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Mostrando postagens com marcador Center for Defense Studies. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador Center for Defense Studies. Mostrar todas as postagens

sábado, 22 de julho de 2023

Segurança alimentar, Direito Internacional, Direito do Mar e suas violações pela Russia de Putin - CDS

 O presidente Lula, sempre tão preocupado com a fome no mundo, em especial a segurança alimentar dos povos africanos, poderia pedir a seus assessores diplomáticos uma informação sobre as ações criminosas de Putin no Mar Negro e suas consequências sobre o mercado de alimentos no mundo inteiro. Aqui estão alguns dados:

Russia's Actions: Potential Impacts on Global Food Security, Ukraine, and Western Relations.

Center for Defense Studies, July 20, 2023

Russia is poised to starve millions of people in the developing world as it pursues the destruction of Ukraine and undermine the West. Russia pulled out from the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI), threatened to target any cargo ships bonded to or from the Ukrainian ports, mined the sea routes, and stepped up targeting grain and other Ukraine's port and commodity-related infrastructure.

If Russia had succeeded in invading Ukraine, it would have the potential to emerge as a significant agricultural superpower, thereby gaining additional leverage to pursue its geopolitical goals. With 17% of world wheat exports in 2021 (33 million tons), Russia ranked first, surpassing the E.U. (16% or 31 million tons). Along with Ukraine (ranked 5th with 10% of exports or 19 million tons), it could have amassed a 27% share of global wheat exports — equivalent to the combined export share of the E.U. and the U.S. On top of that, before the all-out Russian invasion, Ukraine ranked first in exports of sunflower oil and millet; third in corn, barley and rapeseed; fifth in walnut and honey; and sixth in the export of soy.

Unable to achieve its initial neo-colonial objectives, Russia resorted to dismantling the Ukrainian economy and infrastructure. This strategy aimed to weaken the Ukraine’s ability to resist the invasion immediately and hinder its capacity to recover, rebuild, and allocate resources for defense and security in the long run.

Agriculture accounted for 10% of Ukraine's GDP in 2021 and was severely affected by Russia's illegal occupation and combat in Ukraine's Eastern and Southern oblasts, which are crucial agricultural regions. Russian forces intentionally targeted agricultural infrastructure, looting equipment and machinery, and "exporting" stolen grain and other products to foreign markets. 

Ukraine is now among the most heavily mined countries globally, with up to a third of its territory contaminated by mines and unexploded ordnance. The estimated time required for demining the territory, including crop fields, varies from thirty to sixty years. Russia's destruction of the Kakhovka dam also caused the irrigation system's collapse on which key regions depended (Kherson - 94%, Zaporizhzhia - 74%, and Dnipropetrovsk - 30%). 

After another instance of withdrawing from the grain deal, Russia has escalated its attacks on Ukrainian ports and agriculture-related infrastructure for several consecutive days. These actions constitute war crimes and will have lasting damaging implications for Ukraine's economy and worsen global food security for years to come.

The Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) comprises two distinct agreements: one between Turkey, Ukraine, and the U.N. for exporting food from Ukraine and Turkey, and another between Russia, Turkey, and the U.N. for exporting food and fertilizers.

Russia has consistently disregarded the agreements it entered from the start of it. Just barely 12 hours after signing a deal on July 22, 2022, Moscow initiated a missile barrage against Odesa, targeting Ukraine's main port and infrastructure. It had frequently threatened to withdraw from the deal or decline its extension routinely. Moreover, it deliberately misused the monitoring mechanism to create shipment hurdles and disrupt their flow.

In October 2022, the Kremlin declared the suspension of its participation in the deal. However, it had to eventually rejoin the agreement due to the continued determination of Ukraine, Turkey, and the U.N. to proceed with the outflow of food under the terms of the deal.

The BSGI allowed Ukraine to export some 30 million tons of its food to foreign markets through the Black Sea, while enhancing alternative transportation routes. The railway is capable of exporting more than a million tons monthly, road transport could handle more than 600 thousand tons, and the Danube River ports might handle over two million tons, potentially reaching up to three million tons. However, alternative export routes can't substitute the sea trade for many reasons, including increased costs, logistical difficulties, the necessity for big-ticket and long-time infrastructure investments, etc. 

While its sea trade remains unimpeded, Russia has managed to claim control over the North-West part of the Black Sea, even though it did not succeed in occupying it, and faced no repercussions for doing so under the Law of the Sea. Instead of making Russia obey the Law of the Sea, ensuring freedom of navigation, the international community talks about prolonging the BSGI.

The U.N. State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2023 Report highlights that one in ten people worldwide faces hunger, and a staggering 3.1 billion individuals cannot afford a nutritious diet. Due to Russia's aggression against Ukraine, an alarming 23 million people have been pushed into hunger. The Russian authorities have been utilizing these vulnerable populations as leverage against the West. The Kremlin has been widely disseminating narratives in the Global South, attributing the surge in food prices and food scarcity to the Western sanctions imposed on Russia.

In June, a delegation of African leaders led by South African President Cyril Ramaphosa visited Kyiv and Moscow, advocating for their peace initiative, which involved facilitating food exports. Prior to that, in May, Senegalese President Macky Sall, acting as the African Union chief, visited Moscow and Paris (bypassing Kyiv), urging the West to lift sanctions against Russia. It's worth noting that there are currently no sanctions on Russian food and fertilizer exports, and these exports have been particularly lucrative, bringing Russia a 70% increase in revenue due to the surge in prices. Furthermore, U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres recently emphasized that "Russian grain trade has reached high export volumes." 

Russia has strategically utilized the BSGI to undermine the Western sanctions directly or, in the event of failure, to shift the blame for the food crisis onto the West. The Kremlin's objective is to create a looming food crisis that could trigger waves of refugees, destabilizing social and political situations in European countries. The Russian hope is that this instability would pave the way for pro-Russian political forces to displace the current ones, consequently weakening support for Ukraine and disrupting Trans-Atlantic unity concerning Russia.

Ukraine has been proactively seeking a solution to restore its freedom of navigation and ensure a stable food supply to countries in need. Kyiv has urged its partners to create a naval demining coalition, either as a standalone initiative or as a first step towards enabling protected cargo convoys under the escort of a joint naval force. This coalition may involve assets from littoral states and, hopefully, from nations beyond the Black Sea region. In either scenario, the pivotal role of Turkey is crucial, as it possesses the largest Navy in the Black Sea.

Since the beginning of the all-out Russian invasion of Ukraine, Turkey has invoked the Montreux Convention of 1936 provisions, which restricts Russia and non-Black Sea nations from deploying naval assets to the Black Sea. Ankara is hesitant to proceed with shipments via cargo vessels under its flag, as it fears potential attacks as Turkey is a significant military power and a NATO member. 

The unique dynamics in the relationship between Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan could act as a buffer against further escalation. In 2015, Turkey downed a Russian jet that had violated its airspace, leading to a tense moment in bilateral relations. However, it did not escalate into a full-blown military response from Moscow.

An alternative approach that appears more feasible is chartering sea lines of communications from Ukrainian ports toward the Straits within the territorial waters of the littoral states (Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey). However, this approach would require these nations to confront the risks of a direct attack, regardless of how insignificant it may be, and find solutions to the mine issue in the region.

In addition, legal actions under international law and Ukraine's domestic laws are crucial to hold Russia accountable for its actions. Ukraine's current military capabilities are insufficient to deter the Kremlin from transforming the Northern part of the Black Sea into a "Russian lake." The deployment of anti-ship missiles and modern Western fighter jets could play a significant role in restraining Moscow's actions in the region. 

As Russia continues to cause increasing damage to Ukraine, it has effectively deterred the West from taking more assertive actions against its exports. Notably, the Russian ports on the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea have remained sanctions-free. In fact, Russia has even escalated its exports of oil and oil products from the Black Sea ports, including instances that breach the prohibition of direct shipments to Europe.  

Before the E.U.'s 11th package of restrictive measures was announced, crude oil exports from Russia witnessed a significant surge, increasing by 14.55% in June alone. Among the 42 tankers transporting Russian oil from the Black Sea last month, 15 belonged to companies from E.U. countries, with 14 belonging to Greek shipowners and one to a Latvian company. Russia is gradually shifting its grain exports to Baltic Sea ports in response to capacity challenges.

To compel the Kremlin to reconsider its actions, it is imperative to enforce existing sanctions and target Russian ports in the Black Sea, the Sea of Azov, and the Baltic Sea. Additionally, Ukraine and its allies must intensify efforts to engage with developing countries to counter Russia's propaganda.

domingo, 25 de junho de 2023

A quase guerra civil russa, na visão dos ucranianos do Center for Defense Studies

 Russia, relevant news

Centre for Defence Strategies (CDS), June 24. 2023,

The alleged military coup by the PMC "Wagner" under the leadership of Yevgeny Prigozhin lasted for 24 hours before collapsing and entering negotiations with the Kremlin, mediated by the unrecognized president of Belarus, Lukashenko. According to the Kremlin's version, the conditions for ending the coup included dropping the criminal case against Prigozhin, his departure to Belarus, and assurances from Putin that he would not be pursued. Additionally, the Russian authorities would not hold accountable the "Wagner" PMC combatants involved in the rebellion, while those who did not participate could sign contracts with the Ministry of Defense.

“Today, the world saw that the bosses of Russia do not control anything. Nothing at all. Complete chaos. Complete absence of any predictability,” President Volodymyr Zelensky twitted. 

Though it seems the climax is over and Vladimir Putin has managed to remain on his throne, the failed coup d’état will have far-reaching consequences.

If we assume that today's attempted coup was not staged, we can draw the following conclusions:

-       Firstly, Vladimir Putin personally lost control over the situation and allegedly escaped Moscow. He has chosen a ride, not an ammo [compared to Zelensky]. It’s a sign of weakness that undermines his macho image in a country ruled by criminal-like customs rather than by law and institutions. The massive blow to the cult of personality will play a role in the future.

-       Secondly, the “peacemaking” role of Alexander Lukashenko, if true, equated two tyrants and a warlord. It is well noted at home and abroad. The authoritarian leaders appreciate a firm grip over power and disrespect those who aren’t strong enough.

-       Thirdly, the involvement of a so-called private military company like Wagner highlights the failure of the state. While these entities were created to carry out covert operations without direct connections to the Kremlin (seizure of Crimea, the war in Donbas since 2014, Syria, Africa and other places), their participation in the coup reveals the extent of their political influence. Wagner’s chieftain and several militaries confessed that they played in a show in Ukraine from the beginning. Such revolutions threw out theories about a civil war in Ukraine. Prigozhin also admitted that there was no massive shelling of the Russia-occupied cities by the UAF, and Ukraine wasn’t about to “invade” those territories, an important justification for war made by Putin.

-       Fourthly, over-militarized Russia turned out to be defenseless. Military command failed to enforce actions from subordinates, some of whom joined the failed junta. As previous attacks of the Russian freedom fighters on Belgorod showed, Moscow could hardly gather sizable force and cope with the intrusion.

-       Fifth, the locals in the cities and towns seized by Wagner didn’t organize resistance. Many of them showed sympathy to Wagner mercenaries because they were dissatisfied with Moscow and the way Putin and his closest friends and subjects waged war. 

The failed advance to Moscow, called the “March for Justice”, will leave many in Wagner and those who joined them disappointed. Feelings of injustice and betrayal are multiplied and will play a crucial role in the future. It may show that violence is crucial to bringing “justice,” while agreements serve only those better off and in power. “Either Putin or Prigozhin will be dead before year end. There is no room in Russia for both of them,” Timothy Ash twitted.

Finally, the West got a hint that there should be contingency planning in case of civil war and the dissolution of Russia. Politically correct phraseology about the absence of regime change intentions didn’t impress Putin and did not prevent such events. A failed state and society under such pressure are increasingly heading toward a collapse. The failed coup d’état in 1991 galvanized the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Russia will remain an unstable and unpredictable entity balancing on the edge of collapse for a long time. Ukraine’s role as a guardian of the rest has increased. So, it needs more support to fight for its sovereignty and territorial integrity, therefore mitigating the threats to others and bringing an unstable regime to inevitable collapse.


domingo, 11 de junho de 2023

A Igreja Ortodoxa Russa declara que o pacifismo é uma heresia e apoia o morticínio entre cristãos - Center for Defense Studies

 International and relevant Russia’s news 

CDS, June 11, 2023

In a politically motivated case, the Russian Orthodox Church's Court declared pacifism a heresy, alien to the Church. The reason for such a verdict was an anti-war statement made by Priest Ioann Burdin, "we Christians do not dare to stand aside when a brother kills a brother; a Christian kills a Christian. We cannot bashfully close our eyes and call black on white, evil on good, say that Abel was probably wrong when he provoked his older brother." 

"His pacifism is imaginary, one-sidedly oriented, his anti-Russian political position is clearly visible behind him, perceived in our country as unacceptable, and, it is important to emphasize, radically at odds with the position of the Russian Orthodox Church," the verdict reads. 

Meanwhile, Ukraine's Orthodox Church held a liturgy for the first time in more than three centuries, praying for the repose of Hetman (military ruler) Ivan Mazepa in the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra. Hetman Ivan Mazepa was a close ally of Moscow's Tsar Peter I but turned to Swedish King Charles XII when the Muscovite refused to honor an agreement and help to defend Ukraine. "Ukraine's Hetman, calm and bold" inspired Lord Byron to write a poem in his name (Mazeppa). By order of Tsar Peter I, the Moscow Church imposed an anathema to the Hetman Ivan Mazepa. In September 2018, the Ecumenical Patriarch and the Synod of the Patriarchate of Constantinople stated that they never recognized the validity of the anathema of Ivan Mazepa because it was imposed purely for political reasons. 

Both cases prove that the Russian Orthodox Church has been a political tool of Russian rulers throughout the centuries.

"In Russia's wars, the very senselessness seems to be the sense," Peter Pomerantsev argued about the Russian death cult in the Guardian. "In a culture such as Russia's, where avoiding facing up to the dark past with all its complex webs of guilt and responsibility is commonplace, such oblivion can be especially seductive." 

"Putin's war has become the war of all Russians. His legacy will remain part of their legacy, and it will continue to weigh heavily on their domestic affairs and the country's relationship with the rest of the world," wrote Eugene Rumer of the Carnegie Endowment for Foreign Affairs. 

Source: Center For Defense Studies (Ukraine)

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