Latin America’s vicious circle is a warning to the West - The Economist special survey, June 16, 2022

 

How democracies decay

Latin America’s vicious circle is a warning to the West

Economic stagnation, popular frustration and polarised politics are reinforcing one another The Economist, June 16, 2022

When they vote in a presidential run-off election this weekend Colombians face a grim choice between two ill-qualified populists. On the left, Gustavo Petro has still not wholly shaken off his long-standing sympathy for Hugo Chávez, the caudillo who destroyed Venezuela’s economy and its democracy. On the right, Rodolfo Hernández is a bullying former mayor with no team and not much of a programme beyond expelling “the thieves”, as he calls the political class. This line-up reflects voters’ deep scorn for Colombia’s mainstream politicians, even though the country has done relatively well over the past 20 years. It is the kind of polarised choice that has become worryingly familiar in Latin American elections. In a region that was discontented even before the pandemic, there no longer seem to be many takers for the moderation, compromise and gradual reform needed to become prosperous and peaceful.

That matters not just to Latin America, but to the world. Despite everything, the region remains largely democratic and should be a natural ally of the West. It can play a vital role, too, in helping solve other global problems, from climate change to food security. It is home not only to the fast-diminishing Amazon rainforest and much of the world’s fresh water but also to a wealth of commodities needed for green energy, such as lithium and copper. It is a big food exporter and could provide more.

Not so long ago, Latin America was on a roll. A commodity boom brought healthy economic growth and provided politicians with the money to experiment with innovative social policies, such as conditional cash-transfer programmes. That, in turn, helped bring about big falls in poverty, reducing the extreme income inequality long associated with the region. The middle classes grew. That helped underpin political stability. Democratic governments generally respected human rights, even if the rule of law was weak. Growing prosperity and more responsive and effective politicians appeared to be reinforcing one another. The future was bright.

Now that virtuous circle has been replaced by a vicious one. Latin America is stuck in a worrying development trap, as our special report this week explains. Its economies have suffered a decade of stagnation or slow growth. Its people, especially the young, who are more educated than their parents, have become frustrated by their lack of opportunity. They have turned this anger against their politicians, who are widely seen as corrupt and self-serving. The politicians, for their part, have been unable to agree on the reforms needed to make Latin America’s economies more efficient. The region’s productivity gap with developed countries has widened since the 1980s. With too many monopolies and not enough innovation, Latin America is falling short in the 21st-century economy. 

These challenges are becoming more acute. The impact of the pandemic, especially long school closures, will increase inequality. Governments need to spend more on health care and education, but the cost of servicing debt is rising. The region thus needs to raise more tax, but in ways that do not undermine investment. Chile and its young left-wing president, Gabriel Boric, seemed to offer the chance of a new social contract along those lines. Instead his fledgling government is hostage to a constitutional convention shot through with the familiar Latin American vices of Utopianism and over-regulation.

The consolidation of democracy used to be seen as a one-way street. But Latin America shows that democracies can easily decay—and that is a warning for democrats everywhere. Its politics are now marked not just by polarisation but also by fragmentation and the extreme weakness of political parties, making stable governing majorities hard to assemble (see Bello). This downward spiral is accelerated by the malign influence of social media and the import of identity politics from the north. Technocrats are discredited and jobs in government are increasingly seen, on both the left and the right, as perks to be doled out rather than crucial responsibilities to be reserved for capable administrators. Organised crime, already a big factor in the region’s epidemic of violence, is starting to taint its politics, too.

Many of these are ills of the democratic world in general, but they are particularly acute and dangerous in Latin America. Most Latin Americans still want democracy, albeit a better version than they have. But there is a growing audience for those advocating the supposedly effective hand of autocracy. Venezuela and Nicaragua have become left-wing dictatorships like Cuba. In El Salvador, Nayib Bukele has centralised power and locked up some 40,000 people in a draconian war on gangs. He is the region’s most popular president. The leaders of its two biggest countries, Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil and Andrés Manuel López Obrador of Mexico, are contemptuous of checks and balances. Mr Bolsonaro will seek a second term at an election in October. It is cold comfort that he is likely to lose to Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a former president whose governments were linked to corruption and who lacks new ideas.

The risk is not just that democracies devolve into dictatorships, but that Latin America drifts away from the orbit of the West. In much of the region, China is now the main trade partner and is investing in infrastructure. Some of the region’s left-wing governments seem keen to return to the non-alignment of the cold-war era. Five of the region’s presidents, including Mr López Obrador, chose to boycott this month’s Summit of the Americas in Los Angeles. The United States—and Europe—could do more to engage Latin America, through trade, investment and technology. But Latin America in turn needs to recognise that it has much to gain from rebuilding closer ties, and that its role in a world dominated by China would be that of a neo-colony.

Stopping the rot

The temptation in the region will be to ignore the economic and political malaise and simply surf the new commodity boom triggered by the war in Ukraine. That would be a mistake. There are no short cuts. Latin Americans need to rebuild their democracies from the ground up. If the region does not rediscover a vocation for politics as a public service and relearn the habit of forging a consensus, its fate will get only worse. ■

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This article appeared in the Leaders section of the print edition under the headline "How democracies decay"

A Economist diz claramente que o Brasil só se recupera SEM Bolsonaro: Special Survey

A Economist, junto com o Wall Street Journal,  foi um dos poucos, pouquíssimos veículos da mídia mundial que apoiaram a eleição de Bolsonaro, supostamente por representar o liberalismo, contra um candidato da esquerda. Ambos já devem estar arrependidos desse gesto, pois se tem uma coisa que o Bolsonaro NUNCA foi é liberal, tendo até votado com o PT em diversas matérias econômicas.

 Mas, eles não tinham ideia de que o presidente brasileiro também fosse o ÚNICO NEGACIONISTA do planeta, e mais do que isso um verdadeiro GENOCIDA, por se opor a medidas preventivas e por se opor, de forma ESTÚPIDA, à aquisição de vacinas.

Está justificada, portanto, esta capa.

Reproduzo abaixo resumo da matéria da Época Negócios sobre esse relatório especial da Economist: 

Economia 

Com Cristo no oxigênio, Economist diz que Brasil precisa tirar Bolsonaro em 2022 para sair de crises

A revista não sugere qual candidato seria o mais indicado para governar o Brasil

Revista Época Negócios, 03 Jun 2021  

 

Capa da revista 'The Economist' mostra Cristo Redentor com máscara de oxigênio e a manchete "Na beira" (Foto: Reprodução)

Um relatório especial da revista britânica The Economist, publicado nesta quinta-feira (03/06), afirma que o Brasil vive hoje "sua maior crise desde o retorno à democracia em 1985" e atribui a maior parte dos problemas ao governo do presidente Jair Bolsonaro.

A capa do relatório — que contém sete reportagens em 11 páginas — traz uma imagem do Cristo Redentor usando uma máscara de oxigênio e a manchete "On the brink" ("Na beira").

"Seus desafios [do Brasil] são assustadores: estagnação econômica, polarização política, ruína ambiental, regressão social e um pesadelo ambicioso. E teve de suportar um presidente que está minando o próprio governo. Seus comparsas substituíram funcionários de carreira. Seus decretos têm forçado freios e contrapesos em todos os lugares", diz o texto de abertura do relatório assinado pela correspondente do Economist no Brasil, Sarah Maslin.

No artigo que conclui o relatório — intitulado "Hora de ir embora" — a revista diz que o futuro do Brasil depende das eleições de 2022, e que a prioridade mais urgente do país é se livrar de Bolsonaro.

"Os políticos precisam enfrentar as reformas econômicas atrasadas. Os tribunais devem reprimir a corrupção. E empresários, ONGs e brasileiros comuns devem protestar em favor da Amazônia e da constituição", diz a revista.

"Será difícil mudar o curso do Brasil enquanto Bolsonaro for presidente. A prioridade mais urgente é votar para retirá-lo do poder."

A revista não sugere qual candidato seria o mais indicado para governar o Brasil.

"As pesquisas sugerem que Lula ganharia em um segundo turno [contra Bolsonaro]. Mas, à medida que a vacinação e a economia se recuperam, o presidente pode recuperar terreno. Lula deve mostrar como a forma de [Bolsonaro de] lidar com a pandemia custou vidas e meios de subsistência, e como ele governou para sua família, não pelo Brasil. O ex-presidente deve oferecer soluções, não saudades."

A revista, fundada em 1843 e lida por muitos empresários e políticos em todo o mundo, costuma fazer relatórios detalhados do Brasil. A imagem do Cristo Redentor costuma ser usada nas capas da revista como analogia para a sua opinião sobre o país.

 Em 2009, uma capa mostrava o Cristo Redentor decolando, como se fosse um foguete, com a manchete "O Brasil decola" — elogiando políticas econômicas da época. Mas em 2013, em uma imagem semelhante, o mesmo Cristo Redentor aparecia na capa como um foguete desgovernado e a manchete "O Brasil estragou tudo?". Naquela edição, a revista criticava uma mudança de rumo nas políticas econômicas.

Cristo Redentor foi usado pelo 'Economist' para ilustrar a opinião da revista sobre o Brasil em 2009 e 2013; em 2019, uma capa falava sobre o desmatamento na Amazônia (Foto: Reprodução)

'Década de desastres'

A publicação afirma que o Brasil já enfrentava uma "década de desastres" antes mesmo da chega do presidente ao poder, mas que agora o país está retrocedendo — com Bolsonaro e com a pandemia de covid-19.

"Antes da pandemia, o Brasil sofria de uma década de problemas políticos e econômicos. Com Bolsonaro como médico, o Brasil agora está em coma."

A Economist argumenta que Bolsonaro não deu um golpe de Estado — como alguns temiam que pudesse acontecer —, mas possui instintos autoritários que enfraqueceram as instituições democráticas brasileiras, com suas constantes agressões.

"Muitos especialistas disseram que as instituições brasileiras resistiriam a seus instintos autoritários. Até agora, eles provaram estar certos. Embora Bolsonaro diga que seria fácil realizar um golpe, ele não o fez. Mas, em um sentido mais amplo, os especialistas estavam errados. Seus primeiros 29 meses no cargo mostraram que as instituições do Brasil não são tão fortes quanto se pensava e se enfraqueceram sob suas agressões."

A revista diz que Bolsonaro encerrou a investigação da Lava Jato após acusações feitas contra seus filhos — beneficiando "políticos corruptos e grupos criminosos organizados" —, não promoveu mais reformas significativas desde a reforma da Previdência de 2019 e causou danos à Floresta Amazônica, por se solidarizar com madeireiros, mineiros e fazendeiros que promovem o desmatamento.

"Ele levou uma motosserra para o Ministério do Meio Ambiente, cortando seu orçamento e forçando a saída de pessoal competente. A redução do desmatamento requer um policiamento mais firme e investimento em alternativas econômicas. Nenhum dos dois parece provável."

Em outra reportagem, a revista afirma que depois de uma "geração de progresso", a mobilidade social está desacelerando no país. Segundo a revista, anos de políticas voltadas para o controle da inflação e diminuição da pobreza foram seguidos por uma "década de políticas ruins e sorte pior ainda".

A revista critica as gestões do PT por investirem pouco em infraestrutura, abandonarem reformas pró-negócios e por adotarem políticas semelhante à substituição de importação. Bolsonaro e seu ministro da Economia, Paulo Guedes, também são criticados.

" Guedes se gabava de que seriam feitas reformas para simplificar o código tributário, reduzir o setor público e privatizar empresas estatais ineficientes. No entanto, o espírito reformista se mostrou fugaz. Bolsonaro não é muito liberal. Seu desgosto por reformas duras tornou fácil para o Congresso ignorar a agenda de Guedes."

O relatório traz também análises sobre corrupção e crime, Amazônia, reformas políticas e eleitores evangélicos.

===========

Transcrição da matéria principal:

The captain and his country

Brazil is backsliding. Politicians, businesses and voters must act before it is too late, says Sarah Maslin

Jun 3rd 2021

One day in April, as Brazilian hospitals ran out of oxygen and 3,000 people a day were dying from covid-19, Jair Bolsonaro’s 64-year-old chief of staff, Luiz Eduardo Ramos, got jabbed. It was his turn but he went in secret. His boss is anti-vaccine. When asked why Brazil was blocking approval for the Pfizer vaccine, the president joked that jabs turn people into crocodiles.

That Mr Ramos, a four-star general who once commanded peacekeeping troops in Haiti, had to sneak off reveals the depths to which Brazil has fallen under Mr Bolsonaro, whose career as an army captain stood out only when he was jailed for insubordination. Mr Ramos confessed his jab in a meeting he didn’t know was being broadcast. “Like every human being, I want to live,” he said.

Before the pandemic, Brazil was suffering from a decade of political and economic ailments. With Mr Bolsonaro as its doctor, it is now in a coma. More than 87,000 Brazilians died from covid-19 in April, the worst monthly death toll in the world at the time. Vaccines are so scarce that people under 60 will not get them until September. And a record 14.4% of workers are unemployed.

Yet on May 1st bolsonaristas draped in Brazilian flags took to the streets. Unfazed by a parliamentary commission of inquiry (CPI) into the president’s handling of covid-19, they applauded his refusal to wear a mask, his support for hydroxychloroquine and his wish to send the army to obstruct stay-at-home orders. Fans in São Paulo begged for “military intervention”. One woman told a visitor that Brazil had never had a civil war. “It’s about time,” she said.

Swap Portuguese for English and green and yellow for red, white and blue, and the rally could have been in the United States last year. Mr Bolsonaro borrowed heavily from Donald Trump’s tactics to win election in 2018: populism, nationalism, chauvinism and fake news. Brazil was traumatised from corruption, recession, worsening public services and violent crime. Brazilians were fed up with politicians who had failed to solve these problems. Mr Bolsonaro channelled their frustration.

He portrayed himself as an outsider even though he had spent 27 years as a backbench congressman, making news only when he said something offensive about women, indigenous people or gays. A fan of the military dictatorship of 1964-85, he often posed with his thumbs and forefingers cocked as if he were shooting a machinegun. Once in office, he aimed it straight at Brazil’s democratic institutions.

Good times, bad times

Ten years ago, Mr Bolsonaro’s election would have been unthinkable. After the dictatorship Brazil reformed itself. A constitution signed in 1988 created independent institutions. A new currency in 1994 tamed inflation. A commodity boom in the 2000s brought jobs. With cash in their wallets, Brazilians saw their lives improve. Under the presidency of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Brazil joined Russia, India and China in the BRIC bloc of fast-growing emerging economies. It led climate talks and was awarded both the 2014 football World Cup and the 2016 Olympic games.

Then the commodity boom ended. Protests in 2013 over a rise in bus fares turned into protests aimed at bringing down the left-wing Workers’ Party ( PT) government. An anti-corruption probe launched in 2014, known as Lava Jato (Car Wash), found that dozens of companies had paid bribes to politicians in exchange for contracts with Petrobras, the state oil firm. The economy crashed after irresponsible spending by Lula’s successor, Dilma Rousseff. Bigger, angrier demonstrations led to Ms Rousseff’s impeachment in 2016. Her replacement, Michel Temer, was accused of graft and barely escaped impeachment in 2017.

Mr Bolsonaro’s election followed these traumas. He had little funding or airtime, but was boosted when he was stabbed while campaigning. Casting himself as Brazil’s saviour, he won 55% of the vote. His support was highest in the south and south-east, the richest and whitest regions, and among conservatives like farmers and evangelicals. Millions backed him out of anger at the PT. Mr Bolsonaro seemed to many voters to be the lesser of two evils.

Many pundits said that Brazil’s institutions would withstand his authoritarian instincts. So far they have proved right. Although Mr Bolsonaro says it would be easy to carry out a coup, he has not done it. But in a broader sense, the pundits were wrong. His first 29 months in office have shown that Brazil’s institutions are not as strong as was thought, and they have weakened under his battering. Cláudio Couto, a political scientist at Fundação Getulio Vargas, a university in São Paulo, likens them to brakes on a car hurtling down a hill. “If pushed too hard they can fail,” he says.

Take the judiciary. Lava Jato seemed the triumph of the decade. Brazilians hoped anti-corruption reforms would usher in cleaner lawmakers who would act for the people not themselves. But some Lava Jato prosecutors and judges had a political agenda. This paved the way for Mr Bolsonaro, in the face of allegations against his sons, to shut down the investigation. Its closure helped not only corrupt politicians, but also organised-crime groups.

The economy badly needs reforms to curb the growth of public spending, boost competitiveness and tackle inequality. As a candidate, Mr Bolsonaro briefly professed belief in liberal economics. He hired Paulo Guedes, a free-marketeer educated at the University of Chicago, as economy minister. Then he abandoned both, refusing to back changes that might cost votes. After a pensions revamp in 2019, Mr Guedes’s reform agenda stalled. Six of the ten members of his economic “dream team” have quit or been fired.

The pandemic has wiped out all net jobs created since the recession of 2014-16, sending millions of people back into poverty. None of Mr Bolsonaro’s four education ministers created a workable distance-learning system. One lasted just five days before he was found to have padded his résumé with fake degrees from Argentina and Germany. Some 35m children have been out of school for 15 months, a drag on social mobility for years to come.

In politics “the promise of renewal was a big lie,” says Mr Couto. In 2018 voters kicked out much of the traditional political class. For the first time Congress has more novices than incumbents. A tiny group committed to fiscal responsibility and other reforms offers hope for the future. But most politicians remain gluttons of pork and patronage. After denouncing the system, Mr Bolsonaro joined it to save himself from over 100 impeachment petitions.

He has done most damage to the Amazon rainforest, which in Brazil now emits more carbon than it stores because of climate change and deforestation. The president does not believe in the first and sympathises with those doing the second: loggers, miners and ranchers. He took a chainsaw to the environment ministry, cutting its budget and forcing out competent staff. Reducing deforestation requires firmer policing and investment in economic alternatives. Neither looks likely.

At first covid-19 helped Mr Bolsonaro. Big spending on businesses and the poor distracted from his failure to pass fiscal reforms. His approval ratings briefly hit their highest since he took office. Last July he contracted covid-19 and recovered quickly, as he had promised he would. It seemed that the economy might do the same, paving the way for his re-election in 2022.

Then, in early 2021, Brazil was hit by a second wave with a more infectious variant from the Amazon city of Manaus. As social media filled with images of people in nearby Chile lining up for jabs, gravediggers in Brazil were busy. Mr Bolsonaro continued to rail against lockdowns and vaccines. In a cabinet shake-up he fired the defence minister, who had reportedly refused to pledge his loyalty. The heads of the three armed forces resigned in protest, briefly fuelling rumours of a coup.

It did not happen. Yet this special report argues that Brazil is facing its biggest crisis since the return to democracy in 1985. Its challenges are daunting: economic stagnation, political polarisation, environmental ruin, social regress and a covid-19 nightmare. And it has had to endure a president who is undermining government itself. His cronies have replaced career officials. His decrees have strained checks and balances everywhere. Consider Diário Oficial da União, where every legal change is published, says Lilia Schwarcz, a historian. “There is a coup every day.”■

Full contents of this special report
* Brazil: The captain and his country
The economy: A dream deferred
Corruption and crime: Sliding back
The Amazon: Money trees
Politics: In need of reform
Evangelicals: Of Bibles and ballots
The prospects: Time to go

This article appeared in the Special report section of the print edition under the headline "The captain and his country"

https://www.economist.com/special-report/2021/06/05/the-captain-and-his-country