Brasil ignora Mercosul na definição de novas tarifas aduaneiras: é o desmantelamento do bloco - Lorenna Rodrigues (OESP)

 À revelia do Mercosul, Brasil quer novo corte de imposto de importação

Ideia é reduzir em mais 10% a alíquota sobre produtos comprados de países que não fazem parte do bloco comercial; equipe econômica defende redução permanente de tarifas
   
Lorenna Rodrigues, O Estado de S.Paulo
12 de abril de 2022 | 05h00

BRASÍLIA - O governo brasileiro estuda uma nova redução nas taxas de importação cobradas pelo País sem ter o aval do Mercosul. Segundo o Estadão/Broadcast apurou, a ideia é cortar em mais 10% as alíquotas do Imposto de Importação de grande parte dos produtos comercializados com países de fora do bloco.

Em novembro do ano passado, os ministérios da Economia e das Relações Exteriores anunciaram a redução em 10% das alíquotas de 87% da pauta comercial, mantendo de fora bens como automóveis e sucroalcooleiros, que já têm um tratamento diferenciado pelo bloco. Um novo corte do mesmo montante e com as mesmas exceções está em estudo.

Pelas regras do Mercosul, a Tarifa Externa Comum (TEC) cobrada na compra de produtos de fora do bloco só pode ser alterada em comum acordo pelos quatro países do bloco – Brasil, Argentina, Paraguai e Uruguai. Assim como no ano passado, no entanto, o governo brasileiro deve recorrer a um dispositivo que permite a adoção de medidas voltadas à “proteção da vida e da saúde das pessoas”.

Em novembro, o governo brasileiro afirmou que, com a pandemia do coronavírus, houve alta de preços que poderia ser minimizada com um “choque de importação”. Agora, com os preços aumentando ainda mais, especialmente em meio ao conflito no Leste Europeu, uma nova redução temporária nas tarifas alegando a necessidade de combater a inflação está no radar. A diminuição anunciada no ano passado vale até o fim deste ano.

Ao atingir quase toda a pauta de importação do País, o corte é mais amplo do que o já anunciado pelo Ministério da Economia em março no Imposto de Importação de etanol e de seis produtos com peso na inflação: café, margarina, queijo, macarrão, açúcar e óleo de soja.

Na semana passada, o ministro Paulo Guedes afirmou que uma diminuição na alíquota de 12 produtos com impacto na inflação poderia ser anunciada. Essas reduções pontuais são feitas dentro das normas do Mercosul, que permite que o Brasil reduza tributos sobre a importação de até 100 itens sem ter de negociar com outros países. Já o corte mais abrangente na tarifa externa comum do bloco só pode ser feito com o aval dos outros sócios ou lançando mão de alternativas previstas em lei, como a adotada pelo Brasil para justificar a redução de novembro.

Para o ex-secretário de Comércio Exterior e consultor da BMJ Welber Barral, a medida terá pouco impacto no comércio, já que se trata de uma redução pequena, mas que amplia a diferença entre a tarifa do Brasil e a do Mercosul, o que pode levar inclusive a questionamentos jurídicos sobre a validade da redução. “Acaba distorcendo a tarifa externa comum. Pode haver controvérsia no tribunal do Mercosul e até mesmo a indústria brasileira se sentir afetada pela norma, que não foi acordada no âmbito do bloco”, afirmou.

Procuradas, a Confederação Nacional da Indústria (CNI) e a Federação das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo (Fiesp) não se manifestaram.

Mudança de foco
Desde que o presidente Jair Bolsonaro assumiu, Guedes tem deixado claro a intenção de cortar a tarifa comum do Mercosul de forma permanente. No início de 2021, ele chegou a dizer a empresários que gostaria de reduzir em 20% a TEC ainda naquele ano.

A tentativa do ministro enfrentou forte resistência dos argentinos – que propunham um corte de 10% –, apesar do apoio inicial do Uruguai. Mas, no decorrer do ano, a situação se inverteu. Os brasileiros conseguiram chegar a um acordo com os argentinos depois de reduzirem o tamanho do corte pretendido e o número de produtos atingidos.

Mas os uruguaios passaram a condicionar o apoio a uma flexibilização de outra regra do Mercosul: a que proíbe a negociação de acordos bilaterais, ou seja, sem a participação de todos os países do bloco. O Brasil é favorável, enquanto a Argentina é contrária à flexibilização da regra.

Tarifa
Como países membros do Mercosul, Brasil, Argentina, Paraguai e Uruguai devem cobrar a mesma tarifa na importação de produtos de fora do bloco – a chamada Tarifa Externa Comum (TEC). A alíquota comum é aplicada na maioria das importações, com algumas exceções acordadas com o bloco, como as compras no setor automotivo, brinquedos e bens de informática e capital. A TEC aplicada varia de acordo com o produto importado e é, em média, de cerca de 10%.

Negociações
Desde que assumiu, em 2019, o ministro da Economia, Paulo Guedes, defende uma redução da TEC como forma de abrir o mercado brasileiro e integrar a produção interna a outras cadeias produtivas. Essa redução, no entanto, só pode ser feita de forma permanente com a concordância dos demais  integrantes do Mercosul. A ideia, porém, enfrenta a resistência da Argentina e do Uruguai.

Redução
Sem chegar a um acordo, o Brasil reduziu, sozinho, as tarifas cobradas na importação até o fim deste ano. Um primeiro corte foi anunciado no fim do ano passado, de 10%, para praticamente todas as alíquotas. Para isso, o País recorreu a um dispositivo que permite a adoção de medidas unilaterais voltadas à “proteção da vida e da saúde das pessoas”.

Segundo corte
Um novo corte linear de 10% está em estudo e deve ser anunciado para vigorar também até o fim do ano.

https://economia.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,revelia-mercosul-brasil-novo-corte-imposto-importacao,70004036200

Tariffs and the Textile Trade between Brazil and Britain (1808-1860) - Thales A. Zamberlan Pereira

Um importante estudo de história econômica que desmonta parcialmente aquelas teses "bonitas", mas carentes de comprovação empírica, sobre a não industrialização do Brasil, no século XIX, por causa dos tratados desiguais, da "tarifa inglesa" ou por falta de protecionismo adequado, por parte de um dos melhores historiadores econômicos da atualidade.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

 Tariffs and the Textile Trade between Brazil and Britain (1808-1860) 

Thales A. Zamberlan Pereira 

FGV – EESP 

thales.pereira@fgv.br 

draft: October 2020 

Abstract 

The commercial treaty with Britain in 1810, along the authorization of foreign trade in ports in 1808, are among the most important institutional changes in nineteenth century Brazil. The 1810 treaty lowered tariffs for British manufactures while maintaining high tariffs in Britain for Brazilian sugar and coffee. These terms are generally viewed as disastrous for the Brazilian economy, although there is still limited quantitative information about how much the tariff affected the demand for British imports. This paper provides new qualitative and quantitative evidence on the operation and effect of Brazil’s imports tariffs in the period. I find that the effect of the tariffs is significantly different from what traditional literature assumes. First, the monetary instability in the 1820s and conflicts over product price assessment often led the de facto tariff to be higher than the 15% es-tablished by the treaty. Second, even with higher rates, quantitative analysis shows they did not have decrease imports of British textiles. 

Acesso: 

https://www.dropbox.com/s/knzwi7npvreliz3/Pereira%20-%20Brazil%20Import%20Tariffs%20revisado.pdf?dl=0

1. Introduction 

In 1843, during the final days of the commercial treaty initiated in 1810, an article in the first issue of the newspaper The Economist criticized the preferential treatment given to Britain in exchange for a “liberal” commercial policy from Brazil. Brazil’s main export products paid significantly higher duties compared to the British colonies. Sugar paid duties 150 percent higher and coffee 100 percent higher (The Economist 1843, 4). [The Economist. 1843. “Expiring Commercial Treaty with the Brazils,” September 2, 1843, 1 edition. www.economist.com/node/2002191]  Only cotton had a moderate tariff, being similar to the imposed on the United States. The commercial treaty of 1810, which was initially an agreement with Portugal, continued after Brazil’s independence in 1822. Brazilian officials renewed the treaty in 1827. British imports had an official nominal tariff rate of 15 percent between 1810 and 1843, which is considered a low tariff compared to other countries Brazil traded with at the time. Thus, even the British foreign secretary George Canning argued, in 1826, that the commercial treaty was advantageous to Britain and “more onerous to Brazil.” 

The obvious imbalance of privileges between Brazil and Britain has led the 1810 treaty to be largely condemned by Brazilian historiography (Manchester 1964, 92; Prado Jr. 1972; Pantaleão 2003, 95; Wilcken 2005, 155). Historians such as Alan Manchester, among others, characterized the lower tariff for British manufactures as a “permanent” source of commercial losses to Brazil (Ricupero 2007, 46). Moreover, the sudden increase in the imports of British textiles during the 1810s led to the view that the treaties prevented the development of local manufactures, blocking Brazil’s path to modern economic growth (Luz 1975, 23; Pryor 1965, 99). Stanley Stein argued that the beginning of the textile industry in Brazil was only possible due to the higher import tariffs after 1844 (Stein 1979, 28). Despite not blaming the commercial treaties for Brazil’s failure to industrialize, Celso Furtado argued that a 15 percent tariff “limited the autonomy of the Brazilian government in the economic sector” (Furtado 2006, 71, 143–44). 

Even though there is a longstanding view on the negative consequences of the commercial treaties, there is still limited quantitative information on how tariffs affected Brazilian imports (especially textiles) during the first half of the nineteenth century. The main source of foreign trade in Brazil during the nineteenth century – government statistical yearbooks – provides only aggregate data after 1821. There are no statistics for different countries and products before the 1840s (IBGE 1939; Lago 1982). Even critics of the view that Brazil was an “informal British colony,” such as Stephen Haber and Herbert Klein, based their arguments on the same official sources (Haber and Klein 1997). Some studies that use British sources, on the other hand, do not correct for the well-known problem of outdated prices in the ledgers of imports and exports and overestimate the trade imbalance between Britain and Brazil (Arruda 2008; Imlah 1948). 

By using archival evidence from the British Foreign Office, the Board of Trade, and price information from newspapers, this paper provides new information about how tariffs worked in Brazil after 1810 and discusses how imports of cotton textiles responded to changes in taxation. It extends the work of Arthur Pryor (1965) on the evolution of Brazil’s tariff policy, providing evi-dence that the effective tariff rate in Brazil was sometimes higher than that established by the trade treaties with Britain. The higher average tariff occurred in two ways. First, the Brazilian govern-ment sometimes attempted to increase revenue by overvaluing British products at customhouses, which increased the de facto tariff rate. The government overvalued British products by taxing imported products at official prices from a book of rates, which was called pauta. The use of official values for assessing imports is known in the literature, but it has been largely ignored in the debate over the effects of trade treaties (Lima 1908, 399). Second, that the tariff departed from the 15% established by the treaty because of monetary instability that occurred during the late 1820s. As prices on the book of rates were not often adjusted, sudden changes in the exchange rate had a significant impact on the average tariff level. 

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Política comercial: reforma da TEC do Mercosul ainda duvidosa (Valor Econômico)

Brasil planeja ‘choque’ em tarifa industrial
Valor Econômico, 22/102019

O plano de abertura da economia desenhado pelo governo Jair Bolsonaro prevê um corte unilateral das alíquotas de importação sobre produtos industriais de 13,6% para 6,4%, na média, em quatro anos - o que deixaria o Brasil com níveis de proteção tarifária à indústria equivalentes aos dos países mais ricos do mundo. O Valor teve acesso à simulação feita pelo governo brasileiro e compartilhada com os demais sócios do Mercosul para reduzir a Tarifa Externa Comum (TEC). A intenção do Ministério da Economia e do Itamaraty é avançar nas discussões em encontro de cúpula presidencial do bloco pré-marcado para os dias de 4 e 5 de dezembro, em Bento Gonçalves (RS), com a presença do argentino Mauricio Macri e menos de uma semana antes da conclusão de seu mandato na Casa Rosada. Pela simulação, que representa o primeiro exercício efetivo nas discussões sobre o futuro da TEC, as alíquotas aplicadas sobre automóveis de passageiros trazidos do exterior devem cair de 35% para 12%. Diminuiria também, de 35% para 12% a tarifa cobrada de produtos têxteis e vestuário. Em um momento de sobreoferta e excesso de capacidade global, laminados de aço a quente teriam queda de 12% para 4%. Ônibus passariam de 35% para 4%. O polipropileno, um dos principais bens da indústria petroquímica produzidos no Brasil, baixaria de 14% para 4%. 
Integrantes da equipe econômica já haviam dito, em entrevistas, que o Brasil submeteria ao Mercosul um plano de corte médio e não linear da TEC pela metade. Representantes do setor privado reclamam que, desde então, não têm conseguido abrir um canal de diálogo com o governo para falar sobre o assunto. O que revela a proposta obtida pelo Valor é que, para diversos setores da indústria de transformação, o corte poderia ir muito além de 50% da tarifa de importação praticada hoje. Enquanto isso, o agronegócio ficaria com alíquotas praticamente inalteradas. O documento foi apresentado ao “Grupo Ad Hoc para Analisar a Consistência e Dispersão da TEC” e ainda não teve resposta dos outros sócios do bloco - Argentina, Uruguai e Paraguai. Há sugestões de alíquotas para 10.270 NCMs, como são conhecidas as nomenclaturas comuns do Mercosul. Cada NCM abrange um produto específico ou uma pequena categoria de produtos. 
Quando se levam em conta segmentos industriais como um todo, o “choque tarifário” também fica evidente: o estudo é de redução da TEC para calçados (31,8% para 12%), equipamentos médico-hospitalares (11,2% para 3,8%), móveis (17,6% para 8,8%), produtos plásticos (10,8% para 4,8%), siderúrgicos (10,4% para 3,7%), máquinas, material e aparelhos elétricos (12% para 4,2%). A forte abertura da indústria, no entanto, contrasta com um movimento bem mais tímido de liberalização da agricultura e do agronegócio - justamente os setores nos quais o Brasil tem mais competitividade e, em teoria, não precisaria tanto de proteção. A simulação feita para a tarifa dos vinhos, cujo polo gaúcho de produção fica em base eleitoral do ministro Onyx Lorenzoni (Casa Civil), é manter a alíquota no mesmo nível da praticada hoje (20%). A TEC para o etanol seria mantida em 20%, o que pode conter a insatisfação dos usineiros do Nordeste, com viés mais protecionista e já contrariados com a ampliação recente - de 600 milhões para 750 milhões de litros - da cota livre de tarifas pelo período de um ano.
Outro segmento sem mudança é o dos produtores de banana. A tarifa atual é de 10% e ficaria assim. Em março, Bolsonaro fez questão de “pedir desculpas para o pessoal do Vale do Ribeira”, onde passou a adolescência, pelas importações de bananas do Equador. Em 2017, após anos de negociações, o Ministério da Agricultura reconheceu o país andino livre de um vírus apontado como risco fitossanitário ao Brasil. “Como é que pode uma banana sair do Equador, andar 10 mil quilômetros, passando pelo canal do Panamá e pelo porto de Santos, e chegar a um preço competitivo lá no Ceagesp, se a 150 quilômetros de São Paulo você tem o Vale do Ribeira, cuja economia em grande parte é a banana?”, questionou Bolsonaro. Reservadamente, um alto funcionário do governo brasileiro afirma que a iminência de uma derrota de Macri deve postergar o desfecho das discussões sobre a nova TEC. Até meados do ano, segundo essa fonte, Brasília vinha trabalhando com um cenário de reeleição do atual presidente e um clima mais favorável para a maior reestruturação da tarifa comum do do Mercosul em 25 anos. Como essa aposta não vingou e a chapa oposicionista Alberto Fernández-Cristina Kirchner tem ampla vantagem para ganhar já no primeiro turno, nas eleições presidentes deste domingo, o cronograma está sendo repensado. 
Segundo a fonte ouvida pelo Valor, seria “imprudente” bater o martelo em torno das novas alíquotas na cúpula do Mercosul e deixar um constrangimento ao novo governo argentino, que toma posse em 10 de dezembro. Agora, a ideia é avançar nos trabalhos e ter uma decisão em estágio adiantado, para ser tomada depois de conversas com o provável governo Fernández sobre o futuro do bloco. Como é uma união aduaneira, mesmo cheia de imperfeições (já que muitos produtos têm regimes próprios ou fazem parte de listas de exceções), o Mercosul pratica uma tarifa comum para importações provenientes de outros países. A visão dominante na equipe econômica é que o corte unilateral das alíquotas deve ser feito com ou sem a Argentina. Se o país vizinho recusar a proposta de abertura, seguindo a tradicional linha kirchnerista de maior protecionismo, haveria uma espécie de beco sem saída para o Mercosul: a união aduaneira precisaria regredir para uma zona de livre-comércio.


Giambiagi defende regressão do Mercosul se queda na tarifa não avançar

Intenção do Brasil de reduzir tarifa comum no bloco deve encontrar resistência num eventual governo Alberto Fernández na Argentina

Por Gabriel Vasconcelos, Valor Econômico — Rio

O economista Fabio Giambiagi defende que o governo brasileiro solicite ao Mercosul sua regressão ao status de área de livre comércio — deixando de ser união aduaneira —, caso um eventual governo de Alberto Fernández, na Argentina, se mostre irredutível à proposta de redução da Tarifa Externa Comum (TEC).

A mudança é planejada pela equipe econômica do ministro Paulo Guedes e foi acatada pelo Ministério de Relações Exteriores.

“Já está colocado que o Brasil vai apresentar ao Mercosul uma proposta de redução tarifária. Isso posto, a Argentina pode aceitar a tese num eventual governo Fernández, mas ter discordâncias quanto à velocidade ou intensidade da redução. Aí se pode negociar. Mas, se manifestarem uma rejeição absoluta à ideia, dada a importância que isso tem para a economia brasileira, creio que poderemos estar colocados diante da possibilidade de que o Brasil solicite ao Mercosul sua transformação no que seria apenas uma área de livre comércio, um passo atrás”, disse Giambiagi ao Valor. A eleição presidencial na Argentina acontece neste domingo.

Por mais de uma vez, Giambiagi sugeriu que esta é a compreensão do governo brasileiro. O economista, que é chefe do departamento de pesquisas do BNDES, se diz favorável à proposta de reduzir em 50% a TEC em um prazo de quatro ou cinco anos, estratégia que estaria adiantada junto ao atual presidente argentino, Mauricio Macri, mas pode encontrar resistência de Fernández.

O candidato argentino da chapa que tem como vice a ex-presidente Cristina Kirchner — e conta com a influência de setores peronistas afeitos a políticas protecionistas — venceu com folga as primárias no país e tende a confirmar o resultado nas eleições do próximo domingo.

Criada em 1994, a TEC do Mercosul é o conjunto de impostos de importação cobrados nas aduanas de Brasil, Argentina, Paraguai e Uruguai. As alíquotas variam de 0% a 35%.

A defesa foi feita em debate no Centro Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (Cebri), no Rio, em que estiverem presentes, também, o embaixador José Botafogo Gonçalves e o diretor-geral da Fundação Centro de Estudos do Comércio Exterior (Funcex), Ricardo Markwald.

Todos demonstraram preocupação com as escaladas retóricas do presidente Jair Bolsonaro e também de Fernández, que poderiam prejudicar não só a governança do Mercosul, mas também as trocas comerciais entre Brasil e Argentina, e o acordo comercial entre o bloco sul-americano e a União Europeia, fechado ao fim de junho.

“Fernández já fez declarações fortes dizendo que não se sente nada cingido por esse compromisso [acordo comercial com a UE]. Se a isso somamos as intervenções de Bolsonaro e do chanceler [Ernesto Araújo] sobre as eleições argentinas, não são bons princípios para uma relação”, disse Markwald.

Ele definiu Bolsonaro como “incontrolável” e disse que as relações internacionais brasileiras não são mais comandadas pelo Itamaraty, mas por um discurso ideológico de Araújo, que pode atrapalhar a “tradicional paciência estratégica” do Brasil com o país vizinho.No entanto, o economista ponderou que, hoje, o horizonte do Mercosul poderia ser considerado satisfatório.

    “Pela primeira vez, em uma década ou mais tempo, eu diria que a coisa está indo para frente”, afirmou Markwald.

Nesse sentido, Markwald citou o acordo comercial com a UE, que teria induzido a renovação do acordo automotivo entre Brasil e Argentina — com livre comércio até 2029 — e as pretensões de ambos de integrar o quadro da Organização para a Cooperação e Desenvolvimento Econômico (OCDE). Embora não traga vantagens diretas, o pleito à OCDE, diz, implica “um 'mindset' de abertura econômica importante”.

Para Markwald, uma pista do que será a interação entre os dois países vizinhos e, tão logo, o futuro do Mercosul, virá da negociação da Argentina com o Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI), marcada para o fim deste mês, imediatamente depois das eleições no país vizinho.

Para o economista, caso eleito, Fernández deve moderar o discurso e buscar algum apoio do Banco Central Americano (FED) para manter o aporte. “Uma postura isolacionista seria uma verdadeira 'marcha para a insensatez'”, disse. No fim de setembro, o FMI anunciou a interrupção do programa de ajuda financeira de US$ 56 bilhões à Argentina em função da moratória sobre a dívida local e das incertezas políticas.

Trade Policy in the USA: tariffs - Mises org

Woodrow Wilson and the Tariff: Lessons for Today

William Poole

Theodore Roosevelt (president 1901–09) and Woodrow Wilson (president 1913–21) are the two celebrated progressive presidents. Many of today’s observers, not familiar with the detailed history of that era, fail to appreciate the fundamental importance of the tariff issue to debates of that time.

A search for “tariff” in Scott Berg’s biography, Wilson, turns up 66 hits. Then, 250 hits in Doris Kearns Goodwin’s, The Bully Pulpit: Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, and the Golden Age of Journalism. Wilson’s 1913 book, The New Freedom A Call For the Emancipation of the Generous Energies of a People, was an edited selection of his campaign speeches. Sixty-three hits on this book.

What were the issues? The tariff was a breeding ground for corruption and unfair to those forced to pay elevated prices. The tariff reinforced the position of firms with market power — the “trusts” in the language of that time.

Wilson was thoroughly familiar with how the tariff actually worked, as he explained clearly in The New Freedom. “We have come to recognize in the tariff as it is now constructed, not a system of protection, but a system of favoritism, of privilege, too often granted secretly and by subterfuge, instead of openly and frankly and legitimately, and we have determined to put an end to the whole bad business … .”

Goodwin discusses the difficulties reformers had in making any progress in Congress. “Aware that [Senator Nelson] Aldrich had abundant experience in devising obscure classifications for each of the 4,000 duties in the tariff schedule, …” How familiar does this passage sound?

As is true of pro-tariff arguments today, obfuscation of the issues was a key mechanism of the forces supporting trade restriction during the Progressive Era. Goodwin recounts the campaign against the tariff waged by journalist Ida Tarbell. “Fifty years ago, [Tarbell wrote in 1909] wool was disposed of in perhaps fifty words, which anybody could understand; to-day it takes some three thousand, and as for intelligibility, nobody but an expert versed in the different grades of wools, of yarns, and of woolen articles could tell what the duty really is.” These tariffs pumped up the profits of American firms manufacturing woolen clothing. Tariffs raised the cost of machinery used in cotton production and reduced competition from machinery producers abroad.

Then, as now, log-rolling coalitions made reform difficult. Goodwin writes: “To Taft’s disappointment, the controversial wool schedule was not changed. The combination of ‘the Western wool growers and the Eastern wool manufacturers,’ he lamented, rendered it ‘impossible’ to get lower duties ‘through either the Committee or the House.’ ”

Wilson was a Southerner, born in Virginia and raised in Georgia and South Carolina. He understood the costs high tariffs imposed on the South. The beneficiaries were Eastern manufacturing interests. Farmers were especially disadvantaged as they paid excessive prices for farm equipment in an era of rapid mechanization of agriculture.

A key campaign promise of Wilson’s was reduction of the tariff. This he did after assuming office with the Revenue Act of 1913. Tariff reduction was good for the South and the rest of the country as well. Unfortunately, Wilson failed to institutionalize a lower tariff and did not “put an end to the whole bad business.” In 1922, Congress raised tariffs once again with the Fordney–McCumber Tariff. As I recounted recently in my Tariff of Abominations II, President Trump is taking the United States back to an unhealthy era of tariff controversy, special-interest pleading and retaliation by other countries.

Worse, President Trump has upset a painful and slow institutional process begun after World War II in moving the world toward freer trade. No country will be a winner. Wilson’s experience as president after the election of 1912 should serve as a warning. Winning a battle is not enough to win a war.

Perhaps it is time to start thinking about the tariff in an entirely different way. Starting with the Tariff Act of 1789, the US tariff has been the playground of special interests, and used as a means of rewarding political friends, and harming political enemies. If we must have a tariff, all tariffs ought to be levied at the same rate. This approach would turn the tariff principle from that of “bad business” favoritism to pure revenue.

William Poole is Distinguished Scholar in Residence at the University of Delaware. He was a member of President’s Reagan’s Council of Economic Advisers 1982-85. He retired as President and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis in March 2008.

Comercio exterior brasileiro se arrasta penosamente em direcao a...

...a que mesmo?
Não se sabe bem. Provavelmente em direção ao marasmo.
Se o Brasil, a despeito de custos inaceitáves nos procedimentos de importação (com cobranças altíssimas não só de tarifas elevadas, mas de outros impostos indevidos como Pis-Cofins na importação), ainda tem de importar dezenas de bilhões de dólares de produtos primários e insumos básicos para a sua indústria, então é porque nós nos tornamos inacreditavelmente caros, ou seja, não competitivos para qualquer coisa, e tudo isso por causa dos mesmos fatores que tornam o ambiente de negócios no Brasil um pântano empresarial: o custo Brasil, com a enorme carga tributária governamental em primeiro lugar.
Caminhamos, lenta mas seguramente, para uma crise de transações correntes, o que redundará, inevitavelmente em desvalorização cambial, ou seja, nos tornaremos mais pobres, além de aumentar o custo financeiro de nossas transações externas, o spread e tudo o mais.
Esse é o resulta das políticas improvisadas, de "puxadinhos" setoriais, implementadas pelo governo, que parece uma barata tonta. Em lugar de atacar os problemas reais, o governo insiste em contornar o problema, jogando os custos para nós, ou seja, obrigando-nos a suportar duplamente os encargos do protecionismo alfandegário e dos preços de cartel por falta de concorrência. Isso além de provocar deliberadamente inflação, ao manter uma meta que de fato é o teto da banda, um nível inflacionário três vezes superior à média mundial.
Como diria Roberto Campos, o Brasil é um país que não perde a oportunidade de perder oportunidades.
Com a ajuda do governo, assim continuará...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

O comércio exterior carece de dinamismo e inovação

Editorial O Estado de S.Paulo, 06 de novembro de 2012

O que mais se destaca na análise do movimento do comércio exterior nos dez primeiros meses deste ano é a pouca mudança, tanto nos bens exportados e importados quanto no destino e origem de exportações e importações. É o quadro da acomodação de um país que não procura oferecer inovação e mantém os mesmos clientes e fornecedores, por falta de dinamismo. A única diferença, de um ano para outro, é que as importações crescem um pouco mais do que as exportações, acentuando o déficit da balança de comércio.
As exportações estão em situação precária, pois dependem muito da venda de produtos básicos, cujo preço é variável e influenciado pelo contexto internacional, e a China é o maior cliente. Neste ano, o resultado mensal variou de um mínimo de US$ 16,1 bilhões a um máximo de US$ 23,2 bilhões. Nosso governo insiste muito sobre os efeitos da crise nos países ricos, mas nos dez primeiros meses do ano nossas exportações para os EUA cresceram 9,6% e diminuíram 8,4% para a União Europeia; 6,1%, para a China; e 20,6%, para a Argentina.
A estrutura de nossas importações ficou ainda mais estável que a de nossas exportações. Bens de capital continuam a participar com 21,9%, mas as matérias-primas e bens intermediários ocupam o maior espaço entre nossas importações, com pouco mais de 45%.
Isso mostra que a nossa indústria importa bens intermediários (num valor de US$ 83,4 bilhões) que poderiam ser produzidos em parte no Brasil, mas, por serem muito mais baratos no exterior, acabam sendo importados. Participam, assim, do processo de desindustrialização que afeta todo o setor manufatureiro e nos coloca praticamente na marginalidade quando se trata de bens de alto conteúdo tecnológico, o que se reflete negativamente nas vendas externas e tende cada vez mais a tornar o Brasil um país exportador de commodities.
Havia a expectativa de que o Brasil rapidamente se tornaria um grande exportador de petróleo. Nesse campo, nossas exportações nos dez primeiros meses foram de US$ 16,4 bilhões e nossas importações, de US$ 10,5 bilhões, mas as de outros combustíveis chegaram a US$ 17,4 bilhões. Portanto, o País continua dependendo da importação.
O crescimento do parque industrial vai depender muito de uma mudança em face dos mercados externos: temos de apresentar inovações e aumentar o conteúdo tecnológico dos bens oferecidos ao exterior, e para isso é imprescindível reduzir os nossos custos.

Council on Hemispheric Affairs - Mercosur Future

After decades of chronic political unrest within a number Latin American countries, that featured complex transnational relations within the region, multilateral trade agreements that linked a few major economies began to emerge. These informal agreements were targeted at increasing stability within the region, and eventually developed into an official trade agreement. In order to promote economic cooperation, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay established the Common Market of the South (El Mercado Común del Sur). Formed in 1991, the union of these four countries (referred to as the Mercosur pact) almost immediately came to be dominated by Brazil. Over the past two decades, the Mercosur countries have sought to alter a legacy of distrust and a determination to work towards “an incremental growth to achieve common market.” In order to do so, the member nations have managed to reduce or eliminate nearly all trade tariffs for fellow Mercosur partners. By 1994, Mercosur countries imposed standardized tariffs on imports from non-member countries in order to further ratioanlize trade among member nations. By decreasing or eliminating the relative import taxes on Mercosur countries, members were able to benefit from both increased exports as well as achieve cheaper imports from within their economic union.

Since Mercosur members’ economies rely so heavily upon one another, fluctuations in one nation’s economy and further political transformation undeniably affect the other Mercosur countries. Specifically, when Brazil and Argentina both were experiencing economic recessions, the remaining member nations as a result experienced economic setbacks; such deep dependency on one another for economic prosperity ultimately disrupted trade and caused apprehension and friction among members.

This analysis was prepared by COHA Research Associate Rebecca Gorn.

Brazil’s Real(ly) Big Problem

September 9, 2011

• The Mercosur agreement, given birth in 1991, allows Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay to trade freely amongst themselves.
• Interdependent economies lead to tensions among member countries, especially between Brazil and Argentina over Brasilia’s plan to combat hyperinflation and the ebbing demand for Brazilian goods.
• Export-dependent economies trading more expensive goods, like Brazil and Argentina, face enhanced competition from abroad; therefore, these countries must now focus on opening up trade and cooperation with other countries possessing major export sectors while protecting their own economies.

After decades of chronic political unrest within a number Latin American countries, that featured complex transnational relations within the region, multilateral trade agreements that linked a few major economies began to emerge. These informal agreements were targeted at increasing stability within the region, and eventually developed into an official trade agreement. In order to promote economic cooperation, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay established the Common Market of the South (El Mercado Común del Sur). Formed in 1991, the union of these four countries (referred to as the Mercosur pact) almost immediately came to be dominated by Brazil. Over the past two decades, the Mercosur countries have sought to alter a legacy of distrust and a determination to work towards “an incremental growth to achieve common market.”[1]In order to do so, the member nations have managed to reduce or eliminate nearly all trade tariffs for fellow Mercosur partners. By 1994, Mercosur countries imposed standardized tariffs on imports from non-member countries in order to further ratioanlize trade among member nations.[2]By decreasing or eliminating the relative import taxes on Mercosur countries, members were able to benefit from both increased exports as well as achieve cheaper imports from within their economic union.

Figure 1. Average Tariff Rates in Mercosur Countries

Figure 1 illustrates the intensity of reductions in tariffs among the Mercosur countries in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Since Mercosur members’ economies rely so heavily upon one another, fluctuations in one nation’s economy and further political transformation undeniably affect the other Mercosur countries. Specifically, when Brazil and Argentina both were experiencing economic recessions, the remaining member nations as a result experienced economic setbacks; such deep dependency on one another for economic prosperity ultimately disrupted trade and caused apprehension and friction among members.[3]As illustrated in Figure 2, trade among all Mercosur members is almost instantly affected when the domestic economy of even one member weakens or strengthens.

Figure 2. Intra-Mercosur Exports as a Percentage of Total, 1990-2005

The instability and integration of Mercosur is illustrated in Figure 2. The dramatic downturns in exports have occurred immediately following financial crises, with the impact across nations being quite significant.

While Mercosur countries have made extensive efforts to promote free trade initiatives among member countries in order to stabilize all members’ economies, the agreement’s success continuously has been in question. According to the U.S. Congressional Research Service, since its inception, Mercosur has “struggled to reconcile a basic inconsistency in its goals for partial economic union” due to its members’ repeated individualistic attitudes.[4]When even one Mercosur country has experienced economic or political hardship, the union’s level of integration has exacerbated existing transnational tensions. Thus, the realization of Mercosur’s initial goals have become much more difficult during these periods.

Brazil’s Economic Growth, Unexpected Results

For years, developed nations examined Brazil as it made its slow transition from a developing nation to an international economic superpower. Brazil’s abundance of natural resources and large labor pool has allowed it to dominate the international exporting market, generating enormous profit.[5]Now, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the WB, Brazil boasts the seventh largest economy in the world; by 2016, the World Bank expects Brazil to become the fifth largest.[6]However, what is most impressive about Brazil’s economy is the fact that it shows little sign of slowing down in the near future. In fact, it is just the opposite: studies show the worth of Brazil’s currency against the dollar has increased by 50 percent over the past three years. No longer with merely a foot in the door, Brazil has “moved into the group of countries with a strong currency, and with balanced fiscal accounts,” according to Brazilian Trade and Industry Minister Fernando Pimentel.[7]The government continues with efforts aimed at bolstering the country’s economy, while further affirming Brazil’s new, increasingly secure position in the international economy.

Prosperity, security, and a lowered level of poverty generally accompany economic growth; however, Brazil’s economy, though growing rapidly, is experiencing record inflation and an appreciating currency. As a result of the nation’s rapid growth, its domestic market and currency are attracting increased international investment, only further strengthening the intrinsic value of the real. The currency’s rapid appreciation has resulted in what some economists are beginning to refer to as the “Super Real.” According to Brazil’s Finance Minister Guido Mantega, the appreciation of Brazil’s currency “results from investors’ enthusiasm about Brazil because the country offers more stable, secure conditions.”[8]

However, the practical consequences of a sudden currency appreciation can prove to be ominous, often contributing to greater economic insecurity. Recently, the consequences of a highly valued currency hit Brazil’s export sector shockingly hard. Exports accounted for USD 201.9 billion of Brazil’s total gross domestic product (GDP) in 2010, indicating Brazil’s heavy reliance on its export sector.[9]With an appreciating currency, Brazilian goods tend to become more expensive and therefore, less desirable to other industrialized nations.

Appreciation Escalates, Brazil’s Drastic Response

Today, international markets are struggling amidst what many consider the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression.[10]While the rest of the world has been hit by the economic recession over the past couple of years, Mercosur countries’ growth rates have “exceeded 7.5% in 2010.”[11]Such growth would usually be a positive indicator for a nation’s economy; however, combined with a weak overseas market, the appreciation of the currency results in drastic consequences for export-dependent countries like Brazil. According to the National Confederation of Industry (CNI), half of Brazil’s export industries “reduced or eliminated their export activities in 2010,” due to the decreased demand for goods in overseas markets.[12]Slow world growth rates have exacerbated the Super Real phenomenon in Brazil, thus increasing the appreciation of the real to an unmanageable rate. Traditionally, the Brazilian government exercises highly interventionist policies in order to adjust these rates and protect the nation’s economy. Consequently, as “domestic producers are growing increasingly frustrated, and the government is concerned that appreciation is reducing competitiveness and undermining balanced growth,” President Dilma Rousseff’s administration has instituted a plan to slow the appreciation of the real.[13]

Embracing the rapid growth of the economy, the plan is appropriately titled “Bigger Brazil.” In short, the government administered plan aims to protect the export sector of the nation’s economy through broad-based tax reform. On the day of its implementation, on August 2, President Rousseff referred to Bigger Brazil as “the first step to boost Brazil’s competitiveness relying on innovation.”[14]The government hopes that this two-year, 25 billion real (USD 16B) initiative will help manufacturers cope with current market conditions until the real begins to equalize and the world market recovers. Most of the subsidies are intended for the encouragement of textile, footwear, software, and vehicle production, since labor-intensive industries are being impacted most by fluctuations in international market demand. Incentivizing the purchase of local products is another major component of Bigger Brazil, which will be executed in order to both boost production and strengthen businesses.

Accusations and Actuality

Given the level of interdependence that exists among the Mercosur countries, the economic success of one bloc member would presumably lead to similar growth in the other three nations. However, current domestic reforms at the height of Brazil’s economic development could call this norm into serious question. Through Bigger Brazil’s government purchasing-program component, the purchase of domestic products over inexpensive imports will be encouraged. By focusing on and stimulating its export industry, Brazil has sparked considerable fear among the other Mercosur countries, whose domestic economies have grown to depend heavily on the lower tax rates agreed upon among the trade body’s members. With the implementation of Brazil’s self-satisfying plan, Mercosur countries are now accusing the Brazilian government of the specter of protectionism—a move that aims to strengthen the Brazilian economy through discouraging imports that may come at a cheaper price than domestic goods. Not surprisingly, of greatest importance to Brazil’s new plan is the support of their aspiring major South American neighbor, Argentina. President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner administration has taken issue with multiple parts of the proposed initiative, especially the government purchasing program that favors Brazilian products. Jose Ignacio De Mendiguren, president of the Argentine Industrial Union (UIA), called the plan “impulsive, [and] emotional.”[15]

In contrast with past patterns of economic parallelism, Argentina’s growth is not comparable to that of Brazil. With a history of turmoil between the rival industrializing nations, including accusations between the two surrounding breaches in the Mercosur pact, Buenos Aires has been quite vocal concerning how Brasilia’s economic plan will ultimately affect the Argentine economy. One indicator of the disparity in Argentina’s economic growth and impetus for expansion is its current concern that while the real has appreciated rapidly against the dollar over the past few years, Argentina’s peso “has weakened versus the greenback over the same period.”[16]Furthermore, with the implementation of “Bigger Brazil,” Argentina is concerned not only about Brazil’s commitment to Mercosur, but also the estimated competition that will result if Brazilian exports become cheaper. In May, Argentine products were no longer granted non-automatic import licenses in Brazil, leading to delays in trade and tensions between the two nations. Since exports represent such a large sector of Argentina’s economy, any decline in trade is bound to register a very negative impact. The implementation of the Bigger Brazil initiative further exacerbates these already existing tensions between these two South American economic forces.

In response to Buenos Aires’ accusations, the Rousseff administration has been assiduously assuring Mercosur nations, specifically Argentina, that rather than discouraging imports, the provision of subsidies to Brazilian industries via Bigger Brazil has simply encouraged local production. In fact, the government has promised to “pay up to 25% more for local goods which contain at least 40% local content from Brazil or any Mercosur country.”[17]Not only has the Brazilian government considered Mercosur countries in the formation of its plan, but it also sought to offer incentives in order to ensure a positive impact on the economies of their fellow South American neighbors. In fact, according to Alberto Ramos, a senior economist for Goldman Sachs, “on the whole, Argentina maintains a competitive advantage due to the currency [and] is running a…surplus in the automotive industry.”[18]

Similarly, while a devaluation of Argentina’s currency is not conducive to growth, it does offer Argentina a major advantage because exported goods became less expensive as the nation’s currency devalued. In addition, Brazil is less of a threat in a competitive market, since its goods became more expensive as the relative price of Argentine commodities dropped. Therefore, it is unlikely that Brazil’s new initiatives will affect Argentina’s prevailing level of export or trade activity between the two nations. For that matter, Mercosur countries, protected by the same measures, will remain relatively unaffected, if not actually advantaged, by Brazil’s economic reforms.

Bigger Brazil is not Biggest Threat

Despite the controversy surrounding how Brazil’s plan will prove inevitably damaging to the economies of other Latin American nations—especially Mercosur members who are usually under the protection of the trade agreement that exists among them—these countries could face a much larger threat than the Rousseff administration’s domestic reforms. Competition from other areas of the world, specifically countries that are able to offer lower priced goods, is an increasingly ubiquitous threat to Latin American nations whose economies depend heavily on exporting to industrialized nations. According to Pimentel, “the situation in all of Mercosur has been dramatic because of the entrance of cheap goods from abroad.”[19]Given this rising threat, Brazil’s reforms to protect domestic producers may be an entirely appropriate reaction.

Additionally, the plan may also signal to other export-dependent nations that government action through protective policies is a perfectly orthodox solution; if the plan succeeds, it could very well have the potential to serve as a model to these nations as well. Bigger Brazil includes investments not only in the export sector and in industries. Since developed countries are based upon industrial economies, countries competing to export to developed economies may benefit from industrializing themselves through similar investments.[20]In addition to adjusting to new market conditions, opening up trade may also appease any international tensions resulting from increased competition. According to Adrian van den Hover, the head of international relations for Business Europe, “an agreement with the South American block would help [Europe] to retain our bilateral trade relation” and could potentially ease concerns with Chinese competition within Mercosur.[21]Thus, both learning from and working with countries with similar concerns will aid countries like Argentina in their efforts to avoid being affected by countries offering cheaper goods to the international market.

Conclusion

Due to Brazil’s status as a Western Hemisphere coastal commercial powerhouse, its fiscal expansion is a necessary compass for the rest of the region’s progress. Brazil’s domestic economic plans explicitly stand to help Mercosur countries, despite opposing cries from Argentina. While Brazil’s economic plan to correct the rapid appreciation of the real and revive the export industry may be beneficial for Mercosur countries like Argentina, it is impossible to predict the effect these domestic reforms will have on non-member Latin American who, as major trading partners, are inherently integrated with Mercosur economies. More importantly,however, Bigger Brazil serves as an indication that the international market is transforming, meaning adaption and protection of domestic economies is essential. Therefore, export-dependent economies must be able to rely upon government policies to protect them from competition abroad.