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Mostrando postagens com marcador LATIN AMERICA. Mostrar todas as postagens
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quinta-feira, 21 de novembro de 2024

What Marco Rubio Has Said About Latin America - Emilie Sweigart (Americas Quarterly)

 U.S. POLICY

What Marco Rubio Has Said About Latin America

Trump’s nominee for Secretary of State is known for his hardline stances on dictatorships and China’s activity in the region.


President-elect Donald Trump has nominated Florida Senator Marco Rubio for Secretary of State, making him potentially the first Latino to hold the position. The three-term senator, a son of Cuban immigrants, was born in Miami and was highly influential on Latin America policy during Trump’s first administration.

That influence is now likely to grow. He has consistently spoken out against dictatorships in Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua. He has also criticized some of Latin America’s leftist leaders for their positions on Venezuela and China’s presence in the region.

Here is a selection of some of Rubio’s recent statements on Latin America.

April 2024
Article in 
The National Interest:
“We must take seriously the opportunities for collaboration presented by countries like Ecuador, El Salvador, Argentina, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, Peru, Guyana, and Costa Rica.”

“Our region is currently experiencing at least six major crises. These range from unprecedented mass migration at the U.S. southern border to the complete breakdown of social order in Haiti to ramped-up state oppression in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. At the same time, the outlook for our region remains bright.”

“Is this a contradiction? Only if we ignore the bright spots in Latin America and the Caribbean. Even as we recognize the horrors occurring not far from our shores—and do our best to counter them—we must draw inspiration from the new generation of potentially pro-America leaders in the Western Hemisphere.”

August 2024 
Introducing a resolution in the Senate condemning the Cuban government:
“The world is bearing witness to the multiple ways the Castro/Díaz-Canel regime has served as a puppet for Communist China, Iran, and most recently Russia. America has a moral duty to defend our nation’s interests and we must continue to uphold democratic order and justice in our hemisphere.”

April 2024
Interview in 
Voz:
“Cuba has a long history of intelligence and military cooperation with the communist government of China…. In many cases, we have not done enough to create alternatives to what China has done in many countries.”

August 2024
Op-ed in the Miami Herald:
“The Biden-Harris administration has “serious concerns” that dictator Nicolás Maduro’s announcement of electoral victory in the recent presidential election “does not reflect the will or the votes of the Venezuelan people.”

“But such an outcome to this sham election was entirely predictable from the start. It was made more so by three years’ worth of concessions to and negotiations with the Maduro narco-dictatorship.”

“In short, the Biden-Harris Administration gave away every ounce of leverage we had over Maduro, then appeared surprised when he didn’t do what they wanted. It’s problematic to say the least, and not just for the people of Venezuela—or for opposition leader María Corina Machado and presidential candidate Edmundo González, who are now facing threats of imprisonment—but for America.”

“In recent years, nearly eight million Venezuelans have fled their country. Many of them have crossed our southern border, and many more will do the same if Maduro retains power.”

“The tyrant will also happily send dangerous criminals—like the brutal Tren de Aragua gang, which is already wreaking havoc on our streets—the United States’ way. None of this makes life easier for American communities. It shows the White House’s feckless policies have failed across the board.”

January 2019
Comments for 
CNN regarding Venezuela:
“I don’t know of anyone who is calling for a military intervention.”

September 2018
Quote in Newsweek:
In an interview with Univision 23Rubio said he would not rule out the military option in Venezuela. Rubio, a vocal opponent of Maduro’s regime, commented in Spanish and was quoted by Newsweek.

“For months and years, I wanted the solution in Venezuela to be a non-military and peaceful solution, simply to restore democracy.”

“I believe that the Armed Forces of the United States are only used in the event of a threat to national security. I believe that there is a very strong argument that can be made at this time that Venezuela and the Maduro regime has become a threat to the region and even to the United States.”

May 2023
Interview in 
El Universal:

“Mexico is an important partner of the United States. The country, its institutions. But López Obrador is not a good ally. The current president, unfortunately, is dedicated to talking nonsense, to interfering in U.S. policy. His thinking is beyond the left, a strange thinking in terms of that line with all these dictators in the hemisphere. And he has a domestic policy with which he has handed over a large part of his national territory to the drug traffickers who control those areas. That matters to us because we are seeing the consequences of that violence, that criminality entering our border and our country. So I have my disagreement with him, but he is the president of Mexico today, he was not yesterday and he is not going to be tomorrow. There is a difference between the country and the importance of the country and its institutions and whoever is in office at the moment.”

Interviewer: “Would you agree with sending U.S. troops to combat drug cartels in Mexico?”

“Well, as long as there is cooperation from the Mexican government, which at the moment I don’t think we are going to see, because this is a president who came into office saying that he didn’t want to go after these criminal gangs. I would be willing to support this measure, but it has to be in coordination with the armed forces and the Mexican police force. Otherwise, it would not be possible to do it.”

May 2023
X post commenting on a Reuters piecereporting on Lula’s critiques of U.S. sanctions on Venezuela:
“Brazil’s Lula da Silva is the latest far-left leader who whitewashes the criminal nature of the Maduro narco-regime, days after meeting with Pres. Biden. Under the Biden Administration’s weak foreign policy, tyrants in our region feel emboldened to seek international support.”

February 2023
Op-ed in 
The Epoch Times:
“It sounds paradoxical, but President Lula da Silva of Brazil is seeking closer ties with both the United States and Communist China…. For now, that means he will take what he can get from both the U.S. and the CCP—so long as it benefits his agenda.”

“President Biden must take a firm line with Brazil’s new president, holding Lula to account for his friendliness toward the CCP—as well as other bloody handed dictatorships, like those of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.”


Senator Marco Rubio speaks outside the White House during a news conference in Sept. 2022 on U.S. policy toward Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Colombia. (Photo by Win McNamee/Getty Images)

April 2023
Interview in
 Semana:
“It is very dangerous that the president of a country, which for years has been a great ally of the United States, now chooses to be the spokesperson for a criminal drug dictatorship like the one in Venezuela. In order to obtain the support of intermediaries like Maduro and Castro for “negotiations” with the ELN terrorists, Petro is willing to lobby for a vile dictatorship.”

April 2023 
In Medium:
“For decades, Colombia has been ravaged by the violent outbursts of rebel groups like the National Liberation Army (ELN)…. Over the past few months, Petro has sought to end the violence through negotiations…, but he’s only sowing disaster.…”

“Case in point: the ELN continues to attack the Colombian government…. These are the mercenaries Petro wants to appease, even to the point of backtracking on Colombia’s longstanding extradition agreement with the U.S. It’s terrible, but it’s what happens when you negotiate with terrorists from a position of weakness.”

“It’s also what happens when you cooperate with tyrants…. Petro has been the foremost Latin American advocate of “engagement” with narco-dictator Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela and puppet dictator Miguel Díaz-Canel in Cuba [because] he wants both regimes to use their leverage over the ELN in Colombia’s favor. [I]t’s a fool’s errand, because internationally ostracized dictators have nothing to gain from increasing stability in the region.…”

“The icing on the cake is that Petro has also joined the ranks of Latin America’s pro-China voices. In February, his Ministry of Foreign Affairs went so far as to issue guidelines instructing Colombian officials to refuse contact with Taiwan….”

October 2024
Op-ed in the 
Miami Herald on Huawei:
“Its primary goal was and remains, the domination of the global wireless market on Beijing’s behalf, combined with the expansion of the Chinese Communist Party’s ability to spy on and disrupt other countries’ communications.”

“I urge Latin American leaders not to heed Huawei’s siren song. No 5G deal is worth allowing a totalitarian dictatorship to spy on and interfere in a free nation’s affairs.”

March 2022
Remarks at Senate Committee on Foreign Relations subcommittee hearing on China in Latin America:
“Unfortunately, many of these newer leaders in the region have expressed admiration for the Communist Party in China’s model, even as they turn a blind eye and in many cases are supportive of the regimes that are creating tremendous suffering in Cuba and Venezuela and in Nicaragua.”

“So Beijing sees this, and they’re seizing the opportunity to grow both their influence and their power in the Western Hemisphere. As an example, their Belt and Road Initiative uses massive infrastructure loans and projects to lure nations into economic and political dependency — debt traps. That’s now spread to Argentina, Brazil, Barbados, and Panama. And in their annual report last year, the bipartisan US-China Security and Economic Review Commission found that the Communist Party of China is taking advantage of its economic importance and political relationships to encourage governments across the region to make domestic and foreign policy decisions that favor the CCP and undermine democracy and free markets in the region.”

“Their intentions in the region are not to be active because they want to make life better for people living in the Western Hemisphere. They care only about power and influence. They don’t care about stability or economic development. And so even as increasing exports to China boost the economies of some of the nations in these regions, the Communist Party of China is pushing countries to remain dependent on mining and the export of other natural resources instead of partnering with them to develop and industrialize their economies. It’s encouraging them to weaken or even break their own environmental, social and [governmental] regulations by promising them increased investment from China in return.”

“And they do this because they know that chaos in Latin America and the Caribbean would severely hurt us, destabilize us, who they view as their primary and central rival. If cartels have greater operating freedom to send drugs and violence across our border, it worsens the opioid and fentanyl epidemic and [amplifies] gang violence in our communities. If more countries go the way of Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba, you’ll see massive new waves of illegal immigration and human trafficking that’s associated with it.”

“So we simply can’t afford to let the Chinese Communist Party expand its influence and absorb Latin America and the Caribbean into its private political-economic bloc. That would leave our country worse off and ensnare the people of Latin America and the Caribbean into a generation of suffering and repression. So I’m hopeful that our nation will begin to address this threat head on and seriously revitalize our engagement in the region.”

This article was updated on November 13 to reflect the confirmation of Rubio’s nomination.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Sweigart is an editor at Americas Quarterly and a policy manager at the Americas Society/Council of the Americas

Follow Emilie Sweigart:   LinkedIn   |    X/Twitter

domingo, 5 de maio de 2024

Law, Peace and Status: Brazil’s Call for Sovereign Equality During the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907 - Lars Janssen

Research Article

Law, Peace and Status: Brazil’s Call for Sovereign Equality During the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907

Lars Janssen

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/07075332.2024.2345226 

Abstract

This article reevaluates Brazil’s role in the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907, challenging prevailing narratives about Brazil’s call for sovereign equality. By combining theoretical insights on international status with an extensive examination of primary sources, such as diplomatic communications and conference proceedings, I show that Brazil’s call for sovereign equality was a strategic response to status struggles rather than an ideological commitment. The call enabled Brazil’s leading delegate, Rui Barbosa, to gain leadership over a Latin American multilateral coalition against a Great Power proposition to create a hierarchical international court. The leadership not only bolstered Brazil’s position as a regional power, but paradoxically, also strengthened the relations with its main opponent during the conference, the US. As such, this study both contributes to our understanding of Latin American historical diplomacy and underscores the nuanced dynamics of non-Great Powers in international politics.

Notes

1 Proceedings, Mtg., First Comission, James Brown Scott, The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conference, vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1921), 148; Gerry Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 132–47.

2 James Brown Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907: A Series of Lectures Delivered before the Johns Hopkins University in the Year 1908, Volume 1 – Conferences (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1909), 169.

3 Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 24–6; Martha Finnemore and Michelle Jurkovich, ‘Getting a Seat at the Table: The Origins of Universal Participation and Modern Multilateral Conferences’, Global Governance, xx (2014), 361–73; Max Paul Friedman and Tom Long, ‘Soft Balancing in the Americas: Latin American Opposition to U.S. Intervention, 1898-1936’, International Security, xl (2015), 120–156; Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States, 132–47; Arnulf Becker Lorca, Mestizo International Law: A Global Intellectual History 1842-1933 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 143–199.

4 My translations: ‘visionário’, ‘pilares do multilateralismo contemporâneo’. Celso Amorim, ‘A Diplomacia Multilateral do Brasil: Um Tribute a Rui Barbosa’, (Lecture, Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2007), 20; Fundação Casa de Rui Barbosa, ‘Águia de Haia’, http://www.casaruibarbosa.gov.br/interna.php?ID_S=298&ID_M=762; Isadora Loreto da Silveira, Laura de Castro Quaglia, Nathassia Arrúa de Oliveira Cardoso, Taiane de Bittencourt, ‘A Inauguração do Multilateralismo na Política Externa Brasileira: A Participação do Brasil na 2ª Conferência de Paz de Haia’, Fronteira, ix (2010), 29–46.

5 E. Bradford Burns, The Unwritten Alliance: Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966); Amado Luiz Cervo and Clodoaldo Bueno, História da Política Exterior do Brasil (Brasília: Editora UnB, 2002), 192–215; Luís Viana Filho, A Vida de Rui Barbosa (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1949), 331–53; Christiane Vieira Laidler, A Segunda Conferência da Paz de Haia, 1907: o Brasil e o Sistema Internacional no Início do Século XX (Rio de Janeiro: Edições Casa de Rui Barbosa, 2010); Rejane Magalhães. ‘Presença de Rui Barbosa em Haia’, Fundação Casa de Rui Barbosa (2007), 1–14; Antônio Celso Alves Pereira, ‘O Barão do Rio Branco e a II Conferência da Paz’ in Manoel Gomes Pereira (ed), Barão do Rio Branco: 100 Anos de Memória, (Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2012), 389–422; Joseph Smith, Unequal Giants: Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Brazil, 1889–1930 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991).

6 Carsten-Andreas Schulz, ‘Accidental Activists: Latin American Status-Seeking at The Hague’, International Studies Quarterly, lxi (2017), 612–22.

7 Ibid., 612, 619.

8 Edward Keene, ‘The Standard of “Civilisation”, the Expansion Thesis and the 19th-Century International Social Space’, Millennium, xlii (2014), 651–73; Jonathan Renshon, ‘Status Deficits and War’, International Organization lxx (2016), 513–50; William C. Wohlforth, Benjamin de Carvalho, Halvard Leira & Iver B. Neumann, ‘Moral Authority and Status in International Relations: Good States and the Social Dimension of Status Seeking’, Review of International Studies, xliv (2017), 526–46.

9 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 31.

10 Carsten Holbraad, Middle Powers in International Politics (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984), 75–91.

11 For an explanation of the shortcomings of the material approach, see Marina G. Duque, ‘Recognizing International Status: A Relational Approach’, International Studies Quarterly, lxii (2018), 578–80.

12 T. V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson and William C. Wohlforth, Status in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 7–10. Also see: Duque, ‘Recognizing International Status’, 577–92; Keene, ‘The Standard of “Civilisation”’, 651–73; Renshon, ‘Status Deficits and War’, 513–50; Ann E. Towns, ‘Norms and Social Hierarchies: Understanding the International Policy Diffusion from Below’, International Organization lxvi (2012), 179–209.

13 Renshon, ‘Status Deficits and War’, 529; Duque, ‘Recognizing International Status’, 588; David, A. Lake, ‘Status, Authority, and the End of the American Century’ in T.V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson and William C. Wohlforth (eds), Status in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 251.

14 Renshon, ‘Status Deficits and War’, 529; Keene, ‘The Standard of “Civilisation”’, 664.

15 Paul, Larson and Wohlforth, Status in World Politics, 18–19.

16 Renshon, ‘Status Deficits and War’, 526.

17 Wohlforth et al., ‘Moral Authority and Status’, 526–546.

18 Ibid, 530.

19 Adam Chapnick, ‘The Middle Power’, Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, vii (1999), 74–76; Bernard Jr. Prosper, ‘Canada and Human Security: From the Axworthy Doctrine to Middle Power Internationalism’, American Review of Canadian Studies, xxxvi (2006), 233–261; Wohlforth et al., ‘Moral Authority and Status in International Relations’, 526–546.

20 Andrew Hurrell, ‘Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order, What Space for would be Great Powers?’, International Affairs, lxxxii (2006), 12–15; Eduard Jordaan, ‘The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations: Distinguishing between Emerging and Traditional Middle Powers’, Politikon, xxx (2003), 165–81; Wohlfort et al. ‘Moral Authority and Status’, 534–5.

21 Hurrell, ‘Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order’, 11.

22 Charalampos Efstathopoulos, ‘Leadership in the WTO: Brazil, India and the Doha Development Agenda’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, xxv (2012), 269–93; Stefan Schirm, ‘Leaders in Need of Followers: Emerging Powers in Global Governance’, European Journal of International Relations, xvi (2010), 197–221.

23 Sandra Destradi, ‘Regional Powers and their Strategies: Empire, Hegemony, and Leadership’, Review of International Studies, xxxvi (2010), 903–30; Hurrell, ‘Would be Great Powers?’, 8-9; Detlef Nolte, ‘How to Compare Regional Powers: Analytical Concepts and Research Topics,’ Review of International Studies, xxxvi (2010), 881–901.

24 Efstathopoulos, ‘Leadership in the WTO’, 269-293; Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, ‘Global Power Shifts and South Africa’s Southern Agenda: Caught between African Solidarity and Regional Leadership’ in Günther Taube (ed), Power Shifts and Global Governance: Challenges from South and North (London: Anthem Press, 2011), 141–52.

25 Jeremy Adelman, ‘An Age of Imperial Revolutions ‘,The American Historical Review, cxiii (2008), 337; Schulz, ‘Civilisation, Barbarism and the Making of Latin America’s Place in 19th-Century International Society’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, xlii, iii (2014), 849–51.

26 Liliana Obregón. 2006. ‘Between Civilisation and Barbarism: Creole Interventions in International Law’, Third World Quarterly, xxvii, v (2006), 822–3.

27 Lilia Moritz Schwarcz, ‘A Mestizo and Tropical Country: The Creation of the Official Image of Independent Brazil’, European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, lxxx (2006), 28.

28 Leslie Bethell, ‘O Brasil no Mundo’, in Alfredo Gomes, Leslie Bethel, Lilia Moritz Schwarcs, Luiz Aranha Côrrea do Lago, Gustavo Franco and José Murilo de Carvalho (eds), História do Brasil nação: 1808-2010 (Rio de Janeiro: Academia Brasileira de Letras, 2012), 153–57.

29 Mary Wilhelmine Williams, Dom Pedro the Magnanimous: Second Emperor of Brazil (Abingdon: Frank Cas & Co. Ltd., 1996), 141–56.

30 Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão. n.d., ‘Embaixadas do Brasil Histórico dos chefes de legações e embaixadas’, www.funag.gov.br/postos/.

31 Reşat Bayer, 2006. ‘Diplomatic Exchange Data set, v2006.1’, http://correlatesofwar.org.

32 Schulz, ‘Latin America’s Place in 19th-Century International Society’, 850–1.

33 Bethell, ‘O Brasil no Mundo’, 131–49.

34 Boris Fausto and Sergio Fausto, A Concise History of Brazil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 144–56.

35 Pereira, ‘II Conferência da Paz’, 391.

36 Amado Luiz Cervo and Clodoaldo Bueno, História da Política Exterior do Brasil (Brasília: Editora UnB, 2002), 167–72.

37 Carlos Henrique Cardim, ‘A Primeira Conferência de Paz da Haia, 1899: Por que a Rússia?’, in Manoel Gomes Pereira (ed), Barão do Rio Branco: 100 Anos de Memória (Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2012): 368–75.

38 Bayer, ‘Diplomatic Exchange Data set’.

39 Luiz Felipe de Seixas Corrêa, ‘O Barão do Rio Branco chefe de missão: Liverpool, Washington, Berna e Berlim’, in Manoel Gomes Pereira (ed), O Barão do Rio Branco: 100 Anos de Memória (Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2012), 31–56.

40 Alvaro Lins, Rio Branco: Biografia Pessoal e História Política (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1965), 259–60.

41 ‘Não venho servir a um partido político: venho servir ao nosso Brasil, que todos desejamos ver unido, íntegro, forte e respeitado’. Rio Branco, ‘No Clube Naval, 1 Dec. 1902, Manoel Gomes Pereira (ed), Obras do Rio Branco IX, Discursos(Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2012), 108.

42 Tânia Maria Pechir Gomes Manzur, ‘Opinião Pública e Política Externa do Brasil do Império a João Goulart: Um Balanço Historiográfico’, Revista Brasileira Política Internacional, xlii (1999), 42–43.

43 Ibid.

44 Laidler, A Segunda Conferência da Paz de Haia, 105; Smith, The United States and Latin America, 67.

45 Smith, The United States and Latin America, 67.

46 Juan Pablo Scarfi, ‘In the Name of the Americas: The Pan-American Redefinition of the Monroe Doctrine and the Emerging Language of American International Law in the Western Hemisphere, 1898-1933’, Diplomatic History, xv, ii (2016), 189–218; Friedman and Long, ‘Soft Balancing in the Americas’.

47 Smith, The United States and Latin America, 69.

48 Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention, 24-51; Finnemore and Jurkovich, ‘Getting a Seat at the Table’; Friedman and Long, ‘Soft Balancing in the Americas’.

49 Roberto Schwarz, ‘Misplaced Ideas: Literature and Society in Late Nineteenth-Century Brazil’, Comparative Civilizations Review, v (1980), 1–19.

50 Burns, The Unwritten Alliance.

51 Cervo and Bueno, História da Política Exterior do Brasil, 192; Clodoaldo Bueno, ‘O Barão do Rio Branco no Itamaraty (1902-1912)’, Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, lv (2012), 173.

52 Burns, The Unwritten Alliance.

53 Ibid, 90–3.

54 Ibid, 103–8.

55 Clodoaldo Bueno, ‘O Barão do Rio Branco no Itamaraty (1902-1912)’, Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, lv (2012), 177; Smith, Unequal Giants, 53–4.

56 Laidler, A Segunda Conferência da Paz de Haia, 114–115; Pereira, ‘II Conferência da Paz’, 392–393.

57 Speech from Rio Branco to the conference, July 23, 1906, in International American Conference (3rd: 1906: Rio de Janeiro, Brazil), Minutes, Resolutions, Documents, (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1907), 39–40.

58 Armando de Senna Bittencourt, ‘O Emprego do Poder Militar como Estratégia de Rio Branco’, in Manoel Gomes Pereira (ed), O Barão do Rio Branco: 100 Anos de Memória (Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2012), 62, 73.

59 Burns, The Unwritten Alliance, 94; Laidler, A Segunda Conferência da Paz de Haia, 128.

60 João Paulo Alsina Jr., ‘Rio Branco, Grand Strategy and Naval Power’, Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, lvii (2014) 9–28; Bueno, ‘Rio Branco no Itamaraty’, 180-1; Burns, The Unwritten Alliance, 182; Doratioto, ‘A Política Platina do Barão do Rio Branco’, 132, 140.

61 Rio Branco, speech, 27 Aug. 1906, p. 405, International American Conference, Minutes, Resolutions, Documents (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1907); Doratioto, ‘A Política Platina do Barão do Rio Branco’, 130–49.

62 Cervo and Bueno, História da Política Exterior do Brasil, 210.

63 Doratioto, ‘A Polítical Platina do Barão de Rio Branco’, 134.

64 Maartje Abbenhuis, Christopher Ernest Barber and Annalise R. Higgins, War, Peace and International Order? The Legacies of the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017); Maartje Abbenhuis, The Hague Conferences and International Politics, 1898-1915 (London: Bloomsburg Academic, 2019).Finnemore and Jurkovich, ‘Getting a Seat at the Table’.

65 Nicholas II, ‘Rescript of the Russian Emperor (1898)’, in A Series of Lectures, vol 2, J. B. Scott (ed). (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1909), 1.

66 Scott, A Series of Lectures, vol.1, 95–100.

67 Finnemore and Jurkovich, ‘Getting a Seat at the Table’, 367.

68 Pereira, ‘II Conferência da Paz’, 402.

69 Filho, A Vida De Rui Barbosa.

70 Pereira, ‘II Conferência da Paz’, 402–3.

71 ‘desejo ardente de servir ao pais.’ Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 30 March 1906, [Rio de Janeiro, Arquivo de Rui Barbosa], [Série Segunda] C[onferência da Paz em] H[aia] 2/1, fo. 1.

72 Scott, Proceedings, vol. 1, 2–15.

73 ‘Quizera saber o que ha de exacto sobre assumpto.’ Rio Branco to Joaquim Nabuco, 14 Apr. 1907, CH 2/1, fo. 14G.

74 Joaquim Nabuco to Rio Branco, 17 Apr. 1907, CH 2/1 fo. 14G.

75 Memo Nabuco to US secretary of state Elihu Root, 25 May 1907, CH 6/1, fo. 1.

76 Smith, Unequal Giants, 59.

77 Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 30 May 1907, CH 2/2, fo. 26.

78 Conference list, 27 Sept. 1907, CH 18; Filho, A Vida de Rui Barbosa, 334.

79 ‘Estamos todos seguros do brilhante exito da sua missão.’ Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 27 May 1907, CH 2/2, fo. 25.

80 ‘Article discussing the map of the Hall of Knights’, Courier de la Conférence de la Paix, 18 June 1907, 2.

81 ‘Trabalho acumula-se cresce enormemente não havendo quasi tempo estudar’. Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 29 June 1907, p. 4, CH 9, fo. 1.

82 Ibid, p. 5.

83 Proceedings, Mtg., Fo[urth] C[commission], 5 July 1907, p. 770-7, Scott, Proceedings, vol. 3.

84 Ibid, 771–2.

85 Proceedings, Mtg., FoC, 12 July, p. 808, Scott, Proceedings, vol. 3.

86 Ibid.

87 Filho, A Vida de Rui Barbosa, 338–9.

88 ‘Consideram irritante impolitico.’ Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 14 July 1907, p. 10, CH 9, fo. 1.

89 ‘Elles a abandonaram appressando-se plena sessão solicitar proposta belga dando assim nossa como for a combate.’ Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 15 July 1907, p. 10, CH 9, fo. 1.

90 Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 3 Aug. 1907, p. 22, CH 9, fo. 1.

91 Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 25 July 1907, p. 16, CH 9, fo. 1.

92 Burns, The Unwritten Alliance, 118-20; Smith, Unequal Giants, 61.

93 ‘effeito partido seria deploravel … depois tantos brilhantes trabalhos.’ Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 26 July 1907, CH 2/2 fo. 62.

94 ‘aqui quasi todas contra nós.’ Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 21 July 1907, CH 9, fo. 1.

95 Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 29 July 1907, CH 22, fo. 65.

96 Roque Sáenz Peña, La Republica Argentina en la Segunda Conferencia International de la Paz (Buenos Aires: Imprenta y Litografia A. Pech. Cerrito 55, 1908), 34–7.

97 Proceedings, Mtg., FC: First Subcommission, 1 Aug. 1907, p. 312–31, Scott, Proceedings, vol. 2.

98 Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 3 Aug. 1907, p. 22, CH 9 fo. 1.

99 ‘amargo humiliação.’ Ibid.

100 Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 5 Aug. 1907, CH 2/3 fo. 71.

101 Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 8 Aug. 1907, CH 2/3 fo. 77; Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 10 Aug. 1907, CH 2/3 fo. 78; Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 16 Aug. 1907, CH 2/3 fo. 90.

102 ‘terem Brazil Argentina Chile cada um seu arbitro’, Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 12 Aug. 1907, CH 2/3 fo. 81.

103 Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 15 Aug. 1907, CH 2/3 fo. 87.

104 Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 16 Aug. 1907, CH 2/3 fo. 74.

105 Proceedings, Mtg., FC: Committee B, 17 Aug. 1907, p. 609-13, Scott, Proceedings, vol. 2.

106 Ibid, 610.

107 Ibid.

108 Proceedings, FC: Second Subcommission, 4 July 1907, p. 783-786, Scott, Proceedings, vol. 2.

109 Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 11 Aug. 1907, p. 30, CH 9 fo. 1.

110 Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 14 Aug. 1907, CH 2/3 fo. 86.

111 Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 16 Aug. 1907, CH 2/3 fo. 90.

112 Proceedings, FC, 10 Sept. 1907, p. 11-13, Scott, Proceedings, vol. 2.

113 ‘Não sei como obter supplente quando americanos recusam … Tenho dito vocencia bastante para habilital-o jugar realidade nossa posição aqui quasi isolados entre estados e americanos e impotentes contra predominio absoluto … potencias’ Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 16 Aug. 1907, p. 35, CH 9 fo. 1.

114 Ibid.

115 ‘Nenhum representante por mais habil e competente que seja mesmo representante um paiz forte pode estar certo de conseguir tudo quanto deseja ou seu paiz deseja.’ Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 17 Aug. 1907, CH 2/6 fo. 235.

116 ‘enthusiasmo pelo brilho vocencia.’ Ibid.

117 Pereira, ‘O Barão do Rio Branco e a II Conferência da Paz’, 411.

118 Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 17 Aug. 1907, p. 37, CH 9 fo. 1.

119 Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 24 Aug. 1907, CH 2/3 fo. 106.

120 Proceedings, FC: First Subcommission, 20 Aug. 1907, p. 619-22, Scott, Proceedings, vol. 2.

121 Ibid., 623–30.

122 ‘Nossa autoridade moral cresce todos dias.’ Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 23 Aug. 1907, p. 44, CH 9 fo. 1.

123 Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 23 Aug. 1907, p. 47, CH 9 fo. 1; Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 26 Aug. 1907, p. 49-50, CH 9 fo. 1; Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 23 Aug. 1907, CH 2/3 fo. 102; Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 26 Aug. 1907, CH 2/3 fo. 111; Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 27 Aug. 1907, CH 2/3 fo. 115.

124 Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 23 Aug. 1907, p. 45, CH 9 fo. 1.

125 Ibid.

126 Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 4 Sept. 1907, p. 61-2, CH 9 fo. 1.

127 Proceedings, FC: Committee of Examination, 17 Aug. 1907, p. 827, Scott, Proceedings, vol. 2.

128 Ibid.

129 ‘Esteva levantou-se dizendo adheria completamente nossa attitude.’ Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 18 Aug. 1907, CH 9 fo. 1.

130 ‘Abandonalos alem de deslealdade seria transferir-lhes vantagem posição que hoje occupamos.’ Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 31 Aug. 1907, p. 56, CH 9 fo. 1.

131 Schulz, ‘Accidental Activists’, 613.

132 Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 19 Sept. 1907, CH 2/4 fo. 150.

133 William Hull, The Two Hague Conferences and their Contributions to International Law (New York: Kraus, 1908), 423–5; Scott, A Series of Lectures, vol.1, 169.

134 Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 31 Aug. 1907, CH 2/4 fo. 122; Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 31 Aug. 1907, CH 2/4 fo. 123.

135 ‘Grande pezar que nos causa a dissidencia em que infelizmente nos achamos.’ Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 31 Aug. 1907, CH 2/4 fo. 123.

136 ‘Article Discussing the Brazilian Banquet’, Courier de la Conférence de la Paix, 25 Aug. 1907, 3; Filho, A Vida de Rui Barbosa, 340.

137 ‘Les Sept Sages de la Conférence’, Courier de la Conférence de la Paix, 7 Sept. 1907, 1.

138 Schulz, ‘Accidental Activists’, 619–20.

139 Ibid., Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States, 162.

140 Burns, The Unwritten Alliance; Smith, Unequal Giants.

141 Proceedings, Mtg., FC: Committee B, 17 Aug. 1907, p. 613, Scott, Proceedings, vol. 2.

142 Proceedings, FC: Second Subcommission, 4 July 1907, p. 1086, Scott, Proceedings, vol. 2.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Lars Janssen

At the moment of publication, Lars Janssen is a PhD-candidate at Utrecht University. His research focuses on diplomatic history, and specifically the roles of, and the interactions with, Latin American actors in the development of the international order.


sábado, 18 de junho de 2022

Latin America’s vicious circle is a warning to the West - The Economist special survey, June 16, 2022

 

How democracies decay

Latin America’s vicious circle is a warning to the West

Economic stagnation, popular frustration and polarised politics are reinforcing one another

The Economist, June 16, 2022


When they vote in a presidential run-off election this weekend Colombians face a grim choice between two ill-qualified populists. On the left, Gustavo Petro has still not wholly shaken off his long-standing sympathy for Hugo Chávez, the caudillo who destroyed Venezuela’s economy and its democracy. On the right, Rodolfo Hernández is a bullying former mayor with no team and not much of a programme beyond expelling “the thieves”, as he calls the political class. This line-up reflects voters’ deep scorn for Colombia’s mainstream politicians, even though the country has done relatively well over the past 20 years. It is the kind of polarised choice that has become worryingly familiar in Latin American elections. In a region that was discontented even before the pandemic, there no longer seem to be many takers for the moderation, compromise and gradual reform needed to become prosperous and peaceful.

That matters not just to Latin America, but to the world. Despite everything, the region remains largely democratic and should be a natural ally of the West. It can play a vital role, too, in helping solve other global problems, from climate change to food security. It is home not only to the fast-diminishing Amazon rainforest and much of the world’s fresh water but also to a wealth of commodities needed for green energy, such as lithium and copper. It is a big food exporter and could provide more.

Not so long ago, Latin America was on a roll. A commodity boom brought healthy economic growth and provided politicians with the money to experiment with innovative social policies, such as conditional cash-transfer programmes. That, in turn, helped bring about big falls in poverty, reducing the extreme income inequality long associated with the region. The middle classes grew. That helped underpin political stability. Democratic governments generally respected human rights, even if the rule of law was weak. Growing prosperity and more responsive and effective politicians appeared to be reinforcing one another. The future was bright.

Now that virtuous circle has been replaced by a vicious one. Latin America is stuck in a worrying development trap, as our special report this week explains. Its economies have suffered a decade of stagnation or slow growth. Its people, especially the young, who are more educated than their parents, have become frustrated by their lack of opportunity. They have turned this anger against their politicians, who are widely seen as corrupt and self-serving. The politicians, for their part, have been unable to agree on the reforms needed to make Latin America’s economies more efficient. The region’s productivity gap with developed countries has widened since the 1980s. With too many monopolies and not enough innovation, Latin America is falling short in the 21st-century economy. 

These challenges are becoming more acute. The impact of the pandemic, especially long school closures, will increase inequality. Governments need to spend more on health care and education, but the cost of servicing debt is rising. The region thus needs to raise more tax, but in ways that do not undermine investment. Chile and its young left-wing president, Gabriel Boric, seemed to offer the chance of a new social contract along those lines. Instead his fledgling government is hostage to a constitutional convention shot through with the familiar Latin American vices of Utopianism and over-regulation.

The consolidation of democracy used to be seen as a one-way street. But Latin America shows that democracies can easily decay—and that is a warning for democrats everywhere. Its politics are now marked not just by polarisation but also by fragmentation and the extreme weakness of political parties, making stable governing majorities hard to assemble (see Bello). This downward spiral is accelerated by the malign influence of social media and the import of identity politics from the north. Technocrats are discredited and jobs in government are increasingly seen, on both the left and the right, as perks to be doled out rather than crucial responsibilities to be reserved for capable administrators. Organised crime, already a big factor in the region’s epidemic of violence, is starting to taint its politics, too.

Many of these are ills of the democratic world in general, but they are particularly acute and dangerous in Latin America. Most Latin Americans still want democracy, albeit a better version than they have. But there is a growing audience for those advocating the supposedly effective hand of autocracy. Venezuela and Nicaragua have become left-wing dictatorships like Cuba. In El Salvador, Nayib Bukele has centralised power and locked up some 40,000 people in a draconian war on gangs. He is the region’s most popular president. The leaders of its two biggest countries, Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil and Andrés Manuel López Obrador of Mexico, are contemptuous of checks and balances. Mr Bolsonaro will seek a second term at an election in October. It is cold comfort that he is likely to lose to Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a former president whose governments were linked to corruption and who lacks new ideas.

The risk is not just that democracies devolve into dictatorships, but that Latin America drifts away from the orbit of the West. In much of the region, China is now the main trade partner and is investing in infrastructure. Some of the region’s left-wing governments seem keen to return to the non-alignment of the cold-war era. Five of the region’s presidents, including Mr López Obrador, chose to boycott this month’s Summit of the Americas in Los Angeles. The United States—and Europe—could do more to engage Latin America, through trade, investment and technology. But Latin America in turn needs to recognise that it has much to gain from rebuilding closer ties, and that its role in a world dominated by China would be that of a neo-colony.


Stopping the rot

The temptation in the region will be to ignore the economic and political malaise and simply surf the new commodity boom triggered by the war in Ukraine. That would be a mistake. There are no short cuts. Latin Americans need to rebuild their democracies from the ground up. If the region does not rediscover a vocation for politics as a public service and relearn the habit of forging a consensus, its fate will get only worse. ■

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This article appeared in the Leaders section of the print edition under the headline "How democracies decay"


quarta-feira, 16 de março de 2022

"China Engages Latin America: Distorting Development and Democracy?", by Evan Ellis - and my response, Paulo Roberto de Almeida

I have just received a gentle communication from an American partner: 

16 de mar. de 2022, à(s) 19:12, R. Evan Ellis, PhD from Evan Ellis on Latin America and the Caribbean <evanellis@substack.com> 

What I have responded: 

Dear Ellis, 

        China is just following the path started by European colonialism and imperialism centuries ago, and followed by the US over the whole 20th century, imposing and disposing its hegemonic presence over the entire continent, support either democracies, or dictatorships, even helping some military coups when something was not going according to Washington.

China wants to become rich, as Europe and US did in their respective itineraries, and the best form to do that is to perform as the two previous hegemonic powers have done: investments, trade, finance, infrastructure, technical cooperation and so on. China is far behind to what was done by the two previous economic giants and arrogant superpowers, so Latin American countries will seek their own interests, despite all the talk about distorting democracy and development.
If these two criteria were in the forefront of European and American cooperation toward the region, LAC should already have attained a higher degree of economic and social development, and a democratic regime of superior quality. If not, both past and present hegemonic presence in the region was neither functional nor successful. Let’s try the Chinese experiment, which is basically based in trade, not development nor democracy, similar to those previous dominances. In due course, China will also cooperate in S&T and educational undertakings, equal as those conducted by Europe and US. 
There is no more chasse gardée for a single power...

Paulo Roberto de Almeida