A China finalmente liberaliza sua política cambial e os EUA a acusam de manipulação - Jeffrey Schott

Quando a China finalmente adota a flutuação cambial, depois de décadas de manipulação para manter a paridade numa situação de baixa, os EUA, sob Trump (sempre equivocado) a acusam de manipulação cambial, o que não mais se justifica...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

The US-China currency deal will provoke new trade tensions

Jeffrey J. Schott (PIIE)

Peterson Institute of International Economy, February 7, 2020 5:00 AM

https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/us-china-currency-deal-will-provoke-new-trade-tensions?utm_source=update-newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=piie-insider

President Donald Trump has long claimed that China gained competitive advantage in trade by manipulating its exchange rate. That was true 15 years ago but not in recent years. No matter, Trump administration officials continue to raise the specter of past goblins to rally support for their efforts to erect new import restrictions against Chinese goods and services. And that remains the case despite the recently announced US-China “phase one” trade deal and its new obligations on currency practices.

Currency manipulation is a widely cited but imperfectly understood concept. In brief, it occurs when a country intervenes in foreign exchange markets to artificially suppress the value of its currency in order to boost exports and curb imports. China was widely accused of buying dollars and selling its own currency in the first decade and more of this century, contributing to its export boom.

Using Trade Measures to Enforce Currency Obligations

Under the phase one deal, China has accepted substantial and enforceable obligations on its exchange rate practices. For the first time, the entire currency chapter will be subject to the pact’s dispute settlement procedures, thus allowing the United States to challenge Chinese currency manipulation and impose trade measures to counter the impact on bilateral trade.[1]

Why did China agree to bilateral enforcement provisions? In brief, the pact’s obligations simply codify recent practices of the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) that comply with its G-20 and International Monetary Fund (IMF) commitments to avoid competitive devaluation and currency manipulation. And, in return, the US Treasury lifted its controversial designation of China as a currency manipulator, issued in August 2019.[2]

On that calculus, China didn’t seem to give up much to satisfy US demands. But it underestimated how much the United States would move the goalposts regarding what constitutes manipulation and thus open the door for new protectionist actions.

To date, the US Treasury has been the arbiter of currency disputes. Under separate statutes enacted in 1988 and 2015, Treasury is required to report twice a year on whether major trading partners, including China, have manipulated their currencies; each statute contains different criteria for assessing currency manipulation. The 2015 criteria include whether the trading partner has racked up a big bilateral trade surplus and global current account surplus and has persistently intervened in foreign exchange markets to keep its currency undervalued. The laws require the United States to take specific “remedial” actions against the manipulating country, but these do not include imposing tariffs. Until last August, no US administration had labeled China a currency manipulator since 1994.

But Treasury’s designation of China as a currency manipulator in August 2019 showed that the statutes are open to differing interpretations as to what constitutes currency manipulation. Moreover, Congress can always change the requirements, as it has tried to do over the past 15 years when frustrated by Treasury’s unwillingness to designate China, to tip the scales of Treasury’s assessment of foreign currency practices so that it produces more positive findings of currency manipulation or to authorize the Commerce Department to counter currency undervaluation under US unfair trade laws (as Senators Charles Schumer and Lindsey Graham sought to do 14 years ago).

Currency enforcement actions under the US-China phase one pact would be initiated by the US Treasury secretary (or PBOC governor) and then referred to the Bilateral Evaluation and Dispute Resolution Arrangement co-chaired by the United States trade representative (USTR) and a Chinese vice premier. If the two sides don’t agree after extensive consultations on what needs to be done, the United States would be authorized to unilaterally retaliate “by suspending an obligation…or by adopting a remedial measure in a proportionate way” (Article 7.4:4b).[3] Note that a “proportionate” US response to currency manipulation could involve across-the-board tariffs on all US imports from China!

In other words, the US-China pact enables USTR to act against what it deems to be Chinese currency manipulation if US complaints about Chinese currency practices are not resolved to its satisfaction during bilateral consultations. The new enforcement mechanism contains elaborate consultative requirements and explicit retaliation rights, but it would essentially lead to the same stand-off and subsequent unilateral actions that have occurred throughout the two-year trade war. China can either accept the US actions or withdraw from the pact, presumably reigniting the trade war.

Currency Practices and Unfair US Trade Laws

Allowing the use of trade measures to enforce exchange rate policy obligations greatly expands the prospective remedies that US officials may pursue under current US law when confronting currency manipulation.[4] It also would likely have knock-on effects on other US laws that could be deployed to counter foreign currency practices.

With USTR as judge and jury of currency disputes with China, protectionist lobbies will be emboldened to push Congress to revise US trade law so that US officials can impose trade measures to manage exchange rates. And there is now a new channel for currency protectionism under trade laws administered by the Commerce Department.

It is probably not a coincidence that the Commerce Department issued final regulations on February 3, 2020, that define currency undervaluation as a countervailable subsidy liable to penalty duties under US unfair trade laws. US imports from China benefiting from “unfair currency subsidies” could potentially face countervailing duties for “causing harm to [US] industries.” Bluntly put, Commerce has manipulated the definition of currency manipulation for protectionist purposes. Though Commerce officials decry their innocence, this regulatory change conflicts with current Treasury practice and almost assuredly violates World Trade Organization (WTO) subsidy obligations, which I helped write 40 years ago. Look for Congress to resolve the Treasury-Commerce conflict through new, bipartisan legislation that (1) codifies Commerce practice under the new regulations in line with past efforts pursued by Senators Schumer and Graham and (2) rejects concerns that changes in US law would violate WTO obligations and prompt retaliation against US exporters.

Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, inadvertently or not, has accepted a deal that will likely further politicize exchange rate policymaking and spark new trade tensions. US currency policy has become a political football with USTR and Commerce, not the Treasury secretary, at quarterback.

Notes

1. The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) also includes currency provisions in its core text.  However, enforcement actions in the USMCA are limited to violations of transparency and reporting provisions under USMCA Article 33.5. 

2. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin lifted that financial indictment on January 13, 2020, but kept China on a special currency watch list.

3. In addition, either country could ask the IMF to monitor policies or initiate consultations with the “Party Complained Against” (Article 5.4:2).

4. Under the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, remedial actions must include one or more of the following measures: block Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) financing or federal procurement of goods and services (consistent with WTO obligations); consider not entering into bilateral/regional trade pacts; and call for more IMF surveillance.

US-China Trade Agreement: resumo por Paulo Roberto de Almeida

O acordo acaba de ser assinado, e me pareceu uma rendição quase completa da China em face das imposições autoritárias dos EUA, que conseguiram impor obrigações à China que rompem com o espírito multilateralista do sistema de comércio regido pela OMC. 
Trata-se de um acordo bilateral que recua 90 anos na história do comércio internacional, regulando fluxos de comércio no espírito do mercantilismo do século XVIII.
Acho que a China não tinha muito o que fazer pois as perdas poderiam provocar problemas internos nas suas cadeias produtivas.
Tenho certeza de que o Brasil será prejudicado, obviamente bem mais na área agrícola do que na área industrial. 
Na luta entre elefantes, quem sofre é a grama, ou as formigas...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Brasília, 15 de janeiro de 2020

Acordo Econômico e Comercial EUA-China; alguns dispositivos:

Seleção e recortes por Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Sobre propriedade intelectual:

"Within 30 working days after the date of entry into force of this Agreement, China will promulgate an Action Plan to strengthen intellectual property protection aimed at promoting its high-quality growth. This Action Plan shall include, but not be limited to, measures that China will take to implement its obligations under this Chapter and the date by which each measure will go into effect."

Productos lácteos:

"[China deve] within 10 days of the date of entry into force of this Agreement, recognize the U.S. dairy-safety system as providing at least the same level of protection as China’s dairy-safety system; (...) allow U.S. dairy imports into China from those facilities; (...) allow the importation of U.S. dairy permeate powder;"

Carne de Aves:

"...China shall permit their importation consistently with existing bilaterally-agreed import protocols;"

Carne bovina:

"China recognizes the U.S. beef and beef products traceability system. (...) Within one month of the date of entry into force of this Agreement, China shall adopt maximum residue limits (MRLs) for zeranol, trenbolone acetate, and melangesterol acetate for imported beef. "

Carne processada:

"Upon entry into force of this Agreement, China shall recognize FSIS oversight of U.S. meat, poultry meat, and processed meat and poultry meat facilities for purposes of allowing imports of U.S. meat, poultry meat, and processed meat and poultry meat. (...) Each time the United States provides China with an updated and complete list of FSIS- approved facilities, China shall, within 20 working days of receipt, publish the list on the GACC website and allow the importation into China of products from all facilities on the list."

Produtos aquáticos:

"... each time the United States provides China with an updated and complete list of aquatic products facilities under the jurisdiction of the FDA, within 20 working days of receipt of the list, register the facilities, publish the list of the facilities on the GACC website, and allow U.S. aquatic product imports into China from those facilities."

Arroz:

"Each time the United States provides China with a list of rice facilities approved by the APHIS..., within 20 working days of receipt of the list, China shall register the facilities, publish the list of facilities, and allow the importation of U.S. rice from each of the APHIS- approved rice facilities."

Pet food:

"...upon entry into force of this Agreement, allow the importation of U.S. pet foods containing poultry products;"

Medidas de apoio doméstico:

"China shall respect its WTO obligations to publish in an official journal its laws, regulations, and other measures pertaining to its domestic support programs and policies."

Serviços financeiros:

"China shall accept any applications from a U.S. electronic payment services supplier, including an application of a supplier seeking to operate as a wholly foreign-owned entity, to begin preparatory work to become a bank card clearing institution within five working days of submission, and may make a one-time request within those five working days for any corrections or supplementary information."

"No later than one month after a U.S. service supplier notifies China that it has completed its preparatory work, China shall accept the license application of such U.S. supplier, including any license application of Mastercard, Visa, or American Express, and shall make a determination with respect to the application, including an explanation of any adverse determination."

"No later than April 1, 2020, China shall remove the foreign equity cap in the life, pension, and health insurance sectors and allow wholly U.S.-owned insurance companies to participate in these sectors."

Políticas macroeconômicas e cambiais:

"Each Party confirms that it is bound under the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Articles of Agreement to avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary system in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage. (...) achieve and maintain a market-determined exchange rate regime;"

Expansão econômica e oportunidades de comércio:

[PRA: Na verdade, comércio administrado]

"During the two-year period from January 1, 2020 through December 31, 2021, China shall ensure that purchases and imports into China from the United States of the manufactured goods, agricultural goods, energy products, and services identified in Annex 6.1 exceed the corresponding 2017 baseline amount by no less than $200 billion. ...

(a) For the category of manufactured goods identified in Annex 6.1, no less than $32.9 billion above the corresponding 2017 baseline amount is purchased and imported into China from the United States in calendar year 2020, and no less than $44.8 billion above the corresponding 2017 baseline amount is purchased and imported into China from the United States in calendar year 2021;

(b) For the category of agricultural goods identified in Annex 6.1, no less than $12.5 billion above the corresponding 2017 baseline amount is purchased and imported into China from the United States in calendar year 2020, and no less than $19.5 billion above the corresponding 2017 baseline amount is purchased and imported into China from the United States in calendar year 2021;

(c) For the category of energy products identified in Annex 6.1, no less than $18.5 billion above the corresponding 2017 baseline amount is purchased and imported into China from the United States in calendar year 2020, and no less than $33.9 billion above the corresponding 2017 baseline amount is purchased and imported into China from the United States in calendar year 2021; and

(d) For the category of services identified in Annex 6.1, no less than $12.8 billion above the corresponding 2017 baseline amount is purchased and imported into China from the United States in calendar year 2020, and no less than $25.1 billion above the corresponding 2017 baseline amount is purchased and imported into China from the United States in calendar year 2021." (...)

"The Parties project that the trajectory of increases in the amounts of manufactured goods, agricultural goods, energy products, and services purchased and imported into China from the United States will continue in calendar years 2022 through 2025. The United States shall ensure to take appropriate steps to facilitate the availability of U.S. goods and services to be purchased and imported into China."

Solução de Controvérsias:

"The Parties shall create the Trade Framework Group to discuss the implementation of this Agreement, which shall be led by the United States Trade Representative and a designated Vice Premier of the People’s Republic of China. The Trade Framework Group shall discuss (a) the overall situation regarding implementation of this Agreement, (b) major problems with respect to implementation, and (c) arrangements for future work between the Parties. The Parties shall resume macroeconomic meetings to discuss overall economic issues, which shall be led by the United States Secretary of the Treasury and the designated Vice Premier of the People’s Republic of China. Both Parties shall make every effort to ensure that meetings of the Trade Framework Group and the macroeconomic meetings are efficient and oriented toward solving problems."

Entrada em vigor do acordo:

"This Agreement shall enter into force within 30 days of signature by both Parties or as of the date on which the Parties have notified each other in writing of the completion of their respective applicable domestic procedures, whichever is sooner."

Vale a leitura completa da prepotência americana.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Fim da guerra comercial entre China e EUA? Efeitos possiveis sobre o Brasil - Marcos Jank

Se persistir a política anti-China do chanceler, ou mesmo se, por milagre, nossa política externa for totalmente pró-China, ainda assim poderemos ter consequências nefastas de um acordo de conveniência entre a China e o governo Trump. 
Nós sofreremos as consequências, como alerta Marcos Jank...
Transcrevo o trecho final: 
"Enfim, se esse acordo se concretizar, poderemos estar entrando numa era de “comércio administrado” caso a caso, sob a égide de interesses geopolíticos, que pode reduzir o nosso acesso à China, ao Brics e a outros mercados emergentes. Aí sim, estaríamos entregando a nossa alma."
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Impacto do Acordo EUA-China no agro brasileiro

Jornal “Folha de São Paulo”, Caderno Mercado, 16/03/2019

Marcos S. Jank (*)

André Soares (**)

Brasil pode ser atingido em soja, milho, algodão, etanol e todas as carnes.

O encontro entre Jair Bolsonaro e Donald Trump no dia 19 se dará às vésperas da conclusão de um acordo histórico entre EUA e China que pode ser altamente disruptivo para o agronegócio mundial, afetando principalmente o Brasil.

O acordo pode representar o fim de uma era em que o comércio se expandia baseado essencialmente na competitividade dos países, sem grande esforço.

Ele traz novos elementos para a equação: pressionados por imenso déficit comercial de US$ 420 bilhões, os EUA deram início a uma guerra mercantilista com a China impondo elevadas tarifas sobre US$ 250 bilhões em importações. O gigante asiático retrucou impondo tarifas sobre US$ 110 bilhões dos EUA, o que atingiu em cheio a soja americana. A disputa trouxe US$ 8 bilhões adicionais às nossas exportações de soja para a China, levando os incautos a inclusive “comemorar” a guerra comercial.

Tudo indica que os EUA vão forçar a China a ampliar as suas compras de produtos agropecuários americanos em absurdos US$ 30 bilhões anuais, que, na melhor das hipóteses, se somariam aos US$ 14 bilhões que foram adquiridos em 2018. Previsões mais sombrias dizem que as importações chinesas vindas dos EUA poderiam ultrapassar US$ 50 bilhões anuais, se somadas ao valor de 2017, que foi de US$ 22 bilhões.

Acreditamos que as exportações mundiais de soja voltarão ao seu curso normal pré-2017, com os chineses se beneficiando plenamente da alternância das safras americana (EUA) e sul-americana (Brasil e Argentina), que ocorrem em diferentes momentos do ano. Essa complementariedade garante estabilidade de oferta e menor risco para a China.

Ocorre, porém, que, para chegar aos US$ 30 bilhões adicionais, a China teria de oferecer acesso privilegiado aos EUA em outros produtos.

Dois casos com forte impacto sobre o Brasil são o milho e o algodão. O consumo de milho da China é gigante (280 milhões de toneladas), porém as suas importações têm sido muito reduzidas —apenas 3,5 milhões de toneladas em 2018. Os EUA pressionarão a China a importar muito mais milho, flexibilizando o seu regime restritivo de cotas de importação e facilitando o ingresso de milho transgênico.

Outros produtos americanos que seriam beneficiados pelo acordo são o etanol de milho, o DDG (subproduto da produção de etanol usado em alimentação animal) e as carnes. No caso do etanol, a importação viria da obrigatoriedade de mistura de 10% de etanol na gasolina da China (E10), que foi mandatada no passado, mas jamais cumprida.

Estimamos que, entre produtos e subprodutos de milho, etanol e algodão, a China poderia ampliar suas importações dos EUA em mais de US$ 10 bilhões adicionais por ano.

Nas carnes, se a China retirar as restrições técnicas e sanitárias que foram impostas aos americanos nos últimos anos, certamente seremos prejudicados em todas as proteínas animais —aves, suínos e bovinos—, com destaque para as perdas de mercado em pés e coxas de frango.

A China certamente tem meios para atender à forte pressão dos EUA, ampliando o acesso de soja e de outros produtos agropecuários. Resta saber se isso será feito à luz das regras da OMC, se ela vai “forçar a barra” na flexibilização das barreiras técnicas e sanitárias e se usará a sua estrutura estatal (estoques estratégicos e empresas públicas) para operacionalizar o acordo.

Enfim, se esse acordo se concretizar, poderemos estar entrando numa era de “comércio administrado” caso a caso, sob a égide de interesses geopolíticos, que pode reduzir o nosso acesso à China, ao Brics e a outros mercados emergentes. Aí sim, estaríamos entregando a nossa alma.

(*) Marcos Sawaya Jank é especialista em questões globais do agronegócio. Escreve aos sábados, a cada duas semanas.

(**) André Soares é Senior Fellow do CEBRI (Centro Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais).

US-China Trade War - Forbes (2018)

The Threat of a Trade War with China That Nobody Is Talking About

By Patrick W. Watson

ForbesApr 16, 2018

Trade and tariffs are all over the news because President Trump is going after China.

The president’s tweets and public statements tell us he doesn’t like trade deficits, particularly the one with China. He seems to view it as a win-or-lose proposition.

That’s not exactly right.

For one, a trade deficit between two nations isn’t unusual. Precise balance would be strange. Countries have different needs, so some import more than others.

Also, it’s not like the side with the deficit loses anything.

In this case, China gets our dollars and we get Chinese-made goods. Your house is probably stuffed with little pieces of the U.S.-China trade deficit.

Is that bad? As an economic matter, it’s just reality.

• Americans want Chinese goods more than we want the dollars spent on them.
• Chinese want those dollars more than they want the goods.

It’s not about winning or losing. Everybody gets what they want.

The Real Threat

There’s a catch, though. I said, “The Chinese want those dollars,” but they’d prefer to use their own currency. Eventually they will, too, but for now we still settle our trade in dollars.

Just as our homes hold Chinese goods, Chinese bank accounts hold trillions of greenbacks. That’s the other side of the trade deficit President Trump hates so much. It’s the same money.

What do the Chinese do with those excess dollars?

Well, they invest many of them in U.S. Treasury securities — to the point that China is our government’s largest foreign lender.

Some people see this as ominous, fearing China will dump this paper and cause a crisis. But doing so would probably require Beijing to take a big loss, and that’s not its style.

The bigger danger is that China may simply buy fewer Treasury bonds. This is simple math. Chinese investors can’t buy our T-bonds unless they have excess dollars — and they won’t if the president succeeds in reducing the trade deficit.

See the problem?

• The U.S. government spends way more than it collects in taxes.
• Treasury must finance the difference by selling bonds.
• Someone with dollars must buy those bonds.
• China’s dollar surplus makes it a natural buyer.

If China doesn’t buy our bonds, somebody else will… but probably at higher interest rates. Prices rise when an external force constrains supply. This will raise Washington’s interest costs and further enlarge the debt.

And when Treasury rates rise, other long-term interest rates (like mortgage rates) rise too. That could make home purchases more expensive, reducing other consumer spending and maybe hurting the housing industry.

So attacking this trade deficit problem — which isn’t really a problem — risks making some actual problems even worse. That’s not “winning.”

Burning Bridges

Now, some say all of this is a negotiating tactic… that the president’s unpredictable tough talk leaves opponents off guard and sets up a “win.”

Such tactics worked for Trump in private business. In fact, the president’s business skill is why many folks voted for him. He promised to negotiate great deals and had a track record for doing it.

The problem: Governing isn’t a business.

In a transactional business like real estate, you probably won’t deal with the same counterparty again. Burning bridges behind you can make sense if you have thousands more unburned bridges in front of you.

In politics, both domestic and international, you must negotiate with the same people repeatedly on different topics. If you’re unreasonable on Item A, it also affects Item B.

Trade negotiations are particularly hard because so many groups have a stake in the outcome. Overt threats rarely help. They might even hurt, by sparking opposition that prevents the other leader from offering concessions.

On the Brink of a Global Trade War

Trump is right that China hasn’t always played fair. Many other nations feel the same way. That’s a negotiating tool the U.S. could use to our advantage.

As China’s biggest export market, the U.S. has plenty of leverage. We could have even more leverage by working with China’s other top customers, primarily Western Europe.

But Trump isn’t doing that. He is doing the opposite by openly threatening Canada, the EU, Japan and other developed countries with tariffs as well.

This makes it hard to ask for their help against China — and even gives China an opening to seek EU support against the U.S.

Consequently, the chance of getting significant reforms from China is lower, and the risk of a negative outcome like trade war is higher.

Maybe President Trump sees that as a risk worth taking. But it highlights another key difference between business and government negotiations.

In his real estate deals, the people at risk were Trump himself and the business partners who willingly joined him. As president, he’s generating risk for everyone. No one gets to opt out.

Financial markets see this and don’t like it at all — nor should they. Events could easily spiral out of control, with harsh economic consequences.

China’s response so far is to threaten its own tariffs on U.S. agriculture and other Trump-friendly sectors. They think penalizing the president’s supporters will make him back down.

I’m not so sure, for two reasons:

• First, those same business groups failed to stop the president’s earlier trade actions. Their influence on the White House appears to have waned.
• Second, being punished by China might make the president’s supporters moreloyal, not less. Outside attacks often unify people who might otherwise split.

If so, the trade fight is likely to get worse before it gets better. So get ready for a long siege.

Otaviano Canuto analisa a guerra comercial Trump-China, sim, Trump-China...

Desculpem o título inusitado, mas se trata exatamente disso: Trump vs China, ou Trump vs o resto do mundo.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Trégua entre EUA e China deve ser avaliada por 3 ângulos, diz Otaviano Canuto

Otaviano Canuto

Poder 360, 6/12/2018

Donald Trump preza pelo bilateralismo

Quer deslocar produção para os EUA

China tem rebalanceado a economia

Os presidentes dos EUA, Donald Trump, e da China, Xi Jinping, reuniram-se na Cúpula do G20 Reprodução/Twitter/Casa Branca - 2.dez.2018

Poder 360, 06.dez.2018 (quinta-feira) 

A trégua comercial entre os Estados Unidos e a China, anunciada após o jantar dos presidentes dos dois países em Buenos Aires no sábado, depois da reunião do G20, deve ser avaliada a partir de três diferentes motivações que podem ser atribuídas ao Presidente Trump para iniciar a guerra.

Embora atenção especial tenha sido dada às implicações imediatas positivas da trégua para a conjuntura macroeconômica mundial e seus reflexos sobre mercados financeiros, cabe não perder de vista o que mais está em jogo.

Desde logo, a trégua e o confronto comercial bilateral EUA-China em que se inscreve representam um momento crucial da transição do multilateralismo para o bilateralismo nas relações externas dos EUA a partir da chegada de Presidente Trump ao poder.

O multilateralismo pleno enfrentou grandes dificuldades durante a rodada Doha de negociações comerciais, nas quais processos complexos de negociação necessitavam unanimidade para aprovação e ficavam vulneráveis a travas estabelecidas por alguns poucos países.

O governo Obama iniciou, com suporte de países envolvidos, sua substituição por um plurilateralismo, conforme proposto na Parceria Trans-Pacífico e num possível acordo posterior com países europeus. Presidente Trump enterrou tal iniciativa e vem argumentando haver vantagens para seu país negociar em bases bilaterais.

Nesse contexto pode-se colocar a revisão do NAFTA assinada pelos presidentes dos EUA e México e o primeiro-ministro do Canadá na sexta-feira, também em Buenos Aires, cujo processo de negociação foi marcado justamente por iniciativas bilaterais pelo Presidente Trump.

Da mesma forma, o comunicado oficial da reunião do G20 fez referência a reformar a OMC. Esta já não tem ocupado papel proeminente em negociações e presume-se que a reforma poderá circunscrever inclusive seu papel na resolução de disputas comerciais.

A segunda motivação declarada para os movimentos comerciais pelo governo Trump é deslocar produção do exterior para os EUA em alguns setores, ao mesmo tempo encolhendo o déficit comercial do país com o resto do mundo. Como na elevação de tarifas sobre importações de aço e alumínio –inclusive sobre parceiros do NAFTA–, células solares e outros.

O resultado provável da revisão do NAFTA –USMCA ou T-MEC– será uma transferência parcial da participação mexicana na cadeia de produção automobilística para os EUA –e um pouco para o Canadá– além de abertura do mercado de laticínios deste último.

Na mesma linha, conforme comunicado emitido pelo governo dos Estados Unidos, a suspensão do aumento de tarifas dos EUA sobre US$ 200 bilhões de importações da China de 10% para 25%, previsto para 1º de janeiro de 2019, teve como contrapartida uma promessa chinesa de aumento substancial de compras de produtos agrícolas, energéticos e manufatureiros dos EUA.

Em que medida presidente Trump poderá anunciar tais resultados como evidência de acerto de sua opção por bilateralismo, de seu estilo de combinação de tarifas e acenos de acordos em troca de concessões pelo outro lado? Afinal, sua campanha prometeu o retorno de empregos manufatureiros aos EUA a partir de tal reposicionamento da política comercial do país.

Os resultados imediatos em termos de exportações e importações dos Estados Unidos podem dar a impressão de sucesso. Contudo, a privilegiada posição negociadora do país no âmbito bilateral e a correspondente obtenção de concessões não garantem a consecução daquelas promessas.

A imediata elevação doméstica da produção e do emprego em atividades manufatureiras e outros beneficiários da proteção se dará com elevação de custos e preços locais dos correspondentes bens. Mesmo supondo-se que a perda de competitividade nesses setores seja compensada por outras medidas, inclusive as promessas de compras embutidas em acordos comerciais, há duas razões para questionar aquele sucesso.

Primeiro, a destruição relativa de empregos manufatureiros na história norte-americana recente é mais resultado de mudanças tecnológicas que de importações da China ou de outros países. Adicionalmente, os déficits em conta corrente do país refletem um descompasso entre poupança doméstica e investimentos.

Nesse caso, um sucesso do protecionismo na redução de déficits externos só ocorreria na hipótese de aumento da poupança no país como um todo, por conta de queda de poder de compra dos que dependem de salários como contrapartida da rentabilidade do capital nos setores protegidos. Esse não seria bem o resultado prometido em campanha.

Para além do bilateralismo mercantilista, há um terceiro componente na guerra comercial EUA-China. O re-balanceamento da economia chinesa em curso vem incluindo sua presença crescente em etapas de maior valor agregado em cadeias globais de valor, para o que tem recorrido a utilizar a baixo custo fontes tecnológicas externas.

Para tal tem recorrido a transferências de tecnologia forçadas sobre investidores estrangeiros interessados em seus mercados, não reconhecimento de propriedade intelectual, subsídios a empresas estatais, barreiras não-tarifárias e similares.

Em grande medida, forçar a China a mudar tais práticas havia sido uma motivação chave para os acordos plurilaterais com sua exclusão liderados por Obama, como forma de impor-lhe uma adaptação regulatória como requisito para integração com países signatários.

Na opção bilateral de Trump, não admira que a trégua de 90 dias para o aumento de tarifas concedida em Buenos Aires tenha como condição para sua extensão, segundo o comunicado do governo dos EUA, a obtenção de acordo sobre “mudanças estruturais” na China naquelas áreas.

Excluída como irrealista a hipótese de motivações simplórias tais como “deter o avanço da China”, a guerra comercial poderá arrefecer caso os chineses estejam preparados para oferecer algo significativo a respeito.

Um cálculo custo-benefício chinês favorável a buscar formas alternativas de suporte tecnológico local, permitindo-lhe focar em seus desafios domésticos de re-balanceamento sem o ônus adicional do confronto comercial, pode muito bem ser uma opção racional dos governantes daquele país.

Dos desdobramentos nesse terceiro componente dependerá a longevidade da trégua anunciada após o jantar de Buenos Aires. Pessoalmente, confesso ter ficado com água na boca pensando na combinação de filé argentino, vinho Malbec e ricota de cabra lá servida.

China-EUA: a guerra comercial continua, tanks to Mr. Trump - The Washington Post

Trump has decided to impose tariffs on $200 billion in Chinese goods in dramatic escalation of trade battle

David J. Lynch

The Washington Post, September 15 at 4:44 PM

President Trump has decided to impose tariffs on $200 billion in Chinese goods, two people briefed on the decision said, one of the most severe economic restrictions ever imposed by a U.S. president.

An announcement is expected to come within days, the people said, speaking on the condition of anonymity because they weren’t authorized to discuss internal plans.

The new tariffs would apply to more than 1,000 products, including refrigerators, air conditioners, furniture, televisions and toys. These penalties could drive up the cost of a range of products ahead of the holiday shopping season, though it’s unclear how much.

Apple said recently its Apple Watch, AirPods, MacMini and a variety of chargers and adapters would be caught in the tariff war. “Our concern with these tariffs is that the U.S. will be hardest hit, and that will result in lower U.S. growth and competitiveness and higher prices for U.S. consumers,” the company said in a letter to the U. S. Trade representative. “The burden of the proposed tariffs will fall much more heavily on the United States than on China.”

Trump has ordered aides to set the tariffs at 10 percent, likely leading to higher prices for American consumers. These tariffs are paid by U.S. companies that import the products, though they often pass the costs along to U.S. consumers in the form of higher prices.

The U.S. imports roughly $500 billion in Chinese goods each year, and — combined with existing tariffs — these new penalties would cover half of all goods sent to the U.S. from China each year.

The 10 percent tariff is scaled back from Trump’s initial plan to impose 25 percent penalties on all of these imports. But the impact will still likely be felt by millions of American consumers.

A White House spokesman didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment on Saturday afternoon.

On Friday, White House spokeswoman Lindsay Walters said: “The President has been clear that he and his administration will continue to take action to address China’s unfair trade practices. We encourage China to address the long standing concerns raised by the United States. ”

Trump’s top advisers have been united behind his effort to push China to change its economic practices, but they have been split on his tactics. Some have advocated a more cautious, diplomatic approach.

But Trump has signaled that he believes only the threat of real economic pain will push Beijing into major changes. He has recently boasted that he believes China’s economy is suffering because of his hard-charging style.

Trump has accused China of a number of unfair trade practices. He wants China to buy more American products, open up China to more U.S. investment, and stop stealing U.S. intellectual property, among other things.

The tariffs come as a number of top White House advisers have been trying to de-escalate tensions between Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin was planning to restart talks with China soon.

Chinese leaders have vowed to retaliate to any escalation of the trade battle with punitive steps of their own, and Trump’s move could further push Beijing to retaliate.

The decision was first reported by the Wall Street Journal.

Trump has tried to use tariffs to penalize a number of countries this year, including Mexico, Japan, Canada, and members of the European Union, hoping that the threat of driving up costs on their products will make them more open to his demands. The tactic has had mixed success.

Trump first imposed tariffs on roughly $50 billion in Chinese products this summer. The list of products mostly included industrial equipment to avoid directly impacting consumers.

China responded by imposing tariffs on U.S. products like beef and soybeans, a response that spooked the U.S. agriculture industry and angered Trump and other White House officials. Trump responded this summer by ordering his advisers to come up with a list of $200 billion in other Chinese products to penalize, a package of products that includes many consumer products.

And two weeks ago he said he is preparing a third package of penalties on what he said would be $267 billion in additional items, a list that likely encompasses all remaining goods produced in China.

“For the near term, this combination of tactics seems to signal that unless and until China comes to the table with significant actions on the issues the U.S. is hammering, the U.S. will keep tariff pressure going,” said Claire Reade, a former U.S. trade negotiator. “Talks without action won’t do the trick. The open question, of course, is how much action is enough and can China find a way to move that will be seen as being in its own interest, not kowtowing to the U.S.

The U.S. ran a $233.5 billion deficit in goods trade with China during the first seven months of the year, an 8 percent increase compared with the same period in 2017.

Corporate executives increasingly believe the trade dispute can only be resolved by direct talks between Trump and Xi. The two leaders may see each other at the United Nations General Assembly in New York later this month and are scheduled to meet on the sidelines of the G-20 summit in Buenos Aires in November.