Trump will be more disruptive than some currently expect – especially on Mexico - Brian Winter (Foreign Affairs)

 Dear friends,

For Foreign Affairs, I spoke to about two dozen people, including officials in Donald Trump’s first administration, to anticipate what his return might mean for Latin America.

My takeaway: I believe the president-elect will be more disruptive than some currently expect – especially on Mexico.

There are also clear (and realistic) opportunities for greater investment, and a growing group of leaders in the region who will welcome his return.

All feedback welcome as always.

Abrazo

Brian 

 

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/guest-pass/redeem/gkNtnMeZQMo

 

Latin America Is About to Become a Priority for U.S. Foreign Policy

Trump Will Disrupt Three Decades of “Benign Neglect”

 

By Brian Winter

December 10, 2024

 

• BRIAN WINTER is Editor in Chief of Americas Quarterly.

 

While traveling throughout Latin America in recent years, visitors heard the same refrain: Washington isn’t paying enough attention to the region. Business leaders, academics, and politicians on both the left and the right agreed that the United States lacked a clear strategy for engagement and was losing influence and economic opportunities, especially to China. Such talk is hardly new. A 1973 article in Foreign Affairs warned that “the United States has no Latin American policy, save one of benign neglect.” But these laments seemed to reach a crescendo during the Biden administration, which was seen as too focused on the United States’ growing rivalry with Beijing and the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East to devote even minimal bandwidth to its southern neighbors.

 

As the old adage goes, be careful what you wish for. Donald Trump’s second presidency seems destined to focus more attention on Latin America than any U.S. administration in perhaps 30 years, including the incoming president’s first term. The reason is straightforward: Trump’s top domestic priorities of cracking down on unauthorized immigration, stopping the smuggling of fentanyl and other illicit drugs, and reducing the influx of Chinese goods into the United States all depend heavily on policy toward Latin America. His stronger-than-expected electoral mandate (winning the popular vote plus control of both houses of Congress) coupled with a substantial increase in the flows of migrants and narcotics since he first occupied the White House mean that Trump will be even more emboldened than before to pressure Latin American governments to help achieve his goals. He will resort if necessary to punitive measures including tariffs, sanctions, and perhaps limited military action, such as drone strikes against Mexican cartels, to try to get his way.

 

Trump’s heightened interest in the region will be welcomed by fellow conservatives, such as Argentine President Javier Milei, El Salvadorian President Nayib Bukele, and others at a time when the ideological right appears to be ascendant throughout much of Latin America. The appointment of U.S. Senator Marco Rubio as secretary of state, if confirmed by the Senate, would not only elevate a son of Cuban immigrants and fluent Spanish speaker but also make him probably the most well-traveled and connected official on Latin American issues to serve at such a high level in Washington since Nelson Rockefeller was vice president under President Gerald Ford in the 1970s. Trump and Rubio’s approach could, over time, bring new and unexpected opportunities for economic integration and investment to Latin American countries the administration perceives as cooperative and friendly.

 

But especially in the short term, Trump’s policies toward the region are likely to be highly disruptive—and could risk pushing key Latin American countries further away from Washington rather than reversing the drift of recent years. Mexico faces the biggest challenges, including the possibility of severe damage to trade with the United States, the destination of more than 80 percent of its exports, unless it meets Trump’s demands to help secure the countries’ 2,000-mile-long shared border. Trump’s recent threats to implement a 25 percent tariff on Mexico upon taking office were only the start of a protracted and tense negotiation that no one should assume is a bluff. Indeed, Mexico is not alone. Other countries, stretching from Guatemala to Colombia, will also face tariffs or other sanctions unless they are seen to be halting the northward flow of migrants through the Darien Gap and other key transit points and taking back citizens swept up in Trump’s promised mass deportations. A second Trump administration will try to pressure Latin American governments including Brazil, Panama, and Peru to stop accepting Chinese investment for sensitive projects such as ports, electric grids, and 5G telecommunications networks. Many Republicans perceive these linkages, and the growing Chinese presence in Latin America more broadly, as unacceptable violations of the Monroe Doctrine, the 201-year-old edict that the Western Hemisphere should be free of interference from outside powers, an idea that has enjoyed a certain revival among Republicans in today’s era of heightened great-power competition.

 

Whether Trump’s policies toward the region result in a widespread backlash, a series of quiet accommodations, or an era of stronger U.S.-Latin American ties will depend on several factors. Some of them, such as the crises driving record migration in recent years from several countries across the region, will be largely beyond the president-elect’s control. The biggest question, some Republican officials say, is whether Trump comes to see Latin America as not just a source of the United States’ biggest problems but also a potential solution to them.

 

HEADING SOUTH

 

It is fair to note that many of the most dire prophecies about Trump’s first term in Latin America failed to come true. After Trump launched his 2016 presidential campaign by accusing Mexico of sending rapists to the United States, threatening to withdraw from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and promising to make Mexico pay for a new border wall, some predicted that he would take a hostile approach not just to Mexico but also to the entire region.

 

His policies proved to be more nuanced. Despite clear ideological differences between Trump and former Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, a leftist, the two leaders managed to forge a relationship that was transactional and ultimately respectful. As long as López Obrador cooperated on migration issues—by ordering Mexican troops to stop northward bound migrants before they reached the U.S. border, for example—Trump left Mexico alone to pursue its domestic agenda without interference or even much commentary. The two countries approved a new trade deal with Canada, known as the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), that even some free-market advocates saw as an improvement on its predecessor NAFTA due to its enhanced protections for intellectual property and labor rights. Elsewhere, Trump established cordial relationships with several like-minded Latin American leaders, helping secure a $57 billion International Monetary Fund loan package—the largest in the history of the Washington-based lender—for his longtime friend President Mauricio Macri of Argentina. Most of Trump’s vitriol and ire was focused on the socialist dictatorships of Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, which he targeted with sanctions and other policies that enjoyed broad support elsewhere in the hemisphere at the time.

 

But the relatively benign outcomes of Trump’s first term in Latin America may now be breeding a certain complacency about his second. U.S.-Mexican ties were salvaged during his first term only after Mexican officials secured repeated last-minute interventions from sympathetic interlocutors in the White House, including Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner and his former chief of staff John Kelly, who helped convince the president not to unilaterally close the border or withdraw from NAFTA, according to accounts at the time. Those moderating voices may be absent or at least outnumbered in a second term, overshadowed by more hawkish officials such as incoming national security adviser Mike Waltz, a Florida congressman who introduced legislation in 2023 seeking to authorize U.S. military force against Mexican cartels. Waltz has said that the legislation would not include the deployment of U.S. troops on Mexican soil, but it would allow the use of drones, cyberwarfare, “intelligence assets [and] naval assets” to target organized crime groups. The incoming vice president, JD Vance, a Marine Corps veteran, also voiced support during the campaign for sending the U.S. military to “do battle with the Mexican drug cartels,” an idea that has become much more widely accepted in Republican circles since Trump’s first term.

 

There is no doubt that the issues of drug trafficking and migration along the border have become more urgent. Although overdose deaths in the United States fell slightly in 2023 to about 107,000 people, that number is still about 70 percent higher than when Trump first took office in 2017. About three-quarters of the fatalities were caused by fentanyl, which U.S. officials say comes mostly from Mexico. The number of unauthorized migrant crossings detected at the U.S.-Mexican border tripled under Biden’s watch, according to U.S. Customs and Border Protection data, although migration has sharply declined in recent months after Biden implemented more stringent controls prior to the November election. Meanwhile, bilateral trade has also evolved in a way not to Trump’s liking, with the United States running a record trade deficit with Mexico of $152 billion in 2023. Throughout his campaign, Trump described tariffs on Mexico not just as a tool to secure greater cooperation on migration but also as a necessary step to protect U.S. manufacturing, suggesting that he might implement duties of 100 percent or higher on Mexican-made vehicles.

 

Officials in both countries know that Trump is a dealmaker, and some believe the conduct of his presidency will ultimately be less harsh than his rhetoric. New tariffs on Mexico would damage the U.S. economy as well, given how deeply supply chains have become intertwined over the last 30 years, and they risk a resurgence of the inflation that drove many Americans to vote for Trump this year. Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum, a protégé of López Obrador who took office in October, will likely be able to satisfy some of Trump’s demands, including receiving migrants from third-party countries as they await entry to the United States. Trump sounded pleased in public remarks regarding a large seizure of fentanyl by authorities in Mexico in early December, days after he made a particularly dramatic tariff threat.

 

Nevertheless, Mexican officials fear that difficult times are still ahead. Trump has repeatedly cast Mexico as a source of the United States’ biggest problems, and he often sounded during the 2024 campaign as if he believed a fundamental split between the countries would bring jobs back to the United States and other benefits for his working-class base. It’s also unclear whether Mexico has the resources or the political will to fully secure the vast border or to confront organized crime groups that have grown even more powerful in recent years and that by some estimates now control as much as one-third of Mexico’s territory. (Mexico’s government strongly rejects such estimates.) As fate would have it, the USMCA is set for a previously scheduled review by its three members in 2026. Some close to Trump say he never liked the deal in the first place, viewing it as a first-term concession to business interests, whose support will be less critical now that he is not seeking reelection. Mexico’s recent decisions to replace its judiciary through direct elections and move toward abolishing autonomous regulatory agencies may violate the USMCA’s terms, making it even easier for Trump to try to overhaul its provisions—or simply walk away.

 

TOUGHENING UP

 

Mexico certainly won’t be the only country facing intensified pressure. During Trump’s first term, migrants came largely from Mexico and the so-called Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. More recently, the profile has been much more diverse, with record outflows from Cuba, Haiti, and Venezuela, as well as from Ecuador, Peru, and other countries in the region struggling with organized crime and economic stagnation. Just as many Latin American officials complained in recent decades about a narcotización of their relationships with the United States, as narcotics dominated all other subjects, regional ties may see a migratización in coming years, with tariffs and other punishments doled out to governments perceived as failing to stop the flow of migrants northward.

 

The leftist dictatorships in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela will also receive tougher treatment, although it’s unclear how much attention Trump will devote to them. During his first term, Trump adopted a “maximum pressure” strategy of sanctions against Venezuela and its dictator Nicolás Maduro, recognizing the opposition figure Juan Guaidó as the country’s legitimate president—a decision supported by numerous other Latin American governments, as well as by Canada and the European Union. The strategy ultimately failed to dislodge Maduro, however, and sanctions only deepened Venezuela’s economic crisis, contributing to an even greater exodus of Venezuelan migrants to the United States and elsewhere in the region. The Biden administration tried negotiating with Maduro’s regime, only to see it resort to massive fraud in July presidential elections and lock up yet another round of political opponents. Trump will almost certainly return to a more adversarial approach toward all three dictatorships, which are particularly important causes for Rubio and others among Trump’s Florida-heavy team of advisers. Yet there appears to be a split between those who believe the regimes are “weak and teetering,” as Florida Representative Mario Díaz-Balart recently contended, and other Republicans who, burned by the experience of Trump’s first term, argue that major new sanctions and other pressure tactics would stand little chance of restoring democracy and risk unleashing yet another large wave of outward migration.

 

Indeed, Trump and his team may save their energy for what they see as the larger threat: China. Latin America’s trade with China has exploded from $18 billion in 2002 to $480 billion in 2023, and Beijing has increasingly become a key investor in infrastructure projects including ports, public transportation, and electric grids. No one on Trump’s team believes the new administration can convince Latin American countries to turn their backs on Beijing entirely, but officials do plan to be more aggressive in trying to keep the Chinese away from the most sensitive civilian and military assets in the region, which they see as a matter of national security.

 

For example, Trump’s former top Latin America aide, Mauricio Claver-Carone, recently proposed applying a 60 percent tariff on any imports to the United States that have passed through Peru’s massive new port of Chancay, which was built by China at a cost of $1.3 billion. Claver-Carone called his proposal a “shot across the bow” meant to deter any country in Latin America from accepting Chinese investment in critical infrastructure. Trump officials have also deemed Huawei, the Chinese telecommunications provider, and Chinese companies that produce electric vehicles in Mexico to be strategic threats. It’s unclear how governments around the region will react to such pressure, since ties with China often have little to do with ideology—even Milei, the first foreign leader to meet with Trump after his election, is reportedly now considering a visit to Beijing in early 2025. Attempts at pressure could backfire and convince some countries, including Brazil and Colombia, to deepen their ties with Beijing and other nonaligned groups such as BRICS, the partnership whose first members were Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.

 

THE CHINA FACTOR

 

Perhaps ironically, some Trump backers believe that the United States’ competition with China may ultimately be what compels the president-elect to pursue a more constructive relationship with Latin America. If Trump is truly intent on reducing Chinese imports, the theory goes, he may see allied countries in the Western Hemisphere as alternative sources of cheap labor that would help strengthen the U.S. supply chain. The growth of near-shoring, which accelerated under the Biden administration, could also boost the economies of the region—and, over time, give potential migrants a reason to stay home. In a July essay for Americas Quarterly, Claver-Carone cited “the inextricable link between U.S. national security and mutual economic growth” in the hemisphere and proposed using the Development Finance Corporation and other U.S. agencies to finance investments and “Make the Americas Grow Again.”

 

It is unclear whether Trump, once in office, will come to see Latin America as more of an opportunity than a threat. But such integration-minded proposals and other parts of the Trump agenda would win considerable support in a region eager for economic growth and greater engagement with Washington. Even Trump’s immigration and deportation policies may find sympathy at a time when the likes of Argentina, Chile, and Costa Rica have themselves struggled to accommodate rising migration from poorer countries. Widespread frustration over organized crime throughout the hemisphere, as well as social changes such as the spread of evangelical Christianity, mean that right-wing leaders may be favored to win upcoming elections in Chile in 2025 and Brazil and Colombia in 2026. It is entirely possible to imagine Trump working with a broad array of like-minded governments in the region to address security and other shared challenges.

 

But others sound a note of caution. The stagnation that has supposedly plagued U.S. ties with Latin America in recent years may have had less to do with a lack of bandwidth or ambition in Washington than some believe. Competing with China, for example, has been exceedingly difficult now that, for the first time since World War II, both political parties in Washington fundamentally do not believe in the benefits of free trade. Unlike China, the United States cannot order its companies to do business in Latin America and expect them to wait years for a profit—or simply to invest for geopolitical reasons. The past 30 years of U.S.-Latin American relations, seen in a different light, can be interpreted as an unglamorous but methodical construction of trade and other ties that have supported mutual economic growth, favored the strengthening of democracies, helped address challenges such as climate change, and promoted more equal relationships in the wake of the Cold War. Whether “benign neglect” will be replaced with something better during Trump’s second presidency remains to be seen.

 

 

Brian Winter

Editor-in-Chief, Americas Quarterly

Follow me at @brazilbrian

 

Brian Winter

Editor-in-Chief, Americas Quarterly

Vice President, Americas Society/Council of the Americas

680 Park Avenue - New York, NY 10065

Follow me at @brazilbrian

O antiamericanismo de Lula já está comprovado: o resto decorre mais disso do que de outros fatores - Brian Winter, Nelson de Sá (Americas Quarterly, FSP)

 Is Lula anti-American?

It’s the question in Washington that won’t go away: “Is Lula anti-American?” Since returning to Brazil’s presidency on January 1, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has repeatedly caused alarm in the U.S. capital and elsewhere with his comments on Ukraine, Venezuela, the dollar and other key issues. An unconfirmed GloboNews report in June said President Joe Biden may have abandoned any intentions of visiting Brasilia before the end of the year because of frustration with Lula’s positions.    

The question causes many to roll their eyes, and with good reason. Three decades after the end of the Cold War, some in the United States continue to see Latin America in “You’re either with us or against us” terms. Washington has a long record of getting upset with Brazil’s independent stances on everything from generic AIDS drugs in the 1990s to trade negotiations in the 2000s and the Edward Snowden affair in the 2010s. A large Latin American country confidently operating in its own national interest, neither allied with nor totally against the United States, simply does not compute for some in Washington, and maybe it never will.   

That said, there is a long list of reasonable people in places like the White House and State Department, in think tanks and in the business world who are perfectly capable of understanding nuance — and have still perceived a threat from Lula’s foreign policy in this, his third term. The list of perceived transgressions is long and growing: Lula has repeatedly echoed Russian positions on Ukraine, saying both countries share equal responsibility for the war. In April, Lula said blame for continued hostilities laid “above all” with countries who are providing arms—a slap at the United States and Europe, delivered while on a trip to China, no less. Lula has worked to revive the defunct UNASUR bloc, whose explicit purpose was to counter U.S. influence in South America. He has repeatedly urged countries to shun the U.S. dollar as a mechanism for trade when possible, voicing support for new alternatives including a common currency with Argentina or its other neighbors. Lula has been bitterly critical of U.S. sanctions against Venezuela–”worse than a war,” he has said—while downplaying the repression, torture and other human rights abuses committed by the dictatorship itself.    

For some observers, the inescapable conclusion is that Lula’s foreign policy is not neutral or “non-aligned,” but overtly friendly to Russia and China and hostile to the United States. This has been a particular letdown for many in the Democratic Party who briefly saw Lula as a hero of democracy and natural ally after he, too, defeated an authoritarian, election-denying menace on the far right. And for the record, it’s not just Americans who feel this way: the left-leaning French newspaper Liberation, in a front-page editorial prior to Lula’s visit to Paris in June, called him a “faux friend” of the West.  

To paraphrase the old saying, it’s impossible to know what truly lurks in the hearts of men. But as someone who has tried to understand Lula for the past 20 years, with admittedly mixed results, let me give my best evaluation of what’s really happening: Lula may not be anti-U.S. in the traditional sense, but he is definitely anti-U.S. hegemony, and he is more willing than before to do something about it.  

That is, Lula and his foreign policy team do not wish ill on Washington in the way that Nicolás Maduro or Vladimir Putin do, and in fact they see the United States as a critical partner on issues like climate change, energy and infrastructure investment. But they also believe the U.S.-led global order of the last 30 years has on balance not been good for Brazil or, indeed, the planet as a whole. They are convinced the world is headed toward a new, more equitable “multipolar” era in which, instead of one country at the head of the table, there will be, say, eight countries seated at a round table—and Brazil will be one of them, along with China, India and others from the ascendant Global South. Meanwhile, Lula has lost some of the inhibitions and brakes that held him back a bit during his 2003-10 presidency, and he is actively out there trying to usher the world along to this promising new phase—with an evident enthusiasm and militancy that bothers many in the West, and understandably so. 

“A new geopolitics” 

In private and in public, Lula’s allies vigorously reject the idea that he is anti-American — highlighting that he visited Washington within six weeks of taking office, and had a, by all accounts, friendly meeting with Biden. If the delegation Lula took to China two months later was far bigger and more ambitious, as many have pointed out, well, that’s realpolitik: China was offering Brazil much more in terms of investment and support, and now buys three times as many Brazilian exports as the United States. Lula was never going to continue the nearly automatic U.S. alignment that characterized much (though not all) of Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency. But he has a long record of pragmatic and often friendly engagement, including an apparently genuine personal bond with George W. Bush during his first presidency. When I met Lula’s top foreign policy adviser Celso Amorim in São Paulo last year for an otherwise off-record conversation, Amorim paused and emphatically told me: “This you can publish: It is in the interest of Brazil to have a positive relationship with the United States. No doubt.”   

The idea that the world would benefit from a more multipolar order, and that Brazil should “actively and assertively” push in that direction, has been a mainstream tenet of its foreign policy for many years (thanks in part to Amorim, who was foreign minister the first time in the early 1990s). Brazil’s long, fruitless pursuit of a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, for example, is seen across the political spectrum as a sign that greater influence will have to be pried from the United States and Western Europe rather than politely requested. In that vein, Lula’s lobbying for peace in Ukraine can be understood not as instinctively anti-Western, but expressive of the doctrine that the world’s sixth-most populous nation should elbow its way if necessary into major issues of the day, as it did (or tried to do) during Lula’s first presidency on subjects like Iran’s nuclear ambitions, Mideast peace and Doha trade talks.  

The problem, from the Western point of view, is that Lula and Amorim seem to think it’s not enough for Brazil to simply build itself up on the world stage. Rather, they seem to believe that, for the Global South to rise, Brazil should work to actively tear down, or at least weaken, the pillars of the U.S.-led order of recent decades. 

The clearest evidence of this is probably not Lula’s stance on Ukraine or Venezuela, which have received the most attention, but his tireless advocacy for countries to abandon the U.S. dollar. “Every night I ask myself why all countries are obligated to do their trade tied to the dollar,” Lula said to applause during his trip to China. “Who was it who decided ‘I want the dollar’ after the gold standard ended?” He expressed similar sentiments when he hosted Venezuela’s dictator in May, and touted the idea of a common BRICS currency. It is worth noting that Brazil does not have a dollar scarcity problem; rather, it has vast reserves, meaning Lula’s advocacy can only be understood as part of a larger geopolitical project. Meanwhile, Lula focused his recent summit of South American leaders on a proposal to reestablish UNASUR, which was founded in the 2000s as a counterweight to the Washington-based Organization of American States (and later unraveled when it became too blindly leftist for most of its members). Brazil’s position on Ukraine is more complex—but Lula’s rhetoric, and cultivation of warm ties with Moscow more generally, has often seemed rooted in a desire to chip away at NATO, perhaps the ultimate symbol of the postwar order. 

“Our interests with regard to China are not just commercial,” Lula said in Beijing. “We’re interested in building a new geopolitics so that we can change global governance, giving more representativity to the United Nations.”  

Of course, these are valid strategic choices, and Brazil is hardly alone in these views. Lula and Amorim may in fact believe that Brazil’s future lies more with its BRICS partners than with a country where bombing Mexico has become a mainstream foreign policy idea in one of the two major parties. Similarly, it is easy to understand why the broader notion of a repressed Global South finally throwing off the shackles of domination by wealthy, formerly colonialist powers appeals to someone who sees the world primarily through the lens of class struggle, as Lula does. At age 77, and after his experience in prison, Lula may be past the point of biting his tongue and sense now is the time to move decisively on a variety of causes he has spent a lifetime pursuing. (Amorim, for the record, is 81.)  

But there can be no doubt that the last six months have put Lula at odds with another cherished tenet of Brazilian foreign policy: The idea that Brazil can essentially be friends with everybody. The tone in Paris, Berlin, Brussels and Washington has been less one of anger, and more of surprise and disappointment among people who were deeply predisposed to embrace Lula, and Brazil more broadly, in the wake of the shambolic Bolsonaro years. Many have wondered, fairly, why Lula is so intent on bolstering the influence of dictatorships whose values don’t match his own 40-year record defending democracy in Brazil. Whether his actions have ultimately brought Brazil closer to its dream of greater global relevance, or more distant, is the biggest question of all, and will depend on what exactly happens next.  

A rocky road ahead 

There have been signs in recent weeks that Lula may be pivoting to a different approach. “I don’t want to get involved in the war of Ukraine and Russia,” he said on July 6. “My war is here, against hunger, poverty and unemployment.” This possible shift, if it holds, may be driven not by the Western backlash, but domestic opinion; recent polling suggests Lula’s foreign policy may be dragging on his overall approval rating in a country where, outside the left, most people have positive views of the United States and the West. But it is also unrealistic to expect a major change without a wholesale reshuffling of Lula’s foreign policy team—which almost no one in Brasilia expects to happen.  

That means Washington must figure out how to cope. Some voices have urged confrontation, saying Washington should warn Brasilia that U.S. investment and other areas of cooperation will suffer without a change in tack. History shows that approach is almost certain to backfire, but it may gain more adherents as the 2024 election draws closer and Republicans seek to burnish their “anti-communist” credentials. (Lula is a capitalist, by the way, but that’s another column.) The Biden administration, wisely, has chosen a more mixed strategy; firmly pushing back against Brazil when necessary, but also trying to acknowledge its ambitions. Sources told me that during their February meeting, Biden told Lula he sees Brazil “not as a regional power, but a global power” —a comment that brought a vigorous nod from the Brazilian leader. Whether Washington can figure out a way to make that vision a reality, in a way that doesn’t undermine its own interests or the democratic order more broadly, remains unclear. 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Winter is the editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly and a seasoned analyst of Latin American politics, with more than 20 years following the region’s ups and downs.

https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/is-lula-anti-american/

EUA cercam diplomaticamente o “antiamericanismo “ de Lula

EUA cercam diplomaticamente o 'antiamericano' Lula

Visita de Victoria Nuland, nomeação de Elliott Abrams e artigos de organizações de política externa se voltam para o Brasil

A subsecretária de Estado dos EUA, Victoria Nuland, encontrou-se em Brasília com o assessor especial de Lula, Celso Amorim, "para aprofundar nossa cooperação em questões globais vitais" (abaixo). Segundo ela, "a relação EUA-Brasil segue forte graças ao nosso compromisso compartilhado com a democracia", entre outras razões.

Semanas antes, como noticiou a CNN, entre críticas da MSNBC ao Guardian, o diplomata Elliott Abrams foi nomeado por Joe Biden para sua Comissão sobre Diplomacia Pública. Ele é lembrado por passagens como a "campanha para trocar" o governo venezuelano, o escândalo Irã-Contras e "o maior assassinato em massa na história recente da América Latina", em El Salvador.

Abrams estava no Council on Foreign Relations, organização influente na política externa americana, e seu texto mais recente destacou que Lula não recebeu o presidente do Irã, em visita à região: "Será que Lula enfrentou reação forte o suficiente, ao seu abraço em Nicolás Maduro, para persuadi-lo de que a visita era muito arriscada?".

Na revista do CFR, Foreign Affairs, o brasileiro Matias Spektor, ligado à FGV e à organização Carnegie, publicou o artigo "O lado bom da hipocrisia ocidental" ou, mais precisamente, americana. Defende que "a hipocrisia ocidental pode ser benéfica" e "a alternativa –um mundo em que as potências nem se preocupam em justificar suas ações com valores morais– seria mais prejudicial".

Em suma, "o Sul Global deve reconhecer que crítica demais à hipocrisia pode colocar em risco a cooperação internacional ao gerar cinismo".

De sua parte, a Americas Society/Council of the Americas publicou na Americas Quarterly o artigo "Lula é antiamericano?". Brian Winter, vice da organização, escreve que "Lula e Amorim parecem acreditar que, para que o Sul Global se erga, o Brasil deve trabalhar para derrubar ou enfraquecer os pilares da ordem liderada pelos EUA".

Para ele, "a evidência mais clara é a incansável defesa de que os países abandonem o dólar". Por outro lado, "não é realista esperar grande mudança sem a reformulação total da equipe de política externa de Lula —o que quase ninguém em Brasília espera que aconteça. Isso significa que Washington precisa descobrir como lidar com a situação".

(...)

https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/nelsondesa/2023/07/eua-cercam-diplomaticamente-o-antiamericano-lula.shtml

Brazil’s Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira on the “Lula Doctrine” - Brian Winter (Americas Quarterly)

 Brazil

Q&A: Brazil’s Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira on the “Lula Doctrine”

BY BRIAN WINTER
MARCH 23, 2023 

An exclusive interview with Brazil’s top diplomat, on the relationship with China, the U.S., the need for multilateral reform, and more.

Brazil's Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira gives a statement in Asunción, Paraguay on March 9, 2023.Norberto Duarte/AFP via Getty Images

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Reading Time: 9 minutes

This article is a preview of Americas Quarterly’s upcoming special report, “What Lula Means for Latin America,” to be published in April. (Ler em português)

BRASILIA — “Brazil is back,” declared President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva at an international conference shortly after his election. But what does that mean in practice for its relationships with the rest of Latin America, how it navigates the growing competition between China and the United States, and key flashpoints like the Ukraine war, Venezuela and Nicaragua?

Some of the answers will sound familiar to those who remember Lula’s first presidency, from 2003-10. But a lot since then has changed, both in Brazil and the world, which will lead to differences in foreign policy, Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira explained in an interview with AQ.  

“Twenty years ago, China’s growth was visible, but now it is a superpower, without a doubt,” Vieira said. “In less than 20 years, China has become Brazil’s main trading partner—and not just Brazil, but many Latin American countries. So that changed the scenario a lot, and geopolitics have changed.”

This interview took place in Portuguese via Zoom on March 13. It has been translated to English and lightly edited for clarity and content.

Brian Winter: This may be a very American question, but here in the United States, we always talk about presidents’ doctrines – the Biden doctrine, the Bush doctrine. Is there a Lula doctrine?

Minister Mauro Vieira: I’d say the Lula doctrine is one of restoring Brazil’s image and its relationships—not just with our Latin American neighbors, but also restoring Brazil’s presence in the world, on all the different kinds of world stages, be they bilateral or multilateral. In the past four years, Brazil halted its diplomatic tradition of being a country that is open to all interlocutors, regardless of their ideological positions, and of maintaining contact, and negotiating and talking. I think that if there is a doctrine, that is it.

President Lula gave me very specific instructions. He gave a very powerful, very important speech during the Sharm el-Sheikh Climate Change Conference, where he said that “Brazil is back.” After he appointed me and after he took office, he said repeatedly that this is what matters most, that it should be known that Brazil is back to its diplomatic tradition. He told me to rebuild all the bridges and all channels of communication that had been destroyed.

BW: The world has changed a lot in the past 20 years since Lula’s first term. What are the most important differences between his foreign policy then and now?

MV: At the time, his foreign policy was referred to as ativa e altiva (active and assertive). That’s a phrase coined by the former Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, for whom I worked as chief of staff, and who represented very well this style of foreign policy in the first eight Lula years.

Of course, the world has changed a lot, in all ways, including media—information travels much more quickly—and geopolitics have also changed. Twenty years ago, China’s growth was visible, but now it is a superpower, without a doubt. In less than 20 years, China has become Brazil’s main trading partner—and not just Brazil, but many Latin American countries. So that changed the scenario a lot, and geopolitics have changed.

Now we have a war going on in Europe. And I think that global governance has also changed, because multilateral organizations, whether political or commercial, are very weakened, and they have lost their ability to act. From a commercial point of view, the World Trade Organization is paralyzed; it has lost relevance. And, at the same time, the situation of the United Nations is also worrying because we are witnessing the paralysis of its main body aimed at maintaining peace and security, which is the Security Council. The Security Council, with its 1945 format, is no longer reflected in today’s reality. And we are facing a major crisis in which its mechanisms, methods and composition do not allow the United Nations to play the fundamental role it should have—as Brazil’s argues it should, and as it did in the past.

Today there is a certain paralysis, to the detriment of world peace, to the detriment of better governance. So I think those are the big changes. And that’s where Brazil and President Lula’s foreign policy want to be active again, in promoting a discussion on global governance as well.

BW: The world has changed a lot. Brazil has also changed, especially in the last four years, as you mentioned. How do you see the efforts to restore Brazilian democracy following the events of recent months, especially the January 8 attacks in Brasilia? And these episodes, which represented an authoritarian risk for the country, similar to what we face here in the United States, do they have any point of intersection with Brazilian foreign policy? Or are they separate themes?

MV: Look, the issue of democracy in Brazil… I think that since 1964, when there was a break in the democratic order, which took 21 years [for democracy to be restored]… I think that with the restoration of democracy in Brazil and with the promulgation of the [1988] Constitution, we launched a young democracy, but a solid one, with solid instruments, dictated by the Constitution.

The events of January 8 were the result of clashes that have taken place in Brazilian society in recent years, since 2016, with the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff and then, in 2018, with the election of the last government, which represented a huge shift to the right. That changed Brazil’s position in terms of foreign policy, but it also changed domestic policies, emboldening a group that felt privileged and encouraged to even finance the events of January 8. I was in Brasília, and it was an unexpected and surprising event—to see that number of people, about 4000 people, arriving at the Praça dos Três Poderes [where the judicial, legislative and executive branches are located] and destroying the buildings… It is an unbelievable thing, which received not only ideological and political encouragement, but also important financial support from various sectors.

This comes from a part of Brazilian society that is not democratic and does not appreciate democratic values. There is no doubt that there was an election, that President Lula won.

So, now it’s a matter of investigating and clarifying what happened, who inspired this, who committed these highly illegal acts that could have really compromised Brazilian democracy. But I think society and the established authorities reacted quickly and everything was brought under control. On Sunday [when the attack happened], already at the beginning of the evening, everything was under control and many had been arrested. And that’s that, in short.

BW: And does this have any impact on Brazil’s foreign policy? For example, were the similarities between the risks faced by Brazil and the United States a fundamental part of President Lula’s [February 10] visit with President Biden in Washington?

MV: Undoubtedly, these are national issues, but also with repercussions on foreign policy. That night I received maybe 15 phone calls from foreign ministers from other countries, in which they expressed solidarity and support for Brazil and for Brazilian democratic institutions. Presidents Biden and Lula discussed the subject, referencing events in each country, and they made public comments on the need to strengthen democracies around the world.

I think that big countries like the United States, Brazil and others, can play an important role in the dissemination of democratic values and in reinforcing the importance of maintaining democracy and highlighting the gains of democracy. In the case of Brazil, it was thanks to the restoration of democracy since the promulgation of the Constitution of 1988 that we’ve had progressive governments, such as that of President Lula, which created conditions for economic growth and which benefited the population, lifting millions of people out of poverty, creating housing for people in need, healthcare systems and everything else.

This only happens in a democracy. Hence the importance of defending democracy, and any initiative to defend democracy internationally is very valid, because this way countries can develop and grow.

BW: Does the relative silence of the Lula government about dictatorships in Latin America, such as Nicaragua and Venezuela, in any way contradict this appreciation for democracy?

MV: No, because there is no silence.

The first time that there has been some movement on Nicaragua in the international scene inside a multilateral organization was in Geneva, at the Human Rights Council. [Editor’s note: On March 9, 54 countries including the United States, Chile, Peru and Colombia signed a statement urging the Ortega government to “release all political prisoners” and condemning the regime’s recent decision to revoke the citizenship of more than 300 Nicaraguans.] Brazil did not support [the statement], on the contrary. We wanted to make a separate statement, independent of that made by that group of nations. Because we wanted to make clear our position that there need to be changes, there need to be adjustments. Brazil wanted to first appeal to the multilateral mechanisms that are there and then discuss and exhaust all options before any other stronger measure, such as, for example, the adoption of sanctions, an element that was suggested throughout the debates.

That was the element that made us publish a separate declaration, referring to the need for dialogue with the [Ortega] government and relevant actors from Nicaraguan society. Unilateral sanctions, a measure many countries adopt, are illegal for Brazil. We can only apply sanctions that have been approved by the Security Council of the United Nations. So we could not, in principle, support a statement that didn’t make a reference to dialogue as a first step. And as it was the first opportunity [to debate this subject] in a multilateral forum, which is an institution that has the mechanisms to correct these points, and this was the first time that this discussion took place since President Lula took office, two and a half months ago, we wanted to make our position very clear.

BW: Does Brazil and the president have a role in possible peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia?

MV: Look, President Lula has said this countless times… There is a lot of talk about Lula’s proposal… He didn’t make a concrete proposal, with goals to follow to reach peace. What he said is that he keeps hearing about war, about large amounts of resources being allocated for the purchase of arms, about destruction and death, and he doesn’t hear about peace. What he wants and what he has done is to call for us to start discussing, in some way, peace.

This is what is important, in the face of all the victims, all the destruction wreaked in the country. He also condemned the invasion of Ukraine, and commented on the worldwide effects of inflation, a threat to food security, the risk of this war lasting for many years, or even getting out of control, in a world where weapons are increasingly destructive and more lethal. So, it is with all this concern that he has made and will continue to make, calls for a sit-down, because we are absolutely convinced that it is not in the interest of either party to continue with this sad and deplorable war, without at least trying to find a negotiated solution.

Brazil is a pacifist country … that’s our diplomatic DNA. That’s what the president wants to tell the world.

BW: Many countries, especially in the global south, are adopting the idea, or the doctrine, of “active non-alignment” as a strategy for dealing with the growing competition between the United States and China. Ambassador Amorim, whom you mentioned, even wrote a chapter for a recent book on this idea. Does this concept basically summarize the Brazilian position on this issue?

MV: Yes, we don’t have an automatic alignment to either side. We have, on the contrary, excellent relations with the United States — in fact, next year we will celebrate 200 years of diplomatic relations with ambassadors in each country. And we also have important relations with China. What guides us is the national interest within a framework of multilateralism, of international law. Automatic alignments do not bring positive results and results that are beneficial to the national interest. There can be losses when there is an automatic and unjustifiable alignment. In fact, as there was during the last four years.

Brazil’s Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira (R) meets with his counterpart from Uruguay Francisco Bustillo at Itamaraty Palace in Brasilia on March 7, 2023. 
Photo by Evaristo Sa/AFP via Getty Images.

BW: There is a lot of talk about Latin American integration right now. There is ideological alignment between many governments in the region, but there is skepticism among some as to whether these ideas will translate into practical decisions, aside from meetings and the existence of blocs like CELAC and Unasur. Is there a concrete, practical agenda when it comes to regional integration? And what are the most important opportunities?

MV: There is no doubt that integration is a serious goal. In fact, Latin American integration is even in the Brazilian Constitution. And there are concrete examples, very concrete ones. The president visited Argentina and Uruguay. I just came back from Paraguay. President Lula will soon have a meeting with the president of Paraguay. These are the original partners of Mercosur. In these three cases, very specific measures and projects were agreed upon, pertaining to physical integration, for example, which is fundamental. We’ll soon announce them.

And these are projects that will benefit the road and rail infrastructure and river navigation in these countries, which will also have an immediate impact on trade: it lowers costs, it provides more security. It’s not just rhetoric. These are not projects that are starting now. We’re finalizing them, we put the final touches on them, and they are going to be implemented soon. And there are many others that could come.

CELAC is a place, it is a stage for discussions that can lead to concrete things. In addition, President Lula wants to review and update Unasur, which was indeed, differently from CELAC, a strong body, with concrete integration initiatives in many areas and which unfortunately was abandoned, but which we want to adapt and update, because it is also not the same world anymore. Mercosur integration translated to exponential growth in trade between our countries. Today we have important and significant trade for our economies, and without Mercosur, without an integration project, that would not happen.

BW: I mentioned this ideological alignment. Most governments, especially in South America, are left-wing, for all their differences. But it is possible that we will see a change of government in Argentina this year, for example. Is this ideological alignment important for Latin American relations, or is its importance overestimated?

MV: Look, the important thing is the national interest—and above all, the decisions of each country regarding integration with its neighbors. We cannot, under any circumstances, stop talking to any country, even more so to those with which we share a border. You know very well, as a Brazilianist, that we share 10 large borders with countries in the region. We cannot stop talking because this or that government has this or that ideological orientation. This is something that will not happen during President Lula’s government and that did not exist in Brazilian diplomatic tradition.

We will always talk to everyone. Regardless of ideological orientation. The national interest is above any difference of political position. So that’s what I can say, that’s what’s relevant, that’s what counts.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Brian Winter is the editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly and one of Latin America’s most influential political analysts, with more than 20 years following the region’s ups and downs.

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Tags: Brazil,  Brazil's foreign policy,  Lula

Las cuatro lecciones que Uruguay le puede enseñar al resto de América Latina - Brian Winter (La Nación)

Las cuatro lecciones que Uruguay le puede enseñar al resto de América Latina

La democracia más fuerte de la región ofrece muchas lecciones, incluido el valor de una sólida red de seguridad social

Brian Winter

 La Nación, Buenos Aires - 1.2.2023

 

Montevideo - Fue una escena que inspiró admiración, y no poca envidia, en toda América Latina. En la toma de posesión del pasado primero de enero del presidente de Brasil, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, estuvieron presentes no uno, sino tres presidentes de Uruguay: el actual mandatario, Luis Lacalle Pou, así como los expresidentes José “Pepe” Mujica (2010-2015) y Julio María Sanguinetti (1985-1990; 1995-2000), rivales históricos en la política uruguaya, uno de izquierda, otro de centroderecha, sonriéndose y dándose palmaditas en la espalda mientras las cámaras grababan.

En otra época, una escena así podría haberse considerado banal. Pero en esta época de extrema polarización y agitación social en toda América Latina, la muestra de unidad fue tratada nada menos que como una revelación en Twitter y demás sitios. “Los uruguayos son siempre tan civilizados que no sé cómo nos soportan como vecinos”, bromeó Bruno Bimbi, periodista argentino. “Por eso Uruguay es Uruguay, y es la democracia con más calidad de la región y una de las mejores del mundo”, escribió Daniel Zovatto, destacado politólogo en Panamá. Los periódicos brasileños señalaron celosamente el contraste con su propio país; el predecesor de Lula, Jair Bolsonaro, no asistió a la inauguración tras perder las elecciones, y en su lugar voló a Orlando, en Florida.

Francamente, no era la primera vez que Uruguay parecía estar una realidad aparte. El país tiene la renta per cápita más alta de América Latina (unos 17.000 dólares), la tasa de pobreza más baja (7%) y uno de los niveles de desigualdad más bajos. La matriz energética uruguaya es la más verde de la región, y se prevé que su economía crezca un saludable 3,6% en 2023, más del doble que el promedio latinoamericano.

Los estudios internacionales sitúan con frecuencia a Uruguay como el país menos corrupto de la región; The Economist Intelligence Unit lo clasificó como la décima tercera democracia más fuerte del mundo, por delante del Reino Unido (18), España (24) y Estados Unidos (26), y muy por delante de países de la región como Brasil (47), Colombia (59) o México (86).

Este éxito no ha pasado desapercibido en otros lugares de la región y, de hecho, del mundo. En mayo pasado se celebró en la Universidad Católica de Chile una conferencia titulada “El caso uruguayo: ¿un modelo posible?”, centrada en cómo ha combinado el crecimiento económico con una sólida red de seguridad social.

Uruguay está atrayendo cifras récord de expatriados no solo de Argentina, como suele ocurrir en tiempos de crisis, sino también de Brasil, Chile, Venezuela y otros países. La ciudad turística de Punta del Este se convirtió en un imán para los trabajadores extranjeros durante la pandemia, impulsando un boom inmobiliario estimado en 6000 millones de dólares en nuevas inversiones solo en los últimos tres años.

La idea de que Uruguay se está convirtiendo en una especie de Singapur para América del Sur, un relativo oasis para los negocios y el comercio en un continente convulso, ha atraído la atención de empresas globales y grandes potencias, por igual; el gobierno conservador de Lacalle Pou inició recientemente negociaciones para cerrar acuerdos comerciales con China y Turquía.

Tim Kaine, demócrata del Comité de Relaciones Exteriores del Senado de Estados Unidos, calificó recientemente a Uruguay de “modelo en muchos sentidos” y se preguntó por qué Estados Unidos no está invirtiendo más o impulsando su propia agenda comercial en este país.

Dado todo este interés, viajé a Montevideo en noviembre con la esperanza de responder a las preguntas: ¿qué podemos aprender de Uruguay? ¿Cuáles son los secretos de su relativo éxito? A lo largo de una semana, entrevisté a destacados políticos, analistas, líderes empresariales y gente corriente, en un esfuerzo por comprender los puntos fuertes y débiles de Uruguay, y cómo otros países de América, incluido Estados Unidos, podrían aprender de ellos. Asistí a un mitin político; caminé por la rambla de la capital; me comí un chivito, el plato nacional no oficial que consiste en carne con jamón, panceta, queso y un huevo frito. Bueno, me comí dos.

A pesar de estas delicias, una de las conclusiones más obvias de mi visita fue la siguiente: Uruguay no es un paraíso. Es un país que tuvo su mejor momento hace más de un siglo, cuando las exportaciones agrícolas lo convirtieron brevemente, junto con la Argentina, en uno de los diez países más ricos del mundo. Desde entonces, ha habido largos periodos en los que la economía apenas creció, y hoy los economistas afirman que su rendimiento está muy por debajo de su potencial, con una tasa media de crecimiento anual de solo el 1% en los cinco años anteriores a la pandemia. Montevideo puede parecer una versión más gris y menos dinámica de Buenos Aires; incluso en los barrios acomodados, a casi todo le vendría bien una mano de pintura.

El Uruguay actual se enfrenta a una ola de delincuencia realmente aterradora, con una tasa de homicidios que casi duplica la de la Argentina o Chile, causada en parte por la expansión de bandas criminales procedentes de otros lugares de la región. Solo el 40% de los estudiantes terminan el bachillerato, una de las tasas más bajas de América Latina, aunque los resultados de los exámenes son altos en comparación con la región.

A fines de 2022, estalló un escándalo de corrupción que involucraba la administración de Lacalle Pou y que puso en entredicho la reputación del país de tener un gobierno no corrupto que había sido tan cuidadosamente cultivada.

Del mismo modo, es razonable preguntarse hasta qué punto el éxito de Uruguay es realmente replicable en otros lugares de América Latina.

Muchos brasileños y argentinos ponen los ojos en blanco, alegando que la pequeña población de Uruguay, de unos 3,4 millones de habitantes, hace que sea mucho más fácil gobernar. (Esto ignora el hecho de que, por ejemplo, Honduras y El Salvador también son pequeños).

Otros dicen que la historia de la inmigración europea ha hecho de Uruguay un lugar “homogéneo” y, por tanto, próspero. (Esto es manifiestamente falso, y también racista, pero lo he oído muchas veces). Otros susurran que Uruguay puede tener algunos méritos, pero que se ha beneficiado sobre todo de los errores de la Argentina y Brasil, en consonancia con su historia como Estado amortiguador sujeto a los ciclos de sus mucho más grandes vecinos.

Pero también es cierto que la historia de Uruguay es más… bueno, cercana… de lo que muchos suponen. La próspera democracia actual fue una dictadura en 1985, plagada de las mismas divisiones y violaciones de los derechos humanos que se han observado en otros lugares del continente. ¿Esa envidiable tasa de pobreza del 7%? Hace solo 20 años, alcanzaba el 40%, en medio de una crisis económica tan grave que Uruguay exportaba miles de trabajadores cualificados, en lugar de recibirlos.

Según Sanguinetti, uno de los dos expresidentes que inspiraron tanta admiración, incluso la bonhomía política que se exhibió en la toma de posesión de Lula costó trabajo construirla y corre peligro de desvanecerse.

“Si la gente cree que Uruguay siempre fue así, se equivoca”, me dijo riendo Sanguinetti, de 87 años. “Nada es fácil. Estoy seguro de que hay lecciones que humildemente podemos ofrecer a los demás”.

De hecho, hay muchas. Pero basándome en mis viajes e investigaciones, destacaría cuatro aspectos que ayudan a explicar la imperfecta historia de éxito de Uruguay:

 

1)  Una red de seguridad social refuerza la democracia

 

Mujica, el otro expresidente que viajó a la toma de posesión de Lula, consiguió seguidores en todo el mundo en la década de 2010 como una especie de oráculo del anticonsumismo, al seguir conduciendo su Volkswagen Beetle de 1987 de ida y vuelta a su humilde granja en las afueras de Montevideo todos los días mientras ocupaba el cargo, en lugar de vivir en el palacio presidencial, y también al donar el 90% de su salario a obras de caridad.

Y aunque Mujica nunca fue tan popular en su país como lo fue en el extranjero, una de sus frases más famosas capta indudablemente el ethos uruguayo: “Nadie es más que nadie”.

Esa filosofía igualitaria sobresale en América Latina, donde la mayor brecha existente en el mundo entre ricos y pobres ha alimentado innumerables conflictos sociales a lo largo de los años. Y aunque sigue siendo más un ideal que una realidad, ha sostenido lo que en algunos aspectos es el Estado de bienestar más antiguo y generoso de la región.

En la actualidad, alrededor del 90% de la población uruguaya mayor de 65 años está cubierta por el sistema de pensiones, una de las tasas más altas de la región. El Estado proporciona seguro de desempleo, transferencias monetarias a las familias de bajos ingresos, recursos para el cuidado de niños y ancianos, y un sistema de sanidad pública.

Pagar todo esto no es barato, por supuesto. Uruguay recauda alrededor del 27% de su PBI en impuestos, por encima de la media latinoamericana (22%), aunque menos que Brasil (32%) y la Argentina (29%), y muy por debajo de la media de la OCDE (34%), un club compuesto en su mayoría por países europeos desarrollados. En general, el gobierno desempeña un papel importante en la economía uruguaya: las empresas estatales dominan el sector petrolero, los préstamos hipotecarios e incluso la transmisión de datos de internet. Aproximadamente uno de cada cinco trabajadores está empleado por el sector público, según el Banco Mundial.

Javier de Haedo, economista vinculado a la centroderecha uruguaya, afirma que la economía se ha visto afectada por un ciclo de largo plazo de crecientes demandas sociales, aumentos de impuestos y reestructuraciones periódicas de la deuda. “Esa es la historia de Uruguay”, me dijo. “La única solución es crecer más”.

Lacalle Pou llegó al cargo con un programa de reformas favorables a las empresas tras 15 años de gobierno del izquierdista Frente Amplio (FA). Pero por un golpe del destino fue investido el 1 de marzo de 2020, 12 días antes de que apareciera el primer caso de Covid-19 en Uruguay. Ha pasado gran parte de su mandato gestionando la pandemia en lugar de aprobar leyes.

Pero incluso Lacalle Pou y sus aliados se centran más en introducir ajustes en el sistema vigente -por ejemplo, aumentar la edad mínima de jubilación- que en derribarlo por completo.

En Uruguay se escucha muy poco acerca de la acalorada retórica sobre el socialismo o el neoliberalismo que domina la política en otros lugares de América Latina. “Casi no importa quién esté en el poder; hay una especie de consenso socialdemócrata que no cambia en lo fundamental”, afirma Nicolás Saldías, analista uruguayo para América Latina de The Economist Intelligence Unit.“Lo que se oye son debates sobre las tasas de impuestos, más que sobre el impuesto en sí”, añade.

De Haedo, el economista crítico, reconoció que ha habido “ejemplos espectaculares” de buena administración por parte del sector público.

Puede que el modelo uruguayo no sea para todos. Pero en una época en la que las demandas de mayores derechos sociales y servicios han invadido América Latina, provocando violentas protestas y una grave inestabilidad en países como Chile, Ecuador, Perú y otros, es difícil no darse cuenta de que Uruguay está… bastante tranquilo. Incluso después de la pandemia, los uruguayos consideraban en general que sus necesidades básicas estaban cubiertas.

En una encuesta publicada en mayo de 2022 por las Naciones Unidas, el 37% de los uruguayos dijo que su situación socioeconómica era buena, el 48% la consideró ni buena ni mala, y solo el 14% la calificó como mala. Dada la relativa satisfacción con el statu quo, no parece casualidad que Uruguay nunca haya elegido a un verdadero populista ideológicamente de izquierda o de derecha, mientras que los pilares fundamentales de una economía estable basada en el mercado también son ampliamente aceptados.

Hablé con un grupo de jóvenes activistas del Partido Nacional de Lacalle Pou, de centroderecha, y ellos también parecían apreciar el equilibrio. “La gente en Uruguay se siente protegida”, dice María Ángela Rosario, de 27 años. “No conozco a nadie que quiera cambiar eso en lo fundamental”.

2) La carrera se gana despacio y con constancia

Hacer algo a la uruguaya significa hacerlo despacio, gradual y deliberadamente. Es un aspecto célebre de la cultura local, tan uruguayo como tomar mate o contemplar la puesta de sol sobre el Río de la Plata (ambas cosas, no por casualidad, se deben hacer a la uruguaya).

Y, como tantas otras cosas aquí, puede ser un arma de doble filo.

Cuando se propone una nueva legislación, los políticos dicen que suele debatirse, y debatirse, y luego volver a debatirse. Las reformas a menudo no se consideran definitivas hasta que son aprobadas a través de plebiscitos o referéndums populares, cuya organización puede llevar años, los cuales se han utilizado desde la década de 1990 para votar sobre la privatización de los servicios públicos, leyes de amnistía, políticas contra la delincuencia, derechos sobre el agua y otras cuestiones.

A veces, cuando el cambio entra en vigor, el mundo ya ha cambiado. “He visto a Uruguay perder muchas oportunidades porque no pudimos actuar a tiempo”, me dijo un abogado que trabaja con inversionistas internacionales, haciendo referencia a puertos de aguas profundas, centros de datos y más.

De hecho, incluso en Montevideo, el ritmo de todo -comercio, política y vida cotidiana- puede resultar un poco extraño para quienes están acostumbrados a Buenos Aires, Lima o Ciudad de México. Una mañana cometí el pecado capital del periodista: se me acabó el espacio en mi cuaderno.

Eran las 11.30 de un miércoles y estaba en pleno centro. Encontré una papelería a dos cuadras; las llaves estaban en la puerta principal, la cual abrí lentamente, y me quedé esperando unos minutos hasta que un hombre mayor, mate en mano, apareció en la parte de atrás de la tienda. “¡Buen día!”, dijo alegremente. “No abrimos hasta, no sé, las 12.45 o 13. Intente cruzando la calle”. Así lo hice: “Ah, no me quedan cuadernos”, me dijo el vendedor. “Vuelva el lunes o el martes. O puede intentar al otro lado de la calle”. Al final me rendí y le pedí uno prestado a un periodista uruguayo. Otros expatriados compartieron historias similares acerca de un país que rara vez parece tener prisa. Un amigo de Sen Paulo me dijo: “Todos los días quiero gritar”.

Pero tomar la vida con calma tiene sus ventajas, sobre todo en política. Una reforma puede tardar mucho en aprobarse y luego sobrevivir a un referéndum. Pero una vez que lo hace, el cambio se considera legítimo y establecido, y la gente generalmente sigue adelante. “Tenemos una cultura política de tomar decisiones y luego aceptarlas”, afirma Yamandú Orsi, intendente de Canelones, una ciudad al norte de Montevideo, y posible candidato presidencial en las elecciones de 2024. “Lo que desde fuera puede parecer lento, muchas veces es una búsqueda democrática de diálogo y consenso”.

Como resultado, Uruguay ha visto poco de la política extrema en otras partes de América Latina, así como en los Estados Unidos y Europa, en que los gobiernos asumen el poder decididos a deshacer los logros de sus predecesores. Esta estabilidad ha dado certeza a los inversionistas, un sentido de dirección a largo plazo que generalmente no existe en el resto de la región. “Aburrido es bueno. Dios, ojalá la Argentina y Brasil fueran así de aburridos”, me dijo un inversionista. Como con tantas otras cosas en Uruguay, me quedé pensando si era posible separar lo positivo de lo negativo.

3) Las instituciones importan, sobre todo, cuando son accesibles para el público

Mientras estaba en el país, un gran escándalo se desató en torno a un esquema en el que funcionarios del gobierno supuestamente vendieron docenas, y quizás cientos, de pasaportes falsos a extranjeros, incluidos rusos que huían de su país tras la invasión de Ucrania.

A medida que los fiscales investigaban el caso, también encontraron indicios de que el guardaespaldas presidencial de Lacalle Pou intentó vender un software que podría utilizarse para rastrear a líderes de la oposición. (El presidente, su guardaespaldas y otros funcionarios negaron haber actuado indebidamente).

A pesar de todo, los fiscales hicieron su trabajo con normalidad, sin interferencias políticas, como es costumbre en Uruguay. “El fuerte sentido republicano hace que el uruguayo promedio entienda que ninguno de los poderes del Estado puede pisar al otro. Por encima de todo, el sistema judicial es una salvaguarda”, dijo Agustín Mayer, abogado del despacho Ferrere. Y aunque el escándalo fue claramente vergonzoso y un golpe a la reputación del país, algunos vieron una oportunidad para fortalecer aún más la democracia uruguaya.

“Lo que veo es a la sociedad debatiendo esto, procesándolo, tratando de entender lo que pasó”, dijo Adolfo Garcé, analista político. “Eso es lo que hacemos. Esta es una democracia con una tremenda capacidad de aprendizaje”.

Algo que distingue a las instituciones uruguayas es lo abiertas que son y lo integradas que están en la sociedad. Casi todo el mundo parece formar parte de algo: un partido político, un sindicato, un club de barrio, que a su vez tiene vínculos, o al menos cierta conectividad, con el Estado. “Los movimientos sociales activos han sido el motor de la política y la democracia uruguayas”, me dijo Carolina Cosse, intendenta de Montevideo y otra posible aspirante a la presidencia.

En su opinión, prácticamente “todas” las reformas sociales de los últimos años se iniciaron desde las bases, y mencionó la sanidad universal, la matrimonio igualitario y una nueva universidad en el interior del país como causas que los políticos asumieron como propias. Cosse y otros destacaron la gran importancia de los partidos políticos: Los mismos tres partidos han dominado la política uruguaya durante décadas, han defendido ideologías generalmente consistentes en lugar de servir como vehículos personalistas, y cuentan con miles de personas de a pie entre sus miembros.

Toda esta mezcla de gente común y funcionarios electos también desmitifica un poco la política, y en este punto, de acuerdo, el tamaño del país puede tener mucho que ver. Cuatro personas diferentes me enseñaron selfies con Lacalle Pou, tomadas en heladerías, restaurantes y en la calle. Esto también puede contribuir a la cultura de transparencia de Uruguay.

“Si un político se compra un coche nuevo y caro, todo el mundo lo sabe. Vivimos uno al lado del otro, nos vemos en el supermercado”, afirma Martín Aguirre, director del diario El País. Como prueba de ello, al salir de comer (chivito, naturalmente), nos topamos con su tía. Charlaron durante 15 minutos; cuando nos íbamos, él sonrió y se encogió de hombros. “¡Pequeño país!”

4) La civilidad es difícil, pero merece la pena

Sería tentador concluir que el énfasis en el civismo en la política uruguaya es también un resultado de la que la gente viva codo con codo. Pero no siempre fue así, especialmente en los años 60 y 70, cuando Uruguay cayó en la misma espiral de violencia guerrillera y represión brutal que asoló gran parte de la región.

En nuestra conversación, Sanguinetti me dijo que él y Mujica solían ser “no solo adversarios, sino enemigos”, señalando que Mujica fue líder del grupo rebelde Tupamaro, que no se reincorporó plenamente a la vida política hasta que retornó la democracia en los años ochenta.

Sanar esas divisiones llevó tiempo y esfuerzo. Mujica, que pasó 13 años en la cárcel, ha hablado de forma conmovedora a lo largo de los años sobre su propio camino. “Yo tengo mi buena cantidad de defectos, soy pasional, pero en mi jardín hace décadas que no cultivo el odio”, dijo Mujica al retirarse de la política cotidiana en 2020. “Aprendí una dura lección que me impuso la vida, que el odio termina estupidizando, nos hace perder objetividad”.

Esos sentimientos parecen haber calado en el conjunto de la sociedad. Orsi habló de la importancia de las “reglas no escritas” en la política uruguaya, en concreto el respeto a la oposición por parte del gobierno que esté en el poder, y señaló que Lacalle Pou asistió a su toma de posesión como intendente a pesar de ser de partidos rivales. “Eso es algo que nunca olvidaré”, dijo Orsi.

Orsi tiene 55 años y el presidente, 49, lo que sugiere que estas tradiciones se están transmitiendo a una nueva generación de dirigentes. No obstante, otros uruguayos con los que hablé expresaron la sensación de que estas tradiciones están bajo amenaza por las redes sociales y las presiones que afectan al resto de América Latina tras la pandemia. Algunos observaron con preocupación que un partido de tendencia populista quedó en cuarto lugar en las elecciones de 2019. Chile es un ejemplo de cómo incluso las más cacareadas historias de éxito de la región pueden desmoronarse rápidamente y sin previo aviso.

Y por eso Sanguinetti y Mujica, incluso a sus 87 años, siguen haciendo de su relación un escaparate, hasta el punto de escribir juntos un libro recientemente. “Seguimos discrepando en muchas cosas, cosas fundamentales”, dijo Sanguinetti. “Pero bueno, estos viejos intentan demostrar a las nuevas generaciones que se puede discrepar, sin perder la civilidad”.

“Creo que otros también pueden hacer esto”, añadió. “Uruguay no tiene nada de especial”.

Brian Winter

  

Esta columna fue publicada originalmente en Americas Quarterly. El autor es su editor general y vicepresidente de la Americas Society and Council of the Americas.

 

Para acessar a íntegra:

https://www.lanacion.com.ar/el-mundo/las-cuatro-lecciones-que-uruguay-le-puede-ensenar-al-resto-de-america-latina-nid01022023/