9gyjTc0QxgsT!2135095376?isOldUri=true&uri=CELEX:61990CJ0006

 Alejandro D. Perotti

terça-feira, 11 de fevereiro de 2014

Alianca do Pacifico avanca agressivamente para o livre comercio; enquanto outros...

Parece que as comparações são inevitáveis, com certos "foot-draggers" (ou seja, os indecisos) do outro lado do continente.
Os desafios existem, inclusive o de aprofundar o déficit comercial, temporariamente, como preço a pagar pelo aumento geral dos fluxos comerciais. Mais adiante os desequilíbrios são corrigidos, via câmbio ou investimentos diretos, e o país fica melhor.
Só não acham os protecionistas renitentes...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Pacific Alliance: moving forward

Peru's Ollanta Humala, Chile's Sebastián Piñera, Colombia's Juan Manuel Santos, Mexico's Enrique Peña Nieto and Costa Rica's Laura Chinchilla in Cartagena, Colombia
Peru's Ollanta Humala, Chile's Sebastián Piñera, Colombia's Juan Manuel Santos, Mexico's Enrique Peña Nieto and Costa Rica's Laura Chinchilla in Cartagena, Colombia
It’s all about free trade. The Pacific Alliance, a growing bloc in Latin America that stands among the world’s 10 largest economies, sealed a deal on Monday to eliminate tariffs on 92 per cent of goods and services in a move that distances it further from some of its more protectionist neighbours.
“I don’t think there has been an integration process that has taken decisions so fast as the Pacific Alliance has done,” Colombia’s President, Juan Manuel Santos, told beyondbrics.
Formed in June 2012 and cemented in May last year, the tie-up links the free-trading economies of Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, and is moving quickly to fulfil the goal of unrestricted movement of capital, goods and services, as well as people.
Santos, Ollanta Humala of Peru, Enrique Peña Nieto of Mexico, and outgoing Sebastián Piñera of Chile shook hands at a presidential summit in Colombia’s colonial city of Cartagena, also agreeing that the remaining tariffs for agricultural goods will be eliminated gradually over the coming years.
The total output for the four members accounts for more than a third of Latin America’s total gross domestic product. According to the latest available data, in 2o12 the bloc attracted some 41 per cent of all foreign direct investment inflows. Exports were $550bn and imports $561bn in the same year.
Even if trade between the nations has been flowing thanks to bilateral agreements that were in place before the Pacific rim union was established, the alliance also opens the door for member countries to export to markets where some of them had limited or no access, strengthening their value chains to be more competitive in the global supply chain, with a particular focus on Asia.
Santos added:
“We have a common vision on how to manage our economies, common attitudes regarding foreign investment, the role of the market in the economy, respect for private property.”
“Because we have common denominators, we would be able to play with more specific weight on the global economy.”
Other regional economies such as Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela – which are part of another regional bloc called Mercosur – are more inward-looking when it comes to trade and capital flows, and have been struggling with slippery economic growth.
Notwithstanding, late last week, Brazil’s foreign minister, Luiz Alberto Figuereido ,said Mercosur was interested in trade integration with members of the Pacific bloc.
The Pacific Alliance is set to expand in coming months with the entrance of Costa Rica as a full member. Panama and then Guatemala are likely to follow suit. Several other countries inside and outside the region act as observers – including the US, the UK and China.
In addition to removing trade barriers, member countries have opened joint trade offices and diplomatic missions around the world in places such as Ghana, Azerbaijan and Vietnam.
Sceptics say that, for the moment, the Pacific club is not much more than a very successful marketing strategy that highlights how the member countries are open for business. Eduardo Ferreyros, Peru’s former foreign trade minister, shrugs off the argument, saying “what’s been agreed today demonstrates there are concrete results, there is dynamism.”

terça-feira, 28 de agosto de 2012

Paraguay en el Mercosur: entrevista al embajador en Montevideo

Uruguay: Entrevista a Embajador paraguayo

Felipe Caorsi


Hace dos días fui a la Embajada de la Republica del Paraguay en Uruguay a entrevistar al embajador Interino Don Ricardo Caballero Aquino. La idea era saber su opinión sobre los últimos actos políticos en la región que involucraban a su país.
Me encontré con una persona muy preparada que había integrado delegaciones en distintos países, incluido Los EEUU.
Felipe Caorsi- ¿Por qué cree usted que la decisión del Parlamento paraguayo es legítima al deponer mediante “juicio político” al expresidente Fernando Lugo?
Ricardo Caballero Franco-Primeramente querría  decirle que el nombre correcto es “voto de censura” y es un mecanismo que existe en nuestra constitución. El Paraguay ha vivido muchos años de dictaduras y por esa razón se eligió tener una constitución que si bien es presidencialista tiene aspectos parlamentarios como este. En el proceso mencionado Lugo tuvo que presentarse al Parlamento y defender su continuidad en la Presidencia del país. El resultado fue demoledor, 120 parlamentarios en contra y solo 5 a favor de su continuidad. Lugo estuvo una semana buscando acuerdos y finalmente entro al parlamento donde tuvo dos días más para hacer su defensa. Recordemos que Fernando Lugo apareció en la política en el año 2006 y nunca tuvo partido político propio. Algunos creen que no estaba preparado para gobernar. Tanto así que impuso un secretario de intermediario entre el, su vicepresidente y el resto del Gobierno. Era un hombre sin preparación y de difícil acceso.
FC – ¿Por qué cree usted que el Parlamento paraguayo nunca aprobó el ingreso de Venezuela como socio pleno del Mercosur?
RCA – Sin dudas un factor importante fue la agresividad del Presidente venezolano al declarar “le doy al parlamento paraguayo hasta el 30  de octubre para que lo apruebe”. Se podrá imaginar que los partidos mayoritarios, el Colorado y el Liberal, vieron esto como una intromisión y una amenaza. La presencia cada vez mayor de militares en la embajada venezolana en Paraguay y el carácter militarista de su Presidente también  contribuyó a que no se aprobara.
FC- El Presidente Chavez y el dirigente Tupamaro Julio Marenales han declarado que hubo pedido de “coimas” por parte de los Parlamentarios paraguayos al gobierno venezolano para que se apruebe la entrada. ¿Qué me puede decir de esto?
RCA – Sabemos que hubo ofrecimiento de dinero por parte de una persona muy allegada al Presidente Chavez a nuestros Parlamentarios. Sabemos como era la operativa de entrada de ese dinero si era aceptado y también sabemos que unos pocos parlamentarios estuvieron tentados a tomar el dinero. Lo cierto es que no ocurrió y que la iniciativa corrupta de la que se habla no fue nunca planteada por nuestros parlamentarios. No se pidió coima para aprobar nada. Sino ya se hubiera aprobado, sabemos que Chavez no  tiene problema en repartir dinero a sus “socios ideológicos”.
FC-¿Qué opina de la decisión de suspender a Paraguay del Mercour tomada por Argentina, Brasil y Uruguay en Mendoza?
RCA – Le voy a confesar que nos ha dolido mucho. Paraguay es el único país del Mercosur que tiene balanza comercial negativa con sus otros tres socios. Eso muestra que nuestro país si respeta “el libre transito de bienes y personas” en el Mercado Común del Sur. Cuando Argentina bloqueó los puentes que unía a Uruguay fuimos nosotros los que pedimos que se tratara en el Mercosur hasta que el Presidente Lula (Brasil) lo vetó en su momento. Los funcionarios paraguayos en cierto modo hemos sido tratados como “leprosos”, todo comenzó cuando Cristina Fernández retiro su embajador de Asunción. No nos reconocen ninguno de nuestros socios, aunque seamos los mismos funcionarios que hace dos meses. Nobleza obliga, debo reconocer que el Presidente Mujica fue el primero en anunciar que “no habría sanciones económicas”, lo cual fue agradecido inmediatamente por el Presidente Franco. Las sanciones económicas del Mercosur y especialmente de la OEA castigarían al pueblo. Se cortarían préstamos del BID y del BM dedicados a educación por ejemplo.
FC – La suspensión del Mercosur rige hasta el año próximo. ¿Evalúa el Gobierno paraguayo retirarse del bloque?
RCA – El Presidente Franco fue bien claro: “Soy un Presidente de transición no puedo tomar esa decisión tan importante para mi país”. Paraguay es un país sin salida al mar, tenemos la necesidad imperiosa de buscar alianzas, más ahora que la política argentina frente a nuestros puertos es cada vez más hostil.
FC- Entre las alianzas que busca su Gobierno, ¿no se ha pensado en seguir el camino de Chile, Colombia y Perú?, o sea firmar un TLC con los EEUU. Quizás la coyuntura política regional le pueda abrir puertas en el país más poderoso del planeta.
RCA – Alemania, Francia, el Reino Unido y Canadá fueron los primeros países en reconocer nuestro gobierno actual y se han puesto a disposición. Nosotros vemos en Taiwán un aliado importante y sabemos que debemos de aumentar nuestras relaciones con ese país a través del Pacifico. Creemos que a mediano y largo plazo nuestro futuro comercial pasa por ahí. Un acercamiento a Perú, Chile, Colombia y también México. Queremos irnos del Populismo. Nosotros no tenemos censura, tenemos una economía abierta, donde circulan todas las monedas sin restricciones para el ciudadano. Estamos abiertos a los cambios tecnológicos, nuestro IVA es del 10% y respetamos las leyes internacionales a la hora de recibir y cuidar inversiones extranjeras.
FC – Una vez vencido el plazo de suspensión de Paraguay en el Mercosur, ¿ustedes reconocerían a Venezuela como miembro pleno del bloque?
RCA – Miré eso es algo muy delicado. El hecho esta consumado, el mundo entero dice que Venezuela entro por una ventana al Mercosur. El reconocimiento político paraguayo  va a requerir negociaciones de ambos gobiernos. Nuestro país entra en período electoral entre diciembre (2012) y abril (2013). Sin lugar a dudas las negociaciones deberán de darse de aquí a diciembre de este año. Si no se hace es muy difícil que el nuevo gobierno reconozca a Venezuela como “socio”, usted tiene que comprender que el pueblo paraguayo esta muy indignado por lo sucedido y no votaría jamás a un gobierno que reconociera a Venezuela como “socio” sin más. Debe de haber un acuerdo político nacional para que el nuevp gobierno lo reconozca.
FC - ¿cómo ve a la clase política y el pueblo uruguayo con respecto a estos sucesos?
RCA – Los expresidentes Sanguinetti, Batlle y Lacalle pusieron paños fríos e incluso favorecieron la llegada de parlamentarios paraguayos a Uruguay. Cosa que el gobierno primeramente prohibió y que luego no pudo evitar. Lacalle Pou fue quien coordino las reuniones de los parlamentarios de ambos países. El pueblo uruguayo fue muy solidario, le reconozco que me emociono ver balconeras con la bandera de mi país en los edificios y toda clase de manifestaciones en las redes sociales. Todo comenzó aquí, ustedes fueron los primeros dentro del Mercosur en solidarizarse con nosotros.
FC – ¿Hubo algún país fuera del Mercosur que le haya extrañado el no reconocimiento de su Gobierno?
Si, el presidente Raúl Castro declaró que “Cuba no reconocía ningún Presidente que no fuera elegido por la mayoría popular”. ¿Sabe usted que país es el que comerciaba más con Cuba en 1960?: La España de Franco, un régimen anticomunista. La URSS le mandaba a Cuba en esa época tanques para despejar la nieve. Como verá lo político no siempre tiene tanto peso en las relaciones comerciales.

quarta-feira, 14 de setembro de 2011

Council on Hemispheric Affairs - Mercosur Future



After decades of chronic political unrest within a number Latin American countries, that featured complex transnational relations within the region, multilateral trade agreements that linked a few major economies began to emerge. These informal agreements were targeted at increasing stability within the region, and eventually developed into an official trade agreement. In order to promote economic cooperation, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay established the Common Market of the South (El Mercado Común del Sur). Formed in 1991, the union of these four countries (referred to as the Mercosur pact) almost immediately came to be dominated by Brazil. Over the past two decades, the Mercosur countries have sought to alter a legacy of distrust and a determination to work towards “an incremental growth to achieve common market.” In order to do so, the member nations have managed to reduce or eliminate nearly all trade tariffs for fellow Mercosur partners. By 1994, Mercosur countries imposed standardized tariffs on imports from non-member countries in order to further ratioanlize trade among member nations. By decreasing or eliminating the relative import taxes on Mercosur countries, members were able to benefit from both increased exports as well as achieve cheaper imports from within their economic union.
Since Mercosur members’ economies rely so heavily upon one another, fluctuations in one nation’s economy and further political transformation undeniably affect the other Mercosur countries. Specifically, when Brazil and Argentina both were experiencing economic recessions, the remaining member nations as a result experienced economic setbacks; such deep dependency on one another for economic prosperity ultimately disrupted trade and caused apprehension and friction among members.
This analysis was prepared by COHA Research Associate Rebecca Gorn.

Brazil’s Real(ly) Big Problem
September 9, 2011
  • The Mercosur agreement, given birth in 1991, allows Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay to trade freely amongst themselves.
  • Interdependent economies lead to tensions among member countries, especially between Brazil and Argentina over Brasilia’s plan to combat hyperinflation and the ebbing demand for Brazilian goods.
  • Export-dependent economies trading more expensive goods, like Brazil and Argentina, face enhanced competition from abroad; therefore, these countries must now focus on opening up trade and cooperation with other countries possessing major export sectors while protecting their own economies.
After decades of chronic political unrest within a number Latin American countries, that featured complex transnational relations within the region, multilateral trade agreements that linked a few major economies began to emerge. These informal agreements were targeted at increasing stability within the region, and eventually developed into an official trade agreement. In order to promote economic cooperation, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay established the Common Market of the South (El Mercado Común del Sur). Formed in 1991, the union of these four countries (referred to as the Mercosur pact) almost immediately came to be dominated by Brazil. Over the past two decades, the Mercosur countries have sought to alter a legacy of distrust and a determination to work towards “an incremental growth to achieve common market.”[1]In order to do so, the member nations have managed to reduce or eliminate nearly all trade tariffs for fellow Mercosur partners. By 1994, Mercosur countries imposed standardized tariffs on imports from non-member countries in order to further ratioanlize trade among member nations.[2]By decreasing or eliminating the relative import taxes on Mercosur countries, members were able to benefit from both increased exports as well as achieve cheaper imports from within their economic union.

Figure 1. Average Tariff Rates in Mercosur Countries

Figure 1 illustrates the intensity of reductions in tariffs among the Mercosur countries in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Since Mercosur members’ economies rely so heavily upon one another, fluctuations in one nation’s economy and further political transformation undeniably affect the other Mercosur countries. Specifically, when Brazil and Argentina both were experiencing economic recessions, the remaining member nations as a result experienced economic setbacks; such deep dependency on one another for economic prosperity ultimately disrupted trade and caused apprehension and friction among members.[3]As illustrated in Figure 2, trade among all Mercosur members is almost instantly affected when the domestic economy of even one member weakens or strengthens.

Figure 2. Intra-Mercosur Exports as a Percentage of Total, 1990-2005

The instability and integration of Mercosur is illustrated in Figure 2. The dramatic downturns in exports have occurred immediately following financial crises, with the impact across nations being quite significant.

While Mercosur countries have made extensive efforts to promote free trade initiatives among member countries in order to stabilize all members’ economies, the agreement’s success continuously has been in question. According to the U.S. Congressional Research Service, since its inception, Mercosur has “struggled to reconcile a basic inconsistency in its goals for partial economic union” due to its members’ repeated individualistic attitudes.[4]When even one Mercosur country has experienced economic or political hardship, the union’s level of integration has exacerbated existing transnational tensions. Thus, the realization of Mercosur’s initial goals have become much more difficult during these periods.
Brazil’s Economic Growth, Unexpected Results
For years, developed nations examined Brazil as it made its slow transition from a developing nation to an international economic superpower. Brazil’s abundance of natural resources and large labor pool has allowed it to dominate the international exporting market, generating enormous profit.[5]Now, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the WB, Brazil boasts the seventh largest economy in the world; by 2016, the World Bank expects Brazil to become the fifth largest.[6]However, what is most impressive about Brazil’s economy is the fact that it shows little sign of slowing down in the near future. In fact, it is just the opposite: studies show the worth of Brazil’s currency against the dollar has increased by 50 percent over the past three years. No longer with merely a foot in the door, Brazil has “moved into the group of countries with a strong currency, and with balanced fiscal accounts,” according to Brazilian Trade and Industry Minister Fernando Pimentel.[7]The government continues with efforts aimed at bolstering the country’s economy, while further affirming Brazil’s new, increasingly secure position in the international economy.
Prosperity, security, and a lowered level of poverty generally accompany economic growth; however, Brazil’s economy, though growing rapidly, is experiencing record inflation and an appreciating currency. As a result of the nation’s rapid growth, its domestic market and currency are attracting increased international investment, only further strengthening the intrinsic value of the real. The currency’s rapid appreciation has resulted in what some economists are beginning to refer to as the “Super Real.” According to Brazil’s Finance Minister Guido Mantega, the appreciation of Brazil’s currency “results from investors’ enthusiasm about Brazil because the country offers more stable, secure conditions.”[8]
However, the practical consequences of a sudden currency appreciation can prove to be ominous, often contributing to greater economic insecurity. Recently, the consequences of a highly valued currency hit Brazil’s export sector shockingly hard. Exports accounted for USD 201.9 billion of Brazil’s total gross domestic product (GDP) in 2010, indicating Brazil’s heavy reliance on its export sector.[9]With an appreciating currency, Brazilian goods tend to become more expensive and therefore, less desirable to other industrialized nations.
Appreciation Escalates, Brazil’s Drastic Response
Today, international markets are struggling amidst what many consider the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression.[10]While the rest of the world has been hit by the economic recession over the past couple of years, Mercosur countries’ growth rates have “exceeded 7.5% in 2010.”[11]Such growth would usually be a positive indicator for a nation’s economy; however, combined with a weak overseas market, the appreciation of the currency results in drastic consequences for export-dependent countries like Brazil. According to the National Confederation of Industry (CNI), half of Brazil’s export industries “reduced or eliminated their export activities in 2010,” due to the decreased demand for goods in overseas markets.[12]Slow world growth rates have exacerbated the Super Real phenomenon in Brazil, thus increasing the appreciation of the real to an unmanageable rate. Traditionally, the Brazilian government exercises highly interventionist policies in order to adjust these rates and protect the nation’s economy. Consequently, as “domestic producers are growing increasingly frustrated, and the government is concerned that appreciation is reducing competitiveness and undermining balanced growth,” President Dilma Rousseff’s administration has instituted a plan to slow the appreciation of the real.[13]
Embracing the rapid growth of the economy, the plan is appropriately titled “Bigger Brazil.” In short, the government administered plan aims to protect the export sector of the nation’s economy through broad-based tax reform. On the day of its implementation, on August 2, President Rousseff referred to Bigger Brazil as “the first step to boost Brazil’s competitiveness relying on innovation.”[14]The government hopes that this two-year, 25 billion real (USD 16B) initiative will help manufacturers cope with current market conditions until the real begins to equalize and the world market recovers. Most of the subsidies are intended for the encouragement of textile, footwear, software, and vehicle production, since labor-intensive industries are being impacted most by fluctuations in international market demand. Incentivizing the purchase of local products is another major component of Bigger Brazil, which will be executed in order to both boost production and strengthen businesses.
Accusations and Actuality
Given the level of interdependence that exists among the Mercosur countries, the economic success of one bloc member would presumably lead to similar growth in the other three nations. However, current domestic reforms at the height of Brazil’s economic development could call this norm into serious question. Through Bigger Brazil’s government purchasing-program component, the purchase of domestic products over inexpensive imports will be encouraged. By focusing on and stimulating its export industry, Brazil has sparked considerable fear among the other Mercosur countries, whose domestic economies have grown to depend heavily on the lower tax rates agreed upon among the trade body’s members. With the implementation of Brazil’s self-satisfying plan, Mercosur countries are now accusing the Brazilian government of the specter of protectionism—a move that aims to strengthen the Brazilian economy through discouraging imports that may come at a cheaper price than domestic goods. Not surprisingly, of greatest importance to Brazil’s new plan is the support of their aspiring major South American neighbor, Argentina. President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner administration has taken issue with multiple parts of the proposed initiative, especially the government purchasing program that favors Brazilian products. Jose Ignacio De Mendiguren, president of the Argentine Industrial Union (UIA), called the plan “impulsive, [and] emotional.”[15]
In contrast with past patterns of economic parallelism, Argentina’s growth is not comparable to that of Brazil. With a history of turmoil between the rival industrializing nations, including accusations between the two surrounding breaches in the Mercosur pact, Buenos Aires has been quite vocal concerning how Brasilia’s economic plan will ultimately affect the Argentine economy. One indicator of the disparity in Argentina’s economic growth and impetus for expansion is its current concern that while the real has appreciated rapidly against the dollar over the past few years, Argentina’s peso “has weakened versus the greenback over the same period.”[16]Furthermore, with the implementation of “Bigger Brazil,” Argentina is concerned not only about Brazil’s commitment to Mercosur, but also the estimated competition that will result if Brazilian exports become cheaper. In May, Argentine products were no longer granted non-automatic import licenses in Brazil, leading to delays in trade and tensions between the two nations. Since exports represent such a large sector of Argentina’s economy, any decline in trade is bound to register a very negative impact. The implementation of the Bigger Brazil initiative further exacerbates these already existing tensions between these two South American economic forces.
In response to Buenos Aires’ accusations, the Rousseff administration has been assiduously assuring Mercosur nations, specifically Argentina, that rather than discouraging imports, the provision of subsidies to Brazilian industries via Bigger Brazil has simply encouraged local production. In fact, the government has promised to “pay up to 25% more for local goods which contain at least 40% local content from Brazil or any Mercosur country.”[17]Not only has the Brazilian government considered Mercosur countries in the formation of its plan, but it also sought to offer incentives in order to ensure a positive impact on the economies of their fellow South American neighbors. In fact, according to Alberto Ramos, a senior economist for Goldman Sachs, “on the whole, Argentina maintains a competitive advantage due to the currency [and] is running a…surplus in the automotive industry.”[18]
Similarly, while a devaluation of Argentina’s currency is not conducive to growth, it does offer Argentina a major advantage because exported goods became less expensive as the nation’s currency devalued. In addition, Brazil is less of a threat in a competitive market, since its goods became more expensive as the relative price of Argentine commodities dropped. Therefore, it is unlikely that Brazil’s new initiatives will affect Argentina’s prevailing level of export or trade activity between the two nations. For that matter, Mercosur countries, protected by the same measures, will remain relatively unaffected, if not actually advantaged, by Brazil’s economic reforms.
Bigger Brazil is not Biggest Threat
Despite the controversy surrounding how Brazil’s plan will prove inevitably damaging to the economies of other Latin American nations—especially Mercosur members who are usually under the protection of the trade agreement that exists among them—these countries could face a much larger threat than the Rousseff administration’s domestic reforms. Competition from other areas of the world, specifically countries that are able to offer lower priced goods, is an increasingly ubiquitous threat to Latin American nations whose economies depend heavily on exporting to industrialized nations. According to Pimentel, “the situation in all of Mercosur has been dramatic because of the entrance of cheap goods from abroad.”[19]Given this rising threat, Brazil’s reforms to protect domestic producers may be an entirely appropriate reaction.
Additionally, the plan may also signal to other export-dependent nations that government action through protective policies is a perfectly orthodox solution; if the plan succeeds, it could very well have the potential to serve as a model to these nations as well. Bigger Brazil includes investments not only in the export sector and in industries. Since developed countries are based upon industrial economies, countries competing to export to developed economies may benefit from industrializing themselves through similar investments.[20]In addition to adjusting to new market conditions, opening up trade may also appease any international tensions resulting from increased competition. According to Adrian van den Hover, the head of international relations for Business Europe, “an agreement with the South American block would help [Europe] to retain our bilateral trade relation” and could potentially ease concerns with Chinese competition within Mercosur.[21]Thus, both learning from and working with countries with similar concerns will aid countries like Argentina in their efforts to avoid being affected by countries offering cheaper goods to the international market.

Conclusion
Due to Brazil’s status as a Western Hemisphere coastal commercial powerhouse, its fiscal expansion is a necessary compass for the rest of the region’s progress. Brazil’s domestic economic plans explicitly stand to help Mercosur countries, despite opposing cries from Argentina. While Brazil’s economic plan to correct the rapid appreciation of the real and revive the export industry may be beneficial for Mercosur countries like Argentina, it is impossible to predict the effect these domestic reforms will have on non-member Latin American who, as major trading partners, are inherently integrated with Mercosur economies. More importantly,however, Bigger Brazil serves as an indication that the international market is transforming, meaning adaption and protection of domestic economies is essential. Therefore, export-dependent economies must be able to rely upon government policies to protect them from competition abroad.