Law, Peace and Status: Brazil’s Call for Sovereign Equality During the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907 - Lars Janssen

Research Article

Law, Peace and Status: Brazil’s Call for Sovereign Equality During the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907

Lars Janssen

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/07075332.2024.2345226 

Abstract

(US$ 53, for full access to the article: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07075332.2024.2345226?scroll=top&needAccess=true )

This article reevaluates Brazil’s role in the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907, challenging prevailing narratives about Brazil’s call for sovereign equality. By combining theoretical insights on international status with an extensive examination of primary sources, such as diplomatic communications and conference proceedings, I show that Brazil’s call for sovereign equality was a strategic response to status struggles rather than an ideological commitment. The call enabled Brazil’s leading delegate, Rui Barbosa, to gain leadership over a Latin American multilateral coalition against a Great Power proposition to create a hierarchical international court. The leadership not only bolstered Brazil’s position as a regional power, but paradoxically, also strengthened the relations with its main opponent during the conference, the US. As such, this study both contributes to our understanding of Latin American historical diplomacy and underscores the nuanced dynamics of non-Great Powers in international politics.

Notes

1 Proceedings, Mtg., First Comission, James Brown Scott, The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conference, vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1921), 148; Gerry Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 132–47.

2 James Brown Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907: A Series of Lectures Delivered before the Johns Hopkins University in the Year 1908, Volume 1 – Conferences (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1909), 169.

3 Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 24–6; Martha Finnemore and Michelle Jurkovich, ‘Getting a Seat at the Table: The Origins of Universal Participation and Modern Multilateral Conferences’, Global Governance, xx (2014), 361–73; Max Paul Friedman and Tom Long, ‘Soft Balancing in the Americas: Latin American Opposition to U.S. Intervention, 1898-1936’, International Security, xl (2015), 120–156; Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States, 132–47; Arnulf Becker Lorca, Mestizo International Law: A Global Intellectual History 1842-1933 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 143–199.

4 My translations: ‘visionário’, ‘pilares do multilateralismo contemporâneo’. Celso Amorim, ‘A Diplomacia Multilateral do Brasil: Um Tribute a Rui Barbosa’, (Lecture, Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2007), 20; Fundação Casa de Rui Barbosa, ‘Águia de Haia’, http://www.casaruibarbosa.gov.br/interna.php?ID_S=298&ID_M=762; Isadora Loreto da Silveira, Laura de Castro Quaglia, Nathassia Arrúa de Oliveira Cardoso, Taiane de Bittencourt, ‘A Inauguração do Multilateralismo na Política Externa Brasileira: A Participação do Brasil na 2ª Conferência de Paz de Haia’, Fronteira, ix (2010), 29–46.

5 E. Bradford Burns, The Unwritten Alliance: Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966); Amado Luiz Cervo and Clodoaldo Bueno, História da Política Exterior do Brasil (Brasília: Editora UnB, 2002), 192–215; Luís Viana Filho, A Vida de Rui Barbosa (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1949), 331–53; Christiane Vieira Laidler, A Segunda Conferência da Paz de Haia, 1907: o Brasil e o Sistema Internacional no Início do Século XX (Rio de Janeiro: Edições Casa de Rui Barbosa, 2010); Rejane Magalhães. ‘Presença de Rui Barbosa em Haia’, Fundação Casa de Rui Barbosa (2007), 1–14; Antônio Celso Alves Pereira, ‘O Barão do Rio Branco e a II Conferência da Paz’ in Manoel Gomes Pereira (ed), Barão do Rio Branco: 100 Anos de Memória, (Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2012), 389–422; Joseph Smith, Unequal Giants: Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Brazil, 1889–1930 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991).

6 Carsten-Andreas Schulz, ‘Accidental Activists: Latin American Status-Seeking at The Hague’, International Studies Quarterly, lxi (2017), 612–22.

7 Ibid., 612, 619.

8 Edward Keene, ‘The Standard of “Civilisation”, the Expansion Thesis and the 19^th-Century International Social Space’, Millennium, xlii (2014), 651–73; Jonathan Renshon, ‘Status Deficits and War’, International Organization lxx (2016), 513–50; William C. Wohlforth, Benjamin de Carvalho, Halvard Leira & Iver B. Neumann, ‘Moral Authority and Status in International Relations: Good States and the Social Dimension of Status Seeking’, Review of International Studies, xliv (2017), 526–46.

9 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 31.

10 Carsten Holbraad, Middle Powers in International Politics (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984), 75–91.

11 For an explanation of the shortcomings of the material approach, see Marina G. Duque, ‘Recognizing International Status: A Relational Approach’, International Studies Quarterly, lxii (2018), 578–80.

12 T. V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson and William C. Wohlforth, Status in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 7–10. Also see: Duque, ‘Recognizing International Status’, 577–92; Keene, ‘The Standard of “Civilisation”’, 651–73; Renshon, ‘Status Deficits and War’, 513–50; Ann E. Towns, ‘Norms and Social Hierarchies: Understanding the International Policy Diffusion from Below’, International Organization lxvi (2012), 179–209.

13 Renshon, ‘Status Deficits and War’, 529; Duque, ‘Recognizing International Status’, 588; David, A. Lake, ‘Status, Authority, and the End of the American Century’ in T.V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson and William C. Wohlforth (eds), Status in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 251.

14 Renshon, ‘Status Deficits and War’, 529; Keene, ‘The Standard of “Civilisation”’, 664.

15 Paul, Larson and Wohlforth, Status in World Politics, 18–19.

16 Renshon, ‘Status Deficits and War’, 526.

17 Wohlforth et al., ‘Moral Authority and Status’, 526–546.

18 Ibid, 530.

19 Adam Chapnick, ‘The Middle Power’, Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, vii (1999), 74–76; Bernard Jr. Prosper, ‘Canada and Human Security: From the Axworthy Doctrine to Middle Power Internationalism’, American Review of Canadian Studies, xxxvi (2006), 233–261; Wohlforth et al., ‘Moral Authority and Status in International Relations’, 526–546.

20 Andrew Hurrell, ‘Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order, What Space for would be Great Powers?’, International Affairs, lxxxii (2006), 12–15; Eduard Jordaan, ‘The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations: Distinguishing between Emerging and Traditional Middle Powers’, Politikon, xxx (2003), 165–81; Wohlfort et al. ‘Moral Authority and Status’, 534–5.

21 Hurrell, ‘Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order’, 11.

22 Charalampos Efstathopoulos, ‘Leadership in the WTO: Brazil, India and the Doha Development Agenda’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, xxv (2012), 269–93; Stefan Schirm, ‘Leaders in Need of Followers: Emerging Powers in Global Governance’, European Journal of International Relations, xvi (2010), 197–221.

23 Sandra Destradi, ‘Regional Powers and their Strategies: Empire, Hegemony, and Leadership’, Review of International Studies, xxxvi (2010), 903–30; Hurrell, ‘Would be Great Powers?’, 8-9; Detlef Nolte, ‘How to Compare Regional Powers: Analytical Concepts and Research Topics,’ Review of International Studies, xxxvi (2010), 881–901.

24 Efstathopoulos, ‘Leadership in the WTO’, 269-293; Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, ‘Global Power Shifts and South Africa’s Southern Agenda: Caught between African Solidarity and Regional Leadership’ in Günther Taube (ed), Power Shifts and Global Governance: Challenges from South and North (London: Anthem Press, 2011), 141–52.

25 Jeremy Adelman, ‘An Age of Imperial Revolutions ‘,The American Historical Review, cxiii (2008), 337; Schulz, ‘Civilisation, Barbarism and the Making of Latin America’s Place in 19th-Century International Society’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, xlii, iii (2014), 849–51.

26 Liliana Obregón. 2006. ‘Between Civilisation and Barbarism: Creole Interventions in International Law’, Third World Quarterly, xxvii, v (2006), 822–3.

27 Lilia Moritz Schwarcz, ‘A Mestizo and Tropical Country: The Creation of the Official Image of Independent Brazil’, European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, lxxx (2006), 28.

28 Leslie Bethell, ‘O Brasil no Mundo’, in Alfredo Gomes, Leslie Bethel, Lilia Moritz Schwarcs, Luiz Aranha Côrrea do Lago, Gustavo Franco and José Murilo de Carvalho (eds), História do Brasil nação: 1808-2010 (Rio de Janeiro: Academia Brasileira de Letras, 2012), 153–57.

29 Mary Wilhelmine Williams, Dom Pedro the Magnanimous: Second Emperor of Brazil (Abingdon: Frank Cas & Co. Ltd., 1996), 141–56.

30 Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão. n.d., ‘Embaixadas do Brasil Histórico dos chefes de legações e embaixadas’, www.funag.gov.br/postos/.

31 Reşat Bayer, 2006. ‘Diplomatic Exchange Data set, v2006.1’, http://correlatesofwar.org.

32 Schulz, ‘Latin America’s Place in 19th-Century International Society’, 850–1.

33 Bethell, ‘O Brasil no Mundo’, 131–49.

34 Boris Fausto and Sergio Fausto, A Concise History of Brazil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 144–56.

35 Pereira, ‘II Conferência da Paz’, 391.

36 Amado Luiz Cervo and Clodoaldo Bueno, História da Política Exterior do Brasil (Brasília: Editora UnB, 2002), 167–72.

37 Carlos Henrique Cardim, ‘A Primeira Conferência de Paz da Haia, 1899: Por que a Rússia?’, in Manoel Gomes Pereira (ed), Barão do Rio Branco: 100 Anos de Memória (Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2012): 368–75.

38 Bayer, ‘Diplomatic Exchange Data set’.

39 Luiz Felipe de Seixas Corrêa, ‘O Barão do Rio Branco chefe de missão: Liverpool, Washington, Berna e Berlim’, in Manoel Gomes Pereira (ed), O Barão do Rio Branco: 100 Anos de Memória (Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2012), 31–56.

40 Alvaro Lins, Rio Branco: Biografia Pessoal e História Política (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1965), 259–60.

41 ‘Não venho servir a um partido político: venho servir ao nosso Brasil, que todos desejamos ver unido, íntegro, forte e respeitado’. Rio Branco, ‘No Clube Naval, 1 Dec. 1902, Manoel Gomes Pereira (ed), Obras do Rio Branco IX, Discursos(Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2012), 108.

42 Tânia Maria Pechir Gomes Manzur, ‘Opinião Pública e Política Externa do Brasil do Império a João Goulart: Um Balanço Historiográfico’, Revista Brasileira Política Internacional, xlii (1999), 42–43.

43 Ibid.

44 Laidler, A Segunda Conferência da Paz de Haia, 105; Smith, The United States and Latin America, 67.

45 Smith, The United States and Latin America, 67.

46 Juan Pablo Scarfi, ‘In the Name of the Americas: The Pan-American Redefinition of the Monroe Doctrine and the Emerging Language of American International Law in the Western Hemisphere, 1898-1933’, Diplomatic History, xv, ii (2016), 189–218; Friedman and Long, ‘Soft Balancing in the Americas’.

47 Smith, The United States and Latin America, 69.

48 Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention, 24-51; Finnemore and Jurkovich, ‘Getting a Seat at the Table’; Friedman and Long, ‘Soft Balancing in the Americas’.

49 Roberto Schwarz, ‘Misplaced Ideas: Literature and Society in Late Nineteenth-Century Brazil’, Comparative Civilizations Review, v (1980), 1–19.

50 Burns, The Unwritten Alliance.

51 Cervo and Bueno, História da Política Exterior do Brasil, 192; Clodoaldo Bueno, ‘O Barão do Rio Branco no Itamaraty (1902-1912)’, Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, lv (2012), 173.

52 Burns, The Unwritten Alliance.

53 Ibid, 90–3.

54 Ibid, 103–8.

55 Clodoaldo Bueno, ‘O Barão do Rio Branco no Itamaraty (1902-1912)’, Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, lv (2012), 177; Smith, Unequal Giants, 53–4.

56 Laidler, A Segunda Conferência da Paz de Haia, 114–115; Pereira, ‘II Conferência da Paz’, 392–393.

57 Speech from Rio Branco to the conference, July 23, 1906, in International American Conference (3^rd: 1906: Rio de Janeiro, Brazil), Minutes, Resolutions, Documents, (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1907), 39–40.

58 Armando de Senna Bittencourt, ‘O Emprego do Poder Militar como Estratégia de Rio Branco’, in Manoel Gomes Pereira (ed), O Barão do Rio Branco: 100 Anos de Memória (Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2012), 62, 73.

59 Burns, The Unwritten Alliance, 94; Laidler, A Segunda Conferência da Paz de Haia, 128.

60 João Paulo Alsina Jr., ‘Rio Branco, Grand Strategy and Naval Power’, Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, lvii (2014) 9–28; Bueno, ‘Rio Branco no Itamaraty’, 180-1; Burns, The Unwritten Alliance, 182; Doratioto, ‘A Política Platina do Barão do Rio Branco’, 132, 140.

61 Rio Branco, speech, 27 Aug. 1906, p. 405, International American Conference, Minutes, Resolutions, Documents (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1907); Doratioto, ‘A Política Platina do Barão do Rio Branco’, 130–49.

62 Cervo and Bueno, História da Política Exterior do Brasil, 210.

63 Doratioto, ‘A Polítical Platina do Barão de Rio Branco’, 134.

64 Maartje Abbenhuis, Christopher Ernest Barber and Annalise R. Higgins, War, Peace and International Order? The Legacies of the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017); Maartje Abbenhuis, The Hague Conferences and International Politics, 1898-1915 (London: Bloomsburg Academic, 2019).Finnemore and Jurkovich, ‘Getting a Seat at the Table’.

65 Nicholas II, ‘Rescript of the Russian Emperor (1898)’, in A Series of Lectures, vol 2, J. B. Scott (ed). (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1909), 1.

66 Scott, A Series of Lectures, vol.1, 95–100.

67 Finnemore and Jurkovich, ‘Getting a Seat at the Table’, 367.

68 Pereira, ‘II Conferência da Paz’, 402.

69 Filho, A Vida De Rui Barbosa.

70 Pereira, ‘II Conferência da Paz’, 402–3.

71 ‘desejo ardente de servir ao pais.’ Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 30 March 1906, [Rio de Janeiro, Arquivo de Rui Barbosa], [Série Segunda] C[onferência da Paz em] H[aia] 2/1, fo. 1.

72 Scott, Proceedings, vol. 1, 2–15.

73 ‘Quizera saber o que ha de exacto sobre assumpto.’ Rio Branco to Joaquim Nabuco, 14 Apr. 1907, CH 2/1, fo. 14G.

74 Joaquim Nabuco to Rio Branco, 17 Apr. 1907, CH 2/1 fo. 14G.

75 Memo Nabuco to US secretary of state Elihu Root, 25 May 1907, CH 6/1, fo. 1.

76 Smith, Unequal Giants, 59.

77 Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 30 May 1907, CH 2/2, fo. 26.

78 Conference list, 27 Sept. 1907, CH 18; Filho, A Vida de Rui Barbosa, 334.

79 ‘Estamos todos seguros do brilhante exito da sua missão.’ Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 27 May 1907, CH 2/2, fo. 25.

80 ‘Article discussing the map of the Hall of Knights’, Courier de la Conférence de la Paix, 18 June 1907, 2.

81 ‘Trabalho acumula-se cresce enormemente não havendo quasi tempo estudar’. Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 29 June 1907, p. 4, CH 9, fo. 1.

82 Ibid, p. 5.

83 Proceedings, Mtg., Fo[urth] C[commission], 5 July 1907, p. 770-7, Scott, Proceedings, vol. 3.

84 Ibid, 771–2.

85 Proceedings, Mtg., FoC, 12 July, p. 808, Scott, Proceedings, vol. 3.

86 Ibid.

87 Filho, A Vida de Rui Barbosa, 338–9.

88 ‘Consideram irritante impolitico.’ Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 14 July 1907, p. 10, CH 9, fo. 1.

89 ‘Elles a abandonaram appressando-se plena sessão solicitar proposta belga dando assim nossa como for a combate.’ Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 15 July 1907, p. 10, CH 9, fo. 1.

90 Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 3 Aug. 1907, p. 22, CH 9, fo. 1.

91 Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 25 July 1907, p. 16, CH 9, fo. 1.

92 Burns, The Unwritten Alliance, 118-20; Smith, Unequal Giants, 61.

93 ‘effeito partido seria deploravel … depois tantos brilhantes trabalhos.’ Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 26 July 1907, CH 2/2 fo. 62.

94 ‘aqui quasi todas contra nós.’ Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 21 July 1907, CH 9, fo. 1.

95 Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 29 July 1907, CH 22, fo. 65.

96 Roque Sáenz Peña, La Republica Argentina en la Segunda Conferencia International de la Paz (Buenos Aires: Imprenta y Litografia A. Pech. Cerrito 55, 1908), 34–7.

97 Proceedings, Mtg., FC: First Subcommission, 1 Aug. 1907, p. 312–31, Scott, Proceedings, vol. 2.

98 Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 3 Aug. 1907, p. 22, CH 9 fo. 1.

99 ‘amargo humiliação.’ Ibid.

100 Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 5 Aug. 1907, CH 2/3 fo. 71.

101 Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 8 Aug. 1907, CH 2/3 fo. 77; Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 10 Aug. 1907, CH 2/3 fo. 78; Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 16 Aug. 1907, CH 2/3 fo. 90.

102 ‘terem Brazil Argentina Chile cada um seu arbitro’, Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 12 Aug. 1907, CH 2/3 fo. 81.

103 Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 15 Aug. 1907, CH 2/3 fo. 87.

104 Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 16 Aug. 1907, CH 2/3 fo. 74.

105 Proceedings, Mtg., FC: Committee B, 17 Aug. 1907, p. 609-13, Scott, Proceedings, vol. 2.

106 Ibid, 610.

107 Ibid.

108 Proceedings, FC: Second Subcommission, 4 July 1907, p. 783-786, Scott, Proceedings, vol. 2.

109 Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 11 Aug. 1907, p. 30, CH 9 fo. 1.

110 Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 14 Aug. 1907, CH 2/3 fo. 86.

111 Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 16 Aug. 1907, CH 2/3 fo. 90.

112 Proceedings, FC, 10 Sept. 1907, p. 11-13, Scott, Proceedings, vol. 2.

113 ‘Não sei como obter supplente quando americanos recusam … Tenho dito vocencia bastante para habilital-o jugar realidade nossa posição aqui quasi isolados entre estados e americanos e impotentes contra predominio absoluto … potencias’ Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 16 Aug. 1907, p. 35, CH 9 fo. 1.

114 Ibid.

115 ‘Nenhum representante por mais habil e competente que seja mesmo representante um paiz forte pode estar certo de conseguir tudo quanto deseja ou seu paiz deseja.’ Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 17 Aug. 1907, CH 2/6 fo. 235.

116 ‘enthusiasmo pelo brilho vocencia.’ Ibid.

117 Pereira, ‘O Barão do Rio Branco e a II Conferência da Paz’, 411.

118 Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 17 Aug. 1907, p. 37, CH 9 fo. 1.

119 Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 24 Aug. 1907, CH 2/3 fo. 106.

120 Proceedings, FC: First Subcommission, 20 Aug. 1907, p. 619-22, Scott, Proceedings, vol. 2.

121 Ibid., 623–30.

122 ‘Nossa autoridade moral cresce todos dias.’ Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 23 Aug. 1907, p. 44, CH 9 fo. 1.

123 Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 23 Aug. 1907, p. 47, CH 9 fo. 1; Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 26 Aug. 1907, p. 49-50, CH 9 fo. 1; Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 23 Aug. 1907, CH 2/3 fo. 102; Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 26 Aug. 1907, CH 2/3 fo. 111; Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 27 Aug. 1907, CH 2/3 fo. 115.

124 Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 23 Aug. 1907, p. 45, CH 9 fo. 1.

125 Ibid.

126 Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 4 Sept. 1907, p. 61-2, CH 9 fo. 1.

127 Proceedings, FC: Committee of Examination, 17 Aug. 1907, p. 827, Scott, Proceedings, vol. 2.

128 Ibid.

129 ‘Esteva levantou-se dizendo adheria completamente nossa attitude.’ Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 18 Aug. 1907, CH 9 fo. 1.

130 ‘Abandonalos alem de deslealdade seria transferir-lhes vantagem posição que hoje occupamos.’ Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 31 Aug. 1907, p. 56, CH 9 fo. 1.

131 Schulz, ‘Accidental Activists’, 613.

132 Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 19 Sept. 1907, CH 2/4 fo. 150.

133 William Hull, The Two Hague Conferences and their Contributions to International Law (New York: Kraus, 1908), 423–5; Scott, A Series of Lectures, vol.1, 169.

134 Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 31 Aug. 1907, CH 2/4 fo. 122; Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 31 Aug. 1907, CH 2/4 fo. 123.

135 ‘Grande pezar que nos causa a dissidencia em que infelizmente nos achamos.’ Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 31 Aug. 1907, CH 2/4 fo. 123.

136 ‘Article Discussing the Brazilian Banquet’, Courier de la Conférence de la Paix, 25 Aug. 1907, 3; Filho, A Vida de Rui Barbosa, 340.

137 ‘Les Sept Sages de la Conférence’, Courier de la Conférence de la Paix, 7 Sept. 1907, 1.

138 Schulz, ‘Accidental Activists’, 619–20.

139 Ibid., Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States, 162.

140 Burns, The Unwritten Alliance; Smith, Unequal Giants.

141 Proceedings, Mtg., FC: Committee B, 17 Aug. 1907, p. 613, Scott, Proceedings, vol. 2.

142 Proceedings, FC: Second Subcommission, 4 July 1907, p. 1086, Scott, Proceedings, vol. 2.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Lars Janssen

At the moment of publication, Lars Janssen is a PhD-candidate at Utrecht University. His research focuses on diplomatic history, and specifically the roles of, and the interactions with, Latin American actors in the development of the international order.

Geoeconomic Fragmentation and the Future of Multilateralism - Shekhar Aiyar et alii (IMF Staff Discussion Notes)

Geoeconomic Fragmentation and the Future of Multilateralism 

Prepared by Shekhar Aiyar, Jiaqian Chen, Christian Ebeke, Roberto Garcia-Saltos, Tryggvi Gudmundsson, Anna Ilyina, Alvar Kangur, Tansaya Kunaratskul, Sergio Rodriguez, Michele Ruta, Tatjana Schulze, Gabriel Soderberg, and Juan Pedro Trevinio

IMF Staff Discussion Notes, January 2023

https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/SDN/2023/English/SDNEA2023001.ashx

Summary:

After several decades of increasing global economic integration, the world is facing the risk of policy-driven geoeconomic fragmentation (GEF). This note explores the ramifications. It identifies multiple channels through which the benefits of globalization were earlier transmitted, and along which, conversely, the costs of GEF are likely to fall, including trade, migration, capital flows, technology diffusion and the provision of global public goods. It explores the consequences of GEF for the international monetary system and the global financial safety net. Finally, it suggests a pragmatic path forward for preserving the benefits of global integration and multilateralism.

Do meu lado, concordo com a premissas da fragmentação, mas não creio que intelectuais, ou burocratas, tenham condições de reverter as tendências negativas do presente, processo que depende de estadistas dotados de enorme capacidade de persuasão recíproca, entre os líderes dos três impérios e meio, para encaminhar a política mundial para uma fase menos conflitiva.

Por três impérios e meio entendo serem EUA, China, Rússia (apenas no plano militar) e a UE, todo o resto sendo caudatário de quaisquer entendimentos possíveis entre esses grandes. (PRA)

Executive Summary 

After decades of increasing global economic integration, the world is facing the risk of fragmentation. A shallow and uneven recovery from the global financial crisis (GFC) was followed by Brexit, U.S.–-China trade tensions, and a growing number of military conflicts. The post-GFC era has seen a leveling-off of global flows of goods and capital, and a surge in trade restrictions. The COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have further tested international relations and increased skepticism about the benefits of globalization. This Staff Discussion Note explores the potential economic ramifications of a policy-driven reversal of global economic integration, a multidimensional process that the authors refer to as geoeconomic fragmentation (GEF). 

The benefits of globalization propagate through multiple channels; the adverse consequences of GEF would be felt in many areas as well. For several decades, trade deepening has helped catalyze catch-up in per capita incomes across countries and a large reduction in global poverty, while in advanced economies, low-income consumers have benefited disproportionately through lower prices. Conversely, the unraveling of trade links would most adversely impact low-income countries and less well-off consumers in advanced economies. Restrictions on cross-border migration would deprive host economies of valuable skills while reducing remittances in migrant-sending economies. Reduced capital flows would hinder financial deepening in destination countries, especially through foreign direct investment which can be an important source of technological diffusion. And a decline in international cooperation would put at risk the provision of vital global public goods. 

Estimates of the costs of GEF from economic modeling vary widely. Available studies suggest that the deeper the fragmentation, the deeper the costs; that technological decoupling significantly amplifies losses from trade restrictions; that adjustment costs are likely to be large; and that emerging market economies and low-income countries are likely to be most at risk due to the loss of knowledge spillovers. Depending on modeling assumptions, the cost to global output from trade fragmentation could range from 0.2 percent (in a limited fragmentation / low-cost adjustment scenario) to up to 7 percent of GDP (in a severe fragmentation / high-cost adjustment scenario); with the addition of technological decoupling, the loss in output could reach 8 to 12 percent in some countries. More work is needed to assess and aggregate the costs through multiple channels. 

GEF could strain the international monetary system and the global financial safety net (GFSN). Financial globalization could give way to “financial regionalization” and a fragmented global payment system. With less international risk-sharing, GEF could lead to higher macroeconomic volatility, more severe crises, and greater pressures on national buffers. Facing fragmentation risks, countries may look to diversify away from traditional reserve assets —a process that could be accelerated by digitalization— potentially leading to higher financial volatility, at least during transition. By hampering international cooperation, GEF could also weaken the capacity of the GFSN to support crisis countries and complicate the resolution of future sovereign debt crises. 

To avert runaway fragmentation, the rules-based multilateral system must adapt to the changing world. This includes the international trade and monetary systems. Given current geopolitical realities, progress through multilateral consensus may not always be possible. Trust may have to be rebuilt gradually through differential engagements depending on the countries’ preferences and willingness to work together. Where preferences are broadly aligned, multilateral cooperation remains the best approach to address global challenges. In areas like climate change and pandemics such cooperation is essential. When multilateral efforts stall, open and nondiscriminatory plurilateral initiatives (fewer countries wanting to do more) could be a practical way forward. When countries opt for unilateral actions, credible “guardrails” may be needed to mitigate global spillovers and protect the vulnerable (such as “safe corridors” for food and medicine). Addressing these challenges requires a joint effort of all international organizations, including the IMF. To be effective in a more shock-prone world, the IMF should remain representative of its global membership and at the core of the reinforced GFSN.