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quinta-feira, 21 de novembro de 2024

What Marco Rubio Has Said About Latin America - Emilie Sweigart (Americas Quarterly)

 U.S. POLICY

What Marco Rubio Has Said About Latin America

Trump’s nominee for Secretary of State is known for his hardline stances on dictatorships and China’s activity in the region.


President-elect Donald Trump has nominated Florida Senator Marco Rubio for Secretary of State, making him potentially the first Latino to hold the position. The three-term senator, a son of Cuban immigrants, was born in Miami and was highly influential on Latin America policy during Trump’s first administration.

That influence is now likely to grow. He has consistently spoken out against dictatorships in Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua. He has also criticized some of Latin America’s leftist leaders for their positions on Venezuela and China’s presence in the region.

Here is a selection of some of Rubio’s recent statements on Latin America.

April 2024
Article in 
The National Interest:
“We must take seriously the opportunities for collaboration presented by countries like Ecuador, El Salvador, Argentina, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, Peru, Guyana, and Costa Rica.”

“Our region is currently experiencing at least six major crises. These range from unprecedented mass migration at the U.S. southern border to the complete breakdown of social order in Haiti to ramped-up state oppression in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. At the same time, the outlook for our region remains bright.”

“Is this a contradiction? Only if we ignore the bright spots in Latin America and the Caribbean. Even as we recognize the horrors occurring not far from our shores—and do our best to counter them—we must draw inspiration from the new generation of potentially pro-America leaders in the Western Hemisphere.”

August 2024 
Introducing a resolution in the Senate condemning the Cuban government:
“The world is bearing witness to the multiple ways the Castro/Díaz-Canel regime has served as a puppet for Communist China, Iran, and most recently Russia. America has a moral duty to defend our nation’s interests and we must continue to uphold democratic order and justice in our hemisphere.”

April 2024
Interview in 
Voz:
“Cuba has a long history of intelligence and military cooperation with the communist government of China…. In many cases, we have not done enough to create alternatives to what China has done in many countries.”

August 2024
Op-ed in the Miami Herald:
“The Biden-Harris administration has “serious concerns” that dictator Nicolás Maduro’s announcement of electoral victory in the recent presidential election “does not reflect the will or the votes of the Venezuelan people.”

“But such an outcome to this sham election was entirely predictable from the start. It was made more so by three years’ worth of concessions to and negotiations with the Maduro narco-dictatorship.”

“In short, the Biden-Harris Administration gave away every ounce of leverage we had over Maduro, then appeared surprised when he didn’t do what they wanted. It’s problematic to say the least, and not just for the people of Venezuela—or for opposition leader María Corina Machado and presidential candidate Edmundo González, who are now facing threats of imprisonment—but for America.”

“In recent years, nearly eight million Venezuelans have fled their country. Many of them have crossed our southern border, and many more will do the same if Maduro retains power.”

“The tyrant will also happily send dangerous criminals—like the brutal Tren de Aragua gang, which is already wreaking havoc on our streets—the United States’ way. None of this makes life easier for American communities. It shows the White House’s feckless policies have failed across the board.”

January 2019
Comments for 
CNN regarding Venezuela:
“I don’t know of anyone who is calling for a military intervention.”

September 2018
Quote in Newsweek:
In an interview with Univision 23Rubio said he would not rule out the military option in Venezuela. Rubio, a vocal opponent of Maduro’s regime, commented in Spanish and was quoted by Newsweek.

“For months and years, I wanted the solution in Venezuela to be a non-military and peaceful solution, simply to restore democracy.”

“I believe that the Armed Forces of the United States are only used in the event of a threat to national security. I believe that there is a very strong argument that can be made at this time that Venezuela and the Maduro regime has become a threat to the region and even to the United States.”

May 2023
Interview in 
El Universal:

“Mexico is an important partner of the United States. The country, its institutions. But López Obrador is not a good ally. The current president, unfortunately, is dedicated to talking nonsense, to interfering in U.S. policy. His thinking is beyond the left, a strange thinking in terms of that line with all these dictators in the hemisphere. And he has a domestic policy with which he has handed over a large part of his national territory to the drug traffickers who control those areas. That matters to us because we are seeing the consequences of that violence, that criminality entering our border and our country. So I have my disagreement with him, but he is the president of Mexico today, he was not yesterday and he is not going to be tomorrow. There is a difference between the country and the importance of the country and its institutions and whoever is in office at the moment.”

Interviewer: “Would you agree with sending U.S. troops to combat drug cartels in Mexico?”

“Well, as long as there is cooperation from the Mexican government, which at the moment I don’t think we are going to see, because this is a president who came into office saying that he didn’t want to go after these criminal gangs. I would be willing to support this measure, but it has to be in coordination with the armed forces and the Mexican police force. Otherwise, it would not be possible to do it.”

May 2023
X post commenting on a Reuters piecereporting on Lula’s critiques of U.S. sanctions on Venezuela:
“Brazil’s Lula da Silva is the latest far-left leader who whitewashes the criminal nature of the Maduro narco-regime, days after meeting with Pres. Biden. Under the Biden Administration’s weak foreign policy, tyrants in our region feel emboldened to seek international support.”

February 2023
Op-ed in 
The Epoch Times:
“It sounds paradoxical, but President Lula da Silva of Brazil is seeking closer ties with both the United States and Communist China…. For now, that means he will take what he can get from both the U.S. and the CCP—so long as it benefits his agenda.”

“President Biden must take a firm line with Brazil’s new president, holding Lula to account for his friendliness toward the CCP—as well as other bloody handed dictatorships, like those of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.”


Senator Marco Rubio speaks outside the White House during a news conference in Sept. 2022 on U.S. policy toward Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Colombia. (Photo by Win McNamee/Getty Images)

April 2023
Interview in
 Semana:
“It is very dangerous that the president of a country, which for years has been a great ally of the United States, now chooses to be the spokesperson for a criminal drug dictatorship like the one in Venezuela. In order to obtain the support of intermediaries like Maduro and Castro for “negotiations” with the ELN terrorists, Petro is willing to lobby for a vile dictatorship.”

April 2023 
In Medium:
“For decades, Colombia has been ravaged by the violent outbursts of rebel groups like the National Liberation Army (ELN)…. Over the past few months, Petro has sought to end the violence through negotiations…, but he’s only sowing disaster.…”

“Case in point: the ELN continues to attack the Colombian government…. These are the mercenaries Petro wants to appease, even to the point of backtracking on Colombia’s longstanding extradition agreement with the U.S. It’s terrible, but it’s what happens when you negotiate with terrorists from a position of weakness.”

“It’s also what happens when you cooperate with tyrants…. Petro has been the foremost Latin American advocate of “engagement” with narco-dictator Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela and puppet dictator Miguel Díaz-Canel in Cuba [because] he wants both regimes to use their leverage over the ELN in Colombia’s favor. [I]t’s a fool’s errand, because internationally ostracized dictators have nothing to gain from increasing stability in the region.…”

“The icing on the cake is that Petro has also joined the ranks of Latin America’s pro-China voices. In February, his Ministry of Foreign Affairs went so far as to issue guidelines instructing Colombian officials to refuse contact with Taiwan….”

October 2024
Op-ed in the 
Miami Herald on Huawei:
“Its primary goal was and remains, the domination of the global wireless market on Beijing’s behalf, combined with the expansion of the Chinese Communist Party’s ability to spy on and disrupt other countries’ communications.”

“I urge Latin American leaders not to heed Huawei’s siren song. No 5G deal is worth allowing a totalitarian dictatorship to spy on and interfere in a free nation’s affairs.”

March 2022
Remarks at Senate Committee on Foreign Relations subcommittee hearing on China in Latin America:
“Unfortunately, many of these newer leaders in the region have expressed admiration for the Communist Party in China’s model, even as they turn a blind eye and in many cases are supportive of the regimes that are creating tremendous suffering in Cuba and Venezuela and in Nicaragua.”

“So Beijing sees this, and they’re seizing the opportunity to grow both their influence and their power in the Western Hemisphere. As an example, their Belt and Road Initiative uses massive infrastructure loans and projects to lure nations into economic and political dependency — debt traps. That’s now spread to Argentina, Brazil, Barbados, and Panama. And in their annual report last year, the bipartisan US-China Security and Economic Review Commission found that the Communist Party of China is taking advantage of its economic importance and political relationships to encourage governments across the region to make domestic and foreign policy decisions that favor the CCP and undermine democracy and free markets in the region.”

“Their intentions in the region are not to be active because they want to make life better for people living in the Western Hemisphere. They care only about power and influence. They don’t care about stability or economic development. And so even as increasing exports to China boost the economies of some of the nations in these regions, the Communist Party of China is pushing countries to remain dependent on mining and the export of other natural resources instead of partnering with them to develop and industrialize their economies. It’s encouraging them to weaken or even break their own environmental, social and [governmental] regulations by promising them increased investment from China in return.”

“And they do this because they know that chaos in Latin America and the Caribbean would severely hurt us, destabilize us, who they view as their primary and central rival. If cartels have greater operating freedom to send drugs and violence across our border, it worsens the opioid and fentanyl epidemic and [amplifies] gang violence in our communities. If more countries go the way of Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba, you’ll see massive new waves of illegal immigration and human trafficking that’s associated with it.”

“So we simply can’t afford to let the Chinese Communist Party expand its influence and absorb Latin America and the Caribbean into its private political-economic bloc. That would leave our country worse off and ensnare the people of Latin America and the Caribbean into a generation of suffering and repression. So I’m hopeful that our nation will begin to address this threat head on and seriously revitalize our engagement in the region.”

This article was updated on November 13 to reflect the confirmation of Rubio’s nomination.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Sweigart is an editor at Americas Quarterly and a policy manager at the Americas Society/Council of the Americas

Follow Emilie Sweigart:   LinkedIn   |    X/Twitter

domingo, 29 de setembro de 2024

A Venezuela e os efeitos da polarização - Theodore Kahn (Americas Quarterly, OESP)

A Venezuela e os efeitos da polarização

Theodore Kahn
Americas Quarterly
Diretor de análise de riscos para a Região Andina da Control Risks

O Estado de S. Paulo | Internacional
29 de setembro de 2024

Venezuela voltou ao centro das atenções da diplomacia global esta semana na Assembleia Geral da ONU. Poucos dias antes, uma missão de investigadores das Nações Unidas denunciou a ditadura de Nicolás Maduro por repressão e crimes contra a humanidade após a eleição de 28 de julho.

Muitos chefes de Estado latino-americanos denunciaram o regime chavista em seus discursos na Assembleia-Geral, enquanto outros adotaram uma abordagem mais conciliatória. As opiniões drasticamente divididas são apenas a mais recente evidência de que a crise política na Venezuela está prestes a se tornar um poderoso ponto de conflito no próximo ciclo de eleições na América Latina.

Em seu discurso, Gabriel Boric, do Chile, renovou sua denúncia de fraude e violações dos direitos humanos na Venezuela, chamando o regime de "ditadura que tenta roubar a eleição, que persegue oponentes e é indiferente ao exílio de milhares de seus cidadãos". Após um tribunal na Argentina ordenar a prisão de Maduro e de seu ministro do Interior, Diosdado Cabello, por crimes contra a humanidade, o presidente argentino, Javier Milei, caracterizou o chavismo como uma "ditadura sangrenta".

O guatemalteco Bernardo Arévalo rejeitou a repressão venezuelana às aspirações por liberdades e justiça e o dominicano Luis Abinader reafirmou seu chamado para que Maduro mostre as atas de votação.

BRASIL. O presidente brasileiro, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, não mencionou a Venezuela ou seu papel como mediador na crise em seu discurso, mas à margem do evento da ONU se encontrou com o francês, Emmanuel Macron, para discutir a situação. Gustavo Petro, da Colômbia, pareceu elogiar o país em uma crítica à desigualdade global.

"Esse 1% mais rico da humanidade, a poderosa oligarquia global, é quem permite bloqueios econômicos contra países rebeldes que não se encaixam em seu controle, como Cuba ou Venezuela". No entanto, em entrevista à CNN, Petro pediu uma "solução política" para a crise, enquanto Maduro se prepara para a posse, em janeiro.

Embora as divisões sobre a Venezuela não sejam novas, o chavismo tem sido um ponto de controvérsia desde seu surgimento, nos anos 1990. O impasse sobre a eleição de 28 de julho, provavelmente, fará o debate se tornar cada vez mais contencioso. Além da retórica, a crise política criará desafios muito concretos para os líderes regionais.

A imigração é o efeito imediato da brutal onda de repressão de Maduro. O número de venezuelanos vivendo no exterior, estimado em quase 8 milhões, aumentará nos próximos meses, à medida que mais pessoas fujam da perseguição. Governos latino-americanos estão ansiosos para evitar as implicações sociais, humanitárias e políticas de uma nova onda de migrantes venezuelanos - mas eles podem não ser capazes.

CRIME. A crise também fortalecerá grupos armados organizados, à medida que Maduro procura transferir o ônus da repressão das Forças Armadas para atores não estatais, como os coletivos (gangues pró-governo) e o Exército de Libertação Nacional (ELN), guerrilha colombiana com ligações de longa data com o chavismo.

No restante da região, países que recebem venezuelanos enfrentarão crescentes riscos de segurança ligados à imigração, à medida que gangues se aproveitem das rotas para entrar em novos mercados. Esses fatores apenas intensificarão a retórica anti-imigração na política, assim como as propostas repressivas para lidar com ela.

Enquanto isso, o isolamento internacional e uma escalada das sanções provavelmente levarão Maduro a uma união mais estreita com China, Rússia e Irã. Nos últimos meses, a Venezuela tomou medidas para reforçar os laços com esses governos para atenuar o impacto de uma possível escalada das sanções dos EUA.

Para os EUA e seus aliados, esse cenário significa não apenas o redirecionamento dos fluxos de petróleo para rivais geopolíticos, mas também a crescente influência militar e de inteligência chinesa e russa na América Latina.

Essas considerações criam incentivos para EUA, Brasil e Colômbia serem pragmáticos. Esses principais atores regionais buscam evitar um colapso econômico e conter a repressão da ditadura de Maduro, dois fatores que contribuiriam
para um aumento da migração.

Isso ajuda a explicar por que o governo de Joe Biden adotou cautela em relação a novas sanções e a estratégia de Lula e Petro, que prioriza manter as relações com Maduro para garantir futuramente cooperação em migração e segurança.

Divergências até agora dificultaram uma resposta regional à crise. No entanto, ainda há tempo para corrigir o curso. A Assembleia-Geral da ONU seria uma oportunidade para a região falar com uma só voz e estabelecer uma estratégia coerente e pragmática para lidar com os efeitos da crise.

EVOLUÇÃO. Isso poderia conter os piores instintos de Maduro, proteger a oposição e ajudar a mitigar a repressão, motor da migração. Independentemente de como a crise evolua, a cooperação regional será essencial para defender os direitos humanos, dentro e fora da Venezuela, e responder aos desafios da migração. Os governos têm a chance de tomar medidas práticas para facilitar o compartilhamento de informações, a operabilidade dos sistemas de documentação de migrantes e a coordenação da aplicação da lei.

Nenhum ator externo pode provocar uma transição democrática na Venezuela. Mas a região ainda pode tomar medidas para defender a democracia - ainda que simbolicamente e com uma visão de longo prazo -, enquanto trabalha para mitigar os efeitos externos e internos. @
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A América Latina pode tomar medidas para defender a democracia na Venezuela

 

 

quarta-feira, 26 de julho de 2023

O antiamericanismo de Lula já está comprovado: o resto decorre mais disso do que de outros fatores - Brian Winter, Nelson de Sá (Americas Quarterly, FSP)

 Is Lula anti-American?


It’s the question in Washington that won’t go away: “Is Lula anti-American?” Since returning to Brazil’s presidency on January 1, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has repeatedly caused alarm in the U.S. capital and elsewhere with his comments on Ukraine, Venezuela, the dollar and other key issues. An unconfirmed GloboNews report in June said President Joe Biden may have abandoned any intentions of visiting Brasilia before the end of the year because of frustration with Lula’s positions.    

The question causes many to roll their eyes, and with good reason. Three decades after the end of the Cold War, some in the United States continue to see Latin America in “You’re either with us or against us” terms. Washington has a long record of getting upset with Brazil’s independent stances on everything from generic AIDS drugs in the 1990s to trade negotiations in the 2000s and the Edward Snowden affair in the 2010s. A large Latin American country confidently operating in its own national interest, neither allied with nor totally against the United States, simply does not compute for some in Washington, and maybe it never will.   

That said, there is a long list of reasonable people in places like the White House and State Department, in think tanks and in the business world who are perfectly capable of understanding nuance — and have still perceived a threat from Lula’s foreign policy in this, his third term. The list of perceived transgressions is long and growing: Lula has repeatedly echoed Russian positions on Ukraine, saying both countries share equal responsibility for the war. In April, Lula said blame for continued hostilities laid “above all” with countries who are providing arms—a slap at the United States and Europe, delivered while on a trip to China, no less. Lula has worked to revive the defunct UNASUR bloc, whose explicit purpose was to counter U.S. influence in South America. He has repeatedly urged countries to shun the U.S. dollar as a mechanism for trade when possible, voicing support for new alternatives including a common currency with Argentina or its other neighbors. Lula has been bitterly critical of U.S. sanctions against Venezuela–”worse than a war,” he has said—while downplaying the repression, torture and other human rights abuses committed by the dictatorship itself.    

For some observers, the inescapable conclusion is that Lula’s foreign policy is not neutral or “non-aligned,” but overtly friendly to Russia and China and hostile to the United States. This has been a particular letdown for many in the Democratic Party who briefly saw Lula as a hero of democracy and natural ally after he, too, defeated an authoritarian, election-denying menace on the far right. And for the record, it’s not just Americans who feel this way: the left-leaning French newspaper Liberation, in a front-page editorial prior to Lula’s visit to Paris in June, called him a “faux friend” of the West.  

To paraphrase the old saying, it’s impossible to know what truly lurks in the hearts of men. But as someone who has tried to understand Lula for the past 20 years, with admittedly mixed results, let me give my best evaluation of what’s really happening: Lula may not be anti-U.S. in the traditional sense, but he is definitely anti-U.S. hegemony, and he is more willing than before to do something about it.  

That is, Lula and his foreign policy team do not wish ill on Washington in the way that Nicolás Maduro or Vladimir Putin do, and in fact they see the United States as a critical partner on issues like climate change, energy and infrastructure investment. But they also believe the U.S.-led global order of the last 30 years has on balance not been good for Brazil or, indeed, the planet as a whole. They are convinced the world is headed toward a new, more equitable “multipolar” era in which, instead of one country at the head of the table, there will be, say, eight countries seated at a round table—and Brazil will be one of them, along with China, India and others from the ascendant Global South. Meanwhile, Lula has lost some of the inhibitions and brakes that held him back a bit during his 2003-10 presidency, and he is actively out there trying to usher the world along to this promising new phase—with an evident enthusiasm and militancy that bothers many in the West, and understandably so. 

“A new geopolitics” 

In private and in public, Lula’s allies vigorously reject the idea that he is anti-American — highlighting that he visited Washington within six weeks of taking office, and had a, by all accounts, friendly meeting with Biden. If the delegation Lula took to China two months later was far bigger and more ambitious, as many have pointed out, well, that’s realpolitik: China was offering Brazil much more in terms of investment and support, and now buys three times as many Brazilian exports as the United States. Lula was never going to continue the nearly automatic U.S. alignment that characterized much (though not all) of Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency. But he has a long record of pragmatic and often friendly engagement, including an apparently genuine personal bond with George W. Bush during his first presidency. When I met Lula’s top foreign policy adviser Celso Amorim in São Paulo last year for an otherwise off-record conversation, Amorim paused and emphatically told me: “This you can publish: It is in the interest of Brazil to have a positive relationship with the United States. No doubt.”   

The idea that the world would benefit from a more multipolar order, and that Brazil should “actively and assertively” push in that direction, has been a mainstream tenet of its foreign policy for many years (thanks in part to Amorim, who was foreign minister the first time in the early 1990s). Brazil’s long, fruitless pursuit of a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, for example, is seen across the political spectrum as a sign that greater influence will have to be pried from the United States and Western Europe rather than politely requested. In that vein, Lula’s lobbying for peace in Ukraine can be understood not as instinctively anti-Western, but expressive of the doctrine that the world’s sixth-most populous nation should elbow its way if necessary into major issues of the day, as it did (or tried to do) during Lula’s first presidency on subjects like Iran’s nuclear ambitions, Mideast peace and Doha trade talks.  

The problem, from the Western point of view, is that Lula and Amorim seem to think it’s not enough for Brazil to simply build itself up on the world stage. Rather, they seem to believe that, for the Global South to rise, Brazil should work to actively tear down, or at least weaken, the pillars of the U.S.-led order of recent decades. 

The clearest evidence of this is probably not Lula’s stance on Ukraine or Venezuela, which have received the most attention, but his tireless advocacy for countries to abandon the U.S. dollar. “Every night I ask myself why all countries are obligated to do their trade tied to the dollar,” Lula said to applause during his trip to China. “Who was it who decided ‘I want the dollar’ after the gold standard ended?” He expressed similar sentiments when he hosted Venezuela’s dictator in May, and touted the idea of a common BRICS currency. It is worth noting that Brazil does not have a dollar scarcity problem; rather, it has vast reserves, meaning Lula’s advocacy can only be understood as part of a larger geopolitical project. Meanwhile, Lula focused his recent summit of South American leaders on a proposal to reestablish UNASUR, which was founded in the 2000s as a counterweight to the Washington-based Organization of American States (and later unraveled when it became too blindly leftist for most of its members). Brazil’s position on Ukraine is more complex—but Lula’s rhetoric, and cultivation of warm ties with Moscow more generally, has often seemed rooted in a desire to chip away at NATO, perhaps the ultimate symbol of the postwar order. 

“Our interests with regard to China are not just commercial,” Lula said in Beijing. “We’re interested in building a new geopolitics so that we can change global governance, giving more representativity to the United Nations.”  

Of course, these are valid strategic choices, and Brazil is hardly alone in these views. Lula and Amorim may in fact believe that Brazil’s future lies more with its BRICS partners than with a country where bombing Mexico has become a mainstream foreign policy idea in one of the two major parties. Similarly, it is easy to understand why the broader notion of a repressed Global South finally throwing off the shackles of domination by wealthy, formerly colonialist powers appeals to someone who sees the world primarily through the lens of class struggle, as Lula does. At age 77, and after his experience in prison, Lula may be past the point of biting his tongue and sense now is the time to move decisively on a variety of causes he has spent a lifetime pursuing. (Amorim, for the record, is 81.)  

But there can be no doubt that the last six months have put Lula at odds with another cherished tenet of Brazilian foreign policy: The idea that Brazil can essentially be friends with everybody. The tone in Paris, Berlin, Brussels and Washington has been less one of anger, and more of surprise and disappointment among people who were deeply predisposed to embrace Lula, and Brazil more broadly, in the wake of the shambolic Bolsonaro years. Many have wondered, fairly, why Lula is so intent on bolstering the influence of dictatorships whose values don’t match his own 40-year record defending democracy in Brazil. Whether his actions have ultimately brought Brazil closer to its dream of greater global relevance, or more distant, is the biggest question of all, and will depend on what exactly happens next.  

A rocky road ahead 

There have been signs in recent weeks that Lula may be pivoting to a different approach. “I don’t want to get involved in the war of Ukraine and Russia,” he said on July 6. “My war is here, against hunger, poverty and unemployment.” This possible shift, if it holds, may be driven not by the Western backlash, but domestic opinion; recent polling suggests Lula’s foreign policy may be dragging on his overall approval rating in a country where, outside the left, most people have positive views of the United States and the West. But it is also unrealistic to expect a major change without a wholesale reshuffling of Lula’s foreign policy team—which almost no one in Brasilia expects to happen.  

That means Washington must figure out how to cope. Some voices have urged confrontation, saying Washington should warn Brasilia that U.S. investment and other areas of cooperation will suffer without a change in tack. History shows that approach is almost certain to backfire, but it may gain more adherents as the 2024 election draws closer and Republicans seek to burnish their “anti-communist” credentials. (Lula is a capitalist, by the way, but that’s another column.) The Biden administration, wisely, has chosen a more mixed strategy; firmly pushing back against Brazil when necessary, but also trying to acknowledge its ambitions. Sources told me that during their February meeting, Biden told Lula he sees Brazil “not as a regional power, but a global power” —a comment that brought a vigorous nod from the Brazilian leader. Whether Washington can figure out a way to make that vision a reality, in a way that doesn’t undermine its own interests or the democratic order more broadly, remains unclear. 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Winter is the editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly and a seasoned analyst of Latin American politics, with more than 20 years following the region’s ups and downs.


EUA cercam diplomaticamente o “antiamericanismo “ de Lula

EUA cercam diplomaticamente o 'antiamericano' Lula
Visita de Victoria Nuland, nomeação de Elliott Abrams e artigos de organizações de política externa se voltam para o Brasil

A subsecretária de Estado dos EUA, Victoria Nuland, encontrou-se em Brasília com o assessor especial de Lula, Celso Amorim, "para aprofundar nossa cooperação em questões globais vitais" (abaixo). Segundo ela, "a relação EUA-Brasil segue forte graças ao nosso compromisso compartilhado com a democracia", entre outras razões.

Semanas antes, como noticiou a CNN, entre críticas da MSNBC ao Guardian, o diplomata Elliott Abrams foi nomeado por Joe Biden para sua Comissão sobre Diplomacia Pública. Ele é lembrado por passagens como a "campanha para trocar" o governo venezuelano, o escândalo Irã-Contras e "o maior assassinato em massa na história recente da América Latina", em El Salvador.

Abrams estava no Council on Foreign Relations, organização influente na política externa americana, e seu texto mais recente destacou que Lula não recebeu o presidente do Irã, em visita à região: "Será que Lula enfrentou reação forte o suficiente, ao seu abraço em Nicolás Maduro, para persuadi-lo de que a visita era muito arriscada?".

Na revista do CFR, Foreign Affairs, o brasileiro Matias Spektor, ligado à FGV e à organização Carnegie, publicou o artigo "O lado bom da hipocrisia ocidental" ou, mais precisamente, americana. Defende que "a hipocrisia ocidental pode ser benéfica" e "a alternativa –um mundo em que as potências nem se preocupam em justificar suas ações com valores morais– seria mais prejudicial".

Em suma, "o Sul Global deve reconhecer que crítica demais à hipocrisia pode colocar em risco a cooperação internacional ao gerar cinismo".

De sua parte, a Americas Society/Council of the Americas publicou na Americas Quarterly o artigo "Lula é antiamericano?". Brian Winter, vice da organização, escreve que "Lula e Amorim parecem acreditar que, para que o Sul Global se erga, o Brasil deve trabalhar para derrubar ou enfraquecer os pilares da ordem liderada pelos EUA".

Para ele, "a evidência mais clara é a incansável defesa de que os países abandonem o dólar". Por outro lado, "não é realista esperar grande mudança sem a reformulação total da equipe de política externa de Lula —o que quase ninguém em Brasília espera que aconteça. Isso significa que Washington precisa descobrir como lidar com a situação".
(...)

quinta-feira, 23 de março de 2023

Brazil’s Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira on the “Lula Doctrine” - Brian Winter (Americas Quarterly)

 Brazil

Q&A: Brazil’s Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira on the “Lula Doctrine”

An exclusive interview with Brazil’s top diplomat, on the relationship with China, the U.S., the need for multilateral reform, and more.
Brazil's Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira gives a statement in Asunción, Paraguay on March 9, 2023.Norberto Duarte/AFP via Getty Images
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Reading Time: 9 minutes

This article is a preview of Americas Quarterly’s upcoming special report, “What Lula Means for Latin America,” to be published in April. (Ler em português)

BRASILIA — “Brazil is back,” declared President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva at an international conference shortly after his election. But what does that mean in practice for its relationships with the rest of Latin America, how it navigates the growing competition between China and the United States, and key flashpoints like the Ukraine war, Venezuela and Nicaragua?

Some of the answers will sound familiar to those who remember Lula’s first presidency, from 2003-10. But a lot since then has changed, both in Brazil and the world, which will lead to differences in foreign policy, Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira explained in an interview with AQ.  

“Twenty years ago, China’s growth was visible, but now it is a superpower, without a doubt,” Vieira said. “In less than 20 years, China has become Brazil’s main trading partner—and not just Brazil, but many Latin American countries. So that changed the scenario a lot, and geopolitics have changed.”

This interview took place in Portuguese via Zoom on March 13. It has been translated to English and lightly edited for clarity and content.

Brian Winter: This may be a very American question, but here in the United States, we always talk about presidents’ doctrines – the Biden doctrine, the Bush doctrine. Is there a Lula doctrine?

Minister Mauro Vieira: I’d say the Lula doctrine is one of restoring Brazil’s image and its relationships—not just with our Latin American neighbors, but also restoring Brazil’s presence in the world, on all the different kinds of world stages, be they bilateral or multilateral. In the past four years, Brazil halted its diplomatic tradition of being a country that is open to all interlocutors, regardless of their ideological positions, and of maintaining contact, and negotiating and talking. I think that if there is a doctrine, that is it.

President Lula gave me very specific instructions. He gave a very powerful, very important speech during the Sharm el-Sheikh Climate Change Conference, where he said that “Brazil is back.” After he appointed me and after he took office, he said repeatedly that this is what matters most, that it should be known that Brazil is back to its diplomatic tradition. He told me to rebuild all the bridges and all channels of communication that had been destroyed.

BW: The world has changed a lot in the past 20 years since Lula’s first term. What are the most important differences between his foreign policy then and now?

MV: At the time, his foreign policy was referred to as ativa e altiva (active and assertive). That’s a phrase coined by the former Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, for whom I worked as chief of staff, and who represented very well this style of foreign policy in the first eight Lula years.

Of course, the world has changed a lot, in all ways, including media—information travels much more quickly—and geopolitics have also changed. Twenty years ago, China’s growth was visible, but now it is a superpower, without a doubt. In less than 20 years, China has become Brazil’s main trading partner—and not just Brazil, but many Latin American countries. So that changed the scenario a lot, and geopolitics have changed.

Now we have a war going on in Europe. And I think that global governance has also changed, because multilateral organizations, whether political or commercial, are very weakened, and they have lost their ability to act. From a commercial point of view, the World Trade Organization is paralyzed; it has lost relevance. And, at the same time, the situation of the United Nations is also worrying because we are witnessing the paralysis of its main body aimed at maintaining peace and security, which is the Security Council. The Security Council, with its 1945 format, is no longer reflected in today’s reality. And we are facing a major crisis in which its mechanisms, methods and composition do not allow the United Nations to play the fundamental role it should have—as Brazil’s argues it should, and as it did in the past.

Today there is a certain paralysis, to the detriment of world peace, to the detriment of better governance. So I think those are the big changes. And that’s where Brazil and President Lula’s foreign policy want to be active again, in promoting a discussion on global governance as well.

BW: The world has changed a lot. Brazil has also changed, especially in the last four years, as you mentioned. How do you see the efforts to restore Brazilian democracy following the events of recent months, especially the January 8 attacks in Brasilia? And these episodes, which represented an authoritarian risk for the country, similar to what we face here in the United States, do they have any point of intersection with Brazilian foreign policy? Or are they separate themes?

MV: Look, the issue of democracy in Brazil… I think that since 1964, when there was a break in the democratic order, which took 21 years [for democracy to be restored]… I think that with the restoration of democracy in Brazil and with the promulgation of the [1988] Constitution, we launched a young democracy, but a solid one, with solid instruments, dictated by the Constitution.

The events of January 8 were the result of clashes that have taken place in Brazilian society in recent years, since 2016, with the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff and then, in 2018, with the election of the last government, which represented a huge shift to the right. That changed Brazil’s position in terms of foreign policy, but it also changed domestic policies, emboldening a group that felt privileged and encouraged to even finance the events of January 8. I was in Brasília, and it was an unexpected and surprising event—to see that number of people, about 4000 people, arriving at the Praça dos Três Poderes [where the judicial, legislative and executive branches are located] and destroying the buildings… It is an unbelievable thing, which received not only ideological and political encouragement, but also important financial support from various sectors.

This comes from a part of Brazilian society that is not democratic and does not appreciate democratic values. There is no doubt that there was an election, that President Lula won.

So, now it’s a matter of investigating and clarifying what happened, who inspired this, who committed these highly illegal acts that could have really compromised Brazilian democracy. But I think society and the established authorities reacted quickly and everything was brought under control. On Sunday [when the attack happened], already at the beginning of the evening, everything was under control and many had been arrested. And that’s that, in short.

BW: And does this have any impact on Brazil’s foreign policy? For example, were the similarities between the risks faced by Brazil and the United States a fundamental part of President Lula’s [February 10] visit with President Biden in Washington?

MV: Undoubtedly, these are national issues, but also with repercussions on foreign policy. That night I received maybe 15 phone calls from foreign ministers from other countries, in which they expressed solidarity and support for Brazil and for Brazilian democratic institutions. Presidents Biden and Lula discussed the subject, referencing events in each country, and they made public comments on the need to strengthen democracies around the world.

I think that big countries like the United States, Brazil and others, can play an important role in the dissemination of democratic values and in reinforcing the importance of maintaining democracy and highlighting the gains of democracy. In the case of Brazil, it was thanks to the restoration of democracy since the promulgation of the Constitution of 1988 that we’ve had progressive governments, such as that of President Lula, which created conditions for economic growth and which benefited the population, lifting millions of people out of poverty, creating housing for people in need, healthcare systems and everything else.

This only happens in a democracy. Hence the importance of defending democracy, and any initiative to defend democracy internationally is very valid, because this way countries can develop and grow.

BW: Does the relative silence of the Lula government about dictatorships in Latin America, such as Nicaragua and Venezuela, in any way contradict this appreciation for democracy?

MV: No, because there is no silence.

The first time that there has been some movement on Nicaragua in the international scene inside a multilateral organization was in Geneva, at the Human Rights Council. [Editor’s note: On March 9, 54 countries including the United States, Chile, Peru and Colombia signed a statement urging the Ortega government to “release all political prisoners” and condemning the regime’s recent decision to revoke the citizenship of more than 300 Nicaraguans.] Brazil did not support [the statement], on the contrary. We wanted to make a separate statement, independent of that made by that group of nations. Because we wanted to make clear our position that there need to be changes, there need to be adjustments. Brazil wanted to first appeal to the multilateral mechanisms that are there and then discuss and exhaust all options before any other stronger measure, such as, for example, the adoption of sanctions, an element that was suggested throughout the debates.

That was the element that made us publish a separate declaration, referring to the need for dialogue with the [Ortega] government and relevant actors from Nicaraguan society. Unilateral sanctions, a measure many countries adopt, are illegal for Brazil. We can only apply sanctions that have been approved by the Security Council of the United Nations. So we could not, in principle, support a statement that didn’t make a reference to dialogue as a first step. And as it was the first opportunity [to debate this subject] in a multilateral forum, which is an institution that has the mechanisms to correct these points, and this was the first time that this discussion took place since President Lula took office, two and a half months ago, we wanted to make our position very clear.

BW: Does Brazil and the president have a role in possible peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia?

MV: Look, President Lula has said this countless times… There is a lot of talk about Lula’s proposal… He didn’t make a concrete proposal, with goals to follow to reach peace. What he said is that he keeps hearing about war, about large amounts of resources being allocated for the purchase of arms, about destruction and death, and he doesn’t hear about peace. What he wants and what he has done is to call for us to start discussing, in some way, peace.

This is what is important, in the face of all the victims, all the destruction wreaked in the country. He also condemned the invasion of Ukraine, and commented on the worldwide effects of inflation, a threat to food security, the risk of this war lasting for many years, or even getting out of control, in a world where weapons are increasingly destructive and more lethal. So, it is with all this concern that he has made and will continue to make, calls for a sit-down, because we are absolutely convinced that it is not in the interest of either party to continue with this sad and deplorable war, without at least trying to find a negotiated solution.

Brazil is a pacifist country … that’s our diplomatic DNA. That’s what the president wants to tell the world.

BW: Many countries, especially in the global south, are adopting the idea, or the doctrine, of “active non-alignment” as a strategy for dealing with the growing competition between the United States and China. Ambassador Amorim, whom you mentioned, even wrote a chapter for a recent book on this idea. Does this concept basically summarize the Brazilian position on this issue?

MV: Yes, we don’t have an automatic alignment to either side. We have, on the contrary, excellent relations with the United States — in fact, next year we will celebrate 200 years of diplomatic relations with ambassadors in each country. And we also have important relations with China. What guides us is the national interest within a framework of multilateralism, of international law. Automatic alignments do not bring positive results and results that are beneficial to the national interest. There can be losses when there is an automatic and unjustifiable alignment. In fact, as there was during the last four years.

Brazilian Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira is focused on regional integration and met with Uruguay's foreign minister in March.
Brazil’s Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira (R) meets with his counterpart from Uruguay Francisco Bustillo at Itamaraty Palace in Brasilia on March 7, 2023. 
Photo by Evaristo Sa/AFP via Getty Images.

BW: There is a lot of talk about Latin American integration right now. There is ideological alignment between many governments in the region, but there is skepticism among some as to whether these ideas will translate into practical decisions, aside from meetings and the existence of blocs like CELAC and Unasur. Is there a concrete, practical agenda when it comes to regional integration? And what are the most important opportunities?

MV: There is no doubt that integration is a serious goal. In fact, Latin American integration is even in the Brazilian Constitution. And there are concrete examples, very concrete ones. The president visited Argentina and Uruguay. I just came back from Paraguay. President Lula will soon have a meeting with the president of Paraguay. These are the original partners of Mercosur. In these three cases, very specific measures and projects were agreed upon, pertaining to physical integration, for example, which is fundamental. We’ll soon announce them.

And these are projects that will benefit the road and rail infrastructure and river navigation in these countries, which will also have an immediate impact on trade: it lowers costs, it provides more security. It’s not just rhetoric. These are not projects that are starting now. We’re finalizing them, we put the final touches on them, and they are going to be implemented soon. And there are many others that could come.

CELAC is a place, it is a stage for discussions that can lead to concrete things. In addition, President Lula wants to review and update Unasur, which was indeed, differently from CELAC, a strong body, with concrete integration initiatives in many areas and which unfortunately was abandoned, but which we want to adapt and update, because it is also not the same world anymore. Mercosur integration translated to exponential growth in trade between our countries. Today we have important and significant trade for our economies, and without Mercosur, without an integration project, that would not happen.

BW: I mentioned this ideological alignment. Most governments, especially in South America, are left-wing, for all their differences. But it is possible that we will see a change of government in Argentina this year, for example. Is this ideological alignment important for Latin American relations, or is its importance overestimated?

MV: Look, the important thing is the national interest—and above all, the decisions of each country regarding integration with its neighbors. We cannot, under any circumstances, stop talking to any country, even more so to those with which we share a border. You know very well, as a Brazilianist, that we share 10 large borders with countries in the region. We cannot stop talking because this or that government has this or that ideological orientation. This is something that will not happen during President Lula’s government and that did not exist in Brazilian diplomatic tradition.

We will always talk to everyone. Regardless of ideological orientation. The national interest is above any difference of political position. So that’s what I can say, that’s what’s relevant, that’s what counts.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Brian Winter is the editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly and one of Latin America’s most influential political analysts, with more than 20 years following the region’s ups and downs.


Tags: Brazil,  Brazil's foreign policy,  Lula